



DRAKE
AND
THE TUDOR NAVY
VOL. II

‘Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself’—SIR WALTER RALEIGH.



AN ELIZABETHAN GALLEON, WITH FOUR CONNING TOWERS.

From Visscher's Series of Engravings, published in Holland etc. 1888, to illustrate the defeat of the Armada.

DRAKE
AND
THE TUDOR NAVY

WITH A HISTORY OF THE
RISE OF ENGLAND AS A MARITIME POWER

BY
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IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. II.

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DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY

CHAPTER I

THE INDIES VOYAGE 1585¹

THE commission for the reorganisation of the Navy, with which Drake had been occupied, was appointed none too soon. Before its labours can have been well completed England was on the very brink of war. The forces, which had been making for the inevitable trial of strength with Spain, had grown beyond the control even of Elizabeth's genius for maintaining peace. We have traced them one by one. The expansive force of English commerce that lay inherent and irresistible in the growing wealth and mental activity of the country was the most active. With Hawkins for its leading instrument, it had endeavoured to force legitimate operations, first within the Portuguese sphere, then within the Spanish, each year with increasing exasperation and a higher hand, until the movement was rudely checked with the disaster at San Juan de Ulua. Then followed Frobisher's more peaceful scheme for seeking an opening to the Indies and an area for settlement to the north-west, where the Spanish occupation had not yet extended, but this after three courageous attempts, had ended at last in a failure which entirely stopped the flow of capital in the direction he wished to lead it. To the north-east the Muscovy Company, trying on similar lines to reach Cathay over-

¹ For authorities see *post*, Appendix A.

land by way of Russia, Central Asia, and Persia, had been little more successful; and the outward thrust of the English commercial energy was straining to bursting point the obsolete barriers, which had so long confined it. Mendoza dinned into his master's ears continual warning of how England was becoming the great carrying power of Western Europe. 'They are building ships without cessation,' he wrote, 'and they are thus making themselves masters of the sea. All this swells their pride as they see their country with such multitudes of ships and they think that therefore they are unassailable by any prince on earth.'¹ So well did this militant commerce suit the new spirit of the nation that the old lawlessness of the seas, which before had been religious, had assumed a commercial expression and had begun to draw to itself an increasing share of the unemployed capital of the country. Under the impulse of the movement, we have seen Drake and his followers insignificantly opening a new era by showing the English merchants a drastic way of asserting the natural rights they claimed and redressing the injuries they had suffered. Once started on its course the new school of adventure began to divert against the seat of Spanish wealth the most daring and most powerfully supported section of the piratical forces which hitherto had been spending their energy mainly in European seas. Still, neither the success of Drake's methods nor the ever increasing strain for new markets had availed to break down the immemorial tradition of commercial amity between England and Spain, nor to change in Philip or Elizabeth their confirmed reluctance to measure each other's military strength. Finally we have seen Drake, with all that was most warlike in the country at his back, taking a still bolder step, setting out with the deliberate intention of committing so great an outrage against the Spanish crown, that it could not fail to force the 'prudent' king into a declaration of war. Drastically as

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1581, p. 72.

he had done his work, lawless and unpardonable as had been his violation of Spanish commerce and territory, even this seemed to have failed, and officially peace still reigned.

It is a conspicuous feature of the great Elizabethan war, that there is no moment when it can be said to have begun, no place where a line can be clearly drawn between the period of reprisal and the period of formal hostility. Drake's expedition to the West Indies of 1585 for convenience is usually taken to mark the commencement of the war, but in truth it differed only in degree from much that had been perpetrated before. It will have been seen, that though open war was still undeclared, the English attack on the Spanish monopoly of the oceans had been long and continuously in progress. Commencing at first peacefully in an effort to assert the common rights of international comity, for some time past it had taken the form of barely disguised hostilities, and the cup was fast filling to the brim. If Philip seemed still to cling to a mutilated peace, it was not so much that sufficient provocation was wanting, as that his time was not yet ripe. Apart from the political considerations, which made an attack on England personally inexpedient for Philip while Mary Stuart lived, he had as yet no weapon that could reach his aggressor. Alva, like the great captain he was, completely grasped the truth, and never tired of preaching a policy of peace with England. 'The King of Spain,' he was wont to say, 'could make war with any prince in the world he would, so long as he had peace with the Kingdom of England.'¹ If Elizabeth's entirely successful policy of making herself felt by patronage of privateering and piracy had caused her to neglect the Navy, it had supplied her at the same time with abundance of the best material for rapidly bringing it to perfection. And weak as her naval force seems to us, it was far more powerful than that of any other oceanic sovereign. Until Portu-

¹ 'Hierónimo Lippomano to the Doge,' *Venetian Calendar*, viii. p. 296.

gal was added to the Spanish empire Philip himself had still no standing Navy of ocean-going fighting-ships at all, unless we except the galleons and frigates of the Indian Guard, which Menendez had established; but since these were maintained by a special duty levied by way of general average upon the merchants engaged in the traffic, they were not constitutionally available for the general purposes of the empire. For the work put upon them they barely sufficed, and in no way did they constitute a Royal Navy disposable for political purposes in the sense that Elizabeth's was a Royal Navy. With the acquisition of Portugal, however, Philip's position was changed. The crown of Portugal had a real sea-going fleet comprising twelve splendid galleons. With the exception of one which was burnt during the taking of Lisbon, the whole of this fine force became Philip's prize, and gave the Spanish crown for the first time the sound nucleus of a true ocean-going Navy.

Following this in the winter of 1581 nine new galleons were ordered to be laid down in the Biscay yards for the Indian service.¹ Santa Cruz, the only man perhaps in Philip's dominions who, since Alva's death, had any real grasp of what a war with England meant, began to regard the enterprise as practicable. As Captain-General of the Galleys of Spain he had been ordered to organise in Seville and Lisbon for the summer of 1583 a formidable fleet for the conquest of the Azores. The bulk of the fleet, however, was never used. Santa-Cruz alone succeeded with part of his own squadron in reaching the scene of action in time to be of service. With two of the Portuguese galleons, one of which was the *capitana*, the 'San Martin' of 1,200 tons, and seven Guipuscoan ships and some Flemish hulks amounting with small craft to about twenty-five sail, he met Don Antonio's French privateer fleet under Philip Strozzi and Charles de Brissac at Saint Michael's. Though the enemy were numerically superior, he succeeded after three days' manœuvring for

¹ Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. cap. xvii. and App. p. 480.

the wind in dividing the French fleet and in inflicting upon them a signal defeat, which was followed by the immediate reduction of the islands.¹ Although a French squadron of eighteen sail deserted without firing a shot, the action at Saint-Michael's was proclaimed in Spain as a magnificent victory against overwhelming odds, and Santa Cruz added to the reputation he had won in the command of the reserve galleys at Lepanto the name of the greatest sailing admiral of his time. The fact remains however that he was in no condition to continue the campaign, and was compelled to return to Spain to organise a still larger force for the reduction of the islands. It consisted of nearly a hundred sail, amongst which, though oared vessels had long ceased to be used in oceanic voyages, he had the courage to employ two galleasses and twelve galleys. Of the sixty great-ships five only were galleons, three of the king's and two of the Admiral's. The others were all armed merchantmen, and only half of them Spanish. With this overwhelming force he reached St. Michael's in July 1583, reduced Terceira the same month, and by the middle of September was back again at Cadiz with the whole of the Islands in Spanish hands and his force hardly impaired. After so easy a triumph, no service seemed too hard for his self-confidence, and elated with the honours that were showered upon him, he wrote to the king to propose that the fleet under his command instead of being broken up should be utilised as a basis of organisation for the long deferred reckoning with Elizabeth. His proposal was that the whole of the Portuguese galleons should be immediately taken in hand to be brought forward for sea, and guns cast to arm them; that those already laid down at Santander should be pushed on rapidly to completion; that all the large ships of the province of Biscay should be requisitioned and equipped; and that the Viceroys of

¹ Duro, *Conquista de los Azores*, p. 36; *Armada Española*, ii. cap. xviii. For the French account, see Bréard, *Documents relatifs à la Marine Normande*, pp. 248 et seq.

Naples and Sicily should be ordered to collect and arm a number of large Italian vessels of some six hundred tons burden. With such a force, added to that already under his command, he declared himself willing to undertake the chastisement of the heretic queen with small doubt of success. In addition to Santa Cruz's importunities other of Philip's officers were continually urging upon him the dangers of his weakness at sea. 'The sea-forces,' wrote one Captain Luis Cabreta about the time of Drake's raid on the Indies, 'which the enemy can collect are very great and will increase from day to day, unless some strong effort be made to render your Majesty's present small number of vessels more than equal to the multitude of the enemy. . . . It is all very well to say that your Majesty has a hundred galleys. They may be of some little use in the Mediterranean but they are of small importance elsewhere, especially on the high seas.'¹ Such considerations could not fail to force upon Philip the necessity of making himself a strong oceanic power. Still he could not bring himself to vigorous action; so much, as he said, depended on circumstances. Nevertheless, although he could make Santa Cruz no definite promise, he received his proposal favourably. The orders which the Admiral suggested were issued, and from that moment, it may be said, the 'Enterprise of England' was never lost sight of.²

Here then we have the cradle of the Spanish seapower. From Santa Cruz's memorial and Cabreta's

¹ Report of Captain Luis Cabreta, *Spanish Calendar*, 1580 &c., p. 56. The document is assigned by the editor to 1580, but internal evidence seems conclusive that it refers to the Indian Voyage of 1585-6. It begins: 'In this matter of Sir Francis Drake's Voyage,' and goes on to speak of the 'Portuguese ships' and to discuss the hypothesis of the English holding what they have gained. The voyage referred to then must be subsequent to the conquest of Portugal, and the paper cannot be earlier than the first English conquests in the Indies. Cabreta refers to previous advice given to Philip to reform his Navy by substituting 'galleasses' and some 'newly invented ships' for his galleys.

² Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, 'Santa Cruz to the King,' i. 241; 'The King to Santa Cruz,' p. 213.

report, it is abundantly clear that Monson and Raleigh were not far wrong in saying that up to this time at least the King of Spain had had practically nothing that could be called a sea-going Navy in the modern sense of the word. From this beginning, however—although even now it is clear that the Spaniards had not yet grasped the idea of a true fighting fleet—some semblance of the thing began to grow. In England the danger was fully appreciated, by everyone at least but the queen. Even she now felt, though still refusing to admit the idea of a regular naval war, that something must be taken in hand seriously for lessening the over-greatness of Spain.

We have seen already how at first she hoped that a blow, which would recall Philip to docility, might be struck under Don Antonio's flag ; and, enforced as the threat was by her own naval activity at home, for a time it seemed to have sufficed. Philip's note became more peaceful and Elizabeth was beginning to turn her back upon his Dutch rebels, when suddenly towards the end of the year 1583 there came to light what was known as the Paris Plot. In support of their kinswoman Mary Stuart, the Guises designed to invade England with a French army and the enterprise was to be powerfully supported by Philip. It was paying Elizabeth in her own coin. War seemed inevitable ; every preparation was hurriedly made to resist the attack ; the ports were fortified, and the whole Navy made ready to take the sea on the shortest possible notice.

The strategical dispositions approved by the Government should be noted as an indication of the level which the higher parts of the Naval Art had reached before Drake took the lead. They were on the old faulty lines. Since the attack might come by way of Ireland or of Scotland or direct, the fleet was to be organised in three divisions, one in the Downs, one stationed at the Isle of Wight, and one off Scilly, whereby it was made inevitable that the invading force would encounter nothing strong

enough to defeat it.¹ It was no advance upon Montgomery's idea of an inferior undefeated fleet checking an invasion. Of a concentration upon the enemy's base there is as yet no suggestion.

Still the Government was thoroughly awakened, and from this time forward the work of perfecting the system of national defence in anticipation of war proceeded with thoroughness and sagacity. All the following year, in spite of his second courtship, Drake, like everyone else, was busy with warlike organisation both afloat and ashore—with Carew Raleigh minding the police of the Channel, with Gawen Champernowne reporting on the state of the county forces in South Devon, and with work of graver import.

As the year 1584 drew on and the prospect of invasion grew more remote, Elizabeth began to think of taking the offensive herself, still clinging however to her idea that peace must not be broken. For the execution of this difficult feat, several plans were under consideration. The first was for again approaching the French King and inducing him to compromise himself irrevocably with an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, while the queen despatched a fleet to the Indies. Then the idea of a war under Don Antonio's flag was revived; and finally she fell back on Drake's original methods. None of these schemes, it is clear, she considered would involve her in a regular war. We have seen already how far in this age hostilities could be pushed and yet be held not to exceed the limits of reprisal. So long as the actual territory of a State were not violated, no act of war was necessarily committed. Under colour of reprisal the commerce of a friendly country might be harried to almost any extent without a formal breach of the peace, and Elizabeth seems to have formed the doctrine, that colonies beyond the seas were in the same category as a mercantile marine. They were for her, like ships and sea-borne goods, the

¹ See Burghley's 'Memorial of divers things necessary . . . for this summer,' February 3, 1584; *S.P. Dom.* clxviii. 3.

legitimate subjects of reprisal; and thus it was that as Drake's first wooing was the prelude to his humble inauguration of his method as a private seaman, so his second heralded the adoption of his system as something like an act of State.

When the resolution was definitely taken is not clear, for the project naturally was kept as secret as possible. During October it was being discussed by the Council. In the middle of November Walsingham wrote to his son-in-law, Captain Christopher Carleill, in Ireland, where he was operating with a small squadron against pirates and rebels along the coast, summoning him home to join an expedition which Drake was to command. In any case it was probably settled as a popular measure with which to greet Parliament. It had been summoned for the end of the month; Drake was returned for the pocket borough of Bossiney and attended duly in his place; and on Christmas Eve his commission for the organisation and command of a fleet was signed.¹

With the signing of his commission, however, the affair was still far from decided. As usual he was to be vexed with months of irresolution. How far his preparations were allowed to proceed we do not know. On April 7 Hakluyt wrote to Walsingham from Paris, that the rumours of Drake's voyage were causing the Spaniards great anxiety²; but shortly before this Elizabeth, without consulting Burghley, had suddenly prorogued Parliament, and it began to be doubtful whether he would be allowed to start at all. The queen was deep in one of her darkest and most tortuous bits of policy, which seems to

¹ This commission is recited in a commission which Drake granted to one John Martyn, preserved at Nutwell Court. In spite of his preoccupations, it appears from D'Ewes's Journal that Drake did not neglect his Parliamentary duties. He served with Fox, Richard Grenville, and others on the Committee on the Bill 'For the better and more reverent observing the Sabbath day;' on that for bringing in staple fish and ling; with Sidney, Grenville and others on Raleigh's Bill for the planting of Virginia; and on that for the continuance of certain bills over the adjournment, besides other committees relating to local Devonshire affairs.

² *Cal. S.P. Dom. Add.* April 7, 1585.

have had for its aim a high-handed mediation between Philip and his Dutch rebels in order to avert the gathering danger from her own head. While the fit was on her, she appears actually to have revoked Drake's commission. Nor can it be said she would not have drawn back altogether, had it not been for an event that brought an overwhelming pressure from the commercial classes to bear upon her half-formed purpose.

Philip was still engaged in the preparation of the expedition which Santa Cruz had proposed. But in Galicia and Andalucia there had been so serious a failure of crops, that not only was no corn procurable for biscuit, but the provinces themselves were threatened with famine. To meet the situation Philip under special offers of protection induced the English merchants to send over a large fleet of corn-ships, and no sooner were they well in his ports than he laid an embargo on them all. Every vessel, that was not quick enough to escape, was seized, the crews were thrown into prison, and ships, cargoes, and guns confiscated for the Enterprise of England. There was no possibility of disguise. The plainest proof of Philip's intention had been brought home by the famous 'Primrose' of London, one of the ships that escaped. She had been lying quietly discharging her cargo off Bilbao, when she was visited by the Corregidor or Sheriff of Biscay with a party of his officers in the costume of merchants. He was followed by a pinnace containing a number of soldiers similarly disguised. So soon as they were on board, at a given signal the master was seized and called upon to surrender his ship. He had suspected treachery, however, from the first, and was ready. Instead of submitting, his crew, though considerably outnumbered, seized their weapons, threw themselves upon the Spaniards, and flung them back into their boats and the sea with heavy loss. Those who regained the boats fled, leaving their comrades to drown. A few clung to the English vessel and were humanely rescued by the sailors.

Amongst these was no less a person than the Corregidor himself, who was triumphantly carried a prisoner to London, and upon him was found the king's writ under which he had been acting and which distinctly specified the purpose for which the seizures were to be made.¹

In the English commercial circles the result was an outburst of national indignation so violent as to break the last ties which bound them to Spain. There was now not a class in the country opposed to war. The queen, with her genius for answering to the pulse of the nation, rose to the occasion for the moment; prudence was thrown to the winds; a retaliatory embargo of Spanish goods was proclaimed; letters of general reprisal were issued to the merchants, and Drake was ordered to sail with a fleet to the rescue of the arrested vessels. The seizure had taken place the last week in May; in June he received authority to requisition ships for his expedition; and on July 1 a fresh commission was signed.²

The expedition was extraordinarily popular, and Drake, with his experience of the queen's capacity for sudden changes of front, lost no time in pressing forward his arrangements on the flow of the tide. London, it was said, offered to fit out seven score sail, and by the middle of July the town flocked down to Woolwich to see the contingent of the capital start 'with great jolity' to join Drake's flag at Plymouth.³ Most of the principal ports followed the example of London, and from the queen, Court, and private persons money was subscribed in abundance. For the expedition was to be on the usual lines and to be carried out by a fleet of merchantmen stiffened by some ships from the Royal Navy and financed by a Joint Stock Company. By August Drake had

¹ See 'The escape of the "Primrose," a tall ship of London' &c. in *Hakluyt*, to which a translation of the writ is annexed.

² Burghley's Notes in *Murdin*, p. 782. This second commission is also recited in Captain Martyn's.

³ *Hist. MSS. Com. Rep.* XII. iv. 176, 177.

gathered round him a fleet of about thirty sail, amongst which were the 'Elizabeth Bonaventure', 600 tons, and the 'Aid,' 250 tons, of her Majesty's. The rest were all private ships. Largest of them was the 'Galleon Leicester,' of 400 tons, which had been Fenton's flagship in 1582. The London contingent included several of the finest vessels in the subsidised mercantile marine with the redoubtable 'Primrose' at their head. The rest were mainly West-Country vessels. In all, the ships numbered twenty-one and the pinnaces eight.¹ Drake's flag was hoisted on the 'Bonaventure,' and around him was gathered as brilliant an assembly of officers, whether from family connections or services, as a commander could desire. His own flag-captain was Thomas Fenner, one of the most daring and experienced officers of his time. His Vice-Admiral was Martin Frobisher, who honoured the little 'Primrose' with his flag.² Francis Knollys, the queen's cousin and Leicester's brother-in-law, was Rear-Admiral in the 'Galleon Leicester.' Captain Edward Wynter, son of Sir William, commanded the 'Aid,' and Christopher Carleill was Lieutenant-General commanding the land forces and the 'Tiger.'³ Thomas Drake, the admiral's youngest brother,

¹ A French salt-bark of 40 tons, which was taken possession of off Finis-terre, was afterwards added to the fleet under the name of the 'Drake.' Biggs gives the total at twenty-five, but he omits the 'Bark Hawkins' which was certainly attached to the fleet. The 'Primrose' log says they sailed from Plymouth with twenty-nine ships and pinnaces. Two other Lists (*Tanner MSS.* 79 and *Lansd. MSS.* 100 f. 98) give the total of 'ships and barks' at twenty-one. The Tanner list also gives eight 'pinnaces with decks' and ten 'pinnaces carried in poop.' We thus get a confirmation of the 'Primrose' log total, that is, twenty-nine that sailed from Plymouth.

² It seems to have been a customary privilege allowed to London merchants when serving as partners with the queen, for the commodore of their contingent to hold flag-rank. (See p. 66 for another instance.) Frobisher on this occasion seems not to have been the queen's officer, but the nominee of the London merchants, who had been his early supporters.

³ This was not H.M.S. 'Tiger,' 200 tons, but probably the London vessel of the same name and tonnage, which served against the Armada. Martyn's commission recites Drake's commission 'for the conduction of a fleet wherein two of H.M. ships, viz. the "Bonaventure" and the "Aid," are now used' (see *ante*, p. 9, n.). Moreover, H.M.S. 'Tiger' was at this time probably unfit for service. She was 'new-built' in this or the following year. See Wynter's report, *S P. Dom.* clxxxvii. 44, and Hawkins's report, Decem-

had Sir Francis's ship the 'Thomas Drake.' Tom Moone had another, the 'Francis.' Amongst other of the 'Golden Hind's' men were Captain George Fortescue in the 'Bark Bonner'; Captain John Martyn in the 'Bark Benjamin'; Edward Careless, also called Wright, whom Hakluyt calls the excellent mathematician and engineer, in the 'Hope' of 200 tons,¹ and Richard Hawkins with his first command as captain of the galliot 'Duck.' Under Carleill was a regular military force organised in twelve companies with Captain Anthony Powell as 'Sergeant Major' or chief of the Lieutenant-general's staff and two 'Corporals of the Field' or Aides-de-camp. The whole force, including soldiers and sailors, numbered 2,300 men.²

ber 28, 1585, *ibid.* clxxxv. 33, where Burghley notes against her name, 'new Teigar.' The 'Bonaventure' and the 'Aid' are both absent from this list of available ships.

¹ He was the author of the account of the Earl of Cumberland's voyage to the Azores in 1589, which Hakluyt printed in his collection.

² It was probably twelve companies. Carleill as Lieutenant-general, according to the military organisation of the time, would have, besides his staff rank and ship, command of his own company. So also would the Sergeant-major, each with his Captain-lieutenant as his deputy. The two Corporals-of-the-field would have no company command. Besides these, ten other captains are mentioned, one of whom, Edward Wynter, also commanded a ship. The company commanders were Anthony Platt, Edward Wynter, John Goring, Robert Pew, George Barton, John Merchant, William Cecil, Walter Biggs, John Hannam, and Richard Stanton. Platt and Merchant became staunch adherents of Drake and both perished in the 1595 expedition. William Cecil was presumably Burghley's grandson and the heir of his house.

The details of the sea-force were as follows:

Ships	Tons	Commanders
H.M.S. 'Bonaventure'	600	Admiral and General Sir F. Drake. Flag-Capt. Thomas Fenner.
'Primrose'	200	Vice-Admiral Martin Frobisher.
'Galleon Leicester'	400	Rear-Admiral Francis Knollys.
H.M.S. 'Aid'	250	Captain Ed. Wynter.
'Tiger'	200	Lieut.-general Christ. Carleill.
'Sea Dragon'	—	Captain Henry White.
'Thomas'	200	Thomas Drake.
'Minion'	200	Thomas Cely.
'Bark Talbot'	200	Bailly.
'Bark Bond'	150	Robert Cross.
'Bark Bonner'	150	George Fortescue.
'Hope'	—	Edward Careless.
'White Lion'	140	James Erizo

By the end of the month, this fine force, by far the strongest private squadron that had ever been organised in England, was practically ready, and all concerned were straining every nerve to get it clear away to sea, before a fresh change of front at Court could paralyse its action. Every one understood how much turned on its success. 'Upon Drake's voyage,' wrote Walsingham, 'dependeth the life and death of the cause according to man's judgment.'¹ Burghley himself, now entirely convinced of the necessity of strong measures, was as eager as anyone for its departure. The situation was critical in the extreme. The queen had fallen into something like an agony of indecision. Part of the scheme of action against Spain was to send troops to the assistance of the Dutch, but having agreed to this, she was again hesitating and would not appoint a commander. Nothing was more likely than that at any moment she might change her mind about Drake. At length Leicester was informed officially he was to proceed to take up the command in Holland. At the same time apparently Drake's sailing orders were obtained, and Burghley, as though with a sigh of relief, entered in his journal for August, 'Sir Francis Drake took shipping at Plymouth to pass towards India.'²

But it was not so. To Burghley's disappointment he received a letter from the admiral dated at Plymouth instead of at Finisterre as he had hoped. The fleet was still in Plymouth Sound, and the queen was repenting of her decision about Leicester. Burghley wrote off to Drake, warning him to get away, before it was too

Ships	Tons	Commanders
'Francis' . . . — .		Captain Thomas Moone.
'Vantage' . . . — .		" John Rivers.
'Drake' . . . — .		" John Vaughan.
'George' . . . — .		" John Varney.
'Benjamin' . . . — .		" John Martin.
'Scout' . . . — .		" Edward Gilman.
'Galliot Duck' . . . — .		" Rich. Hawkins.
'Swallow' . . . — .		" Bitfield.

¹ Leicester Correspondence, *Camden Soc.* No. xxvii. p. 341.

² *Murdin*, p. 783.

late.¹ But now a new incident intervened, which throws a strange side light on the manners and feelings of the time, as well as on the character of one of its most conspicuous ornaments. This was nothing less than an attempt on the part of Sir Philip Sidney, if we may believe so far the account of his friend and shadow Fulke Greville, to share with Drake, if not the command, at least the credit of the expedition. The whole truth of the story is difficult to unravel. But it is certain that at the last moment Sir Philip Sidney slipped away from Court, hurried down to Plymouth, and to Drake's dismay announced his intention of accompanying him as a volunteer. For the harassed admiral nothing could well have been more alarming. With a man of Sidney's position on board, Drake would never be able to call the fleet his own. The new recruit had just been appointed Master of the Ordnance, the highest permanent military office in the State.² Moreover he was the queen's latest favourite, and, like Carleill, a son-in-law of the admiral's main supporter Walsingham. To refuse flatly was impossible, and to take with him a man who from his high rank must inevitably acquire an authority in the expedition that would make him virtually its joint commander was equally out of the question for so masterful a spirit as Drake. Still he put a good face on the matter and entertained the truant very handsomely at a banquet. 'Yet I,' says Greville, 'being his loving and beloved Achates in his journey, observing the countenance of this gallant mariner more than Sir Philip's leisure served him to do, acquainted him with my observation of the discountenance and expression which appeared in Sir Francis; as

¹ See 'Drake to Burghley,' *Ellis*, ii. 304. 'Having yet in remembrance you Honour's wish in your last letter, that the receipt of my letter which I had written unto your Honour, a little before, had been dated rather from Cape Finisterre, than from Plymouth,' &c.

² Master of the Naval Ordnance was a comparatively recent creation derived from the older office of Master of the Ordnance. Sidney was appointed jointly with the Earl of Warwick, with survivorship, July 21, 1585.

if our coming were both beyond his expectation and desire.' This it certainly was, and Drake took the only possible course by hurrying off a secret post to town to let his friends know what had happened.

The meaning of Sidney's action has never been satisfactorily explained. Greville's story is that the whole expedition had been arranged between Drake and Sidney on the understanding that they were eventually to share the command. Drake alone was to appear openly, while Sidney used in secret his credit and influence to further the undertaking. Drake's delay in sailing, the 'loving Achates' asserts, was simply due to the fact that he was waiting for Sidney's escape from Court. The curious resemblance which Greville's story bears to that which Cooke had to tell of Doughty's share in the voyage of circumnavigation would be reason enough for receiving it with suspicion. The ascertained facts of the case show that it cannot possibly be true. Drake, except under the severest necessity, certainly would never have thus fettered his freedom of action, and he was now far too influential a man and too powerfully supported to pay such a price for the assistance even of Sidney. In the State Papers relating to the voyage there certainly are traces of Sidney's being interested in the affair, for with Walsingham he signed the order for the delivery of the necessary arms and ammunition from the queen's stores, but this presumably was no more than his duty as Master of the Ordnance. On the other hand, we know that after Drake's commission was signed, Sidney was holding himself in readiness to take five hundred horse into the Low Countries immediately the treaty with the States was signed, and later still that he was expecting to be made governor of Flushing, one of the cautionary towns which Elizabeth demanded as security for the expenses she was to incur.¹ Thus if he contemplated sailing with Drake from the first, he must have been acting with a duplicity foreign to all that is known

¹ 'Talbot to Rutland,' *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 177; 'Walsingham to Davidson,' September 13, 1585.

of his character. It is more credible, that what Walsingham laments as 'his hard resolution' was some sudden decision of his impulsive nature. His father-in-law attributed it to disappointment about the command of Flushing.¹ This may have been so, but there is another and a very different influence which may have had not a little to do with it, and of which Greville says nothing.

In the early part of the year, while Drake was waiting almost without hope to be let loose on the Spanish Indies, a small expedition promoted mainly by Raleigh, in which Drake and Sidney also were concerned, had been allowed to sail. This was the famous venture that under Sir Richard Grenville and Ralph Lane was intended to lay the foundations of a new England in America by making a settlement in Virginia. It was also understood that it was to use its opportunities on the outward voyage for reconnoitring the Spanish Indies and reporting home the state of affairs for the guidance of Drake's larger fleet, should it be allowed to sail. This part of the programme was duly carried out. Landing in Puerto Rico and San Domingo, they entrenched themselves in both places, departing at their leisure after entering into communication with the Spanish officials and fully satisfying themselves how inadequate was the provision for the defence of the islands. Among other reports they sent home, came a private letter from Lane to Sidney relating how they had discovered the defenceless condition of the two colonies, as well as their infinite riches. 'I find it,' he concludes, 'an attempt most honourable, feasible, and profitable, and only fit for yourself to be commander in.' This letter is dated from Virginia August 12.² Sidney, it

¹ So also Mendoza reported to the king, *Spanish Calendar*, 1580, &c., p. 550.

² *Colonial Calendar*, p. 3. It is possible and even probable this date is *stylo novo*, and really means Aug. 2; for Hakluyt's account says on 'the 5th Mr. John Arundel was sent for England.' (See *Sir R. Grenville's Voyage for Sir W. Raleigh in 1585*.) Lane seems to have sent home a vessel before Grenville sailed so as to forestall him and get in the first word about their quarrel. See Lane's other letters of the same date in the *Colonial Calendar*.

would seem, had gone down to Plymouth with the ostensible object of receiving the unhappy Don Antonio, who in absolute penury landed at Plymouth on September 7.¹ Now since Drake in 1573 sailed from the Cape of Florida to Scilly in twenty-two days, it is quite possible that Sidney received Lane's letter if not before he left London, at any rate upon his arrival at Plymouth; and smarting under what he considered a slight he may well have resolved to act upon the advice it contained, and, like Essex on a subsequent occasion, to push himself as far as he could to a prominent position in the enterprise. But Drake had been too clever for him. Immediately the queen heard of the truant's intention, she sent off an express with three letters, one to Drake forbidding him to receive Sidney, one to Sidney commanding him instantly to return, and a third to the mayor enjoining him to see she was obeyed. Four miles from Plymouth the queen's messenger was waylaid by a party of seamen, whose seized his letters, read their contents, and then returned them and allowed him to proceed. It is impossible not to wonder what would have become of them had they not contained orders agreeable to Drake.² On the heels of the express, says Greville, a peer of the realm came posting down to emphasise the recall. The Royal mandate, he says, carried with it in the one hand grace and in the other thunder. Sidney was to return; the whole fleet to be stayed till he did; and there was nothing to do but submit.

Such are the facts of the curious episode, so far as they

¹ *Plymouth Borough Records*; *Hist. MSS. Com.* ix. 278. He and Sidney were reported to be at Drake's house in Devonshire—that is, Buckland Abbey, which he had bought of Sir Richard Grenville in 1581. *Spanish Calendar*, 1580, &c., p. 550.

² 'Stanhope to the Earl of Rutland,' *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 178. Fulke Greville's version of the affair is that Sidney, being warned that a recall was coming down, disguised two trusty soldiers as seamen, who robbed the messenger of his papers, so that the order could not be delivered. Stanhope, however, who knew the messenger, 'one Heyts,' distinctly says the papers were handed back to him after they had been read, and, further, we know that the order for Sidney's recall was delivered.

are ascertainable, independently of Greville's narrative. As to Sidney's motives, they are not conclusive. On his return to Court the queen received it for a truth from himself that he never meant to go¹; but now each may judge for himself. Whatever may be the verdict on the darling of Elizabethan society, all must rejoice that Drake's measures to thwart his design were successful, and that, instead of sailing to mar the great voyage with the endless quarrels that must have ensued between two of the most characteristic figures of the Elizabethan age, he was summoned back to crown his strange reputation on the plains of Zutphen.

Once freed from his incubus Drake was determined not to lose his chance. His water-casks were not full, and a quantity of stores were still heaped upon the quays: but the wind was getting fair for a start, and being, as Carleill wrote, 'not the most assured of her Majesty's perseverance to let us go forward,' he ordered everything to be tumbled into the first ships that came to hand, and on September 14 he hurried his fleet to sea.²

At last he was once more his own master. The commission he held was ostensibly for the release of the embargoed ships, but this it seems was well understood to be a mere cloak to cover the queen, if diplomacy demanded it. Indeed most of the arrested ships appear to have escaped or been released already. Santa Cruz expressly says that those in his jurisdiction had been detained but a week, and that it was only in Biscay some were still under arrest in consequence of the rough treatment the 'Primrose' had given the Corregidor and his officers.³ Drake's real objective was the Plate fleets and the West Indies. He did not even go through the form of visiting any Biscayan port, but making straight for Finisterre came to anchor at the Bayona or Cies Islands off Vigo Bay. It will be remembered that

¹ Stanhope to Rutland, *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. p. 180.

² 'Carleill to Walsingham,' *S.P. Dom.* clxxxiii. 10, October 4, 1585.

³ 'Santa Cruz to the King'; Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, i. 245.

presuming on the total inability of the Spanish king to protect even his own territorial waters, the Protestant rovers had long been in the habit of making this port a regular watering place and harbour of refuge. On this occasion, shortly before reaching the Bayona Islands, Drake had fallen in with a squadron of a score of them, who told him they had just burnt Vianna, a considerable port in the North of Portugal, and expressed their willingness to go with him and serve Bayona and Vigo the same.¹ Forthither Drake meant to go to complete the organisation of his force which his hasty departure had cut short. There were general orders to be issued, for he had not waited even for this, water-casks to be filled up, the disordered stores to be arranged and distributed, besides the contents of prizes which had been picked up on the way, containing stock fish or other provisions, to be divided. There was every indication, too, of bad weather; and Carleill expressly says that these, rather than the release of embargoed vessels, were the reasons that induced Drake to put in; and 'lastly,' he adds, 'which was certainly not the least, to make our proceeding known to the King of Spain, if he may find and see more apparently that we nothing fear any intelligence he hath gotten by all the "spialls" [spies] he hath either in England or elsewhere.' In this wanton flinging of his cards upon the table, in the reckless defiance of his enemy, we seem to see a recrudescence of the old boisterous spirit of his pirate days, perhaps even a mere piece of bravado to show such men as Sussex and Arundel he could make good his after-dinner boasts. And yet we cannot doubt that, born leader of men as he was, he knew best how to inspire his force with the arrogant spirit of self-confidence such an enterprise demanded.

It was on the 27th that they came to anchor at the islands. Ashore they could see the beacons blazing the alarm along the coast, numbers of troops could be seen

¹ 'Primrose' log. It does not appear whether he accepted the offer.

on the move,¹ and Carleill was at once ordered with the pinnaces and boats and 700 men to make a demonstration against the town of Bayona two leagues distant. On his way he met a boat containing the ordinary port officers, whom the Governor, as though nothing unusual were occurring, had sent off, accompanied by an English merchant, to make the usual visitation of the newly arrived ships. These men were turned back, and with them was sent Captain Sampson, one of Carleill's aides-de-camp, with Drake's formal demands. He was an Irish officer who had served long and with distinction under Carleill, and once in the presence of the Governor, he submitted Drake's ultimatum with a soldierlike bluntness that left nothing to be desired. The fleet, he said, had been sent by the queen to inquire about the embargo, and he demanded whether it meant peace or war; the Governor might take his choice. If it was to be peace, he must accede to the reasonable demands of the queen's admiral; if war, he should have it to the uttermost. With that he retired. Truculent as was Drake's diplomacy, his position was unimpeachable. The Governor found himself in a dilemma from which there was no escape. Unless he was prepared to declare war, he must assist the friendly fleet to carry out its obviously hostile intentions. At a loss how to act he sent off to say it was not for him to declare war or peace. The embargo had been by the king's orders; but a week ago it had been raised, and the merchants were free to go and dispose of their goods as they desired. Further, he added, for the demonstration with the pinnaces was still advancing, if watering or any fresh victual might stand Sir Francis in any stead, he was ready to pleasure him therewith as one captain in honest courtesy might and ought to do to another, their princes being in league together.²

Meanwhile, Drake had landed 200 troops upon a little island in the harbour, and lay there with the boats till

¹ 'Prinrose' log.

² 'Carleill to Walsingham,' *S.P. Dom.* clxxxiii. 10, October 10, 1595.

midnight threatening the town. The Governor's answer being considered unsatisfactory, a personal interview was requested in order that a formal convention might be effected. By midnight, however, the weather grew so threatening that the troops were hastily re-embarked, and they barely succeeded in reaching the ships before the gale burst in all its fury. For three days it raged ; several vessels were torn from their anchors, some had to sacrifice their masts, others were driven to sea, and one bark never succeeded in rejoining. During the progress of the storm a suspicious activity had been observed in the river. Numbers of laden boats were seen putting off from Vigo, as though the inhabitants were withdrawing into the interior with their effects. This looked as though the Governor intended resistance, especially as no further answer had been received from him ; and as soon as the weather abated, Drake ordered Carleill with the light vessels of Thomas Drake, Moone and Richard Hawkins, and all the pinnaces, to stand in for the fugitives. The flotilla quickly overhauled some of them, and then, seeing a crowd of boats in the act of retiring up the river, pursued and captured a number of them, in one of which was all the plate and vestments of the cathedral, including their 'great cross of silver, of very fair embossed work, double gilt all over, having cost them a great mass of money.' Their whole plunder they valued at six thousand ducats besides a rich cargo of wine and sugar.

Lawless and indefensible as such high-handed proceedings may appear, they had every excuse. At the worst Drake was commencing hostilities before war had been declared. But in this he was only forestalling his enemy. It had been long an open secret that Philip was preparing a sudden and secret blow against the independence of England. The only crime of the queen's admiral is that he was paying Spaniards in Spanish coin. What publicist is there so precise that under similar conditions to-morrow he would not applaud the side that was clever enough to strike the first blow ?

With Vigo they had not yet done. From their prisoners it was ascertained that a party of sailors from some English vessels that had been lying in the harbour were being detained ashore. Whereupon Carleill detailed Sampson with eighty men to land and retire them. He was met by a party of some two hundred armed Spaniards; but after a short skirmish, in which there was some loss on both sides, he successfully carried out the operation and returned to the inshore squadron with loot which the Spaniards valued at thirty thousand ducats. In the meantime Drake had succeeded in bringing in the rest of the fleet and anchoring it safely in Vigo harbour. Upon this next day the Governor, abandoning any idea he may have had of resistance, sent a flag of truce to inquire what Drake's demands were. The answer was, an interview with an exchange of hostages for security. This was soon arranged, with the result that an agreement was made by which peace was to be preserved on condition that the plunder was restored, the fleet supplied with all it required, and the English merchants given full liberty for themselves and their goods. Visits were then amicably interchanged between the shore and the ships, and as well as might be for heavy rain and continued rough weather, the process of watering was carried on. It was not, however, till October 8, after more than a week's stay, they were able to work out again to the islands. Even then there was a difficulty in getting back the hostages. The Spaniards had been heard to say if they could only detain the force sixteen days they would wash their hands in English blood. But Drake was no easy man to detain against his will. Again he sent a force to threaten Bayona, and the hostages were amicably exchanged. For the rest of the day he waited to receive such English merchants as cared to come off. All, however, elected to remain and collect their debts, and upon the wind shifting to north-north-west Drake put to sea.¹

¹ See 'Wynter to Walsingham,' and 'Carleill to the same,' *ubi supra*. Wynter's despatch is dated 'At anchor by Vigo in Galicia the 21th of October.'

There are many moments in Drake's career upon which the imagination is tempted to dwell, but nowhere with better excuse than here—when the sea-bred admiral from the deck of a queen's ship, with all the budding forces of the coming sea-power gathered at his back, openly challenged the King of Spain to fight for his Empire of the Oceans, and went on his way with colours flying triumphant and unpursued. If the influence of sea-power on history is what has been claimed for it, then this moment marks an epoch. In Spain it was far from being appreciated. The feeling which Drake's visit aroused at Philip's court was rather one of indignation at the presumptuous insult than of apprehension of a vital danger. 'The daring of his attempt,' wrote the king, 'was greater than the damage he was able to effect.'¹ And yet, great as were the naval preparations in all the Spanish ports, not so much as a squadron could put to sea to resent the affront. Philip's whole effective maritime force lay within the Straits, where two squadrons of galleys were cruising under Giannandrea Doria. His orders were to intercept the English Levant fleet, but that was all. His Sicilian squadron encountered it on the homeward voyage, and after a five hours' fight, though in a superiority of more than two to one, was cut to pieces and ignominiously driven into port before the merchantmen's guns.² Santa

But this is probably a mistake. The log of the voyage attached to the map in the *Brief Discourse* gives: 'Oct. 11—Wind came N.N.W. and weighed along the coast of Spain. Oct. 24.—Sighted Lançarotte in the Canaries.' The 'Primrose' log says they sailed on the 9th; the Lansdowne MS. says the 11th.

¹ *Spanish Calendar*. 'The King to Mendoza,' December 29, 1585.

² 'A true report of a worthy fight performed in the voyage from Turkie, by five ships of London against 11 gallies and two frigats of the King of Spain, at Pantalarea, within the Straits, Anno 1586'—in *Hakluyt*. The names of the five ships were the 'Merchant Royal,' the 'Tobie,' the 'Edward Bonaventure,' the 'William and John,' and the 'Susan.' The captain of the 'Merchant Royal,' who acted as admiral, was Mr. Edward Wilkinson. The Spanish fleet, in which were some of the famous galleys of Malta, was commanded by Don Pedro de Gamboa y Leyva, who the previous year had succeeded Don Alonso Martinez de Leyva, the flower of Spanish chivalry, as Captain-General of the Galleys of Sicily. (Duro, *Armada Españ.* ii. App. p. 458.)

Cruz, with his practical sagacity, was fully alive to and even exaggerated the gravity of Drake's exploits. The Governor of Bayona had reported to him, perhaps the better to excuse his action, that the Spanish hostages had estimated the English force at six or seven thousand soldiers and fourteen thousand men in all. They had observed, too, that the fleet carried a quantity of material for erecting fortifications. Santa Cruz could not doubt they meant to establish themselves somewhere in the Indies, and this once done in the midst of the numerous elements of disaffection which the vicious imperial system of Spain bred and fostered in her colonies, he could see no end to the disastrous consequences. But the Government, it seems, could hardly persuade themselves that anything so bold was intended. Drake had disappeared from the coast no one knew whither;¹ and it was unadvisable to interrupt unnecessarily the preparation for the great enterprise. For three days the Council sat discussing what was to be done, 'being much out of tune' at the news from Bayona. Did not the queen know the king's forces, it was asked, and did not she and her people quake at them? Had she no ways to employ Sir Francis Drake but to send him to make demand for the delivery of the Englishmen, and their ships, and goods? Santa Cruz and the Indian captains thought she had, and here was all the trouble. So the outward bound American fleet was stayed and Santa Cruz was ordered to get ready for sea a squadron to pursue Drake, if it were found he had gone to the Indies. It was to consist of sixteen sail, made up of nine second-rate galleons, two India ships and seven small craft, and would carry about four thousand men. This, after all her months of preparation, was the only effort of which Spain felt herself capable to punish Drake's insult and to save the Indies; and while slowly and laboriously the squadron began to get ready, Drake pursued his way to the Canaries.²

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580, &c., p. 553, 'The King to Mendoza.'

² 'Advertisements from Spain,' *S.P. Dom.* clxxxvi. 20 and clxxxix. 4. Duro, *Armada Españ.* ii. App. p. 482. Though the orders were issued apparently in November 1585, the squadron was not able to sail until April 16, 1586.

CHAPTER II

SAN DOMINGO AND CARTAGENA

HAVING carried out his official instructions Drake proceeded on his own responsibility to what was the real object of the expedition. What this was exactly has always been lost sight of, although there exists a detailed plan of his intended operations drawn up apparently for Lord Burghley's information by someone in Drake's confidence.¹ The paper gives the time each operation was expected to take, and the plunder each place should return. After dealing with San Domingo, he intended to pass over to the Spanish Main to sack Margarita, La Hacha, and Santa Marta, and destroy their defences. By the end of the year he expected thus to reach Cartagena, spend a week there in serving it like the rest, and then to seize Nombre de Dios. Hence he proposed by way of the Chagres River to send Carleill against Panama with a combined force of 5,000 Maroons and 1,000 of his own troops, while he himself raided the coast of Honduras. By February 25 he hoped to proceed to Havana and raze it to the ground, but if he found it tenable he meant to establish a garrison in the place and hold it. This well laid if ambitious scheme is no mere raid for plunder. It is the broadly conceived design of a great captain aimed at destroying the fountain head of the enemy's supplies, and seizing and occupying against him the point upon which his whole system of communications turned.

¹ 'A discourse of Sir F. Drake's voyage which by God's grace he shall well perform,' dated April 25, 1586. (*Lansd. MSS.* 100, f. 98.)

Drake's first point was Palma. Here he intended to water and revictual his fleet with fresh provisions; but so heavy was the swell when he arrived, and so dangerous and well guarded the landing place, that after receiving two shots through his flagship he determined to withdraw to Gomera to water and wait for more favourable weather for attempting Palma. After one day's stay, however, the wind came fair for pursuing the voyage, several lost ships joined company again, and in accordance with his invariable rule never to lose a wind he let Palma be and proceeded on his way to the Cape Verde Islands.¹ After a short delay at Cape Blanco for supplying the fleet with fish, according to the practice of the time, on November 16, he made Santiago and anchored halfway between the town and Porto Praya. Against Santiago it seems he had some special grievance. Not only had it been the key of the Portuguese sphere of enterprise and the base of their opposition to foreign trade to the Gold Coast and the East Indies, but some four or five years before, it is said, the authorities had made William Hawkins the victim of some such breach of faith as his brother had suffered at San Juan de Ulua. The place at that time was a stone-built town of some six or seven hundred houses with fine public buildings, and besides being well fortified was of peculiar natural strength. The site it occupied was a triangular valley having the sea for its base and diminishing towards the land side till at its apex it terminated in a gorge little more than two hundred yards wide. On each side it was enclosed by precipitous cliffs, crowned with formidable works. Difficult as was the ground by which these defences could be approached, it was necessary to carry them before the town could be held. The same evening the fleet arrived, therefore, Carleill was landed with a thousand troops to effect the operation. After an arduous march in the dark over ground so broken that the force had to make its way by companies independently, towards morning they found themselves


¹ 'Primrose' log.

SANTIAGO.

EXPLANATIONS (abbreviated from the Original).

- A. The place where the whole fleet first anchored.
- B. The place where the pinnaces and ship-boats did set our soldiers ashore.
- C. The way the army did pass over the mountains.
- D. A large plain or place where the army was marshalled.
- E. A troop of shot sent to discover.
- F. A troop of shot belonging to the vanguard.
- G. The squadron of pikes which had the vanguard, which with the shot thereto belonging consisted of three companies.
- H, I. The troops of shot which marched on the right and left wings or flanks of the vanguard.
- K. A troop of shot belonging also to the vanguard.
- L. The first troop of shot belonging to the 'battle,' and is the lesser of the twain that march before, appointed expressly to discover and to take knowledge of anything before.
- M. The second troop of shot, being the greater belonging to the main-battle and march next before the same.
- N. The troops of shot belonging to the main-battle.
- O. The great squadron of pikes which carried the place of main-battle, which with the troops of shot belonging unto it consisted of four companies of 150 men to each company or thereabout.
- P. The squadron of pikes which made the rear-guard, which with the troops of shot thereunto belonging, consisted of three ensigns or companies.
- Q. Troops of shot belonging to the rear-guard.
- R. A place fortified without the town where we entered.
- S. The valley.
- T. The market place.
- V. The church.
- X. The middle platform towards the seawards furnished with very good artillery.
- Y, Z. The platform on the west and east furnished in like sort.
- AA. A place upon the west side of the valley, and was fortified, as the other over against it, by the which we entered.
- BB. A little chapel.
- CC. The town people being Portugals and flying from thence.
- DD. The way we marched up into the country towards the village called Saint-Domingo.
- EE. The village of Saint-Domingo.
- FF. The town of Prayo.
- GG. The portraiture of a flying fish [a long description of it follows].

NOTE.—This and the following three plates are reduced from the originals (about 16 × 22), engraved to illustrate the 'Summary and True Discourse.' (Brit. Mus. G. 6511 and 6517.) The explanations are shortened from those printed in the margins of the originals.



SANTIAGO

on a broad plateau some two miles from the position they had to attack. Here they waited for dawn, while Carleill used the advantages of the ground to marshal his force in the orthodox three divisions. With the first sign of daylight a general advance was made across the plateau. Not a shot was fired, and for good reason. For when they had come unmolested close up to the works, it was found that not so much as a sentry was there to guard them. Carleill immediately occupied the deserted position and detailed Sampson and another of his captains, each with a 'forlorn' of thirty musketeers, to climb down into the town and reconnoitre. As the light grew it was soon evident to the main force, as from the edge of the cliff they watched the progress of the forlorns in the street below, that the whole town was abandoned, and Carleill, without waiting for a report, despatched after them his great ensign with orders that it should be planted in full view of the fleet as a signal that the place was in his hands. In various parts of the defences some fifty guns were found all ready loaded. It was November 17, the anniversary of the queen's coronation, and in honour of his mistress and his success Carleill ordered them all to be discharged. Drake, who had moved on and anchored before the town, took up the salute with every gun in the fleet, so that to Captain Biggs 'it was strange to hear such a thundering noise last so long together.'

In the evening, after all the necessary points had been occupied, the whole force was marched down and quartered in the town. Ample supplies of fresh and salt provisions and wine were discovered; and while waiting to get into communication with the authorities they continued in the place refreshing themselves and searching for treasure. Still not an ounce of bullion could be found, nor did the Governor give any sign of intending to negotiate the ransom of the town. It was only three years before that the place had been taken and sacked by French privateers and the whole population that was caught massacred. Nothing, therefore, would tempt them to risk

a repetition of the misfortune.¹ After waiting for a week Drake's patience was exhausted and he resolved to take a force as far as San Domingo, some twelve miles in the interior, where he was informed the Governor and the Bishop, with the principal inhabitants, had taken refuge. Accordingly in the early hours he marched with some six hundred men under the immediate command of Carleill, but it was only to find the place abandoned like the capital. For the whole day it was occupied in hopes the Governor would enter into communication, but in vain; and in the evening Drake gave it to the flames and retired his men to Santiago. All hope of making anything of their success was now at an end, and the disappointment, added no doubt to the abundance of wine, seems to have led to some trouble with the troops. A soldier, says Biggs, 'was executed for an odious matter,'² and it would look as though there had been a recrudescence of the old jealousy of the military officers as to their position. For Drake found it necessary to parade the whole force and administer to every man an oath of allegiance to the queen as 'supreme governor'; and further each man was called upon to swear he would do his utmost to advance the enterprise and obey the orders of Drake, as commander-in-chief, and those of his officers. 'By this provident counsel,' remarks Captain Biggs, 'and laying down this good foundation before hand, all things went forward in a due course, to the achieving of our happy enterprise.'

This done Drake determined without further delay to put in force the rigours he had threatened to certain of the inhabitants should the authorities remain contumacious, and accordingly on the 26th preparations were made for re-embarking. First, however, two companies were detached under Captain Sampson in Hawkins's galliot and two of the pinnaces to proceed to Porto Praya and

¹ 'Primrose' log.

² He relates this incidentally in his account of a similar execution at San Domingo in Hispaniola. The offence was not a military one. The 'Primrose' log specifies its nature.

search for hidden treasure, which a prisoner had undertaken to reveal.¹ At Santiago, after all the captured guns, ammunition, and other plunder had been embarked, the evacuation began. Captain Goring had the honour of covering the re-embarkation with a hundred musketeers, Frobisher remaining in the harbour with his pinnace and the necessary boats to bring them off. Though troops had been seen hovering in the rear during the retreat from San Domingo, no attempt was made to molest the operations or to hinder Drake's revenge. Besides the other cause for exasperation, a lad belonging to the force, who had straggled from the town, had been found murdered and horribly mutilated, and Frobisher only embarked Goring's forlorn when Santiago was in flames. Not a building was spared except the hospital, which even in the heat of his resentment Drake ordered to be held sacred. So it was he wiped off a long list of old scores, but even yet he had not done. After weighing from before the burning town he brought up off Porto Praya. There Sampson reported that the prisoner had failed to reveal any treasure; two more guns were all that had been found; and Drake without mercy ordered that Praya should share the fate of the capital. And so on November 26, leaving both places in ashes, he stood away for the West Indies.

Everything now promised well for the success of the main object of the expedition. With the men refreshed and sound, and their spirits emboldened by the easy successes they had won, the prospect was all Drake could desire;

¹ The 'Primrose' log throws an unpleasant light on the way prisoners were dealt with in the general exasperation and disappointment. 'When we had been there six days,' it says, 'there came an Italian down whom we took to be a spy, and searched him and found 50 pieces of gold in his buskins. He was the master governor of the town. We kept him in prison and used a certain kind of torment to make him confess. The next day we took another and used him in like order. Then the first told us that in the Bishop's house was great store of treasure hid, which we presently searched but found none.' Then the other confessed about Porto Praya. In judging Drake's severity, it must be remembered that torture of prisoners refusing information was then and long afterwards a recognised military practice.




CHART TO ILLUSTRATE THE EXPEDITIONS OF 1585 AND 1595

but in mid-Atlantic without any apparent cause the fleet was beset with the invisible enemy, which was to prove for the Spaniards the most redoubtable defender of their American possessions. Seven days out from Santiago a virulent epidemic suddenly appeared. Till then the force had been in excellent health, yet in a few days between two and three hundred men were dead, and numbers more who survived the attack permanently incapacitated. 'The sickness,' says Biggs, 'seized our people with extreme hot burning and continual agues, whereof few escaped with life, and yet those for the most part not without great alteration and decay of their wits and strength for a long time after. In some that died were plainly shown the small spots, which are often found upon those that be infected with the plague.' Fortunately the voyage was a quick one. Eighteen days brought them to the island of Dominica, where the Carib Indians, who at this place had escaped extermination, supplied them in return for beads and trinkets captured at Santiago with an abundance of cassava bread and tobacco, the last commodity being probably especially welcome since in the pharmacy of the early navigators it was a sovereign remedy against all kinds of infection. Staying only long enough to water, they passed on to Saint-Christopher's, where the men were landed to spend Christmas, in order that the foul ships might be cleaned and disinfected and the sick given a chance of recovery. Here too Drake called a council of war, to which he stated his intention of proceeding at once to Hispaniola and attacking San Domingo before his strength further decayed. Bold as was the proposal it was endorsed heartily by his officers. San Domingo was one of the chief jewels in the Spanish crown. But two or three cities in the old country could rival it for strength, size, and beauty. As the oldest town in the Indies, and the seat of government for all the original Spanish colonies, it was the queen city of Philip's colonial empire, and throughout Europe had a renown scarcely inferior to that of the fabulous Quinsay

itself. It was known to be strongly fortified; indeed its strength hitherto had saved it from the fate which almost every other town in the West Indies had suffered. To attempt such a place was an operation far beyond anything that Drake had yet undertaken. His exploits hitherto had been against settlements hardly capable of serious defence, but he well understood the moral effect its capture would ensure, and as for the material advantages the special report of its riches which Sir Richard Grenville had sent home had set everyone's mouth watering.

In order not to waste the delay at Saint-Christopher's which the sanitation of the fleet demanded, the resolution once taken Drake immediately sent forward an advanced squadron with orders to reconnoitre the city and if possible to get into communication with the Maroons, who, as in Darien, were in possession of the highlands of the interior.¹ On the way a frigate bound for the city was picked up, and from her Greek pilot full information of the position was obtained. The harbour was protected by a difficult bar and entirely commanded by a castle very powerfully armed. So dangerous was the surf along the adjacent coast, that except under the guns of the citadel there was no practicable landing place for miles. For three days the advanced squadron kept the garrison harassed with constant alarms,² till on New Year's day, 1586, Drake approached with the main fleet to hear their report. He at once formed his plan of attack. It was on the same lines as at Santiago, but with some further elaborations. The master of the Spanish prize had been induced to point out a practicable landing place some ten miles from the harbour. It was commanded by watch houses, in which a picket was placed every night; but the Maroons, with whom communication had been successfully

¹ 'Advertisement concerning Sir Francis Drake.' *S.P. Dom.* clxxxix. 27, and cf. *ibid.* 42. None of these movements are mentioned by Biggs.

² *S.P. Col. Add. Cal.*, May 26, 1586. 'Sir Francis played with the Spaniards three days, making many false alarms as though he would have landed, and so wearied and tired them.'

established, were prepared to undertake that it should give no trouble. Having himself apparently examined the landing place and made final arrangements with the Maroons for waylaying the picket, at nightfall Drake ordered the whole of the troops into the boats and small craft of the fleet.¹ When all were embarked he placed himself at the head of the flotilla and in person piloted it through the surf. The Maroons had to report that every man of the Spanish picket had been despatched, and thus in absolute secrecy and without a note of alarm reaching the city the landing was successfully accomplished. By dawn the operation was complete, and then, writes Biggs, 'Our general having seen us all landed in safety, returned to his fleet bequeathing us to God and the good conduct of Master Carleill our Lieutenant-general.'

Having regained his ship Drake moved the fleet forward to San Domingo and came to anchor opposite the landing place that lay under the walls of the castle upon the same side of the city as that upon which Carleill was advancing. As the ships took up their stations, Drake ran out his guns and engaged the castle while the boats were lowered away, as though under cover of the bombardment he intended to force a landing. To oppose the threatened attack, horse, foot and artillery were seen to advance out of the city from the two gates nearest the shore, with the intention apparently of taking up a position facing the sea with the cavalry covering their right flank. Scarcely had they formed, however, than a loud alarm of drums and trumpets upon the right rear told them of the trap into which they had fallen. With music playing and standards flying Carleill's force to the number of over a thousand men was seen advancing in two columns to cut them off from the town.²


The Spaniards at once took up a new position covering the town gates, while their cavalry, in Colonial fashion,

¹ *S.P. Col. Add. Cal.* May 16, 1586, says '800 men.'

² *Ibid.* The writer regarded Drake's attack as a real one and not a mere feint. 'His ships,' he says, 'gave a whole charge.'

SAN-DOMINGO.

- A. Fires made by the Spaniards dwelling in the country upon sight of our ships, to give notice unto those of the town.
- B. The place where our pinnaces and ship-boats landed our soldiers, which might be some 10 miles from the city of St. Domingo
- C. A woody way where our army marched along the country to the city of St. Domingo, the same being a beaten broad highway.
- D. A large plain or place where the army was marshalled into order of battle, and so marched towards the city.
- E. A troop of shot sent before the vanguard to discover
- F. A troop of shot belonging to the vanguard, and was led a little before the squadron of pikes of the said vanguard.
- G. The squadron of pikes that had the vanguard, which squadron with the troops of shot belonging unto it consisted of three companies
- H. I. Two troops of shot marching on the right and left wing or flank of the vanguard.
- K. A troop of shot also of the vanguard and followed the pikes.
- L. The first troop of shot belonging to the battle and is the lesser of the twain that march before, appointed expressly to discover and to take knowledge of anything before.
- M. The second troop of shot, being the greater belonging to the main battle and marched next before the same.
- N. Troops of shot belonging to the main battle.
- O. The great squadron of pikes which carried the place of main-battle, which, with the troops of shot belonging unto it, consisted of four companies of 150 men to each company or thereabout.
- P. The squadron of pikes which made the rear guard, which, with the troops of shot thereunto belonging, consisted of three ensigns or companies.
- Q. Troops of shot belonging to the rear guard.
- R. The gate which Mr. Carleill, the Lieut.-General, entered with his companies, where was placed and discharged against us three pieces of ordnance.
- S. The gate where Capt. Powell entered with the vanguard.
- T. A great drove of kine and oxen of huge bigness which the enemy had driven upon us to put us out of order, that then their horsemen might better assal us.
- V. Two troops of horsemen of the enemy, which sometime charged our vanguard, but were quickly made to retire.
- X. Two troops of Spaniards which sometime we saw in fight.
- Y. A troop of shot of the army, which lay in ambush and discharged their volley of shot upon us hard by the gate when the Lieut.-General with his troops entered the city pell mell with them.
- Z. The place where the whole fleet anchored.
- AA. The market place of the city.
- BB. The great church, being very finely built and sumptuously furnished.
- CC. The castle wherein they had planted 50 pieces of ordnance, which commanded all the harbour, as well to seawards and also to the inward part thereof, being walled about with freestone, and was kept by the Spaniards after the town was lost the space of twelve hours until they saw us ready to enter by force and they fled over the river in boats.
- DD. The ships which they purposely drowned in the inner harbour, which upon our departure we consumed with fire.
- GG. Gardens which were very pleasant, &c.
- HH. A Friary at the top of a hill called St. Barbara.
- II. The way which a messenger went from the General up into the country to the Lord President of St. Domingo, being some 12 miles distant from the city.
- KK. A place called the White Tower.
- LL. A strange beast, drawn after the life, and is called by our English mariners Aligarta, by the Spaniards Caiman, &c.
- MM. A tortoise is a fish that lives in the sea. [Long descriptions of the last two items follow. The arms show the horse rampant, with the motto 'Non sufficit orbis,' on which the English officers rallied the Spaniards.]



SAN DOMINGO

threatened the English flank and rear under cover of a drove of cattle ; but so well had Carleill disposed his pikes and musketeers on every side, that they could effect nothing and were compelled to fall back on the infantry, while the English in two columns continued to advance steadily upon the guns. An ambuscade of musketeers beside the road had no better success. Still advancing, both columns received the fire of the Spanish guns at very close quarters. Several men fell, one close to Carleill's side. In those days the moral effect of artillery fire was greater even than it is now ; it was always with difficulty that troops could be brought to face it ; but Carleill gave them no time to consider. Calling on them to rush the guns before they could be reloaded, he gave the order for a charge. Regardless of another ambuscade, both columns broke into a run and charged at push of pike. So hotly was the attack pressed home that the Spaniards broke at the first onset, and friend and foe, mingled in a fierce hand-to-hand fight, were swept on through both gates pell-mell together. Nor did the stormers draw breath till the two columns met in the Plaza.

On board the fleet, which had now ceased firing for fear of injuring Carleill's men, the routed garrison were seen flying in boats across the harbour and out into the country beyond, and soon from the top of a tower the great St. George's ensign unfurled itself to proclaim Carleill's success, and as it floated out on the breeze the whole fleet saluted it with triumphant broadsides.¹

But the victory had yet to be secured. The city was far too large to be occupied by the small force at Carleill's disposal and the castle was still in the enemy's hands. But things were no worse than they had been at Nombre de Dios, and following the plan which Drake had adopted

¹ According to Captain Duro, the Spaniards were taken completely by surprise and had made no preparations for defence. The Governor, a civilian, fled at the first sight of the fleet and left the garrison to its fate. All they could muster, he says, were thirty mounted lancers and fifty harquebusiers (*Armada Española*, ii. 396). But this probably is taking no account of the local force of armed citizens.

there, Carleill secured his position by throwing up barricades across the approaches of the Plaza. This done preparations were made for a night assault upon the castle; but shortly after midnight, as Biggs says, 'hearing us busy about the gates,' probably with a petard, then the favourite method of assault, the garrison evacuated the place and followed their comrades across the harbour. 'Thus,' as they said, 'the Spaniards gave us the town for a New Year's gift.' With the evacuation of the castle Drake was able to take possession of the harbour and the whole of the shipping it contained. Among the prizes were a large French-built vessel, said to be the finest in the Indies, and the flag-galley of the station, besides a number of other vessels of the ordinary local type.¹

The following day, in order to provide quarters for the troops, the area of occupation was extended and protected with a circle of scientifically placed barricades and intrenchments armed with captured guns; and thus securely installed in the heart of the famous city they began to search for the expected half-million. Deep was

¹ Captain Duro (*Armada Española*, ii. p. 396) says, apparently on some Spanish authority, 'In the port they took a ship laden with hides, burnt the *galera real*, and ten or twelve coasting barks.' A Havre captain, whom Drake apparently released with his ship, brought back to France news that Drake had taken 'five great galleons, whereof a ship called the "Grand Guy" of 600 tons burden was one, a new ship French built, the like whereof was not in all Spain; 2 *saettias* whereon there attended 2 gallies, 5 foysts with 15 frigates. The most part he hath burnt, unless it were the "Grand Guy," and 3 galleons more which he hath carried with him' (*S.P. Dom.* clxxxix. 42). Biggs only mentions the king's galley (i.e. the *galera real* or flag-ship) as being there, and one great-ship which they rechristened 'The New Year's Gift,' and carried away laden with their plunder. The Spanish official account therefore may be nearer the truth than the story of the grateful French captain; but possibly it refers only to the vessels Drake captured, saying nothing of those which the Spaniards fired or scuttled to prevent them falling into his hands. An *armada* seems certainly to have been on the station at this time under one Alvaro Flores de Quiñones (Duro, *op. cit.* ii. 482), and as it gave Drake no trouble it may have been destroyed at San Domingo. Early in 1586 two galleys were sent to the city 'because those it had had were lost' (*ibid.*) The 'Primrosa' log says the Spaniards sank three ships in the mouth of the harbour, but mentions no other vessel except the 'very fair galley' and three ships they carried away.

the disappointment. Considerable quantities of copper money were obtained, but of gold and silver hardly any ; for in the older colonies like Hispaniola the Spanish native policy had almost exterminated the Indians, and labour for the mines being unprocurable they were no longer worked. Even in the richest houses, too, the seamen found that owing to the hot climate the inhabitants preferred porcelain and glass to plate, and as for the costly furniture, though of enormous value to the Spaniards, it was almost worthless as loot. The negotiations for a ransom were little more successful. Indeed at their outset they came near to being wrecked altogether. One day a Spanish officer rode up to an English *corps de garde* with a flag of truce on his lance. Drake, in accordance apparently with the custom of the Indies, sent out his own black servant boy to ascertain his business. The Spaniard, it seems, was an officer of the royal galley, and thinking perhaps that such a messenger was an insult cruelly ran him through with his lance and galloped away.¹ The boy had strength to crawl back with his tale and expired at the admiral's feet. Drake's kindly feelings for the negroes are well known, while the cruelties they suffered at the Spaniards' hands were a common theme of execration amongst the English Protestants, and it is hardly to be wondered at if the outrage aroused all the ferocity in Drake's nature. He made peremptory demand for the murderer's execution. This the Spaniards promised, but as it was not done he took his own measures. Amongst the prisoners were some friars. Two of these unhappy men were marched down next morning to the scene of the murder and there hanged by the Provost-Marshal in sight of the Spanish lines. At the same time by another prisoner a message was despatched to the Governor that two more would be hanged at the same hour every morning until the offending officer was given up.² The threat had due effect. On

¹ 'Primrose' log.

² The 'Primrose' log says nothing of this threat. The two friars, it

the morrow the culprit was brought to the gates to be delivered up to justice. But even this did not satisfy Drake. He insisted that the Spaniards themselves should execute the murderer, and this they accordingly had to do in the sight of both armies.

Thenceforth the negotiations went on more smoothly with a free interchange of hospitalities, but little other result. The Governor declared himself wholly unable to pay the heavy ransom demanded. Drake did not believe it, and to enforce his arguments sent a fatigue party of two hundred sailors under a strong escort outside his intrenchments and began to burn the city piecemeal. Day after day the process was repeated, but so substantially were the houses built that the occupation had been prolonged to a month before one third of the place was destroyed. The sailors were exhausted with the labour; and Drake was already six weeks behind time. Finally therefore, assured that no greater sum would be forthcoming, he agreed to accept a ransom of 25,000 ducats for the remainder of the town. The payment was soon arranged, and on February 1, exactly a month after the first attack, the whole force had been re-embarked and the fleet put to sea.

The force as a whole was delighted with the achievement. In the course of their long stay the men had unearthed a good deal more private plunder than was expected after the first disappointment and otherwise they seem thoroughly to have enjoyed themselves. 'We burned all their images of wood,' says the 'Primrose' log, 'brake and destroyed all their fairest work within the churches, and we had in this town much plate, money and pearls hidden in wells and other places.' As for Drake, he had the consolation that, though the exploit had proved pecuniarily less profitable than had been hoped, the moral and material injury to the Spanish power was enormous. 'It was such a cooling to King Philip,' one remarked in

says, were hanged 'in lieu of slaying the negro boy,' and the officer was executed three days after.

Europe when reports of the exploit came home, 'as never happened to him since he was King of Spain.' Apart from the ransom, which was equal to some 50,000*l.* of our money, the city had been completely gutted, the force had lived for a whole month in luxury at free quarters, the fleet was entirely revictualled from the Spanish stores, two hundred and forty guns and quantities of merchandise were snug in the holds of the English ships, their ranks recruited from scores of liberated galley-slaves, Turk as well as Christian, the best of the prizes added to the fleet, and the Galley Royal and all the rest of the shipping entirely destroyed. Even of more importance was the blow to Spanish prestige and the corresponding elevation of spirit in the English ranks. On the great staircase of the Government Palace they had found displayed an escutcheon whereon was painted a horse *rampant* with one foot on a terrestrial globe and the rest in the air. Its motto was *Non sufficit orbis*, as though the world itself were not great enough to contain Philip's power. Under the circumstances the English officers found the humour of the thing irresistible, and amused themselves by asking their Spanish visitors to oblige them by explaining the meaning of the device, to their guests' considerable embarrassment. 'For by some of our company,' says Biggs, 'it was told them that if the Queen of England would resolutely prosecute the wars against the King of Spain, he should be forced to lay aside that proud and unreasonable reaching vein of his; for he should find more than enough to do to keep that which he had already, as by the present example of their lost town they might for a beginning perceive well enough.' This was the doctrine which Drake had been preaching from his youth up. At last he had been able to demonstrate the truth of it; and so with his whole force vibrating to his own spirit of confidence in the national power he passed on to fresh exploits.

The next place on his programme was the Island of Margarita, off the Spanish Main, from which he antici-

pated considerable plunder and whose ports he meant to deprive of their means of defence. It was to have been done two months before. Yet in spite of the lost time he was loth to omit any part of his scheme. The course was accordingly laid for the island; but so tempestuous and contrary did the weather prove, that he could make nothing further east than Cape de la Vela.¹ Here he arrived on February 5 and at once bore up for his next point. This was Rio de la Hacha, where old scores were still unpaid. Reaching it next day he detached Frobisher to work to the westward close in along the coast, to endeavour to pick up some pilots for Cartagena. What else happened we do not know. He stayed there but a single day, and then moved on to the capital.²

In capturing a pilot Frobisher was unsuccessful, so that for guidance in his operations against the capital of the Spanish Main Drake had to rely on the knowledge which he and his followers had picked up so hardly in the old pirate days, when drenched and chilled, without food or shelter, they had ridden out the long storm in their pinnaces in spite of all the Spaniards could do to drive them from the harbour. No city in America was more difficult of approach. It was built close down to the coast, its sea-face to the west, but on this side there was

¹ Neither Pretty nor the 'Primrose' log mentions this. The only authority for it is a curious poem by one Thomas Greepe, entitled the *Employtes of Syr Frauncis Drake*, London 1587. It is one of the most remarkable features of the Elizabethan age that its higher literature displays hardly a trace of having been influenced by the exploits of the seamen. Greepe's is almost the only poem directly inspired by them, and it was nothing but a doggerel ballad. Here is the passage in question, as a specimen of his mettle:

'Then presently they sailed thence
To one rich island they were bent;
But wind and storm turned their pretence
And other course they did invent.

With Cartagena they set at last,
Where all their fleet their anchors cast.'

The plan of operations (*Lansd. MSS.* 100 f. 98) makes it clear that this 'rich island' was Margarita.


² Biggs in his narrative does not even mention the visit to Rio de la Hacha. For our knowledge of the stay there we are indebted to the log attached to the map.

no approach for ships. Its harbour was formed by a long lagoon which stretched along the coast for several leagues southward. The long and narrow neck of land which separated the lagoon from the open sea was pierced at each end by a natural channel. At the extreme south, some two leagues from the city, was the dangerous *Boca Chica*, or 'Little Mouth,' and about three miles nearer to the city was the main entrance known as the *Boca Grande* or 'Great Mouth.' At right angles from the land which lies between the *Boca Grande* and the city walls, a natural breakwater ran inward and eastward across the lagoon, forming an inner harbour and leaving a narrow channel which gave access to it from the outer haven close to the mainland. This narrow entrance was barred by a chain; opposite to it a broad creek impracticable for ships led away from the inner port, completely encircling the city on its eastern and northern sides and terminating in a marsh close to the sea. Thus except for this marsh and the piece of land which lay between the city wall and the *Boca Grande* and divided the inner harbour from the sea, Cartagena was entirely surrounded by water, and access to it from the mainland was only to be had by a narrow stone causeway three hundred yards long which crossed the encircling creek at the point where it left the inner harbour, and here on the mainland was placed as a *tête de pont* a fort which commanded both the causeway and the entrance from the outer haven.¹ Having been warned of Drake's coming some three weeks previously the Spaniards had had time to collect a garrison of some strength, and the Governor had at his command a force of 50 lancers, 450 harquebusiers, 100 pikemen, 20 negro musketeers, and 400 Indian bowmen. Besides these there were 150 regular harquebusiers serving in the two galleys that were attached to the port as guardships under Don Pedro Vique Manrique, general of the coast of the Spanish

¹ For a description of Cartagena as it was in 1587 see Batista Antonio's official report to the King in *Hakluyt*.

CARTAGENA.

- A. The place where the whole fleet anchored.
- B. The place where the pinnaces and ship-boats did set the soldiers ashore.
- C. The way which our army marched along the sea side.
- D. Small sticks in great numbers of half a yard long . . . all dressed with a most villainous and mortal poison.
- E. The troop of pikes and shot which had the vanguard of our army.
- F. A fortification built of stone-work clean over the neck of land, very orderly done . . . and within were five pieces of great ordnance, sakers and demi-culverins . . . and 300 men, pikes and shot.
- G. Two great galleys, to flank us in our approach, in which galleys were planted eleven pieces of ordnance and 400 soldiers . . . all small shot.
- H. A great galleasse well furnished with ordnance which she employed as she might but not to any purpose.
- I. The Spaniards flying away after our entry.
- K. Certain pinnaces of ours which entertained a little skirmish with the fort of the haven.
- L. The fort which kept the inner haven.
- M. The place where the two galleys were burned.
- N. The place where our fleet anchored the second time, which was after the town was won.
- O. Ships of theirs we burned.
- P. The market place.
- Q. The church, which was newly builded of very fair stone-work, which was by us much ruined again by a chance in shooting a piece.
- R. A bridge by which the Spaniards took their flight.
- S. The place where our ships anchored the third time being upon our departure.
- T. An island wherein is planted as in an orchard a great number of delicate fruits.
- V. A beast called a Guana . . . a very delicate meat [long description follows].
- X. Two lakes of standing water, being brackish.



CARTAGENA

Main, an officer of wide and distinguished service.¹ In face of dispositions so formidable, it was clear to Drake that the only possible point for an assault was from the piece of land between the *Boca Grande* and the walls. The Spaniards, however, well knew the weak spot. It was here forty years before that Sores the French corsair had effected his entrance when he held their city to ransom, and precautions had been taken against a repetition of the experience.² Although of considerable width where the breakwater that formed the inner harbour ran out from it, the land in question narrowed down before the walls were reached to a width of one hundred and thirty paces,³ and at this point an entrenchment had been made, which in anticipation of Drake's arrival had been considerably added to and strengthened. From the inner harbour to the sea it entirely barred the way, and not only was its glacis so elaborately defended with poisoned stakes and entanglements as to make a night attack impossible, but its whole front could be enfiladed by the guns and small arms of a large galleasse and Manrique's two galleys moored for the purpose in the inner harbour.

Without disgrace Drake might well have confessed himself beaten, but he was not. His genius for amphibious warfare was quick to detect in these apparently impregnable dispositions a weak point which had escaped all the science of the Spaniards, and with fine elaboration he set about reaping his advantage. It was on February 9 he arrived and passing by the city and the *Boca Grande* so close as to draw the fire of the batteries, in the afternoon with the utmost skill and daring he himself piloted the whole fleet in through the dangerous *Boca Chica* at the far end of the lagoon. The reason of this hazardous move is nowhere stated; but it is clear it must have raised in the minds of the astonished Spaniards, who had already received information of his operations in

¹ Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. 396.

² *Ibid.* i. 210, and Batista Antonio's report.

³ B. Antonio's report. Biggs says 'barely 50.'

Hispaniola, that he must mean, as at San Domingo, to slip his troops ashore secretly and attack from the main land. His next move also was calculated to confirm such an impression ; for he now proceeded to work back up the lagoon, till he was off the inner end of the *Boca Grande* and there he came to anchor about a mile from the entrance of the inner harbour. The position he had taken up threatened an attempt to force the harbour defences, and further to mislead the enemy Frobisher was ordered to prepare for a demonstration against the harbour fort with the flotilla. This was an exact repetition of the proceedings at San Domingo, but it was almost certainly intended only to distract the attention of the garrison from the real point of attack. At nightfall, under cover of the woods which spread over the land between the fleet and the town, Carleill and his soldiers were quietly landed in the *Boca Grande* with instructions to make their way diagonally through the woods until they reached the shore, and then, instead of advancing on the front of the intrenchments, to wade along in the wash of the surf until they were close enough for a rush. This was a key-note of the attack, and one not untouched with genius. For by thus approaching in the sea the greater part of their advance would not only avoid the obstacles on the glacis and be out of the fire area of the guns in the intrenchment, but it would also be covered from the enfilading fire of the galleys by the swell of the land.

Once landed they began to grope their way in the dark, losing much time by a mistake of their guide. Some two miles from the town they encountered a strong cavalry picket, but the bushy ground being impracticable for horse, it merely exchanged shot and retired. The sound of Carleill in contact with the enemy seems to have been the signal for Frobisher to develop his feint, for immediately the Spanish picket retired the shore party could hear the sound of the guns as the flotilla engaged the fort.¹ Continuing their way they soon reached the

¹ Biggs seems to have thought that this movement was meant for a real

shore and having waded along until they were within striking distance they halted in the water to form for the attack. The vanguard or forlorn was committed to Sampson and Goring, the former commanding the pikes and the latter the musketeers. Then came the Sergeant-major, Powell, with the main-battle of four companies, and lastly Captain Morgan, who had led the forlorn at San Domingo, bringing up the rear. Wynter was also with the force, having in his eagerness for a fight persuaded Cecil to change commands with him, he taking Cecil's company and Cecil his ship.¹ Reconnoitring the intrenchment with the first glimmer of dawn, Carleill could see that it did not extend quite down to the sea, since it had been necessary to allow room for the retiring picket to pass round the end of it to regain the town. This space, however, had been closed with large wine pipes filled with earth, and piled one on the top of the other, extending from the end of the intrenchment right into the sea. Here where the guns neither of the galleys nor of the intrenchment could be brought to bear, he resolved to deliver his assault. Attaching himself to the vanguard he gave the signal. Goring's musketeers ran forward and delivered a volley in the Spaniards' faces, and immediately Sampson's men passing through their ranks came to push of pike. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle began. 'Down went

attack. As usual, however, he appears to understand nothing of the fleet tactics. He does not even mention that the entry was made at the *Boca Chica*. 'There could be nothing gotten by the attempt,' he says, 'more than the giving of them of an alarm on the other side of the haven, being a mile and a half from the place we were now at.' The 'Primrose' log inclines to agree with Biggs, describing the operation thus: 'God fought for us; for our ships could not come near the town for lack of water to batter it, and where our pinnaces should go in was but the length of two ships, and it was chained over from the castle with 16 pieces of ordnance in this narrow gutter; yet we did attempt it, though we had the rudder of our pinnace shot away and men's hats from their heads and the top of our main mast beaten in pieces, the oars stricken out of our men's hands as they rowed, and our captain like to have been killed.'

¹ Wynter, who certainly had a company at starting, had probably lost it through some reorganisation which had taken place in consequence of the number of men who had died. The companies under Carleill in this attack seem to have been six only.

butts of earth,' says Biggs, 'and pell-mell came our swords and pikes together after our shot had first given a volley, even at the enemy's nose. Our pikes were somewhat longer than theirs and our bodies better armed, for very few of them were armed¹: with which advantage our swords and pikes grew too hard for them and they driven to give place. In this furious entry the Lieutenant-general slew with his own hands the chief ensign-bearer of the Spaniards, who fought very manfully till his life's end.' Indeed all the chief officers were in the thick of the fight. The gallant Sampson, leading the entry sword in hand, was wounded. Goring engaged the officer commanding the position blade to blade, wounded him and took him prisoner; and Wynter fought at Carleill's side. Fired by such example the Englishmen gave the broken defenders no time for breath. Without a pause they drove them, as at San Domingo, in through the city gates, and following them furiously fought their way over barricade after barricade, where the Spaniards made desperate stands, till again the stormers halted triumphant in possession of the Plaza.²

¹ That is, they had no armour, and were what the Italian specialists called *pichi secchi*. The Spaniards in those hot climates used armour very little, quilted cotton jacks being sufficient protection against the native weapons and much lighter and cooler than regular armour.

² Greepe, who seems to have picked up many little incidents in conversation with those who were present, adds here in curious touch:

'They made a sconce within the street,
And placed great ordnance in the same
To charge the watch, when't came to night,
To daunt their foes, their rage to tame.
Being shot off, their thundering sound,
So shook their church, the roof fell down.'

The 'Primrose' log confirms this, saying, 'They were building a great new church in this town and by our shooting off a great piece of ordnance that stood near the church a great part thereof was shaken down.' Captain Duro says at the first sight of the English 'forlorn' the defenders fled with hardly the semblance of resistance, and wonders why it was the Spanish soldiers in the colonies were so different from those in Flanders. He puts it down to bad leading, but the absence of armour and the inferiority of the Spanish weapons are quite enough to account for it. Moreover, the English account of the fight is too detailed for us to believe that no defence at all was made. Any stand was creditable, seeing that the garrison was out-

The town was now theirs ; for having lost the Plaza the Spaniards abandoned all hope of resistance, and fled over the causeway up into the hills, where they had sent their women and children for safety. The fort on the mainland however still held out ; but the following day on Drake's moving in the fleet with his guns run out for a bombardment, it too was evacuated.

So the capital of the Spanish Main was taken. Though not half the size of San Domingo, it was both from its strategical position and its wealth of far higher importance. The older city though still the principal seat of government had lost its commercial pre-eminence and was inhabited chiefly by officials and lawyers. As a trade centre Cartagena had taken its place. Both on account of its excellent harbour and the convenience of its situation it had become the headquarters of the fleet of Tierra Firme and the Atlantic depôt of the South Sea trade ; and here lived the richest merchants in the Indies. In the programme its sack is put down as worth a million ducats, and to make up for past disappointments Drake demanded for its ransom 100,000*l*. It was a sum which at that time was regarded as is a million to-day. The Governor protested his total inability to pay it, and offered 100,000 ducats or about a fourth part of what Drake asked. Week after week the negotiations went on with little to show for them but international hospitalities till Drake lost patience and resolved to bring the usual pressure to bear. The city was given over to the sack, the whole of the shipping in the harbour was destroyed, and again the process of burning the outer quarters of the place piecemeal was commenced. Still the Spaniards remained obstinate and when a month had gone by Drake called a council of war to consider how best to turn his conquest to account. As at Santiago and San Domingo the sack had produced hardly anything of value. The

manœuvred and overmastered both in numbers and arms. The 'Primrose' log says their fire was very severe, and that 'they galled many of our men in the town. We lost in this skirmish 28 men besides those that were hurt.

inhabitants had had time to remove their treasure into the hills, and Drake's men, who were all volunteers and unpaid, were grumbling at this third disappointment.

The position was far from favourable. During the recent hard fighting the English force had suffered considerable loss, mainly from the poisoned arrows and stakes of the Indian auxiliaries, and this added to the work of the epidemic, which had never really left them, had reduced Drake's numbers very seriously. Many of his best officers were gone, including his earliest and most trusted follower Tom Moone, who in taking possession of two frigates, which had run themselves ashore, had fallen a victim to an ambush of musketeers, such as years before had tried in vain to ensnare Drake himself.¹ In view therefore of a renewed activity in the sickness, which now began to show itself, three courses were open to them.² Drake's fixed intention had been after taking Cartagena to realise his first dream and crown the campaign with the capture of the third provincial capital Panama; but it was now a serious question, whether his force was strong enough for the task even with the support of the Maroons.

The alternatives were either to accept a smaller ransom for Cartagena and close the campaign; or to hold the place as a base for future operations till reinforcements could be fetched from England. These were the questions submitted by the Admiral to his council, who for the purpose of considering them were divided into a military and a naval committee. To the first question the military officers replied that, considering the weakness to which they were reduced and the demoralisation of the men after three disappointments of plunder, they were of opinion that an attempt on Panama was on the whole not worth the risk; but at the same time they earnestly pro-

¹ Amongst the officers who were lost in the expedition by sickness or casualties were Captains Powell, Varney, Moone, Fortescue, Biggs, Cecil, Hannam, and Grenville; Lieutenants Thomas Tucker, Alex. Storkey, and Escot; Gentlemen—George Cavendish, Nich. Wynter, Alex. Carleill, Robert Alexander, Scroope, James Dier, Peter Duke.

² The 'Primrose' log says they lost here a hundred men by sickness.

tested they were ready to go anywhere and do anything Drake ordered. As to keeping the town, they considered that, although but seven hundred men remained fit for service, it might be held with this force against all comers, and they declared themselves ready to do it, provided the sea-officers thought that with the strength that remained to man the ships they could give a good account of any Spanish fleet that might come to recover the place. In case the naval committee felt unable to take this responsibility, then the only course left was to accept the 100,000 ducats already offered, which might now be done without dishonour, seeing the havoc they had made. To this last alternative it must be recorded to their high credit they added a self-denying proviso, that in case it should be adopted not a man of them would claim a penny of the ransom, so that the private soldiers might secure the whole benefit of the officers' shares. The naval committee, it seems, did not feel justified in giving the undertaking the soldiers suggested; for shortly afterwards a ransom of 110,000 ducats was paid and preparations were made to evacuate the gutted city. Before leaving, however, the Spaniards' attention was called to the fact that neither the harbour-fort nor an outlying monastery was within the city. For these places two further sums of 1,000 crowns were demanded. For the monastery the money was paid; for the fort it was refused, and the work was therefore blown up and demolished. So, after six weeks' stay, at the end of March Drake put to sea with a ransom equal to about a quarter of a million of our money,¹ and his prizes loaded down with the merchandise of the Spanish warehouses, as well as over sixty captured guns, all the bells and metal in the town, numbers more liberated galley-slaves, Turks, Greeks, negroes, Frenchmen, and Spaniards, and quantities of the rich silks and furniture of the merchants' houses. Once he had to return, for

¹ The 110,000 ducats at 5s. 6d. come to 30,250l.; the 1,000 crowns at 6s. to 300l., or 30,550l. in all.

the 'New Year's Gift,' the finest of his San Domingo prizes, was found to be in a sinking condition. In alarm the Spaniards again fled the town. But Drake quickly reassured them, promising that if he was allowed free use of their ovens to bake biscuit none but bakers should land.¹ This was agreed to, and under the protection of the town officials the biscuit-baking went on merrily night and day, while the crew and cargo of the unseaworthy prize were distributed amongst the other ships. A week was thus spent, and then Drake finally took up his old homeward course.

The evacuation of Cartagena was considered by the strategists of the time to be the great mistake of Drake's life. Sir William Monson, the highest authority, held that great captain as Drake was, he forfeited by this all claim to be a great general. 'It seems,' he wrote, 'our long peace made us incapable of advice in war; for had we kept and defended these places, when in our possession, and provided to have been relieved and succoured out of England, we had diverted the war from this part of Europe; for at that time there was no comparison between the strength of Spain and England by sea; by means whereof we might have better defended them and with more ease encroached upon the rest of the Indies, than the King of Spain would have aided and succoured them.' And of the whole expedition he says: 'If it had been as well considered of before their going from home, as it was happily performed by the valour of the undertakers, it had more annoyed the King of Spain than all other actions that ensued during the time of the war.' This is all undoubtedly true. Had Drake been able to establish a garrison and a sufficiently manned fleet at Cartagena, it is difficult to see where the disastrous effects on Philip's power would have ended. A hostile naval station would thus have been planted as it were in rear of his base on what was in fact his main line of supply; and so long as it could have been maintained, the whole western trade

¹ 'Primrose' log.

would have been disorganised, if not entirely interrupted, and Spanish finance must have collapsed. Further when we consider the possibility of organising the Maroons and Drake's proved influence over them, when we think of the liberal tendency of the Spanish colonists, which was the chief cause of Philip's dread of Lutheran contact with them, of their hatred of the Inquisition, their impatience of the harassing restrictions with which the home Government throttled their trade, and above all their eagerness for free commerce with the English, it is impossible to deny that the war might have been transferred entirely to the New World and that we might have served Spain as she afterwards served us, when by placing her fleet at the disposition of France, she enabled the bulk of our North American colonies to sever their connection with the crown.¹ At the same time, we now know that it is unfair to blame Drake with the miscarriage. Monson's chief services were rendered towards the end of the war when the queen had thrown herself heart and soul into it and was taking a strenuous offensive; he constantly displays a curious ignorance of recent history and probably he had but little conception of the conditions under which hostilities opened or of the difficulties the military leaders had to encounter in persuading the queen even to sanction any drastic operations at all. He did not know how fondly she had clung to peace, how she never would consent to put forth her naval power, hoping to the last that a telling demonstration of it would be enough to bring Philip to terms. It would therefore be more just rather to admire in Drake the vigour of personality and the intensity of confidence which enabled him thus hobbled to accomplish so much as he did. Had Monson known that it was an integral part of Drake's design to hold Havana, a still more vital point than Cartagena, he would hardly have passed the criticism he did.

¹ For the eagerness of Spanish colonies to trade with us and their persistent evasion of Philip's navigation laws, see 'Mendoza to the King,' *Spanish Calendar*, 1580, &c. p. 600.

The discovery of Drake's plan of campaign affords clear evidence that he fully appreciated the value of what he was giving up. But the question was not one of pure strategy. It was complicated by considerations of finance. In the eyes of the Government at home plunder was at least as important as the acquisition of a naval station. For the queen, as for all her predecessors, with the exception perhaps of her large minded father, the Navy was a revenue rather than a spending department. Both in peace and war it was still for her in a measure what the merchantmen were to her ship-owning subjects, and courtier as Drake had become, he could not be ignorant that the only way of securing his reputation and obtaining a free hand was by making the Navy pay. Thus he must not be accused hastily of want of strategical insight if his immediate anxiety was not the loss of Cartagena, but something entirely different.

The homeward voyage we know was much delayed. At the Cayman Islands and at Cape Antonio it was found necessary to stay for water and to refresh the invalids ashore. At the Cape so little water was found that two attempts were made to get to Matanzas, a port that lies in a deep bay some seventy miles to the eastward of Havana. But so fierce was the wind that the idea of occupying the place had finally to be given up. Still it was not till May 23, a month after their first reaching Cape Antonio, that the fleet held away for Florida.¹ It is difficult to believe that this long delay at the vital point of the Spanish American trade was dictated by want of water alone, especially as the 'Primrose' log tells us they

¹ Captain Duro (*Armada Española*, ii. 397) says that on May 19-29 they looked into Havana, and finding too strong a display of force there returned to Matanzas. Of this the English authorities say nothing. Both Biggs and the 'Primrose' log agree Matanzas was the place aimed at, and it is difficult to believe that in view of the resolution taken at Cartagena and the state of the fleet any serious attempt on Havana was contemplated. If the meaning of the visit was not to look out for the treasure ships that rendezvoused there, it was most probably merely a reconnaissance with a view to future operations.

succeeded in watering when they were first driven back to Cape Antonio. We know at any rate that this was about the regular time for the convoy of the Spanish Main and Peru to sail, and that sometime during the voyage Drake was within an ace of capturing one of the treasure fleets. In reporting his return to Lord Burghley—and this is the only comment we have from his pen on the voyage—before even so much as referring to what he had achieved, he hastens to excuse himself for not having succeeded in doing so ‘So let me assure your good Lordship, that I will make it apparent to your honour, that it scaped us but twelve hours the whole treasure which the King of Spain had out of the Indies, this last year—the cause best known to God—and we had in that instant very foul weather.’ This grave disappointment, so inexplicable to the Admiral’s theology, can hardly have happened, except at this time,¹ and in his anxiety to excuse himself to the Government we possibly see the frustrated hopes that led him to believe he would be able to show for his voyage something more welcome than the keys of Cartagena.


Drake’s behaviour during this trying time called forth the loud admiration of his officers. With the instinct for command born in his pirate days, he posed to his men in the hour of sickness, depression and disappointment rather as the comrade chosen to lead them than as their admiral. ‘I do wrong,’ writes Biggs, in speaking of how painfully they watered at Cape Antonio when forced back there by the weather, ‘if I should forget the good example of the General at this place, who to encourage others and to hasten the getting of fresh water aboard the ships took no less pain himself than the meanest; as also at San Domingo, Cartagena, and other places . . . with such wonderful travail of body as doubtless had he been the

¹ Ellis, ii. 304; *Iansd. MSS.* 51, art. 14. His letter may, however, refer to the forty sail of Spaniards, which on the way out to Palma he heard from a French corsair he had just missed at Cape Saint Vincent. See ‘Primrose’ log.

SAINT-AUGUSTINE.

- A. The place where the whole fleet came to anchor.
- B. The place where the pinnaces and ship-boats did set us on shore.
- C. The beacon or high scaffold standing on the sandhills, wherein the Spaniards did use to discover ships at sea.
- D. The way our army marched along the sands by the seaside towards their fort.
- E. The place where our pinnaces put our ordnance on land.
- F. A low plain or meadow ground through which our troops passed to go towards the woods right over against the Spaniards' fort.
- G. A wood growing hard by the river side, having between it and the river side a high bank of sand, in which wood our men encamped themselves; and in the said great bank of sand, being fitted for the purpose, was placed also two pieces of ordnance to beat the Spanish fort, which was done with such expedition as they were planted and discharged twice or thrice the same day we landed, meaning the next day to have more ordnance brought and to have it planted on the same side of the river, whereon the fort is; whither Master Carleill our Lieut.-General was minded the same night to transport himself and some part of the army, to lodge himself in some trenches close by the fort; but the Spaniards perceiving the approach abandoned the place before day.
- H. A pinnacle which the Spaniards had lying hard by their fort in the little river.
- I. The fort which the Spaniards had made of the bodies of cedar trees. They placed therein some 14 great and long pieces of artillery, which at our arrival there to the sand bank played upon us. The fort was called Saint John de Pinos, which afterward we burned.
- K. Our pinnaces as they rowed up the river being all full of men, who, because the way was not passable, were fain to embark themselves to take the town of St. Augustine which, being won, at our departure was burned to the ground.
- L. The town of St. Augustine where dwelled 150 Spanish soldiers.
- M. A town house.
- N. A high scaffold for a watchman.
- O. The church.
- P. The lively portraiture of a fish called the Dolphin, &c. [description follows].

NOTE.—Just above the town Capt. Powell, on a captured horse, appears, pursuing the retreating Spaniards single-handed. A little higher again is shown his death.



SAINT-AUGUSTINE.

meanest person, as he was the chiefest, he had yet deserved the chief place of honour.'

To the disappointment of their high hopes of loot the homeward voyage was not without consolation. On the coast of Florida, Saint Augustine was visited, where the Spaniards were establishing a settlement on the site of that of the Huguenots which Menendez had so ruthlessly destroyed. This they entirely obliterated, and the fort yielded plunder of a dozen more great brass guns and a pay-chest containing about two thousand pounds. On the other hand Drake had to deplore the loss of Powell, who was shot in endeavouring to get intelligence by capturing a prisoner with his own hand. The other settlement of Saint Helena they were unable to attempt for lack of a pilot to direct them through the shoals. So continuing their way they searched the coast northward to find Raleigh's colony, which Sir Richard Grenville had planted in Virginia. On June 9 it was discovered with Ralph Lane established as Governor in his fort at Roanoak Island. The main fleet, being unable to enter, anchored outside, while Drake communicated with Lane, offering to supply him with everything he wanted, including ships and men, to continue his discoveries or else to carry the whole colony home. Lane stoutly chose the former. A ship was therefore loaded with stores for the purpose, but in the night a gale set in, which lasted three days with such violence that several of Drake's ships were driven from their anchors and Lane's store-vessel was cast away. The result was that the courage of the colonists was so much damped by the disaster that they changed their determination and begged Drake to carry them home. And thus it was that as England's first conquests in America were abandoned, her first colony was abandoned too; and it seemed as though in the very hour in which at last her naval power stood revealed to the world, fate had determined that neither by arms nor peaceful settlement was she destined ever to establish an empire beyond the ocean.

Still the whole affair was a triumphant success. 'My very good Lord,' wrote Drake to Burghley when he got back to Plymouth, 'there is now a very great gap opened, very little to the liking of the King of Spain. God work it all to His glory.' This with an eager request for fresh orders was all he had to say of an exploit that filled Europe with amazement. The plunder was considerable. Some two hundred and forty pieces of ordnance, of which over two hundred were brass, with a large proportion of the heaviest calibres, were ballasting his ships, and these with the prizes, ransoms, jewels and treasure added to the private loot of the men, of which no return was ever made, must have amounted to more than half a million of our money.¹

The damage done by the destruction of fortifications, galleys, and shipping and in the consumption of stores must have been at least as great, and all this only represented the calculable outcome. Far more important than all was the moral effect in Europe. Shortly before Drake had sailed, Antwerp had capitulated to Parma, and the Counter-reformation had reached its highest point. All that was left of Protestantism seemed about to be submerged beneath the flowing tide of Spanish empire, when suddenly it was checked. For the moment Spanish credit was completely shattered. The sources of Philip's wealth and power seemed to be at Elizabeth's mercy. Parma, unable to get money for his starving army from the

¹ Full accounts of the proceeds of the voyage are in the *Lansdowne MSS.* lii. No. 36. Another copy is in the *Asimolean MSS.* Other papers relating to them are in *S.P. Dom.* cxc. 38 & cxcv. 79. The cost of the expedition up to the day of sailing was over 60,000*l.*, which Drake consented to reduce to 57,000*l.* After paying the men their third share of the proceeds, there remained about 46,000*l.* for the adventurers. On this the audit committee recommended a dividend of 15*s.* in the pound, with hope of a shilling more. This left Drake largely out of pocket, and with nothing for the services of himself and his officers; and the committee strongly urge their claims upon the Government, 'considering the worthiness of this enterprise, which hath been so well performed to the honour of her majesty and our country.' No evidence could be stronger of how little Drake and the gentlemen who followed him were influenced by monetary considerations.

Flemish capitalists, could not move. 'They are drawing their purse strings very tight,' he wrote, as the news began to reach Europe, 'and will make no accommodation. The most contemplative of them ponder much over this success of Drake.' In the great commercial centres it was reported that the Bank of Seville had broken, and that that of Venice was likely to follow. Philip himself failed to raise a loan of half a million ducats, and in Paris it was thought he must become bankrupt.¹ In spite of the vast preparations against England, which for a year past had been the talk of every exchange and court in Western Europe, he had not been able to lift a finger to help himself. It was not till April 16, nearly six months after Drake's defiance at Bayona, that Santa Cruz got his flying squadron to sea, and in the very zenith of her power Spain became a laughing stock. 'Truly,' wrote Lord Burghley, who only half approved of what had been done, 'Sir Francis Drake is a fearful man to the King of Spain.'²

¹ Motley, *United Netherlands*, i. 475. French and Spanish advertisements, *S.P. Dom.* clxxxix. 24. Walsingham to Leicester, *Leyc. Corr.* p. 24, April 11, 1586, and *ibid.* July 29.

² See *post*, p. 116 *n.*

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS ON THE SPANISH COAST

THAT the forces which again and again had availed to avert the great war could withstand so sounding a blow as that which Drake had given to Philip's prestige was already regarded as impossible when in the midst of the ovation, with which he was received on his return, was revealed the great 'Babington Plot.' The assassination of Elizabeth, it was declared, was to be followed by an insurrection in Mary Stuart's favour, supported by the Guises and Spain. The ring-leaders were arrested; Mary was placed in close confinement, charged with complicity in the plot, a threat of war from France immediately followed and no one could tell what Scotland would do. The crisis was come at last, and every preparation was made to meet it. The fleet was mobilised to guard the Narrow Seas, and for the first weeks after Drake's return the only question was how best to repeat his stroke. But war did not come. Once more the diplomatists took possession of the stage. In spite of every provocation Philip with shattered credit and an exhausted treasury had no mind to play dog to the Pope and hound his stray sheep back to the fold for nothing, and until he had some security that Rome would pay a large share of the expense of the English Enterprise he would not take the irrevocable step. The prevailing idea at the Vatican was that with or without assistance the Spaniard must undertake the conquest of England in order to save his Indian trade. But Philip, as we know,

had learnt from Menendez another alternative, and he instructed his ambassador to point out to the Pope that his Indian trade and his own coasts would equally well be secured by making himself master of the sea.¹ In other words, his private ends could be attained by the creation of a powerful fleet at a much smaller cost than would be entailed by the difficult English Enterprise. To enforce this attitude he was professing to listen to Elizabeth's old excuse that Drake had exceeded his instructions. The queen, whose pre-occupation in life was a prosperous peace, was ready enough to play Philip's game. Her part was to persuade him, as Alva so earnestly had advised, of the advantage of a lasting understanding with her, and for the time she was content with her favourite device of seeing that he should continue to feel the smart of the gall where her power chafed him. Leicester had been sent to the Netherlands; Hawkins, much against his will, was torn from his administrative duties, and after long years ashore was ordered off to sea again on a cruise for the Plate fleet; while Drake was kept at home in constant communication with Don Antonio to threaten an expedition to Portugal, the Azores, or the East Indies.²

How far the queen was in earnest about a real effort on behalf of the Portuguese pretender she herself probably did not know. So much depended on the turn of the diplomatic cards; but Drake was certainly allowed to go very far. Not only was he given to understand that he might prepare an expedition to sail under Don Antonio's flag, but he was permitted to open negotiations with the Netherlands for a strong Dutch contingent. There are traces even of a deeper design. In 1583 Don Antonio, after the failure of his first attempt to recover his crown, had taken in desperation the same unscrupulous step with

¹ 'The King to Count de Olivares,' November 13, 1586, *Spanish Calendar*, p. 657.

² Of Hawkins's cruise I can find no mention in any English authority — probably because it was entirely unproductive. In view of the Spanish reports it is difficult to doubt that it did take place in the autumn. (See *Spanish Calendar*, 1580, &c., pp. 632, 640–2, 649, 653, 661, 666, 677.)

which Francis I. had fouled the name of France in the eyes of all Christendom. The Porte, which was now recovering from the effects of Lepanto, was again becoming a terror to the Mediterranean powers, and to it he resolved to apply for a fleet in support of his cause, as a measure against the common enemy. The mission was so far successful that it is said Don Antonio was promised that if he would send a properly accredited ambassador he should have a fleet of a hundred sail. In April 1584, he was again suspected of carrying on these negotiations through the French Ambassador at the Porte, and in January 1586, just after, as it will be remembered, he had found an asylum in Drake's country house, his special agents were reported to be on their way to Constantinople.

At this very time Harboard, the accredited diplomatic agent of Elizabeth and the English merchants, had succeeded after an astute and dogged struggle in routing the French Ambassador from his diplomatic monopoly and establishing direct and cordial relations between St. James's and the Porte. Already he had obtained from the Sultan some kind of an assurance that if England would declare war upon the arch-idolater the Porte would do the same. A formidable opponent, however, still remained to the English agent. This was the Capitan-Pacha, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Navy, who above all men it was his interest to win over, as in all warlike matters his influence was the highest, and in his hands moreover lay the safety of the English merchantmen. As yet his efforts had been of no avail; but on April 2 the Venetian Ambassador, who was watching these negotiations with extreme suspicion, had an incident to report that not a little alarmed him. 'Drake,' he wrote to the Doge, 'the famous English corsair and captain well known to your serenity, has sent as a present to the Capitan-Pacha many vases of silver, although he does not know the Pacha personally. The present condition of affairs is the real cause of the gift.' The Turkish admiral, unable to resist so flattering an attention from the greatest seaman

of his time, accepted the presents, and sent to Harboard to inquire Drake's name and titles, that he might send the customary gifts in return. Harboard, however, scented a trick to get the presents home not through him but through the captain of an English vessel that lay in the Golden Horn. He therefore ordered her captain to sail immediately. Whereupon, furious at being outwitted, the Pacha recalled his present, and flew into so violent a passion of bad language against the English agent that he went in fear of his life. It is clear that the Venetian ambassador considered that Drake's present and Antonio's negotiations were connected. It is true, as he admits, the Pacha's letter to Drake, which he saw, contained nothing but compliments; the whole affair, indeed, may have been a mere device of Harboard's to win over his enemy; but the fear of naval co-operation between England and the Porte against Spain was one that constantly recurred. It is certain that for some years past the idea of a Turkish alliance had been in the minds of English military men, and whether or not the Queen's government ever seriously entertained the project it certainly about this time began to grow into a formidable menace that Philip had to calculate as an ugly factor in the situation. We know, too, that on a later occasion Drake did connect himself with a similar negotiation of Don Antonio's, and in any case it cannot be denied that in the relations between the admiral and the Pretender at this time there is some ground for the interpretation which the Venetians put upon the curious incident of Drake's alleged present to the commander-in-chief of the Turkish navy.¹

In the matter of the Dutch negotiation, we stand on firmer and, it must be added, cleaner ground. To bring Philip's Protestant rebels into line with the English reformation had long been a cherished idea of Drake's great

¹ *Venetian Calendar*, viii. Nos. 143, 149, 209, 304, 332, 383; cf. also E. Pears, 'The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.* viii. 439, and Robert Hitchcocke's 'Politie and Warlike ways,' &c. December 30, 1580, *Lansd. MSS.* cxix.

patron Leicester. Since he was now the queen's Lieutenant-general and practically Governor in the States, everything looked well for Drake's scheme. By the first week in October the matter had proceeded so far that the restless admiral was ordered over in person to complete the negotiation. He arrived with a squadron of eight sail carrying reinforcements and stores for Leicester, but although he seems to have met with a splendid reception, as the first navigator of his time, the mission proved a failure. The States, already disgusted with the anomalous position in which they stood with regard to the English crown, refused to accede to the proposals which Drake brought from the queen until she definitely assumed the sovereignty of the Netherlands; if she consented to do this they protested on their part they would obey her orders. Officially Drake could carry the matter no further. Privately, however, he was authorised to treat with the individual sea-port towns for the support of any venture he might be contemplating, and before he left the country it seems to have been understood that he had only to announce another Indies voyage for every capitalist in the Low Countries to support him with open hands. It was not Drake but the English Government they distrusted. At this very moment they were sending over envoys to the queen behind Leicester's back to bring matters to a head. Leicester having seen his army into winter quarters resolved to go home too, and in the first week of December, Drake took him back: and Admiral, Governor, and Envoys all arrived in London together.¹

Drake at once applied to the Council for licence to put to sea.² It was not granted. Not that the idea had been abandoned, but the Government was pre-occupied with the fate of Mary Stuart, whose death-warrant had been settled the day after Drake's return. The question of her ultimate fate and the tremendous political con-

¹ For this mission see Motley, *United Neth.* ii. 98, n.; *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, pp. 644, 656, 669, 674, 679.

² 'Mendoza to the King,' *S.P. Spain, Cal.* 1580-6, p. 681.

siderations which it involved threw everything else into the shade. Don Antonio, who of late had been much caressed and petted, sulked because he could get no attention. He spoke of asking for a passport and was bluntly told it was at his disposal whenever he liked. The fact was there was other work for Drake. Already in the autumn, in view of the growing rumour of naval preparation in Spain, there had been some intention of sending him down with a squadron of royal ships to make a demonstration and reconnaissance in force upon the Spanish coast.¹ Eventually, however, it was resolved to keep the whole fleet together in the Narrow Seas. It was necessary to watch that no movement was made from France by the Guises in Mary Stuart's behalf, and although no war with Spain had been declared the English Government in view of the information in their possession thought themselves justified in stopping all contraband of war proceeding from the Baltic to Spanish ports. In this the Channel guard had small success. The Hansa corn-ships, avoiding the Narrow Seas, slipped round by Scotland and Ireland north-about, and in spite of every effort of the English Philip's vast preparations continued on an unabated scale. As the winter proceeded the reports of the English spies grew so serious that the prospect of an amicable arrangement darkened past hope. To every eye Philip was bent on settling the long account by force of arms, and at last Elizabeth consented to forestall him and strike the first blow herself.

At what time precisely the great resolution was taken is not clear. On December 25 it had been decided that the whole fleet must be mobilised at Portsmouth by March 20 in order 'to impeach the provisions of Spain,'² and at the same time it was determined to send an Admiralty officer over to Holland to assist Leicester on his return to organise a fleet from the Low Countries for

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, p. 627.

² 'Matters to be imparted to Her Majesty,' *S.P. Dom.* clxxxv. 32.

the same date. Till the last moment the part Drake was to play was kept a profound secret. It was not till the first week in March that reports began to spread that he was going to sea again, as it became known that he was down at Plymouth busy with the manning and victualling of a squadron that had been placed under his orders.¹ It consisted of four ships and two pinnaces of the queen's, the Lord Admiral's galleon the 'White Lion,' and his pinnace the 'Cygnet,'² four fine vessels of the Levant Company and some other Londoners whose trade was practically stopped by the unsettled state of affairs. Drake had further commission to take up any ships he might meet at sea and add them to his squadron, and thus by the end of the month he had ready at Plymouth a squadron of twenty-three sail. For his flagship the 'Elizabeth Bonaventure' was again assigned. For Vice-Admiral was attached to him in the 'Golden Lion,' William Borough, Clerk of the Ships, a veteran who next to Drake and Hawkins was the great English authority on all naval matters and a regular queen's officer of the old school. Though Drake's old friend and flag-captain, Thomas Fenner, was with him in command of the 'Dreadnought' of her Majesty's, the third flagship seems to have been the 'Merchant Royal,' admiral of the London squadron, whose commander was Captain Robert Flick, a favourite London officer.³ The fourth Navy ship was

¹ It was not known generally in London on the 4th-14th of March. See 'Selatter to Darell' (Hubert Hall, *Society in the Elizabethan Age*, p. 266). 'Some say that Sir Francis Drake goeth to the seas with an army of 30,000 men.'

² In the accounts Howard is credited with 175 tons. The 'White Lion' was 150, and the 'Cygnet,' the only pinnace of 25 tons.

³ He was a member of the Drapers' Company and one of the Merchant-adventurers (see 'List of adventurers who became sureties, &c.,' in *Camd. Soc. Misc.* v. 27). Of his previous services nothing appears to be known, but he afterwards commanded the London squadron that was sent to the relief of Lord Thomas Howard at the Azores in 1591 when the 'Revenge' was lost. Borough always spoke of the 'Merchant Royal' as the third flag-ship (*ibid.* v. 14). Robert Leng, who wrote an account of the voyage (*Add. MSS.* 21,620; *C. S. Misc.* v.), says the rear-admiral was the 'Dreadnought,' but like Biggs, he was a soldier, and his authority is not so high as Borough's.

the new 'Rainbow,' the very latest experiment of English naval architecture, having been launched only a few months and built on the lines of a galleasse.¹ She was commanded by Captain Henry Bellingham, an officer who was thought worthy of a squadron in the following year. To these were attached the two queen's pinnaces the 'Spy' and the 'Makeshift.'² The Levant ships, having been built specially for trade in seas where enemies of all kinds swarmed, were probably little inferior to the queen's ships of their size; as indeed some of them proved themselves in the famous action off Gibraltar in 1590, when the London ships repeated their feat of 1586, and after a six hours' fight drove off twelve Spanish galleys under Don Pedro de Acuña.³ The other Londoners would fall little short of them. Drake himself had fitted out four other vessels and the remainder were west country craft, whose value he had proved again and again.⁴

Here, then, we almost certainly have another instance of the commodore of the London squadron taking flag rank in the fleet. The official ranks of the other flag officers appear from expressions used by Borough. In his letter of protest to Drake he says, 'I have served in place as I do now 'Vice-admiral-of-the-Sea unto the now Lord Admiral of England,' and again, 'I have served her Majesty as her Admiral-at-the-Seas, as you do now.' As holding the office of 'Vice-admiral-of-the-Sea to the Lord Admiral,' Borough seems to have regarded himself as something more than a mere flag officer of Drake's and as entitled to special consideration.

¹ Her dimensions were: tons 384, length 100 feet, beam 32 feet, depth 12 feet.

² *S.P. Dom.* ccv. 55. In the Armada lists the 'Makeshift' appears as a private vessel in Drake's division, but in his official account he returns it as of the Royal Navy (*S.P. Dom.* ccv. 53). The 'Cygnet,' which in 1587 appears as a private vessel, in 1588 appears in the Navy lists.

³ See 'The Valiant Fight &c.,' in *Hakluyt*, April 24, 1590. Duro (*Arm. Esp.* iii. 77) says Doria was not in command as the English believed. Of the present squadron three at least were engaged—the 'Solomon,' the 'Margaret and John,' and the 'Minion.' The French 'Rellacion' speaks of the 'Merchant Royal' as of the same class as the queen's ships, and also says there were *bes des* 'Deux gallions fort bien faictz pour la guerre du port de 200 tonneaux' (*C.S. Misc.* v. p. 38).

⁴ 'Fenner to Walsingham,' April 1, 1587, *S.P. Dom.* cc. The details of the fleet as then formed are as follows:

Royal Navy, four ships.—'Eliz. Bonaventure,' 550 tons, Sir Francis Drake; 'Golden Lion,' 550 tons, Wm. Borough, Vice-Admiral; 'Dreadnought,' 400 tons, Thos. Fenner; 'Rainbow,' 500 tons, Henry Bellingham:

The expedition as thus constituted has much the aspect of a private venture, and thus it has been usually regarded. The men were not paid nor the ships victualled by the Government, the London contingent on their arrival at Plymouth made a formal agreement with Drake as to the terms upon which they were to serve under his flag, and the organisation of the fleet was on the basis of a combined force composed of the Queen's, the Lord Admiral's, Drake's, and the London Squadrons. Drake as representing the Queen was naturally commander-in-chief. Borough as representing the Lord Admiral was second, and Flick as the London commodore, third. But it must not therefore be thought that it was not essentially a public and official undertaking. In Elizabeth's time the line between public and private expeditions is very hard to draw. Though private in many of its aspects the present one was entirely under the control and direction of the Government, and in the authority delegated to Drake was exactly like a regular naval force. Both in his powers and his limitations he was in all respects a Queen's admiral at the seas.

and two Pinnaces.—'Spy,' 50 tons, Capt. Clifford; 'Makeshift,' 50 tons, Capt. Bostocke.

The Lord Admiral, one ship.—'White Lion,' 150 tons: and one pinnacle.—'Cygnet,' 25 tons.

The Levant Company's Squadron, seven ships.—'Merchant Royal,' 400 tons, Capt. Flick, Rear-Admiral; 'Susan,' 350 tons; 'Edw. Bonaventure,' 300 tons; 'Margaret and John,' 210 tons; 'Solomon,' 200 tons; 'George Bonaventure,' 150 tons; 'Thomas Bonaventure,' 150 tons.

Drake's Squadron, three ships and one pinnacle.—'Minion,' 200 tons; 'Thomas,' 200 tons; 'Bark Hawkins,' 130 tons; 'Elizabeth,' 70 tons.

Other vessels, one ship.—'The Little John,' 100 tons; and three pinnaces.—'The Drake,' 80 tons; 'Speedwell,' 50 tons; 'Post,' 30 tons.

Total: ships, 16; pinnaces, 7.

The above four vessels are attributed to Drake, since they appear at the end of Fenner's official list and amount together to the 300 tons for which he was credited in the accounts. The 'Minion,' however, seems to have been a London ship, for a vessel of that name was in the action with Acuña in 1590, but he and his friends may have chartered her. The Spanish description of the force was, '2 capitanas of at least 500 tons; 2 *almirante* of the same burden; another ship of the same build; 2 galleasses of extreme beauty each 200 tons; 7 ships of 150 tons; and 13 large frigates of from 50 to 60 tons.' *Venetian Calendar*, viii. 275. It is also given in the French account, *C.S. Misc.* v. 38.

It was only in the fact that men and owners looked to the results of their work for remuneration that it fell short of our modern idea of a national undertaking. But at a time when the idea of a national navy was still something wider than a royal navy, and when the machinery of Government was carried on so largely by contract with officers of state, the mere fact that a commander agreed as a condition of his commission to do a piece of public service without cost to the Treasury, and that a great part of his force was privately owned, will not constitute him a privateer in the modern sense of the word. His position was much more nearly akin to that which formerly the great feudatories occupied when engaged upon an act of state in pursuance of their tenure. War upon the sea was still regarded as war by land had once been, as a productive undertaking. The method of pay was therefore a detail, a mere question of finance, and to regard these expeditions of Drake's as merely private ventures is to ignore the wide and radical differences between Tudor and modern methods of administration.

It was as a public officer, on public service and in command of a recognised portion of the naval force of the nation, that Drake sailed. His instructions were, in view of the menacing intelligence from Spain, 'to prevent or withstand such enterprises as might be attempted against her Highness's realm or dominions,' and especially by preventing the concentration of the various squadrons Philip was preparing. As to how he was to do this he was left an entirely free hand, if at least we may believe his Vice-Admiral. Off Cape Saint Vincent Borough professed to recite the queen's instructions, as follows: 'For that by information the King of Spain is preparing a great army by sea, part at Lisbon, other in Andalucia, and within the Straits, all which was judged should meet at Lisbon and the same come for England or some part of her Majesty's dominions; her Majesty's pleasure is by advice of her Highness's Council that you with these ships now under your charge should come hither to this Cape, and up this coast and

seek by all the best means you can to impeach their purpose and stop their meeting at Lisbon if it might be; whereof the manner how is referred to your discretion.' Walsingham, in writing to Sir Edward Stafford, the English ambassador at Paris, gives some additional details. 'His commission is,' he says, 'to impeach the joining together of the King of Spain's fleets out of their several ports, to keep victuals from them, to follow them in case they should be come forward towards England or Ireland and to cut off as many of them as he could and impeach their landing; as also to set upon such as should either come out of the West or East Indies into Spain or go out of Spain thither,' and finally he adds he was 'particularly directed to distress the ships within the havens themselves.'¹

No instructions could have been more satisfactory. Indeed they are those which Drake tried so hard the following year to get sanctioned, showing how he had grasped already the great secret of naval strategy. As usual, however, he had hardly hoisted his flag before more timid counsels prevailed. Elizabeth seems to have been brought to believe that by a reported relaxation in his preparations Philip was evincing a desire for peace and that an understanding might yet be come to if he were not provoked too far. Formal orders were therefore sent down from the Council greatly restricting Drake's former freedom of action, and these from what followed are of deep importance. 'You shall forbear,' they ran, 'to enter forcibly into any of the said King's ports or havens; or to offer any violence to any of his towns or shipping within harbouring, or to do any act of hostility upon the land'; but short of this he was to do his best to capture and bring home '(avoiding as much as may be the shedding of Christian blood) such shipping of the said King or his subjects as you shall find at sea either going from thence to the East or West Indies, or returning from the said Indies into Spain.' The obvious intention of these orders was to reduce the expedition to

¹ Printed in *C.S. Misc.* v. 29.

the level of a cruise for the India fleets like that of Hawkins the previous year, and they undoubtedly represent a reviving influence of the Spanish and peace elements in the Council.¹ Leicester was away again in Holland, nearly all Drake's friends were under a cloud for the execution of Mary, and Walsingham single handed had been unable to stem the tide of Spanish influence.²

But Drake did not mean to be caught. He had reached Plymouth only on the 23rd. Since then he had worked so desperately that in a week all was ready and this in spite of every kind of difficulty which, as he believed, his enemies had thrown in his way. At the last moment numbers of his seamen had deserted, 'and we all think,' wrote Drake to Walsingham, smelling treason at every obstacle, 'by some practice of some adversaries to the action by letters written.' Nothing daunted, with lavish bounties and untiring energy he replaced them with soldiers, writing to the Lord Admiral to demand the punishment of the deserters. All was now ready except for the Levant ships, which, delayed by contrary winds, had not been able to make Plymouth. On April 1, however, they succeeded in joining him, and then, without permitting a day's delay to risk a change in his orders, he put to sea the next morning. So it was that when the Council's messenger reached Plymouth with the unwelcome orders the Sound was empty. Drake had flown. The despatch was at once sent after him in a pinnace. The messenger, it is said, was a 'base-son' of Hawkins and the pinnace Wynter's, and this perhaps is why the gales it encountered were found of such a nature as to compel its return with the new orders undelivered and a fat prize in company.³

¹ 'Council to Drake,' April 9, *S.P. Dom.* cc. 17. 'Walsingham to Stafford,' April 21, *ubi supra*.

² 'Walsingham to Leicester,' April 17, 1587; *S.P. Flanders*. 'There are letters written from certain of my lords by Her Majesty's effectual commandment to inhibit him to attempt anything by land or within the ports of the Kingdom of Spain,' &c., and again on the 11th in sending the same news he adds: 'This resolution proceeded altogether upon a hope of peace,' which he fears may do much harm.

³ See 'Burghley to Andreas de Loo,' July 18, 1587, *S.P. Flanders*;

Thus had Drake gone on his way rejoicing at last in a full authority to take a vigorous offensive in Spanish waters. The special direction to destroy shipping in the ports was even wide enough to cover the seizure of the defences that protected them. It is true that Borough afterwards declared that the Lord Admiral had particularly warned Drake he was not to land, but the amended instructions in expressly directing him not to do so are at least strong evidence that Howard's prohibition cannot have been official; nor is it likely that if Drake had been debarred from shore operations he would have carried with him a regularly organised land force, as he certainly did.¹

Once at sea a fair wind carried him rapidly out of reach of the adversaries to the action and of those, as he wrote in his farewell letter to Walsingham, 'who were too well affected to the alteration of the Government, which he hoped in God they should never live to see.'² The first day out two sails were seen and chased. They proved to be men-of-war of Lyme, and by authority of his commission Drake ordered both of them to attend his flag.³ With his force thus raised to five and twenty sail

'Walsingham to Leicester,' April 11, *ibid.* Burghley says the captain and crew were suspected of deliberately not finding Drake, but that on inquiry they cleared themselves on oath. They seem, however, to have spent their time taking a valuable prize of which Burghley says nothing. See 'Request of the Merchant Adventurers': 'Whereas there was a pinnace sent forth to meet Sir Francis Drake, which hath taken a prize worth £5,000 and better' (*C.S. Misc. v. 45*). See also *Lansd. MSS.* 52, art. 43, where an anonymous attack on Hawkins has the following passage. After explaining that Wynter formerly always spoke ill of Hawkins, the author complains they are now friends. 'For,' says he, 'they have of late received a pretty purchase of £5,000 brought in by Mr. Hawkins's base-son, who was sent with advice to Sir Francis Drake towards Cales and meeting prize on the way returned into Plymouth with the prize' This they shared; but the writer hints that really Hawkins bribed Wynter 'under the faint colour the pinnace was his.'

¹ It consisted of ten companies under Captain Anthony Platt, as Lieutenant-General, with Captain John Marchant as his 'Serjeant-Major.' The names of the other eight captains were Crosse, Parker, Thomas and Edward Fenner, Poole, Spindelowe, Sydenham, and Manington. Each had a lieutenant, an ensign, two sergeants, and four corporals. The other staff officers were Philip Nicholls, chaplain; John Harges, standard-bearer; William Stallenge, muster-master; and John Flower, clerk of the cheque. (See *S.P. Dom.* ccv. 53-4, and cevi. 4.)

² *S.P. Dom.* cc. 2

³ Leng (*C.S. Misc. v.*).

on April 5 he made Finisterre; but here the fleet was scattered in a gale that lasted five days, and it was not till ten days later, the 16th, that the ships were all together again at the rendez-vous at the Rock of Lisbon. Here he heard from some homeward bound Flemish ships, that at Cadiz there was a great accumulation of stores and shipping preparing to sail for Lisbon, and he determined at once to attempt their destruction. Keeping his light squadron inshore to sweep up all the coasting craft they could catch, he proceeded as rapidly as possible without regard to the sailing capacities of individual ships until on the 19th he was within striking distance of Cadiz. While still out of sight of the port it seems that he put out his flag of council, and those officers who were within reach, Borough amongst them, attended on board his ship. By this time some of the slower vessels had fallen far to the rear, and there was a difference of opinion as to whether it would not be better to anchor for the night and attack next morning; but apparently, although Drake listened to his officers' views, no regular council of war was held. His councils were at the best of times perfunctory. Though a willing hearer of other men's opinions, says one who knew him well, he was commonly a follower of his own. His practice, so Borough complained, when his council met was instead of consulting them to tell them briefly what he meant to do; or else he would keep them aboard his ship the greater part of the day entertaining them with good cheer, and so dismiss them no wiser than they came and no council held at all. With his work before him and the wind fair, Drake was no man to waste time in discussion. On this occasion, it seems, he did no more than shortly tell the officers who had answered his summons that he meant to attack immediately, and so dismissed them to their ships. Such proceedings shocked the dignity and the professional pride of the old queen's officer. By the traditions of the service as formulated by Henry VIII.'s orders, it was a standing regulation

that 'the admiral shall not take in hand any exploit to land or enter into any harbour of the enemy, but he shall call a council and make the captains privy to his device.' To undertake so desperate an enterprise as that in contemplation without a solemn discussion in council of war was therefore highly irregular ; to undertake it without detailed orders being issued for the guidance of the fleet must have seemed to Borough almost criminal rashness. Yet it is certain no orders were issued. Like all great admirals, Drake probably believed the fewer and simpler the orders the better. He had but one to give. They were to follow him in and destroy the shipping when they got there.

For Borough's caution there was much excuse. The old town of Cadiz crowned the summit of a precipitous rock, which rises sheer from the sea in the midst of a deep indentation of the coast. From the rock a low and narrow neck of land runs some five miles to the southward in the general line of the coast connecting the town with the land. Behind the natural breakwater thus formed are enclosed an outer and an inner port. Though the entrance is a wide expanse of sea between the rock and the northern sweep of the bay, it is so much encumbered with shoals and reefs that the only safe approach for large ships was by a channel that passed under the town guns. The defences, however, at this time were not formidable, consisting only of a castle called the Matagorda, which had been built some fifty years before in the heyday of Barbarossa's depredations, and of two other batteries, the first commanding the entrance and the second the harbour.¹ The inner harbour was formed by a projecting piece of land known as Puntales, which ran from the inner side of the isthmus eastward towards the main-land till it left an opening only half a mile wide, but it was not yet protected by any defensive works. Immediately opposite the town on the further side of the outer harbour was Port Saint Mary, and within the Puntales

¹ De Castro, *History of Cadiz*, and Borough's chart in *S.P. Dom.* cciii. 28.

passage at the extreme end of the inlet stood Port Royal ; both places, however, were so well protected by shoals as to be unapproachable without a port pilot. Apart from the danger of the batteries such a piece of confined water was an ideal scene of action for galleys to develop their full capabilities. About a dozen of them were stationed at Cadiz, and this must have been known in the fleet.¹ The moral effect of galleys at this time was at least as great as would be that of torpedo boats in a similar situation to-day. By all the rules of war, on which Borough was the great authority in the service, to attack without the most elaborate precautions was madness. But Drake was born to break rules. He was ready to pit bowline and broadside against oars and chasers. In vain Borough pleaded for waiting at least till night-fall. Drake would not listen. The enemy were before him ; his authority was in his pocket ; the wind held fair ; and to the Vice-Admiral's disgust at four o'clock in the afternoon he stood in.²

From Port Saint Mary two galleys had been ordered out to ascertain the strangers' intention, and at these Drake dashed, nor did they escape without severe punishment. As he opened the harbour there lay before him opposite the shore end of the town some sixty sail of ships, and under the second battery were a crowd of caravels and small barks. Almost every class and every nationality were represented in the throng, and all of them, except those which were preparing for the American voyage,


¹ The Spanish account sent to Venice says Don Pedro de Acuña was there with seven galleys and one galleon, but these seem to be the squadron that began the attack and not to include the two galleys that cut off a frigate outside and two more in the inner harbour. (*Venetian Calendar*, viii. No. 513.)

² 'I thought it more sure to bear in in the evening as aforesaid ; he would not listen but bare away for the place presently without consultation or advice given to the fleet in such confused order, as was never heard of in such an action, albeit things happened reasonably well.' Borough's defence, *S.P. Dom.* ccii. 67. From his answer to the fourth article against him (*Lansd. MSS.* art. 41) it appears the consultation took place just before they came in sight of Cadiz.

were engaged in some way or other upon the service of the great enterprise. Some were loaded, some loading, some waiting for a cargo, and almost all waiting for their guns to arrive from Italy. Many of them had no sails, it being the practice to remove them from requisitioned ships in order to prevent desertion. As Drake's fire upon the galleys declared his purpose, the harbour became a scene of terror and confusion. Every vessel that had means of movement cut its cables and fled for the nearest refuge. A score or so of small French and native craft got over the shoals into Port Saint Mary, and six Dutch hulks made for Port Royal. To cover the rest, ten galleys were seen to put boldly out from under the first battery and bear down upon Drake's beam. But he was not to be frightened. Leaving the merchantmen to take the helpless vessels in hand, with the four queen's ships he defiantly met the Spanish attack. Passing across the course of the advancing galleys, he received them with raking broadsides. It was a lesson that needed no repeating. Torn and mangled by the unprecedented storm of fire, they turned and fled. Two retired beyond Puntales without more ado and made off to Port Royal, seven took up an unassailable position inside the Puercas reef where they were covered by the Castle guns, while the tenth had to be hauled ashore to save her from sinking.¹ Thus left to complete their evening's work unmolested, the English came to anchor amongst their prizes.

By nightfall all the vessels that had not been able to get into the inner harbour were in Drake's hands. One, a large 'Argosy' carrying forty guns, was unfortunately sunk by the English fire. Those that had sails were kept, and the rest were plundered and given to the flames. All this was done under the fire of the second battery. So now by the flare of the conflagration, as the burning ships drifted upon the shoals, Drake ordered the 'Merchant Royal' to lead the private ships close up to

¹ Drake claims in his despatch to have sunk two. But Borough's plan shows two at Port Royal and seven inside the reef.



BOROUGH'S CHART TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS AT CADIZ.

Reduced from the Original (17 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. by 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ in.) in the State Papers, Domestic, 1587, cccii, 28.

the Puntales passage, and there to anchor out of range of the town guns. He himself took up a position somewhat to seaward with the other royal ships near him to cover his merchantmen from a fresh attack by the galleys. Borough, it seems, was anxious to complete their work at once and get out safely to sea again, content with the havoc they had wrought : but Drake would not listen to such caution. Great as was the destruction, he was still unsatisfied. As yet there was little to show of profit to the Adventurers. He had still another exploit in his mind, and, dismissing the captains who had come to consult him, he ordered them to lie quiet all night and not to move unless he did.

At daylight next morning Drake weighed, and to Borough's dismay, instead of working out, moved the 'Bonaventure' still further in and came to anchor amongst the rear-most merchantmen. In the inner harbour lay a splendid vessel belonging to no less a person than Santa Cruz himself, the Commander-in-Chief of the English Enterprise. This he was resolved to take, and regardless of the two galleys that were in the inner harbour covering the shipping at Port Royal, he rapidly organised a flotilla of the pinnaces and boats of the fleet, and with the 'Merchant Royal' led them in on the flood in person to effect the capture.

Meanwhile Borough, in a fever to see every tradition of naval warfare violated, instead of following Drake's lead ordered away his pinnace and went in search of him, calling to the vessels he passed to get out as soon they could. Not finding Drake on his flagship, he went on to where the 'Merchant Royal' and the flotilla were now in possession of the great prize. But Drake was already away, and Borough finally found him in the 'Bonaventure.' Drake afterwards swore his Vice-Admiral began there-upon 'in trembling sort' to point out the danger of the position. Borough says he merely consulted his commander about the re-provisioning the queen's ships from the prizes. For although the Londoners had six months'

stores, the Navy ships had been victualled for three months only. Whatever may have been the truth, soon after Borough left to return to his ship Drake saw the 'Lion' was being warped out. Borough's defence was that a gun had been planted on the shore opposite his vessel, and that having received a shot between wind and water and had a gunner wounded, the master had begun to warp out of range before he returned, and as the movement met with his approval he continued it. So far, however, did he proceed that the galleys took heart to emerge from their shelter and endeavour to cut him off. The situation of the Vice-Admiral was now so perilous that Drake felt compelled to order away the 'Rainbow' and the 'Edward Bonaventure,' with five other merchantmen and his own pinnace, to his support. Still Borough continued to beat out, in order, as he himself said, to attack the galleys, but as Drake thought in order to get out clear of the batteries into the mouth of the harbour. Certain it is that, although after a sharp engagement the galleys were forced to get back to the batteries, Borough made no offer to return, but anchored where he was in the mouth of the harbour beyond Saint Mary and kept with him the whole of the ships which had been detailed to his support. His object, as he afterwards protested, was to cover the rest of the fleet from the galleys or from any attack which might be attempted from the sea. To checkmate the galleys, at any rate, the position was well chosen. Lying as the enemy did between the extreme end of the town and the Puercas reef, it was impossible for them on any wind to attack without having either Borough or Drake 'on their jacks,' and at the time Drake seems to have deemed his Vice-Admiral's conduct worthy of no reprimand.

Meanwhile Drake's work was completed, and having gutted Santa Cruz's galleon and set her on fire in spite of the galleys, the flotilla and the 'Merchant Royal' came out. During the past thirty-six hours the fleet had been entirely re-victualled with wine, oil, biscuit, and dried

fruits. Thousands of tons of shipping and a vast quantity of stores had been destroyed, and six vessels laden with provisions were prizes in the fleet. The official Spanish return sets the loss down at twenty-four vessels, valued with their cargoes at 172,000 ducats or about three-quarters of a million of our money, but all told it was probably still more.¹ Satisfied at last, by mid-day Drake had the inshore division all in their positions again, and in fine order prepared to make sail. But now as luck would have it the wind fell, and he had to remain where he was, exposed to all the devices the Spaniards could invent to destroy him. By this time troops were pouring along the isthmus into Cadiz, and the Spaniards, inspired with new life, made every effort to take advantage of Drake's predicament. Guns were moved down into the sand hills and brought to bear on the fleet, fire-ships were launched against him with the tide, and the galleys attacked again and again. Now if ever was their time. 'There were never galleys,' says one English report, 'that had more fit place for their advantage in fight: for upon the shot that they received they had present succour from the town, which they used sundry times, we riding in a narrow gut, the place yielding no better.'² Yet all was of no avail. Drake the day before had demonstrated the superiority on a wind of well-armed broadside ships against more than double their number of galleys; now he was to prove it in a calm. If the smooth water was favourable to vessels of free movement, it was also favourable to gunnery. Galleys, we have seen, never carried more than one gun of long range. The 'Bonaventure'

¹ Duro, *Armada Inven.* Doc. 14 bis. In reference to the charge so often made against Drake of boasting, it is interesting to note that in his despatches he set down the largest ships he destroyed at nearly double the official tonnage. He claimed to have destroyed or taken thirty-seven vessels, and in this the Hakluyt account supports him. He probably included the two galleys he put out of action and the vessels the Spaniards used as fire-ships. The real damage perhaps was little short of a million. The Cadiz officers in their official returns would probably have put the damage as low as possible.


² *Harl. MSS.* 167, f. 104, printed in *C.S. Misc.* v. 33.

had sixteen (culverins, cannons, and demi-culverins). The result was that the galleys one after another were disabled and compelled to retire before they could get within effective range.¹ Nor were the fire-ships more successful. Not one did the English allow to approach them, and as they watched the vessels burning themselves out harmlessly upon the shoals they laughed to think how the Spaniards were saving them trouble. Still the calm continued, and for all that day they had to lie where they were, harassed by the Spanish fire. It was not till two o'clock the next morning that the land wind sprang up again. Drake immediately made sail, and sweeping the galleys once more from his path stood out past the batteries. 'Then,' says the Brief Relation, 'having performed this notable service, we came out of the Road of Cadiz on the Friday morning, with very little loss not worth the mentioning.' Ten of the galleys presumed to give chase, and upon the weather falling calm again, when the English were barely outside, they once more attacked. During the whole forenoon the action continued, but with the same result as before. Before the galleys had inflicted any harm on their enemy, a south breeze sprang up, and they were compelled to draw off and leave Drake to anchor outside in full view of the town, in triumph and undisturbed.²

Here he rode all the rest of the day 'upon a bravado,' defying the galleys to come out and fight him. When the challenge was refused he opened negotiations with the officer in command of them for an exchange of prisoners against the English galley-slaves and a prize crew of five men who had been cut off by a galley the first night; but all he could get from the admiring Spanish officers was

¹ 'Don Pedro del Acugna cependant faisoit tout le devoir avec ses galleres d'endomager l'ennemy, l'artillerie du quel, estant de plus grande portée que celles des galleres, les contraignit de se retirer,' *C.S. Misc.* v. 36. 'I suoi pezzi tiravano più da lontano delli nostri,' *Venetian Calendar*, viii. 275. The report sent by the Venetian ambassador and the French account are obviously taken from the same original throughout.

² Leng. The Venetian report says the galleys had been reinforced, and that twenty-two followed Drake. *Venetian Cal.* viii. 275.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE DRAKE'S OPERATIONS ON THE SPANISH COASTS,
1585 TO 1589.

sweetmeats and courtesies, which as usual seemed highly to have gratified the English admiral.¹ The time, however, was not thrown away; for the delay was improved by completing his re-victualling from the prizes, by firing or scuttling those that were emptied, and by resting his men after their late exertions. For his work was only begun. In Cadiz harbour, besides the loss he had inflicted on the enemy, he had gained for himself full information of the Spanish preparations for the great Armada. The situation into which he had burst was this. At Lisbon, as the point of concentration, the Marquis de Santa Cruz had established his headquarters, and here he was busy accumulating victuals and stores, and superintending the fitting out of the Portuguese galleons which Philip had acquired by his late conquest, and which, as the backbone of the fleet, were to form the Commander-in-Chief's own squadron. Here too was the Medici galleon sent by the Grand Duke as a symbol of adherence to his kinsman's great design and a few vessels of lesser degree, but as yet neither seamen nor soldiers had been mustered to man them.² In the north at Passages, Oquendo, an officer who had highly distinguished himself at Terceira and elsewhere and had been appointed Captain-General of the Armada of Guipuscoa, was organising a squadron from the fine sea-going craft of that province, and besides a large vessel of his own he had six ships and four pinnaces nearly ready for sea. Cruising somewhere about Cape Saint Vincent was Recalde, a veteran of long and varied service, who, as the finest seaman after Santa Cruz in Spain, was destined for Vice-Admiral of the Armada. He was now in command of a similar squadron, consisting

¹ From the documents published by Duro it appears that the galleys in the Andalusian station were commanded by Don Martin de Padilla, Conde de Santa Gadea, but it is not known where he was during Drake's attack. The English accounts all speak of the galley commander as Don Pedro, the French and Venetian as Don Pedro de Acugna. His handling of the galleys can have brought him little honour, for he served in the Armada merely as a paid officer with no important command.

² Hans Friedrich's report, *S.P. Dom.* cxcviii. 34.

of a great-ship of his own with six or seven other Biscayan ships and five pinnaces. He was probably, according to the usual practice, cruising to cover the arrival of the homeward bound American fleets, but an urgent order was immediately sent to him from the Indies Office at Seville to take his squadron into Lisbon.¹ At Cadiz, where the ships of the Andalusian province had been concentrated, there were fifteen fine vessels which had escaped Drake's attack. At Cartagena within the straits were six great Levanter from Sicily, whence they had brought Don Diego Pimentel and his famous Sicilian *tertia* of infantry for service in the enterprise and a large supply of guns for the armament of the fleet.² At the same port were almost daily expected from Naples four of the world-renowned Italian galleasses and two more Levanter, with more guns and the Neapolitan *tertia*. These various squadrons were designed to form the fighting line of the fleet for England, but over and above them there were distributed between Cadiz and St. Lucar a light squadron of about a score of barks and pinnaces and some thirty *urcas* or hulks for victuallers. In the same two ports there were also a number of vessels, of which Drake had destroyed four, that were preparing to leave with the annual New Spain convoy, and were excluded from the scheme of mobilisation. But now regardless of the dislocation of commerce the step involved, Philip felt compelled to sacrifice these vessels also to his devouring undertaking, and all the Mexico ships that had survived the English attack were ordered to be requisitioned for the Armada. The galleons of the Indian guard were as usual apparently on the Azores station awaiting the homeward-bound convoys. These, though of course a most important item in Philip's available naval strength,

¹ These orders were intercepted by Drake. See *Lansd. MSS.* 53, f. 21, *et seq.*, printed in *C.S. Misc.* v. 40.

² A *Tertia* was the earliest form of modern infantry regiment. It consisted of from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and was commanded by a *Maestro di campo*. See *Trattato Universale Militare Moderno*, by the Marchese Annibale Porroni. Further details may be found in 'The Colonel and his Command,' *American Hist. Review*, ii. 1.

it was not as yet intended to place at Santa Cruz's disposal.¹

The injury, therefore, which Drake at present had done to the actual force of the Armada was small. It remained for him to prevent the concentration at Lisbon, which was on the point of being made, and to endeavour to capture the homeward-bound American fleets. What at the moment his intention was, we do not know. His course as he disappeared from Cadiz was due west. The Spaniards at once concluded he was bound for the Azores with the intention of intercepting the home coming fleets. On their safe arrival Spanish credit hung, and in a fever of anxiety, Philip ordered Santa Cruz to put to sea immediately to save them. He replied he had no men, and could not move. The soldiers he had expected had been diverted to the defence of Cadiz; the sailors he looked for to complete his crews, were on the ships that Drake had destroyed; and all Philip could do was to hurry off orders to Cartagena for the Sicilian *tertia* to disembark and proceed across Spain by forced marches to Lisbon. A few days later with a sigh of relief he heard that Drake had re-appeared on the coast to the north of Cape Saint Vincent. His fear now was for the *Levanters*, and alarmed lest they had proceeded without their troops to Lisbon, he directed them to be intercepted at Cadiz till further orders.

What had happened seems to have been this. Whatever were Drake's original intentions, having ascertained Recalde's whereabouts by the interception of his orders to

¹ The above details are mainly from the papers collected by Duro in his *Armada Invencible*. A paper purporting to be a copy of Santa Cruz's official report to the king in June which the Venetian ambassador sent home gives them as follows (*Venet. Cal.* viii. 286):

Lisbon.—13 galleons of Portugal, 2 great-ships, 8 other vessels, 1 galleon of the Duke of Florence, 1 small galley, 8 Biscayans with Recalde.

Gibraltar.—6 ships from Sicily, 4 great galleys.

Cartagena.—2 ships from Naples.

Biscay.—15 galleons.

The last item is certainly a mistake. The Biscay vessels were not galleons.

retire into Lisbon, he resolved to make a dash to capture his squadron. Nothing could have been sounder. At one blow he would severely cripple the Armada and dislocate the protective system of the Indies trade, making the capture of some rich prizes almost certain. Unfortunately calms and contrary winds prevented the rapid movement that was essential to success. When Drake reached Recalde's station he was gone. As high as fifteen leagues north of the Cape he sought him, but the wary old seaman was nowhere to be found. He had succeeded in retiring his squadron into Lisbon untouched.

To redress the disappointment Drake's genius had conceived a scheme which for the time and conditions was of extraordinary brilliancy and boldness. Born strategist that he showed himself, he had grasped the conspicuous importance of that famous Cape, which was destined to be the focus of so much memorable action by his successors. If he had failed to catch Recalde, he had driven him from his station, and his bold resolve was now to take possession of it himself. So fully was its importance recognised, that the anchorage was commanded by forts on the heights. To capture these and get access to water was essential to Drake's scheme, and this was what he intended to do.

Borough was fairly aghast. On the 29th during a calm he had gone on board the 'Bonaventure,' and as he passed to Drake's cabin he heard the officers on deck discussing the astounding resolution in anxious groups. To his Vice-Admiral Drake seems to have given no explanation, but as usual quietly communicated to him his intention of seizing the Cape by surprising either Sagres Castle or the fortified monastery that stood to the eastward of it, and watering on Spanish territory. It was more than poor Borough could endure. Failing entirely to grasp the strategical idea, he returned to his ship and next day wrote Drake a long and solemn protest on his whole conduct of the expedition and in particular on his last mad scheme. After respectfully rebuking him for the way he had ignored his flag-officers and his council-of-war,

he begged him to be more careful how by neglecting regular formations he exposed his fleet to galleys. In the unhappy officer's imagination the coast swarmed with them. Especially he urged upon him the rashness of the present enterprise, and implored him that he would not for the sake of a few guns and the pleasure of boasting he had landed on the King of Spain's territory, expose the fleet to destruction by the vessels of which Borough lived in old fashioned awe. He warned him that having been so long on the coast they could not possibly effect a surprise, and that his own military officers declared that with a couple of guns and a hundred men they could hold a place of so much natural strength against the whole force on board the English fleet. 'I pray you,' he concluded, 'take this in good part, as I mean it: for I protest before God, I do it to no other end, but in discharge of my duty towards her Majesty and the service.'

To us the Vice-Admiral's conduct appears plainly enough as the action of the old conservative queen's officer, hide-bound in the traditions of the service, half resenting the neglect with which a new man was treating his reputation, and half genuinely alarmed to see the most cherished axioms of his art ignored. In Drake's eyes his conduct was something different. For him the letter was not only a gross breach of discipline, but, as he said, 'it toucheth further.' To a man of ardent and direct ideas like himself, the only attitude which a patriotic Englishman could assume towards Spain was one of open, violent, and implacable hostility, and anyone who thwarted him with milder counsels was necessarily a traitor. Borough's behaviour at Cadiz, which hitherto had appeared no worse than a pedant's caution, now began to assume a darker complexion. There can be no doubt that the tragedy of St. Julian's Bay had permanently warped Drake's judgment, and in Borough, a man approved and protected by Burghley, he seems to have seen another Doughty. In Cadiz Bay he considered he had demonstrated the inferiority of galleys with every

circumstance in their favour, and the accusation of neglecting them he considered monstrous. 'I assure your honour,' wrote his friend Fenner, 'there is no account to be made of his [the King of Spain's] galleys. Twelve of her Majesty's ships will make account of all his galleys in Spain Portugal and all his dominions within the Straits, although they are 150 in number. If it be to their advantage in a calm we have made such trial of their fights that we perfectly see into the depth thereof.' Burning with indignation Drake at the first opportunity sent for the offender, and charged him before his chaplain and his flag captain with insubordination in having accused his commanding officer of neglect and in seeking to dictate to him his duty.¹ In vain the unhappy officer protested he meant no harm and was ready to obey him in everything. He even offered to burn his own draft of the protest he had written; but Drake would not listen. Captain Marchant, the Sergeant-Major of the force, was told to take command of the 'Lion' and Borough ordered back to it in arrest; and there he remained day after day, 'ever in doubt of my life' as he afterwards said, 'and expecting daily when the Admiral would have executed upon me his bloodthirsty desire, as he did upon Doughty.'²

This incident took place as they lay inshore some fourteen or fifteen leagues to the northward of Saint Vincent, whither a last effort to find Recalde or the force of a gale seems to have carried them.³ Here they picked up a large Dunkirk fly-boat laden with Spanish goods worth

¹ 'Borough to the Lord High Admiral.' *S.P. Dom.* cccii. 14. 'The principallest points . . . were these, the one said I had charged him with negligence . . . the other said I did not only advise him, but rather instruct and teach him as a tutor.'

² *Lansd. MSS.* 52, art. 39.

³ Borough's letter of April 30 was written in sight of Cape Saint Vincent. He speaks of a gale coming on. He was placed under arrest on May 1, at which time their presence fourteen leagues to the north of the Cape was reported to Philip. On May 2 Fenner wrote to Walsingham they were fifteen leagues from the Cape.

some 10,000*l.* and a second laden with timber ; and then, doubling back to the southward of the Cape, on the 3rd they suddenly appeared before Lagos. This small seaport, so well placed as a fulcrum for his operations, Drake had determined to surprise. At dawn on the following morning about a thousand men were landed on a sandy beach to the westward without opposition, and thence marched inland some three or four miles in order to take the place in reverse, since it was known to be weakly defended on the land side. On coming within musket shot, however, to deliver their assault, it was found that an entirely new set of works had been completed, that it was held by a strong garrison, and certainly could not be taken except at heavy cost. A resolution to retire was at once taken, and after waiting for two hours to endeavour to bring on an action in the open, the whole of the troops were re-embarked without the loss of a man. Foiled in his first attempt, Drake now resolved to seize the Cape, and moved the fleet to Cape Sagres. Here next day eight hundred men were landed, the first companies immediately advancing upon a fort called Avelera. At their approach it was evacuated, the garrison retiring to Sagres Castle, which was the real objective of the operation. It was a large work enclosing about a hundred acres of ground and of extraordinary natural strength. On three sides the cliffs fell sheer some two hundred feet to the sea. On the north side alone it was accessible, and here only upon a front not two hundred yards broad, which was defended by a lofty battlemented wall and four towers flanking the gate. Even to Drake's most zealous officers the place looked little less than impregnable, but it commanded the watering place and the anchorage, and for Drake's purpose it must be taken. Determined to have no repetition of yesterday's work, to-day he took command in person, and having left a garrison to occupy Avelera advanced up the steep ascent. The artillery fire with which they were assailed did little harm, and in due form a 'forlorn' of thirty musketeers was pushed forward to open the assault.

After exhausting their ammunition they retired and Drake summoned the garrison. The summons was of course refused and the assault proceeded. Being without artillery or petards the only means of forcing the gate was by firing it, and for this purpose Drake had ordered a quantity of faggots and pitch to be carried up from the fleet, he himself setting the example by assisting the labour with his own hands. In the same way while the musketeers kept up a hail of fire on the loopholes and battlements, he flung himself into the desperate work of piling the faggots against the gate and firing them. For two hours the struggle continued. Two men were killed and many more wounded, and still the gate resisted, when suddenly the garrison sounded a parley. Their commandant had sunk under his wounds, and they wanted terms. They were at once granted; and so, as it seemed to all concerned, by a miracle Drake got possession of Sagres Castle and all its ordnance.

Daunted by this extraordinary feat, the fortified monastery of Saint Vincent and the castle of Valliera near it surrendered without a blow. Both these places were dismantled and set on fire and their guns carried away. This done, Sagres was treated the same way, and its heavy guns tumbled over the cliffs into the sea, where the boats recovered them, while the Avelera fort was razed to the ground. And so they re-embarked, having secured the most important and frequented roadstead and watering place on the Atlantic Coast for their own use.¹

Meanwhile the seamen had not been idle. From Cape Saint Vincent for some nine miles to the eastward they had

¹ 'These four castles at the Capes defaced is a matter of great importance, respecting that all shipping that come out of the Straits (i.e. of Gibraltar) for Lisbon, or any part of the Northward anchor there until a convenient wind serve them. And so any that come from the North likewise anchor there being bound for Andalucia or the Straits'; 'Fenner to Walsingham,' May 17, 1587. *S.P. Dom.* cci. f. 34. The Spanish official account gives the names of the castles as Valliera and Bolich. Sagres Castle, it says, was taken by escalade, the Portuguese garrison of 150 men offering no resistance (*Venet. Cal.* viii. 282); but there is no reason to doubt that Fenner's detailed despatch contains the truth.

swept the coast of everything that floated. Nearly fifty caravels and barks ranging from twenty to sixty tons and laden with oars and material for casks, for want of which Santa Cruz was at a standstill, were captured and burnt. Besides these between fifty and sixty fishing boats and quantities of nets met the same fate, and thus was entirely destroyed the Algarve tunny fishery, on which, since Bernard Drake's destruction of the Newfoundland fishing fleet, the Armada in a great measure depended for its supply of salt fish. By May 9 the second blow was completed, the fleet fully watered, the ordnance all embarked, and at one o'clock Drake signalled to make sail.

His destination was Lisbon; but what his object beyond a reconnaissance perhaps he himself hardly knew. There can be small doubt that it was on this occasion that he obtained the intimate knowledge of the channels and defences of the port upon which the following year he grounded his refusal to attack it with the small force placed at his command. Lisbon at this time was probably the most powerfully defended sea-port in the world, and with its magnificent harbour admirably adapted for the headquarters of a great fleet. In the elaborate apology for his conduct of the Armada campaign, which Drake procured to be written by Petruccio Ubaldino, the Florentine historian,¹ we are given a detailed account of the place as it then was. Outside the bar to the north was an anchorage commanded by Cascaes Castle, which was situated on the western point of the Bay. Some seven miles to the eastward and immediately opposite the northern end of the bar lay the powerful work known as St. Julian's Castle. This was the most serious obstacle, for immediately beneath its guns passed the North or Main Channel, which in itself was so difficult that ships usually took special pilots for each section of it. The only way of avoiding this formidable work was to pass in by the channel at the opposite or southern end of the bar, but this again was even more dangerous than the other. Sectional pilots

¹ See *post*, p. 133.

were here compulsory, and it was further defended by an old fort known as the Torre Veijo. The bar being passed by one of these two tortuous channels the actual entrance to the river is reached, and here in the midst of the fair way lay a rocky island which was occupied by the Fortaléza de Bethlehem known to the English as Belem. Beyond this again where the river opened out into the port were the batteries of the city itself, and besides all these dangers and the guns of the ships already assembled, there was the regular squadron of galleys attached to the port.

It was on May 10 that Drake appeared off the river and came to anchor in Cascaes Bay. In St. Julian's Castle was the Marquis of Santa Cruz commanding in person, and snug under its guns could be seen seven galleys with their oars out ready for immediate action. As luck would have it, it fell dead calm, giving them a splendid opportunity to attack the English at their anchors. Yet not a galley stirred; perhaps the Cadiz lesson had been too sharp; and all day Drake rode in triumph, where he was 'in contempt of the said town of Cascaes, its castle, and the galleys,' while his light oared vessels hunted down every coaster that came in sight, driving them upon the rocks or capturing them under the Marquis's eyes. 'The Marquis of Santa Cruz,' wrote Drake in his complacent way, 'seeing us chase his ships ashore was content to suffer us there quietly to tarry and never charged us with one cannon shot.'¹

As Santa Cruz would not come out and Drake saw plainly he could not go in, he again attempted to arrange

¹ See his despatch to W[oolley] in *C.S. Misc.* v. 42. His despatch to Walsingham is in *S.P. Dom.* cci. 33. The Spaniards said he threatened a landing at Cascaes and only desisted because he heard the Portuguese would resist it ('The King to Medina-Sidonia'; Duro, *Armada Inven.* Doc. 21. They also say Don Alonso de Bazan, Santa Cruz's brother, did attack with the galleys, but could do no damage, because the English guns were heavier and of longer range, which seems tantamount to saying that he did not attack at all (see *Venetian Calendar*, viii. 2-3). From this report it also appears that they thought it was only the failure of the wind that saved Lisbon from the fate of Cadiz.

an exchange of his prisoners against English galley-slaves, and at the same time demanded whether the king intended that year to make war in England. Santa Cruz sent reply that he had no Englishmen prisoners, and that the king was not provided for war that year. Both statements the English believed to be false, but the second was certainly true, though as yet Philip did not realise it. Drake returned answer that having twice been refused an exchange, he should sell his Spanish prisoners to the Moors and with the purchase money redeem Englishmen in their captivity. To this message he added taunts and insults challenging the Marquis to come out and fight him, but all was of no avail. Poor Santa Cruz could not move, and though all next day Drake stood off and on outside the bar capturing or driving ashore everything that came in sight, not a finger was stirred against him. In the evening a northerly gale began to blow up, and being now assured of the impossibility of attacking the place with the force at his disposal and that he had nothing to fear from Santa Cruz, he ran back and on the 12th took up the anchorage he had secured under Cape Saint Vincent. In not attempting Lisbon he was doubtless well advised, although he certainly seems to have contemplated the exploit. 'Drake,' wrote Ubaldino on the admiral's own information, 'at the beginning of the assembling of the enemy's armada was assured that in a certain way he could do it hurt, notwithstanding the fortresses that are there.' Judging from his previous exploits we may assume that this 'certain way' meant by the co-operation of troops against St. Julian's, and that his reason for not attempting the exploit was that his crews were so much crippled with disease that he regarded his strength as inadequate to furnish a proper force for landing.¹

¹ It is very generally said (see Froude, *Hist. of England*, xii. 295, &c.; *English Seamen*, 183; Green, *Hist. of the English People*) that the reason of Drake's retiring from Lisbon was the receipt of positive orders from the queen that he was not to attack the place. The receipt of this message is nowhere mentioned in any of the narratives or despatches. The idea seems to have arisen from a despatch written by Drake to Walsingham bearing

The unhappy condition of his fleet served further to demonstrate the strategical value of his daring capture of Saint Vincent. The old enemy, which throughout the war continued to thwart the most sagacious conceptions of the English admirals, was so heavily upon him that it had become necessary to weed away the invalids and to refresh the sound men ashore and cleanse the ships. At Cape Saint Vincent he could now do this unmolested; and for a week he was occupied in changing his foul ballast, washing down and disinfecting the whole fleet, and giving the men spells ashore. Nor was this all. They now had full information of how completely the station they had taken up paralysed the Spanish dispositions. 'We hold this cape,' wrote Fenner, 'so greatly to our benefit and so much to their disadvantage as it is a great blessing the obtaining thereof; for the rendezvous is at Lisbon, where we understand of some twenty-five ships and seven galleys. [As for] the rest, we lie between home and them, so as the body is without the members, and they cannot come together.'¹ Drake at this time felt he had secured

date June 2, 1587. Though it is so placed amongst the Domestic State Papers (ccii. 7), the date is clearly a mistake for 1589. On June 2, 1587, Drake was in mid-ocean half way from Saint Vincent to the Azores, a most unlikely time for him to have written a despatch relating to exploits on the Spanish coasts, a full account of which he already had sent home by Capt. Parker on May 22, on the eve of sailing for the Azores (*S.P. Dom.* cci. 38, and 'Newes out of Spain,' reprinted in *C.S. Misc.* v. 42). Moreover, internal evidence makes the matter quite clear. The despatch refers to the destruction of provisions at Coruña and Lisbon, and the capture of sixty provision ships. From Drake's other despatches, it is certain none of these things happened during the expedition of 1587. They did occur, however, during the expedition of 1589. On June 2, 1589, Norreys and he had just failed in their attempt on Lisbon, and hence the expression of regret that he had been forbidden to begin his operations at Lisbon. It is the expression of this regret in the despatch in question that seems to have led to the idea that fresh orders from the queen reached him at Lisbon in 1587. Mr. Froude, relying on the date assigned to this despatch, even makes Drake in 1587 attack Coruña, which he certainly did not. Finally, Drake says he is about to cruise in search of booty ('some little comfortable dew of Heaven,' as he calls it). This we know was his intention on the first week of June 1589 (see 'Norreys and Drake to the Council,' *S.P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 85, June 5, 1589).

¹ *S.P. Dom.* cci. 34, postscript.

the key of the situation and sent home an appeal for reinforcements, that he might cling to it. 'As long as it shall please God,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'to give us provisions to eat and drink, and that our ships and wind and weather will permit us, you shall surely hear of us near the Cape Saint Vincent, where we do and will expect daily what her Majesty's and your honours will further command. God make us all thankful that her Majesty sent out these few ships in time. If there were here six more of her Majesty's good ships of the second sort, we should be the better able to keep the forces from joining, and haply take or impeach his fleets from all places in the next month and so after, which is the chiefest times of their returns home; which I judge in my poor opinion will bring this great monarchy to those conditions which are meet.' Then again, his scientific study of the art of war comes out in a patch from some military text-book with which he tries to mend his rough and ready reasoning. 'There must be,' he adds, 'a beginning in any great matter, but the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory. If Hannibal had followed his victories, it is thought of many he had never been taken by Scipio.'¹ At the thought of Scipio having captured Hannibal the scholarly Walsingham must have smiled, and even for us it is a pleasant picture to see the greatest captain of his time deferentially going to school to the pedants and stumbling so sadly in his efforts to acquire the tritest commonplaces of military debate.

So secure was Drake of his position, or else so much occupied with business in hand, that his scouting does not seem to have been done so well as usual. For on the 18th a negro hotly pursued was seen making his escape to an English shore party, and being carried on board the flagship he reported that ten galleys had just arrived at Lagos. The meaning of this was that on Drake's departure from Cadiz for an unknown destination, Philip had ordered

¹ *S.P. Dom.* cci. 33.

the Count of Santa Gadea to proceed with his squadron of galleys to the south coast of Portugal, if the English were reported in that direction. In order to ascertain the truth his instructions were to cruise as far as Cape Saint Vincent, and if he received intelligence that Drake had gone on to any other port of Portugal he was to follow, and if possible join hands with Santa Cruz in Lisbon.¹ It must have been this squadron that the negro reported at Lagos. Drake at once made sail and proceeded eastwards, sweeping the coast, as usual, with his light squadron as he went. Coming abreast of Lagos he found the galleys still lying off the place and immediately attacked. At his first broadsides, however, Santa Gadea retired among the reefs and took up a position where the shoal-water would not permit the English ships to approach within cannon shot. In vain Drake's pinnaces again played havoc with the coast craft; the galleys would not be tempted out. At night it came on to blow and he put to sea; but, doubling back, he re-appeared at Lagos next morning. Still the galleys had not ventured to stir. Moving further to the eastward, still destroying as he went, he landed four hundred men near Albufeira and burnt a fishing village.² Even this would not draw the galleys and Drake returned to his anchorage in Sagres Bay.

Meanwhile Philip had heard of Drake's demonstration at Lisbon, and was forced once more to change all his orders. Believing that by this time Pimentel with his *tertia* and his cargo of guns in the six Sicilian vessels must have reached Cadiz, he sent orders down to Medina-Sidonia, who was in command there, that if Santa Gadea had not in obedience to previous orders left for the Portuguese coast he was immediately to take Pimentel's *tertia* and

¹ Duro, *Arm. Inven.* Doc. 21, p. 348.

² This episode is related by Leng. He calls the place Algaferra. The Venetian ambassador also reports it: 'He has had,' he writes, 'an engagement with 12 of the galleys at Lagos. It lasted all day with a heavy cannonade, which, however, produced little effect, and they were parted by a storm' (*Venetian Calendar*, viii. 283).

the guns on board his galleys, and together with a body of 600 troops who had been mustered for the Indies fleet, proceed with all speed to Lisbon. If the galleys had sailed, Pimentel was to land and proceed by forced marches to Santa Cruz's relief; and if by chance the galleys were still at Cadiz, and the local officers thought it unsafe for them to leave the port uncovered for any length of time, they were to embark the troops, and instead of taking them to Lisbon to land there at the nearest point they could to shorten the march. As to the ships, they were to wait where they were until the Neapolitan squadron arrived with the galleasses.¹ Two days later, having heard that Drake had disappeared from Lisbon and convinced that now he must be bound to intercept the Indies fleets, the king ordered Santa Cruz to man the Portuguese galleons with the troops that were coming by land and the men of Recalde's squadron, and proceed to sea immediately, in order to prevent the disaster which would completely ruin his shattered finances; and at the same time Medina-Sidonia was instructed to get the ships in Cadiz ready, so that the moment the galleasses arrived they could all put to sea together and join Santa Cruz at Cape Saint Vincent.² Two days later again, the situation was changed a third time by the news that Drake had re-appeared at Saint Vincent. Santa Cruz now wrote that he was sure Drake's object was to prevent the Cadiz divisions joining those at Lisbon, which he had convinced himself could not move. He therefore urgently pressed for the Sicilian *tertia* to be sent to the Tagus overland by forced marches that he might get to sea and fight Drake before he received the reinforcements, which it was believed he was expecting, and which indeed seem to have been actually in preparation at home.³

¹ Duro, *Arm. Inven.* Doc. 21, May 25, 'The King to Medina-Sidonia.'

² *Ibid.* Doc. 22 and 23.

³ 'Four of Her Majesty's ships with six sail of the merchants are ready to go towards Sir Francis'; 'Goche to the Earl of Rutland,' June 19, 1587. *Belvoir Papers, Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 219.

Philip therefore repeated his former orders to Cadiz with renewed emphasis. Meanwhile, however, the officers at that port, burning to retrieve their reputation and not caring perhaps to play second fiddle to Santa Cruz, instead of obeying the king's first order, had sent him word that in a week or ten days' time they could put to sea with sixty sail, not counting the Neapolitan squadron, of which there was still no news, and that they were prepared to drive Drake from his station, and having defeated him to join Santa Cruz in triumph. To this course Philip weakly committed himself, entrusting the command of the proposed movement to Santa Gadea.¹ A week went by, and nothing came from Cadiz except reports of all kinds of difficulties in getting the ships ready for sea, and the king sent down Don Alonso de Leyva, the most brilliant officer at his Court, to inspect the preparations and push things forward. Having during the war of Granada and in the Low Countries achieved a reputation which made him the pattern of Spanish chivalry and soldiership, Leyva had been made Captain-General of the Sicilian galleys. From this command he was promoted to be Captain-General of the Milanese Cavalry, and having resigned this high office in order to serve in the Enterprise of England, he had recently arrived at Court in the full tide of his master's favour and the people's admiration. Yet for all the new life and vigour which he brought he could not stir the inert machine. Drake with his single squadron had thrown everything out of gear; the galleasses were still unheard of; and Philip, in despair, a fourth time changed his plan. The troops were to be taken in the galleys across the Gulf of Cadiz and landed at Ayamonte in the mouth of the Guadiana; and so by river and road to make their way with all speed to Lisbon. For the news the king dreaded had come. Drake had sailed for the Azores.

The motive of this sudden movement Drake does not disclose. On May 17, as we have seen, he announced his

¹ Duro, Doc. 26.

intention of continuing on the station he had seized, and asked for reinforcements. On the 21st, after the ineffectual attempt to bring the galleys to action at Lagos, he wrote another despatch saying he was sending home his sick in some of his prizes, and asking that the best of these vessels might be sent back to him. He also wrote a short letter to Burghley informing him he had dismissed Borough from his command, but neither he nor Fenner hints at the western cruise. The following day the vessels detailed for home parted company, and Drake with the rest of the fleet stood on his course. The explanation which Monson gives is that he had obtained information of a rich carrack homeward bound from the East Indies which had been wintering at Mozambique, and which was consequently expected to arrive that month. This is almost certainly the truth. We know the 'San Felipe'—as the carrack was called—was a source of special anxiety to the king, and that Drake was believed by him to be receiving full information from spies ashore.¹ Monson adds that Drake's men wanted to go home and begged him to do so, and that it was only by fair speeches that he induced them to make the attempt.

Hardly, however, were they a day out, when a gale caught them. For three days it blew with such violence that all the Londoners lost touch and the 'Bonaventure' herself came near foundering. When the gale had blown itself out nearly the whole of the merchantmen had disappeared and only ten vessels were in the company. They seem to have included all six of the queen's vessels, and three private ones, and the force therefore was still formidable; but the same day, while the 'Bonaventure' was repairing damages, a remarkable incident occurred which still further reduced Drake's strength. A strange sail was sighted to leeward, and Marchant in the 'Lion,' upon which all this time Borough had remained under arrest, ever in doubt of his life, gave chase in company

¹ *Venetian Cal.* viii. 283.

with the 'Spy.' She had been lying considerably to leeward of the pinnace, and was the first to fetch up the chase. It proved to be one of their own homeward-bound ships; but instead of beating up to resume her place in the fleet the 'Lion' was seen to stand away before the wind for home, while the 'Spy' pinnace returned alone to the flag-ship. On board her was Captain Marchant. He had to report that, when he had ordered the vessel to go about, the crew with the boatswain at their head had refused to carry out the master's directions. They were short-handed, they said, and water and victuals were low, and they preferred to stand to the queen's mercy than to court certain death with Drake. In vain Marchant reasoned with them. He believed that Borough was at the bottom of the whole affair, and finally, finding it impossible to bring the men to obedience, he had deserted the ship rather than desert his admiral. Drake was furious. Summoning the council of war, he empanelled a jury to try the mutineers. They were found guilty, and as the 'Lion' disappeared below the horizon he sentenced Borough and all the chief officers of the ship to death.¹

Every hope that Drake may have cherished of returning to complete his work on the Spanish coast was now at an end. But still, storm beaten and deserted as he was, his project against the Indian fleets was clung to pertinaciously, and with the nine vessels that remained he held on for the Azores. On the morning of June 8, sixteen days out from Saint Vincent, Saint Michael's rose in sight. Towards evening as they neared the island a very large vessel was made out under the land. Judging

¹ Borough's answer to Drake's accusation, *Lansd. MSS.* 52, art. 31, and *S.P. Dom.* cciii. 1. Deposition of Drake's officers, *S.P. Dom.* ccii. 66. Examination of the ringleaders before the law officers of the crown, *ibid.* 67. Proceedings at 'a general court holden for the service of her Majesty aboard the "Elizabeth Bonaventure," the 30th day of May, &c.,' in the *Cæsar Papers*, *Add. MSS.* 12,505. Part of these which give a highly interesting and graphic picture of the mutiny are printed by Oppenheim, *op. cit.* App. B.

her to be a man-of-war, Drake ordered the 'Rainbow' to heave-to and stand by two of the pinnaces which had fallen astern, while he himself held on for the stranger. At day-break his care was rewarded by seeing her apparently making towards him. On a stiff breeze he at once made all sail to meet her, and before he had reached a league he could see she was a huge Portuguese carrack and knew he had found the splendid prize he had come to seek. She came on dipping her flag again and again as an invitation to the strangers to declare their colours. 'But we,' says an eye-witness, 'knowing what she was, would put out no flag until we were within shot of her, when we hanged out flags, streamers, and pendants, that she might be out of doubt what we were. Which done, we hailed her with cannon-shot; and having shot her through divers times, she shot at us, sometimes at one, sometimes at another. Then we began to ply her hotly, our flyboat and one of our pinnaces lying athwart her hawse, at whom she shot and threw fireworks, but did them no hurt, for that her ordnance lay so high over them. Then she seeing us ready to lay her aboard, all of our ships a-plying her so hotly and resolutely determined to make short [work] of her, six of her men being slain and divers sore hurt, they yielded unto us.'¹

She proved indeed to be the 'San Felipe,' the King of Spain's own East-Indiaman, 'the greatest ship in all Portugal, richly laden, to our happy joy and great gladness.' No such prize had ever been seen. In her hold were hundreds of tons of spices and precious gums; chests upon chests of costly china, bales of silks and velvets, and coffers of bullion and jewels. With her gems, furniture and cargo, she was valued eventually at 114,000*l.* or not far short of a million of our money, and besides, beyond all value, there were the whole of her papers disclosing the long kept secrets of the East India trade.²

¹ Leng.

² It is usually said that it was these papers which stirred the London merchants to form the East India Company, and that in this way Drake's

For Drake there was nothing more to do, but make the best of his way home to secure his prize and seek reinforcements for the completion of his work on the Spanish coast. This accordingly he did, and on June 26, just three months after he had sailed, he anchored in Plymouth Sound with his splendid booty and a reputation unsurpassed in Europe.

In all those wars there was no campaign to match that of 1587. 'The truth is,' wrote the Venetian ambassador, 'that he has done so much damage on these coasts of Spain alone, that though the King were to obtain a most signal victory against him he would not recover one half the loss he has suffered.' Even Monson, the harshest of critics, pronounced it to be without flaw. To this day it may serve as the finest example of how a small well-handled fleet, acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyse the mobilisation of an overwhelming force. We have seen how, when Drake had once secured his well-chosen station, he had merely to shift his position now and again, and to every centre orders came tripping up each other's heels, till the whole system of the enemy was in tangled confusion. Nor even with his disappearance did the effects of his masterly movements cease. As he left the coast we have seen Philip for the fourth time

prize was the foundation of our Indian Empire. It should be noted, however, that the Muscovy Company, and others had endeavoured to open trade to the far East as an immediate result of Drake's treaty with Ternate. Her full value was as under. (See in *C.S. Misc.* v. 50, and in *S.P. Dom.* cciv. 3.)

General cargo . . .	£108,049	13	11
Treasure and jewels . .	3,900	0	0
Ship and ordnance, &c. .	2,000	0	0
	<hr/>		
	£113,949	13	11

The queen's share of the cargo was over £40,000, that of the London merchants a little less, and Drake's about £17,000. The queen seems to have claimed more (probably on the ground that the Londoners were 'out of sight' when the prize struck). But eventually they received their due, and Burghley a present from them of £1,000 for favouring their suit (*Hatfield Papers*, iii. 281). The carrack herself was accidentally burnt.

changing plans.¹ The troops were to proceed to Lisbon by land and the ships to endeavour to slip round in the enemy's absence, so soon as the Neapolitan squadron joined. But on no account were they to move without it, 'because the people that come in the galleasses of Naples are of so much importance by reason of the service they have seen, and the rest are all new and not very expert either at sea or in arms.'² So for fear lest Drake might return, as he had done before, no movement was possible. For the Neapolitan squadron did not come. June wore away, and Philip, with ruin staring him in face, sent down orders that the Cadiz division must sail without the galleasses, and trust to the galleys for protection.³ He was trembling for the Flota of the Spanish Main, which he knew had sailed with the year's produce of Peru, and his idea was for the Cadiz and Lisbon divisions to concentrate at Cape Saint Vincent and save it.⁴ 'Please God,' wrote the Cardinal-Archduke from the seat of his Viceroyalty at Lisbon, 'to give it a happy voyage and that it come to the salvation of Spain.' Of the invasion of England there was no longer a word. Drake had substituted for it a forlorn hope, that possibly by straining every nerve Spain might save herself from ruin. So great was the tension, that the heroic Santa Cruz, impatient of delay, threw Philip's tangled orders to the winds, and the moment the troops reached Lisbon put to sea, sending the king word he was bound for the Azores to save the gold fleet and that he had ordered the Cadiz division to follow when and how it could. This was in the last days of June; and thus as Drake puts in to Plymouth in triumph with his prize, we see his splendid enemy fooled into wasting his strength in a wild-goose chase to avert a danger that did not exist.

How deeply sensible Drake was of the magnitude of his work and the gravity of the crisis we may read in the deepened lines of his character. He sees himself more

¹ Duro, *Arm. Inven.* Doc. 28, June 1-10.
Ibid. Doc. 32, July 5.

² *Ibid.* Doc. 30.
³ *Ibid.* Doc. 34.

clearly than ever as an instrument of Heaven, and the fervour of his conviction is unmistakable in the letter he wrote to John Fox, the devout Martyrologist, in the hour of his triumph at Cadiz. 'To the right reverend godly learned father,' it runs, 'my very good friend, Mr. John Fox, preacher of the Word of God. Master Fox, whereas we have had of late such happy success against the Spaniards, I do assure myself you have faithfully remembered us in your good prayers and therefore I have not forgotten briefly to make you a partaker thereof.' The veteran divine militant was dead as the words were penned, but such prayers we may well believe were breathed with his latest sighs. Drake then gives him a short account of the operations, and ends with a renewed request for his prayers 'that we may have continual peace in Israel,' and he signs himself, 'Your loving friend and faithful son in Christ Jesus.' Then comes the pious postscript. 'Our enemies are many but our Protector commandeth the whole world. Let us all pray continually and our Lord Jesus will hear us in good time mercifully.'

As characteristic was the intensification of his ardour for prompt and vigorous action. 'I thank them much they have stayed so long,' he wrote to Walsingham from Sagres, in urging that a respite was all he had obtained, 'and when they come, they shall be but the sons of men, and for the most part enemies of the truth and upholders of Baal or Dagon's image which hath already fallen before the ark of our God with his hands and arms and head stricken off.' He had won himself time to return with a fresh force to the scene of his triumph before the Armada could possibly sail, and he was burning for the necessary orders. But it was not to be. The diplomatists again had taken the upper hand, and instead of clinching Drake's action by another blow the Government, in hope that enough had been done to induce Philip to abandon his project, was devoting its whole attention to explaining it away as a mistake. The bitterness which Drake felt at seeing the men and ships that had been engaged to support

him paid off, and the intensity of his resentment against all that stood between him and the enemy, found vent in an implacable prosecution of Borough. He seems to have had small doubt that the sentence he had pronounced would be carried out, and on July 25, just a month after his return, he presented formal articles against the culprit at 'Theobalds,' Lord Burghley's house. Here he found things had taken a turn against him. His landing upon Spanish territory had just been officially disavowed, and to Drake's astonishment the Council was not at once convinced of the justice and legality of the sentence he had pronounced upon his Vice-Admiral. The sentence of the court-martial was probably in excess of his authority, for by the traditions of the service a commander's power of life and death did not extend to his principal officers. As formulated by Henry VIII.'s orders the rule was that 'all captains must be obedient unto their admiral; if any be stubborn the admiral shall set him ashore and put another in his place and write to the king and his council of his faults, truly and without malice.' The rule clearly contemplates warfare in the Narrow Seas; it could not be put in force on distant expeditions. Right as Drake was in his ideas, they almost certainly were an innovation and without precedent. The justice of the sentence was as doubtful as its legality. Burghley especially, who seems at this time to have viewed Drake's action on the coast of Spain with no favourable eye and whose characteristic caution could well sympathise with Borough's opposition, took a more lenient view of the unhappy officer's case. His original offence was protesting against the landing at Saint Vincent, and it was just this the Government was declaring in excess of Drake's instructions. The only chance, then, of getting the death sentence confirmed lay in the mutiny, and if we may believe Borough, Drake and his officers, by fair means and foul, endeavoured to induce the imprisoned crew of the 'Lion' to swear the Vice-Admiral had been their ring-leader, while Drake himself openly protested that nothing

repented him so much as that he had not cut the offender off while he had him in his power. Borough retorted by raking up the old story of Drake's desertion of Hawkins at San Juan de Ulua, and took care that Burghley should not forget the case of Doughty. In the end the Lord Treasurer's kindly influence prevailed over Drake's perverse animosity, and Borough, with his high reputation sadly stained by his excess of caution, was acquitted of the graver charges of mutiny and desertion, and not only retained his office as Clerk of the Ships, but two years later was promoted to that of Controller of the Navy.¹

¹ 'Articles against Borough and his answers,' *Lansd. MSS.* 52, arts. 31 and 41; 'Borough to Burghley,' February 1, 1588; Laughton, *Defeat of the Armada*, i. 74; *S.P. Dom.* ccii 66, and cciii. 1, and *Cæsar Papers*, *supra*, p. 101, n. For Burghley's view of Drake's proceedings see *post*, p. 116.

CHAPTER IV

DRAKE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN¹

WITH Drake's relapse into inaction the first stage of the war may be said to come to an end. Although it was easy to criticise adversely these two preliminary campaigns, and especially in the matter of the evacuation of Cartagena, on the whole both in their conception and conduct they have always been regarded as the most brilliant of the war. It is in her conduct of the ensuing stages that Elizabeth has been blamed most severely. In her fanaticism for peace she seemed incapable of appreciating the magnitude and the imminence of the danger. Though Drake had been sent expressly to ascertain the Spanish intentions, it was in vain he warned her. Even in the hour of his triumph a great part of his despatch was devoted to an effort to bring home to her Government the formidable state of affairs. He had merely made a beginning; he had but singed the King of Spain's beard. 'I assure your honour,' he wrote to Walsingham, as he had sailed from Cadiz in quest of Recalde, 'the like preparation was never heard of or known, as the King of Spain hath and daily maketh to invade England. . . . This service, which by God's sufferance we have done, will (without doubt) breed some alteration of their pretences; howbeit all possible preparations for defences are very expedient to be made'; and then again in a post-script, as though he had said but half his mind, 'I dare not a'most write unto your honour of the great forces we hear the King of Spain hath out of the Straits [i.e. from the

¹ For authorities for the Armada campaign see *post*, Appendix B.

Mediterranean]. Prepare in England strongly and most by sea. Stop him now and stop him ever. Look well to the coast of Sussex.' From all sides came similar warnings; but the queen would not listen, and Drake was kept at home. Whatever may have been her political reasons for not wishing to deal Philip too crushing a blow, from a military point of view her decision was undoubtedly a grave mistake, and even at the time everyone seemed to see it except herself.¹ Yet not only did she refuse to let Drake sail again and thus leave Philip free to complete his preparations, but she would not even mobilise her fleet as a precautionary measure. It is for this she has been most severely handled in recent times, as though she had come near to sacrificing the country to a constitutional parsimony and levity of purpose. Yet for this part of her policy may be found not a little justification, and it must be doubted whether much of the animadversion of modern critics is not due to a misapprehension of the conditions that then existed.

In the first place it must be borne in mind that after Drake's devastations and his dislocation of Philip's plans it was a very general opinion in England, that the Armada could not possibly sail till it was too late in the season to fear it. Philip, it is true, thought otherwise. So soon as he heard that Santa Cruz had sailed in pursuit of Drake he sent peremptory orders that the Cadiz division was not to follow that of Lisbon, as the Captain-General had directed, but to carry out its original instructions and proceed to Lisbon. Thus he had checked the wild-goose chase, and minimised the evil effect of Drake's last move. Energetically pushing on his preparations, with Leyva in command at headquarters during Santa Cruz's absence, he still believed the expedition could sail in September, and Parma in Flanders was ordered to hold himself in readiness to cross the Channel the moment the Armada arrived to cover the passage. To complete the

¹ See 'Wroth to Burghley,' from Venice, September 5, 1587; *Hatfield Papers*, *Hist. MSS. Com.* iii. 279.

king's sanguine expectations all the Indies fleet, the greater part of which had been given up as lost, reached Spain in safety and was received with extraordinary rejoicings. Still, in spite of every effort, the concentration went on but slowly. Early in July the Andalucian division got to sea; the Neapolitan contingent followed; but not till nearly a month later did Oquendo get round with his Biscayans from Passages, and still Santa Cruz had not returned from his chase with the Portuguese galleons. It was not apparently till quite the end of September that he was sighted off Cape Saint Vincent, and when at last he reached Lisbon he had to report so much damage from bad weather that it seems he was quite unable to put to sea again without considerable delay.

To Santa Cruz it was now plain that to sail so late in the year was madness; but the hot-headed Leyva in the confidence of his ignorance and high spirit was at hand to prejudice all the solid reasons the old admiral had for the king. Naval experts were sent up to Court to explain the difficulties, and Philip sent them sharply back with renewed orders to get to sea. All through October Santa Cruz protested and worked and the king doggedly insisted. It was the end of the month before the Biscay squadron, which probably to complete its stores had been lying at San Lucar, reached Lisbon. But even when the concentration was thus nearly complete the work was but half done. The more the ships were overhauled the worse their condition appeared. November came and Santa Cruz saw no prospect of being ready for sea till December. The king was induced to believe he was wilfully making difficulties, and at last the admiral sent up a final solemn memorandum to clear himself. As in duty bound he begged the king to defer the enterprise till March. He would thus lose only two months, and avoid the midwinter storms of the Atlantic and the fogs and sickly atmosphere of the English Channel, which must invalidate the military action of the fleet, even if the storms spared it. He warned him of the political weaknesses of his plan; of the

growing danger from the Turks ; of what would befall his Empire if the Armada were destroyed. Every reason of State, of war and of seamanship cried out to them to wait. In conclusion he said that the protest was only what his duty called for, but he vowed he was ready to sail and spend his life on the smallest sign from his master. Then at last the king reluctantly gave way, and by December it was known the Armada was not to sail that year. Thus more by strategical pressure than by actual destruction had Drake given check to the invasion.¹

But while Philip had been thus indefatigably occupied in trying to get his great machine to move, it must not be supposed that England was merely resting on her oars. From Flanders, where Philip's Viceroy was organising his army of invasion, there was present danger. This was met and firmly parried by a small and well-equipped blockading squadron under Sir Henry Palmer. Nor was Philip left entirely free from threats of a fresh offensive. For at Plymouth was kept together the nucleus of Drake's victorious fleet, and around it, as we shall see, he was allowed to weave new schemes for getting at his enemy's throat, which acted as a constant menace upon the king's arrested mobilisation and his Indian trade. Drake himself, as we know from his own letters, was fully aware what a disturbing influence he was, and there can be no doubt the position he maintained was a calculated factor in the English strategical plan. Yet because the main fleet was kept at its moorings in Gillingham Reach, Elizabeth has usually been regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction. 'Had Santa Cruz sailed,' says the best known authority, 'before the end of September, as Philip intended, not a ship could have been brought out to encounter him. Parma beyond question would have crossed the Channel and the battle of English liberty would have been fought not at sea but on shore.'²

¹ See Lippomano's despatches for October and November in the *Venetian Calendar*, viii. 593, 595, &c.

² Froude, *Hist. of England*, xii. 322.

Parma himself was of the same opinion. 'Had the Marquis come,' he wrote, 'when I was first told to look for him, the landing could have been effected without difficulty. Neither the English nor the Dutch were then in a condition to resist your fleet.'¹ But the point is the Marquis did not come and the main fleet was not wanted. The English seamen must have known as well as he did himself that there was barely a chance of his coming and less to fear if he did. The event at least justified the queen's policy. There is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at home, nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers, using much the same arguments as those with which Santa Cruz convinced his master. There was perhaps some faint risk that the Armada might sail in a maimed and unready condition; that it might survive the boisterous and adverse weather it was almost certain to encounter; that in spite of being harassed by Sir Henry Palmer and Drake, it might have made its way up Channel to cover Parma's passage; but the risk was very small, and nothing marks a genius for strategy more highly than knowing when to take such risks and husband strength for a greater and certain advantage.² To have mobilised the fleet in the autumn would have been on the safe side for the time; but in those days, when naval hygiene was so little understood, the waste of men kept long on board ship was a serious factor in the problem, and the ships themselves rapidly deteriorated at sea; nor must we forget the paralysis of commerce which a mobilisation meant. For the time England would have been absolutely safe, but at the cost of weakness when the supreme moment

¹ Froude, *Hist. of England*, xii. 324.

² A parallel case occurred after Lord Howe's victory in 1794, when the French Convention, in spite of all protest from their officers, forced the Brest fleet out in the winter before damages had been thoroughly repaired, with the result that it effected nothing and, though no action was fought, returned to port having suffered damage almost as severe as that which the battle inflicted.

came. Apart from all this it is certain that, if the Armada had sailed, it could only have done so with sufficient notice to the English Government for the new scheme of mobilisation to have put upon the sea a squadron formidable enough to have prevented anything like an unopposed passage for Parma. Much we know could be done in a fortnight; the rapidity with which the English Navy could be mobilised was a new thing not yet grasped abroad, and had Santa Cruz come when Parma was expecting him, we should certainly have seen how well justified were Montgomery's ideas of what an inferior fleet prepared to sacrifice itself could do in paralysing an invading force of even twice its strength.

When Philip, in deference to his naval council-of-war, had decided to postpone his enterprise, he had resolved that the expedition should sail early in the following year, and employed the delay in still further increasing its strength. For now the queen too was vigorously at work, and the reports of her preparation struck Philip with apprehension for the sufficiency of his force. The actual date of the English mobilisation is uncertain. It was not till December 15, 1587, that Lord Howard of Effingham received his instructions; on the 21st his commission as commander-in-chief was signed, and next day he announced that in two or three days the whole of the ships, perfectly manned and equipped, would be ready for sea.¹ Considering that these vessels, together with Sir Henry Palmer's squadron and the London and Western auxiliaries that were also ready for sea, were certainly a match for anything Philip had to bring against them, and that there is no trace of any active measures for placing the Navy upon a war footing before November, this must be regarded as an extraordinary feat of mobilisation.² No other power

¹ *Foljambe Papers, Hist. MSS. Com. XV. v. 109.* Laughton, *Armada*, i. 19 and 23.

² On November 13 there is a proposal from Hawkins to undertake to protect the Isle of Wight from invasion with seventeen sail, endorsed 'not accepted,' which looks as though up to that time no definite resolution about mobilising the Navy had been come to. On November 24 there is an

in Europe could have approached it. Philip's first order for the Armada had been issued in September 1583. At the shortest estimate it had been in active preparation for a year and half, when Drake in the summer of 1587 caught it still unable to put to sea, and it was not till three months after he had appeared on the Spanish coast that Santa Cruz was able to put out with a sufficient force to engage him. It is therefore less than justice to Elizabeth's administration to blame her for the apparent inability to appreciate the gravity of the situation, without at the same time bearing in mind the splendid excuse she had in the completeness of her naval organisation.

More difficult to defend is the step which opened the fateful year 1588. In the first week of January an order was issued to reduce the whole of Howard's crews to one half their war strength, and by the 18th the operation was completed.¹ This has always been attributed to the queen's infatuation for peace and her obstinate belief that the negotiations which she had succeeded in opening with Parma for an armistice would speedily stop the war. But this is by no means clear. It must be remembered that Philip early in December had finally decided to postpone the expedition, and some inkling of this must have reached the Government by the end of the year. Information, indeed, had been received by Walsingham that Philip was contemplating an abandonment of the enterprise altogether, and some credit seems to have been attached to it.² The news was not confirmed, but we know that Philip thought so seriously of the English

estimate for certain Navy ships to serve westward with Drake, and on November 27 emptions had been issued for furnishing fourteen ships of the Royal Navy, so that the mobilisation order must have been issued by that time. Ubaldino (*Second Commentary*) says 'dal primo di Novembre sino alli 20 di Decembre mese di poi furon presti i legni tutti della Corona et dei suoi [i.e. the Lord Admiral's own] per uscire al mare;' by which he seems to mean that the mobilisation was carried out between those dates, for they certainly continued to be ready until the end of the year.

¹ 'Hawkins to Burghley'; Laughton, *Armada*, i. 33.

² 'Howard to Walsingham'; *ibid.* p. 47.

preparations that he ordered Santa Cruz not to sail without a contingent of galleys, and announced February 15 as the earliest date on which a final concentration could take place.¹ Under these circumstances the only present danger was that Parma might elude the blockade and slip across to Scotland or some part of the east coast. For this the Navy was perfectly ready. To reduce the crews by one half was not to reduce the fleet to a peace footing. The numbers retained were equal to the establishment ordinarily employed for working the ships between Chatham and Portsmouth. Ample force therefore remained for a short voyage, and orders had been given that troops were to be in readiness all along the coast to embark at the shortest notice, the idea being apparently that if Parma succeeded in eluding the blockade and in effecting a landing on the English coast a force could be immediately placed in his rear or on his flank and paralyse his further operations.² At the same time it was thought advisable that the whole Navy should be ready by March 10, so as to be concentrated at Portsmouth by the end of the month. Howard himself, though naturally lamenting the breaking up of his splendid crews and disapproving of Queenborough as a station, was otherwise fairly content with the arrangement, merely reminding Walsingham that if the intelligence from Spain became more warlike, he must have good notice in order to complete his crews. As for the ships he could promise to have all in apple-pie order by the middle of March. He even regarded the retention of the half crews as an excess of precaution, feeling sure that with three or four ships fully manned and Palmer's squadron he could be absolutely sure of answering for the Flanders army.

When we consider the practical impossibility of a winter campaign in those days and the absolute necessity

¹ Duro, *Arm. Inven.* i. 411.

² Mem. by Burghley; Laughton, *Armada*, i. 55. It is not dated, but is assigned to January.

there was of dry-docking the ships if they were to be of any use in the spring, it is difficult to regard the policy adopted as otherwise than statesmanlike and seamanlike. Compared at least with the way in which treasure, stores, and lives were being squandered in Spain, the whole of the English naval administration at this time was a masterpiece.¹

Nor must it be forgotten that the retention of the main fleet in a state of semi-mobilisation was by no means the whole of the queen's plan. The strategy, which had been so successful in the last two campaigns, was to be repeated, and for Drake was reserved a field apart, that was entirely after his own heart. To understand his peculiar position, the exact nature of which is important in view of what afterwards occurred, regard must be had to what had befallen him after his return from singeing the King of Spain's beard. Ever since then the attitude of the Government towards him had been one of bewildering inconstancy with a tendency towards pronounced disfavour. In the hour of his triumph he had confidently expected fresh orders from the queen, but Mary's execution seems quite to have unhinged her. She was listening once more to the friends of Spain, and instead of loading him with the honours he deserved, she professed strong displeasure at his having violated Spanish territory. In the middle of July Burghley had been directed actually to write to Flanders disavowing his action. 'Unwitting, yea unwilling to her Majesty,' he wrote on the 18th, 'those actions were committed by Sir Francis Drake, for the which Her Majesty is as yet greatly offended at him.'² On the following day Drake

¹ In judging of the light in which the naval officers, and especially Howard, regarded their orders, their criticisms on the political situation must be carefully distinguished from those on naval affairs. The former are mostly dictated by a praiseworthy impatience to get at the enemy rather than by a full appreciation of the complex situation.

² *S.P. Flanders*, 1587, No. 32, July 28 (draft). It is possible Burghley was really of the queen's opinion. In his 'Discourse of Foreign Policy' (*S.P. Dom.* 1587, cciii. 62) he notes: 'The next greatest offence which hath been com-

arrived in town with a splendid casket of jewels which had been found in the 'San Felipe,' and went down to Theobalds, where the Court was at the time.¹ It was on this occasion, as we have seen, that he presented his articles against Borough, but could make no head against the unfavourable turn things had taken. Towards autumn, however, his prospects had brightened, and there is evidence that a new scheme for his employment was in the air. Don Antonio again seems to have been the centre of it. It will be remembered how, on the eve of Drake's sailing for the Indies, the Portuguese Pretender had landed a beggar at Plymouth, and found an asylum with Sidney at the Admiral's country house. Ever since then we get glimpses of him hanging about the Court as an almost hopeless suppliant. In September 1586 he had been found there under Raleigh's patronage by his old enemy, the famous navigator Sarmiento Gamboa, who was Sir Walter's prisoner.² During Drake's last expedition he had been constantly kept in mind. At every opportunity information had been assiduously collected along the Portuguese coast as to the prospects of effecting his restoration, and indeed it was generally believed by the Spaniards that he was on board the English fleet. A month or two after Drake's return he received a thousand pounds from the Treasury to pay his debts. In October Raleigh procured permission for Sir

mitted against the Spanish King is the spoil of his Indies,' and again, 'The unnecessary entering like enemies upon the continent of Spain. The indiscreet brags and opprobrious words given out at that instant, whereby his indignation hath been aggravated with vain demonstrations and worse effects without the especial benefit of Her Majesty or any diminution to the Spanish greatness.' In the 'indiscreet brags &c.' there seems a suggestion that Drake's character was personally distasteful to Burghley, or at least that he failed to appreciate the admiral's aims and methods. He could not understand the importance of the 'indiscreet brags' for the spirit of Drake's force nor that they were part of the measures he took to exasperate Santa Cruz into coming out to fight him.

¹ *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 222.

² *The Voyage of Pedro Sarmiento*, Hakl. Soc. p. 342. Sarmiento says Don Antonio incurred the queen's displeasure by slandering him and that Don Antonio afterwards tried to get him assassinated.

Francis to visit Leicester in view of a new venture. 'Sir Francis,' wrote Raleigh, 'is in good hope to return to the Indies. If it may be brought to pass, I doubt not all shall be recupered. I hope your Excellency will assist what you may'; and a little later Drake had completed the preliminaries for a new voyage.¹ At first it seems that a purely private venture was contemplated, but towards the end of November, when, upon the news of the concentration of the Armada at Lisbon, the whole Navy was being mobilised an addition of three royal great-ships and two pinnaces was sanctioned. By this time Drake must have been re-established in favour, and his ideas had so far prevailed that the Council seems to have resolved that in spite of the peace negotiations something might be done under the Portuguese flag.² On Christmas day Burghley received a report from a spy that Don Antonio could be easily restored, and in January 1588, before the Commissioners went over to negotiate the armistice on which Elizabeth apparently had set her heart as a preliminary to peace, they received secret instructions to do their best to prevent the Pretender's name being brought into the Convention.³

¹ Note of 'Extraordinary Expenses,' Ladyday to Michaelmas, 1587 (*S.P. Dom.* ccii. 56); and 'Names of Sureties to be bound in £50,000' (*S.P. Dom.* cciv. 53, October 31). In the Camden Society volume this document is printed as relating to the 1587 voyage, but it seems clear that it is a list of those members of the old company who entered into a bond for a new voyage and gave security not to attack Spanish territory. Drake and ten of his old company appear as partners, and the same day a quantity of stores from the Government magazines were delivered for furnishing merchant ships 'appointed to the seas in Her Highness's service under Sir Francis Drake' (*Nutwell Court MSS.*). This, it is worth noting, is just a week after the complete account of the plunder in the 'San Felipe' had been delivered to the queen. Raleigh's letter to Leicester is in the *Tanner MSS.*, dated Oct. 8, 1587, and a facsimile of it in Edwards's *Life of Raleigh*.

² See *S.P. Spain*, xxvi. November 25, 1587. The paper is docketed: 'Doubts to be resolved for the peace commission.' One item is as follows: 'What shall be done if they mean to surcease meddling with Don Antonio?' Against this 'doubt' Burghley has written in the margin, 'No aiding of Don Antonio with forces directly or indirectly'; but his comment is erased, and this is the only one in the whole document that is.

³ *Domestic Calendar*, December 25, 1587; *Hatfield Papers*, iii. 306.

Meanwhile, on December 23, two days after Howard's appointment as commander-in-chief, Drake received a commission for the command of an independent fleet of thirty sail, including seven of the Royal Navy. This commission he afterwards seems to have shown to Ubaldino, the Italian historian whom he instructed to write a true account of the Armada campaign, and whatever his secret orders may have been we know that its tenor was that he was to employ the force committed to him as a flying squadron for the purpose of making a reconnaissance in force of the enemy's position. His instructions, as Ubaldino details them, were to proceed at once to the Spanish coast, look into the ports, and wherever he found ships assembling to do his best to distress them and interrupt further concentration, without exposing his force to undue risk. If, on the other hand, he found the concentration was complete and the enemy at sea, he was immediately to send back a despatch vessel to warn the Government, and with his own fleet to dog the enemy's course, whatever it might be, and to seize every opportunity which the weather or bad seamanship should give him of attacking them without endangering of his own fleet. With a decentralising directness which does credit to Elizabethan methods, his commission further gave him special power, without any communication with headquarters, to order the officials of the seaport towns and coast counties to mobilise the local forces, and concentrate them at any point he thought advisable, so that no time might be lost; and added to these extraordinary powers was an authority to detain and send in all vessels carrying contraband of war.

No sooner was this commission in his hands than in accordance with his usual practice he immediately despatched a pinnace to feel the way upon the scene of the intended operations, and on January 3, as soon as the New Year's festivities were over, he went down to Plymouth to hoist his Admiral's flag and organise his squadron.¹

¹ *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 236.

With his ample commission, which he seemed to consider placed him on an equality with Howard or at least in independence of him, he was well content; and with characteristic ardour he threw himself into the work of preparation. The purport of his commission of course was kept secret, but the rumour spread that he was going to hunt the Indies fleet, and, as a released Spanish prisoner reported, men flocked to his standard in numbers sufficient to man two hundred vessels.¹ As yet, however, his squadron was far from being complete. Thirteen of his old fleet were there, but that was all. Neither the seven Navy vessels, which were to form the royal contingent, nor the five Londoners had yet sailed, and five more vessels he had still to find to make up his thirty sail. At Court so soon as his back was turned the old vacillations seem to have set in, and the Admiralty was busy reducing the crews. Three of the vessels which had been originally promised him—the ‘Hope,’ the ‘Nonpareil,’ and the ‘Advice’ pinnace—were already at Portsmouth, the ‘Makeshift’ and the ‘Spy’ pinnaces were on the coast of Spain, but it was not till the middle of the month that the Chatham division sailed. It consisted of the ‘Aid,’ the ‘Swiftsure,’ and finally the ‘Revenge,’ which Drake was destined to render famous for all time as his flagship. He had thus at his command some of the finest middle-class galleons in the service, and Ubaldino says he had been allowed to choose them for himself. To complete his numbers he requisitioned five hulks, which the same authority says belonged to the King of Sweden and which presumably he had detained as carrying warlike stores. Two of these apparently, which had left Lisbon on January 2, he seized off Plymouth on the 20th.² From their crews he learned that the work upon the Armada was in full blast, and next day he hurried some of the prisoners off to Court with the information. At the same time, however, as ill luck would have it the Government received from their

¹ *Noticias de Inglaterra*, Duro, i. 510.

² Ubaldino. *Second Commentary*.

ambassador in Paris a report that sickness, death, and desertion had been making such havoc with the Armada that it was to be dissolved. The lamentable state of affairs in the Spanish ports gave no doubt considerable colour to the ambassador's information, and, worse than this, his report was immediately confirmed by independent intelligence sent by the King of Navarre. Henry was considered from his position to have every means of knowing the truth; and, false as the news was, great credit was attached to it. Instead of the royal contingent and sailing orders there came down to Plymouth a command to dismiss the Swedish vessels Drake had detained, and vague directions to keep the rest of his squadron together, but no further instructions as to what he was to do with it. Neither he nor Walsingham believed the new information for a moment. The far-seeing Secretary told Howard he must look out for the Armada in April, and Drake, seeing no signs of ships or stores, and firmly convinced of his own power of divining an enemy's movements, wrote to the queen sending her fresh intelligence of active preparations in Spain and imploring her not to throw away the advantage of the first blow nor to run the risk of putting off a definite decision till the last moment.¹

To the queen in the harassing doubts and difficulties of her position Drake seems at this time to have become as it were a comfortable point of rest upon which she could count with no shadow of uncertainty. Her faith in his broad capacity was growing almost as great as his own, and whether or not it was due to his confident persuasion

¹ This letter is not extant, but Ubaldino gives its purport as follows: 'Caval. Drake, che si pensava d'haver ad essere essequitor di gran parte di quella impresa, si risolve, per non mancar dell' ufficio suo in parte alcuna, di scriverne l'opinione sua il dì cinque di Febraio alla Regina, cercando di persuaderla con diverse ragioni a non lasciar perder tempo à i suoi, proponendole il profitto, che si poteva sperar dalla prestezza degli apparecchi proprii, et remonstrando il danno da esser temuto del troppo indugiarsi nell' ultima et più importante resolution loro; messo egli à far ciò dalla certezza di più informationi conformi, et dalla congettura del verisimile conosciuta da lui per l'arte sua propria et per una certa fortunata conoscenza delle cose del mare.'

things at once took a turn for the better. What answer he received we do not know, but it set all in movement. On the 13th he despatched another pinnace to Spain; the Navy ships, foul as they were, came round; by the 17th two of them were already graved and tallowed, and William Hawkins wrote to his brother John that he was working day and night by torchlight and cressets to get the rest ready in immediate anticipation of sailing orders.

Drake as usual was in a fever to be gone. The long delay had resulted in the inevitable epidemic making havoc with his crews.¹ Crofts, the 'friend of Spain,' was at the queen's ear urging her to stop him, even persuading her to sacrifice him to the peace and tempting her to confiscate his property. The unscrupulous minister declared he had men ready to prove sufficient charges, and he promised that after paying all possible Spanish claims and rewarding the informers, there would still be a large surplus for herself.² This iniquitous proposal had no effect. There is no reason to believe the queen listened to it for a moment, and if she did, Drake had now a new and more powerful friend at Court. This was the young Earl of Essex, the son of his old patron in Ireland. Having inherited all his father's romantic passion for adventure, he had just been caught in an attempt to escape to the seat of war in the Low Countries. In Drake, it seems, he saw a fresh chance of flying from his fond mistress and was in secret correspondence with him, evidently intending, as he did on a later occasion, to slip away like Sidney and join the fleet at the last moment. There exists a letter, intense and excited in tone and more than usually full of religious passion, which was written by Drake from Ply-

¹ *Noticias de Inglaterra, ubi supra.*

² 'Crofts to the Queen,' February 21, 1588. After referring to previous letters in which his meaning is more fully explained, he says: 'Sir Francis Drake may be more deeply charged, whose gains I do presume to be so great with other of his complices, as if the King of Spain's Commissioners should require and your Majesty be willing to make restitution of that which he and others of his complices have taken, there will remain a good portion over and above that which the discoverers look for in reward' (*S.P. Spain*, xxii. 33).

mouth with his own hand while Hawkins's night shifts were labouring by the flaring cressets, and which forces us to a suspicion, that in despair at the Government's vacillation and aware perhaps of Crofts's treacherous practices, he was conspiring with Essex to carry his squadron to sea in defiance of all orders, and at any hazard to do what his genius told him the safety of the country demanded. After excusing his delay in writing by his anxiety to hear from the Council definitely whether he would be allowed to sail or not, the letter proceeds: 'My very good Lord, let me beseech you most earnestly to remove all jealousy in not thinking Francis Drake of his promise resolute and most specially to my Lord of Essex. Secondly, let me beseech you pardon my pen, not so much for that I write ill, as for the danger thereof. For one letter seen is sufficient to overthrow all; but the staying of this action shall never cause Francis Drake to forget his promise to my lord of Essex. To be short, while my life doth last, with the grace of God my body shall retain an honest mind and that specially in so good a cause. Good my lord, tear my letter and hold my word as a rock to build on; for as the Lord liveth my lord of Essex hath and shall have a great interest in Francis Drake. My good lord, my conscience and soul beareth me in, that there is some great part to be played in the Church of God by your honour and myself, if we can hold the secret. For secrecy in the beginning is the assurance of the harbour which God will bring for His glory.' So he bids him have courage 'for the cause is good and it is little with God to give victory with few.' In a postscript he adds, as though some land operations were contemplated: 'The employment of your lordship's crowns and mine shall be in victual, powder, small ammunition, spades, shovels, pick-axes, baskets, ropes, twine, and such like. If this arrow fail us for a time, it cannot be long ere there be as good. There is nothing to hurt us, but the knowledge of your Lordship's purpose. For my good lord, as the Lord liveth my conscience and knowledge bear record that God hath

much true honour to lend your lordship ; for it is He that hath given you the true magnanimity.¹

Some desperate enterprise it must have been that these two adventurous spirits were driven to contemplate in their impatience. The nature of the small munitions increases the probability that part of the design was to establish Don Antonio somewhere on Portuguese territory. The main object, however, was understood to be an attempt to burn the Armada in its own ports.² But whatever it may have been it was destined to fall to the ground. To add to the queen's hopes of peace came the news that, like Pero Menendez, on the eve of the great exploit of his life, Santa Cruz was dead. The extraordinary ill fortune that seemed to dog Philip's path to England was still upon him, darker and more pronounced than ever. In its shadow the prospect of war seemed to fade and Crofts's counsels prevailed. Before the end of February the peace commissioners were passing over to Flanders, and at the last moment Drake was ordered not to leave the coast.

Here was Elizabeth's first great mistake. Up to this point the conduct of the war had been sound according to the intelligence obtainable, but this was a blunder undoubtedly due to the queen herself and founded on an entire misconception of the state of affairs. Had Drake sailed at the end of February he would have caught the Armada in a state of radical disorganisation due to the pressure that had been brought to bear on Santa Cruz to get to sea and his subsequent death. When his successor, the incompetent Duke of Medina-Sidonia, arrived at Lisbon from Cadiz he found the fleet wholly unfit to sail. Every thing to the water-barrels was defective. In the hurry to obey the king's impatient orders, guns and stores had been

¹ 'Drake to Essex,' Plymouth, February 16, 1587-8. Holograph in the possession of A. Huth, Esq., to whom I am indebted for permission to make the above extracts. The letter is further of interest as suggesting that Essex had heard Fulke Greville's story of the Sidney episode and that he may have half believed it, but this, of course, is no evidence that it was true.

² *Noticias de Inglaterra, ubi supra.*

tumbled into the wrong vessels, and all had to be changed. Of powder and ball there was but half what was wanted. The unpaid soldiers were without proper kits, pilots and sailors were dying in scores from starvation, and there was nothing like the proper complement of men. Even the chief staff appointments were not yet filled up, and Sidonia reported the fleet would not be safe for a day once it was outside the harbour.¹ The Andalucian squadron was still at Cadiz and in even a worse condition than that at headquarters; and the Indies fleet, on which Philip's last hope of restoring his financial credit depended, had not yet sailed.² Had Drake at the head of his powerful squadron appeared on the coast, the panic and confusion that must have ensued can only have resulted in an overwhelming disaster.

Since his last exploit the very words 'El Draque,' the dragon, had become a terror in the people's ears. Of this he was well aware and with keen satisfaction felt it as a factor in the military situation. For him it was a final reason why he should be allowed to strike, 'for he knew,' wrote Ubaldino, 'without flattering himself what fear there was on all the coast of Spain at his name.'³ Nor was his boast without foundation. For the mass of the Spaniards, that a heretic could so prevail against Christians, admitted of but one explanation. Drake was a magician. He had sold his soul to the devil for a familiar, by whose aid he worked. In his cabin was a magic mirror, that revealed to him the ships of his enemies and all that passed on board of them; he could count their crews and watch their movements; and like the Norse witches of old he had power by some dark bargain to garner the winds to loose or bind them at his will. It is even said

¹ Duro, *Doc.* 78 and 79.

² It did not get to sea till the end of March. Duro, i. 505.

³ It is noteworthy of Ubaldino's anxiety to produce a thoroughly impartial and accurate narrative that he adds to this passage the following marginal note. 'Questo proposito da diversi divertamente è disputato, et non interamente risoluto.' This is all the more to his credit, since we know now from the Spaniards themselves that it was true.

that in order to induce the men to embark it was necessary to spread a report that he was dead.¹ When Philip gave orders on Sidonia's report to raise fresh companies for the fleet, hardly a captain could be found to accept the commissions.² The confidence and enthusiasm which had marked the earlier preparations were growing cold, and officers and men were alike demoralised. So lamentable indeed was the condition of the Armada, that in England, as we have seen, it was openly said that nearly all the crews were dead, and that there was no fear it could ever do any harm;³ and thus in judging Elizabeth it must not be forgotten that the very reasons which condemn her naval policy are to no small an extent a justification of her diplomacy. From a naval point of view it was the moment to strike with her whole force. From the diplomatic side it looked an occasion full of hope for stretching out the hand of peace.

The disgust of the Lord Admiral and his officers, weary to death of their profitless station in the Medway mouth, was profound. In Howard's commission was a special authority to invade the Spanish dominions, and when it became known that all offensive operations were to be suspended, he asked for leave of absence for himself and the noblemen who were serving under his flag. His application was not granted. With a striking foretaste of modern methods the queen felt how much the arguments of her delegates at the conference would be strengthened by a fleet in the offing. For this she required Lord Howard's services. The four largest ships, which were regarded by experts as unfit for winter service in the Narrow Seas, were as usual ordered up to Chatham to be overhauled under Hawkins's superintendence. But beyond this no diminution in the fleet was made. Lord Howard transferred his flag to the 'Ark,' a splendid

¹ Navarrete, *Documentos Inéditos*, tom. 81, p. 245. *Hist. MSS. Com.* xii. iv. 252.

² Sidonia's Report. Duro, i. 476.

³ See also *Noticias de Inglaterra*, *ubi supra*.

vessel which had been designed for Raleigh and sold by him to the queen. In this with the rest of his division he remained at Queenborough, where the ships were scraped and tallowed one by one. When all was taut the Admiral, with a fleet of eight great-ships of the queen's and one of his own together with six pinnaces and a ketch, was ordered to join Palmer, and while maintaining the blockade of Dunkirk to make with the combined squadrons a naval demonstration before Flushing, where the truce commissioners were sitting.

With his whole command, and especially with his new flagship, Howard and his officers were delighted, and everything went to show how utterly unfounded were the slanders that charged Hawkins with having scamped his work. 'Our ships do show themselves like gallants here,' wrote Wynter, the Vice-Admiral, from the Downs. 'I assure you it will do a man's heart good to behold them; and would to God the Prince of Parma were upon the sea with all his forces and we in view of them.'¹ From his new station Howard declared, 'I protest before God and as my soul shall answer for it, that I think there were never in any place in the world worthier ships than there are for so many. And as few as we are, if the King of Spain's forces be not hundreds, we will make good sport with them. And I pray you tell her Majesty from me, that her money was well given for the "Ark Raleigh," for I think her the odd ship in the world for all conditions. . . We can see no sail, great nor small, but how far soever they be we fetch them and speak with them.' Again and again he praises the condition of the ships, and protests, obviously referring to Hawkins's slanderers, that certain persons would prove to be arrant liars. He had crept into every place in every ship wherever man could get, and there was never a one of them knew what a leak meant. The 'Bonaventure' ran hard on a sand-bank off Flushing and was got off without a spoonful of water in her. Whatever irregularities Hawkins may have been guilty of

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, i. 81.

his work was well done, and we can no longer doubt that the men of the next age were right, in looking back on the period of his Treasurership as the golden days of honest and capable administration.

Of his power of beating the Spaniards Howard was as sure as of his ships. He had heard from a French ship that the Armada was to sail on March 25 towing galleys behind it, but he was sure that even without Drake's squadron, which since the last countermand had been demobilised, he could beat them. 'If I may have the four great-ships come to me in time,' he wrote, 'and twenty good hoys with but twenty men apiece. . . and each of them, but with two iron pieces, I doubt not but to make her Majesty a good account of anything that shall be done by the Spanish forces, and I will make him wish his galleys at home again.'¹

Surrounded by real seamen, with Hawkins and Frobisher at their head, he had caught the spirit of their daring and confidence, and himself led the lamentation at the queen's apparent blindness to the snare that lay in the conference. We can almost listen to the talk at his table. 'If we stand at this point,' wrote Hawkins to Walsingham, 'in a mammering and at a stay, we consume, and our Commonwealth doth utterly decay. . . Our treasure doth consume infinitely with these uncertain wars. . . We have to choose either a dishonourable and uncertain peace, or to put on virtuous and valiant minds to make a way through, with such a settled war as may bring forth and command a quiet peace.' He goes on to urge that the war should be purely naval, and that 'we have as little to do in foreign countries as may be.' With six great-ships and six small ones cruising continually off the Spanish coast and the Azores, to be relieved every four months, he thought the Spanish Oceanic trade might be

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, i. p. 84. Seamen seem to have had great faith in the power of these armed hoys to deal with galleys. Raleigh recommended their use to James I. Cf. also Courtney's project for using them 'Five and five in a rank,' *ibid.* p. 127.

destroyed and the queen's navy never the weaker. 'In open and lawful wars,' he writes, for it was while Don Antonio's name was still in the air and when Drake was expecting to sail on his mysterious expedition with Essex, 'God will help us; for we defend the chief cause, our religion—God's own cause; for if we would leave our profession and turn to serve Baal we might have peace, but not with God.'

Here we have the idea, since so often proved fatal and so often re-born as a new strategical discovery, that a naval war may be conducted on economical principles, and a great Power be brought to its knees by preying on its commerce without first getting command of the sea. Hawkins may be taken as the father of it, and as such receive all credit for the great advance it was on the naval ideas that had preceded it. But it is difficult to read the letter and not see the germ of a divergence in opinion between him and his pupil. And, indeed, Drake, down at Plymouth, amidst the toil of salvaging his lost labour, was working out a still greater advance in the science.

Early in March Frobisher, who had been detached by Howard to cruise for intelligence in the Channel, obtained certain information that the Armada was to sail on the 20th. On the 3rd Drake was able, through his scouting pinnaces and from other sources, to send up full details of its strength and organisation.¹ Still the weeks went by, and Drake could get no definite orders; nor was it till the 20th of the month that he was given to understand that the original plan of campaign was to be carried out, and that he was to reorganise his command as a special service squadron to act upon the offensive.²

It is a moment for ever memorable in maritime history, for here we stand beside the cradle of modern naval

¹ See Thomas Fenner (Drake's Vice-Admiral) to Walsingham, February 3, and Drake's 'Opinion,' Laughton, *op. cit.* i. 90.

² His commission is dated March 15 (*Patent Rolls*, 30 *Eliz.* part 13, m. 1, dorso). It gives him special powers to punish 'with all severity.'

strategy. Between this order and Drake's reception of it is to be drawn, if anywhere, the line between the new and the old. The idea that was in the mind of the Government is fortunately clear. On February 15 had been held what we should now call a Cabinet Council to consider the whole situation, and its minutes in Burghley's own hand have come down to us. At this time the outbreak of formal war, which a week or two later Frobisher's and Drake's information made practically certain, was still regarded as not inevitable. The Council, however, saw fit to formulate a plan of campaign. The whole of the naval forces were to be divided into two fleets: the 'Eastern' to be stationed in the Narrow Seas off the eastern coast, and the 'Western' towards Ireland and Spain, 'by which means,' Lord Burghley's minutes run, 'the Spanish navy shall not be able to come to the Low Countries to join with the Flemish navy, for the English "Western" shall follow them if they come to the East, and they shall be intercepted by the English "East" navy.' It was also proposed to send an expedition to Portugal, 'to put comfort into the Portugales when the Spanish navy is come to the sea; and if the King Antonio might be enabled to land in Portugal, the King of Spain should hazard the crown which he possesseth, whilst he seeketh for another.' Finally is suggested an expedition to the Azores 'to intercept some Indian fleets,' if the season served; but in any case it was considered 'that the report of the intention to put such a navy in readiness in the name of Sir Francis Drake may be an occasion to diminish the number of the king's shipping against England, and percase [cause] a diversion of his purpose against England.'¹ This undoubtedly represents the lines on which the Government intended up to this time to conduct the campaign; and to modern ideas

¹ 'A consultation upon certain questions in presence of L. Chancellor, L. Treasurer, L. Steward, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Woolley.' *Brit. Mus. MSS. Vesp. C. viii., f. 12*, Holograph, by Lord Burghley. Endorsed '25th February, 1587,' i.e. 1588. Edited by Dr. W. F. Tilton for the *American Hist. Rev.*, October 1896.

nothing could have been more vicious. The only part of it that has any colour of modernity was the attempt to check the Spanish attack by a raid on their communications at the Azores, and this it will be observed was to the Council the least important feature. The rest is as bad as can be. The proposed landing in Portugal after the Spaniards had sailed was nothing but a resurrection of the old mediæval strategy that never got beyond using fleets for 'cross-raiding.' Of a main fleet taking a vigorous offensive and crushing the enemy's main fleet by superior numbers or advantageous position there is not a trace. On the contrary, the navy was to be broken up into two weak divisions, so disposed that if one had the weather of the enemy the other must necessarily be to leeward of him. The fundamental idea is to prevent a junction between Santa Cruz's fleet and Parma's flotilla by operations in the Channel. Drake's great idea of attacking the Spanish main fleet at its point of departure with the whole available English force clearly found no place in their minds.

Of the general design, of which his own instructions formed a part, Drake was most probably informed by Walsingham. How far he clearly recognised the faultiness of the scheme, or whether his opinion upon it had been asked, we cannot tell; but certain it is that in acknowledging his orders he seized the occasion to tender to the Government an exposition of the true principles on which in his opinion the war should be conducted. It is in this letter, written from Plymouth on March 30, 1588, that is found for the first time an enunciation of the root ideas of the new English school that Nelson brought to perfection. 'If her Majesty and your lordships,' he wrote, 'think that the King of Spain meaneth any invasion of England, then doubtless his force is and will be great in Spain; and thereon he will make his groundwork or foundation, whereby the Prince of Parma may have the better entrance, which in mine own judgment is most to

be feared.¹ But if there may be such a stay or stop made by any means of this fleet in Spain, so that they may not come through the seas as conquerors—which I assure myself they think to do—then shall the Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet.’ Here we have an enunciation—as clear as Drake could ever make himself when involved in penning a formal despatch—of the modern doctrine that the kernel of naval strategy is to destroy the enemy’s main fleet, and that no invasion is practicable without command of the sea. ‘To prevent this,’ he goes on, meaning to prevent the Spanish fleet coming through the seas as conquerors, ‘I think it good that these forces here [that is, his own, the Western or flying squadron] should be made as strong as to your Honours’ wisdoms shall be thought convenient, and that for two special causes—first, for that they are like to strike the first blow; and, secondly, it will put great and good hearts into her Majesty’s loving subjects both abroad and at home; for that they will be persuaded that the Lord will put into her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear any invasion, but to seek God’s enemies and her Majesty’s where they may be found.’ Thus he stumbles on into the other idea of which his mind was full—an idea as modern as the first—the importance in naval warfare of taking the offensive and striking the first blow. ‘My very good lords,’ he goes on to urge, ‘next under God’s mighty protection, the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good; wherein I most humbly beseech your good Lordships to persevere as you have begun; for that with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home.’ Then the man—pugnacious and fiercely patriotic—bursts out through the scientific admiral, as he informs them

¹ This ‘which’ relates, like the previous ‘whereby,’ to the force in Spain and not to Parma’s army, as is obvious from the next paragraph, which concludes this part of this argument, and would be nonsense if he meant Parma’s army was ‘most to be feared.’

the Spanish fleet is being furnished with English colours, 'which is,' he hotly protests, 'a great presumption proceeding from the haughtiness and pride of the Spaniard and not to be tolerated by any true natural English heart.' Again he relapses into the great captain and shows how his mind was as full of the tactical as of the strategical revolution he was perfecting. What would seem to have been the regular proportion of ammunition had been sent down to him, but he protests it is but a third part of what was necessary. He meant to beat the Spaniards with his guns; he had been training his men to use them with rapidity, and the powder and shot sent him would last, he says, but a day and a half 'if it be begun and continued as the service may require.' 'Good my lords,' he implores, 'I beseech you to consider deeply of this, for it importeth but the loss of all.'

Such is the pith of Drake's memorable despatch, written at the great crisis of England's fortunes, which he was born into the world to meet—a despatch deserving to be treasured for a sacred document of the nation as the first enunciation of the doctrines which made her mistress of the seas.

Weighty as was his appeal, it failed to get him what he desired. Though it clearly had made a deep impression, and induced a reconsideration of the Government's plans, the true significance of his despatch was missed. The idea of sending him off on the secondary operation that Burghley had designed for him was indeed abandoned; but instead of the instructions for which he was burning, he received a command from the queen to inform her how the enemy's fleet in Lisbon could best be distressed; and, secondly, how strong he considered her fleet ought to be to encounter the Armada. Now an attack on the mass of the Armada behind the Tagus forts was a thing he had not proposed. Ubaldino explains that whatever might have been the chances of success before the concentration had gone so far, he now considered the operation impracticable. His idea seems to have been by attacking some weaker port to

compel the Spaniards to put to sea, and then, as Ubaldino puts it, 'to be ready resolutely to harass them and throw them into confusion as they issued from their port.' Nothing could be sounder; but it was a very different thing from attacking a superior fleet behind the guns of a port extremely difficult of approach, and probably the most powerfully defended in the world. The point is of high interest in estimating Drake as an admiral; for it shows that the daring exploits with which his name is chiefly associated were founded on a sober and sagacious calculation of risk and were in no case the mere inspirations of a reckless corsair. All this, which Ubaldino puts quite clearly, we see him trying in his inarticulate way to explain in his answer to the queen's first query. 'Truly,' he wrote, 'this point is hardly to be answered yet, for two special causes: the first, for that our intelligencies are as yet uncertain: the second is the resolution of our own people, which I shall better understand, when I have them at sea. The last insample at Cadiz,' he adds bitterly, still harping implacably on his late Vice-Admiral's unpunished desertion, 'is not of divers yet forgotten: for one flying now, as Borough did then, will put the whole in peril.' But he was ready to do all that was practicable. 'If your Majesty,' he continues, 'will give present [i.e. immediate] order for our proceeding to the sea and send to the strengthening of this fleet here four more of your Majesty's good ships and those sixteen sail of ships with their pinnaces, which are preparing in London, then shall your Majesty stand assured, with God's assistance, that if the fleet come out of Lisbon, as long as we have victual to live withal upon that coast, they shall be fought with, and I hope through the Goodness of God, in such sort as shall hinder his quiet passage into England.' Ubaldino is certainly correct. Drake's idea is to lie off Lisbon, and to fight the Armada at a disadvantage if it attempts to put to sea. But he urges there is no time to be lost. 'The advantage of time and place in all martial actions,' he adds with a touch of pedantry, which again reveals his study of the military text-books of the time, 'is half a victory: which

being lost is irrecoverable. Wherefore if your Majesty will command me away with those ships, which are here already and the rest to follow with all possible expedition, I hold it in my poor opinion the surest and best course.' Like all the queen's other flag-officers he complains he is short of victuals for the exploit. Two months' supply from April 24—just enough to take him there and back, but none wherewith to keep the coast—was all that had been authorised. Even yet no warrants had been issued, and in desperation he had to raise money on his private credit before he could begin to get them.¹ Urgently he begged for a larger supply. 'Here,' he pleads as he lavished his own money, 'may the whole service and honour be lost for the sparing of a few crowns.'²

To the queen's second query he returned the only possible answer. 'Touching my poor opinion,' he writes, 'how strong your Majesty's fleet should be to encounter this great force of the enemy, God increase your most excellent Majesty's forces both by sea and land daily: for this I surely think—there was never any force so strong as there is now ready or making ready against your Majesty and true religion.' And then he concludes in the

¹ Ubaldino.

² Professor Laughton, on the complete evidence he has collected in his *Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, acquits the queen of any blame in regard to the inadequate victualling of the fleet. From first to last, he says, the queen had nothing to do with it (*Introd.* vii.). This of course must be taken as relating only to details of administration after she had signed the victualling orders. In the face of her flag-officers' letters she certainly cannot be held guiltless of the policy which led to the Navy being victualled only from month to month and to the neglect of adequate reserve stores. The policy was no doubt adopted deliberately and not merely out of parsimony, in order to compel her more unruly and adventurous officers to keep within hail, but it was almost certainly hers. It was adopted at any rate against the advice, and even the protests, of all her admirals, and seeing how completely she was her own war minister, it is impossible to acquit her of responsibility for the way it crippled the free action of her fleets. (See especially 'Howard to Burghley,' April 8, *ibid.* p. 13.) As Mr. Oppenheim points out (*op. cit.* p. 141), the officers of the Victualling Department thoroughly understood the necessity of a reserve of stores for an adequate scheme of mobilisation, and they did well enough when they were allowed sufficient notice; but at this time the Royal warrants came so late into their hands that they could only begin to collect victuals when the fleets' supply was already almost exhausted.

same fervent spirit, 'Thus in all humble duty I continually will pray to the Almighty to bless and give you victory over all his and your enemies. From Plymouth this 13th of April 1588. Your Majesty's most loyal, Fra: Drake.'¹

His advice was not taken. He was not allowed to sail for Lisbon with the reinforced squadron he desired, but immediately after the receipt of his letter we have a notable sign of a more healthy and active naval policy. On April 17 Howard received orders to carry the bulk of his fleet to the West and form a junction with Drake's squadron, leaving in the Channel a sufficient force to watch Parma. For this purpose Howard detailed six of his smallest ships and eight pinnaces, besides two larger ones for the flag-officers. The new blockading squadron was placed under the command of Lord Henry Seymour, the Lord Admiral's nephew, and for this high-born officer the 'Rainbow,' a galleon of nearly 400 tons by dimension and one of the best ships in the Navy, had to be uselessly sacrificed. Sir Henry Palmer continued on his old station, as vice-admiral, in the 'Antelope,' and at the last moment it would seem Sir William Wynter for some unexplained reason was added to the squadron, as rear-admiral, his flagship the 'Vanguard' replacing the 'Swallow,' captain Richard Hawkins. The 'Vanguard,' like the 'Rainbow,' had only been launched in 1586. She was of 450 tons by dimension, and of the very latest type, 'low and snug in the water,' 'like a galleasse,' representing the furthest point naval architecture had yet reached.²

¹ In apology for Drake's advice, Ubaldino, who apparently thought it revolutionary, quotes a precedent, which may or may not have been suggested by Drake. 'And not lacking,' he writes, 'a singular example of precaution and wisdom, we know the Romans did the like, attacking Macedonia, when it was expected that Philip, king of those peoples, was minded to pass into Italy to join forces with Hannibal, thus keeping at a distance that second blast of war'—another instructive instance of the way 'the influence of the sea power' was studied in the sixteenth century.

² Monson, p. 321. Their dimensions were: 'Rainbow,' tons, 384; length, 100; beam, 32; depth, 12. 'Vanguard,' tons, 449; length, 108; beam, 32; depth, 13. The former was built by Pett at Deptford, and the latter by Baker at Woolwich. They carried the same crew and armament, and seem

That two such ships should have been detached from the fighting fleet, to stiffen a squadron blockading a helpless flotilla was a grave error, probably due to the advocates of the original plan of dividing the fleet and not a little to the Government's nervousness about the Duke of Parma, which Drake had been unable finally to overcome. The 'Bonavolia,' the only galley surviving in the queen's service, was also attached to Seymour's flag, but being found unable to keep the sea that stormy summer she acted throughout the campaign as a guardship in the mouth of the Thames and as a tug for getting supply-ships to sea. As a curious commentary to the triumph of Drake and his ideas we find the discredited William Borough expiating his excessive regard for the galley in this thankless command. Over and above his Navy vessels ¹

to have been intended and regarded as sister ships, both rated at 500 tons. They thus afford an interesting example of the latitude allowed to the constructors and the difficulty there was at the time of producing a vessel exactly of any given tonnage.

¹

The Channel Squadron

Admiral	.	.	Lord Henry Seymour.
Vice-Admiral	.	.	Sir Henry Palmer.
Rear-Admiral	.	.	Sir William Wynter.

Royal Navy

1. 'Rainbow'	.	.	500 tons	Flagship.
2. 'Antelope'	.	.	400	" Vice-flagship.
3. 'Vanguard'	.	.	500	" Rear-flagship.
4. 'Bull'	.	.	200	" Capt. Jeremy Turner.
5. 'Tiger'	.	.	200	" " John Bostocke.
6. 'Tramontana'	.	.	150	" " Luke Ward.
7. 'Scout'	.	.	120	" " Henry Ashley.
8. 'Achates'	.	.	100	" " Gregory Riggs.
9. 'Charles'	.	.	70	" " John Roberts.
10. 'Spy'	.	.	50	" " Ambrose Ward.
11. 'Merlin'	.	.	50	" " Walter Gower.
12. 'Sun'	.	.	40	" " Mr. Richard Buckley.
13. 'George'	.	.	100	" " Richard Hodges.
14. 'Fancy'	.	.		
15. 'Ketch'	.	.		
16. 'Brigantine'	.	.	90	" Capt. Thos. Scott.
17. The galley 'Bonavolia'	.	.		" William Borough.

The above details of the royal ships are from the corrected list (Laughton, ii. 180). Howard's original draft is *ibid.* i. 168. Seymour's

Seymour was also given the whole of those requisitioned from the Cinque Ports and the towns of the East Coast

instructions are in the *Foljambe Papers* (*Hist. MSS. Com.* xv. v.), p. 117. They detail the galley and brigantine as Thames guard-ships under Borough,

Private Vessels

23. Cinque Ports	5 ships and 1 pinnace.
27. Newcastle	3 " 1 "
30. Hull	2 " 1 "
33. Lynn	2 " 1 "
35. Aldborough	1 " 1 "
38. Ipswich and Harwich	3 hoys.

These were the vessels originally ordered, April 29. Those actually furnished were as follows :

Details of Seymour's Auxiliary Squadron, May 27
(*Ibid.* i. 185 and ii. 330)

Town	Ship	Men	Tons	Days' Victual
East Coast—				
Newcastle	'Daniel'	70	160	24
"	'Galleon Hutchins'	60	150	24
"	'Bark Lamb'	60	150	24
"	'Fancy'	60	60	24
Hull	'Griffin'	35	70	25
"	'Little Hare'	25	50	25
"	'Handmaid'	35	75	25
Ipswich	'William' (hoy)	50	140	30
"	'Katharine'	50	125	30
Harwich	'Primrose' (hoy)	40	120	30
Lynn	'Mayflower'	170	150	35
"	'Susan'	20	40	35
Aldborough	'Marigold'	70	150	21
Yarmouth	'Grace' (ship)	70	150	35
Lowestoft	'Mathew'	16	35	21
Colchester	'William of Bright- lingsea'	50	140	21
Cinque Ports—				
Dover	'Elizabeth'	70	120	50
Sandwich	'Reuben'	65	110	50
Peversham	'Hazard' (pinnace)	34	38	30
Hythe	'Grace of God'	30	50	34
Romney	'John Young'	30	60	—
Rye	'William' (ship)	60	80	31
Hastings	'Anne Bonaventure'	50	60	24

The total was thus : 12 ships of 100 tons and upwards ; and 11 small craft.

Newcastle furnished its quota, Hull did not. Ipswich and Harwich,

with further authority to stay all craft that might arrive from Holland. His whole squadron thus amounted to about forty sail, of which twenty-two were capital-ships and mostly galleons—a force which in conjunction with the swarm of small Dutch craft, which were watching Parma, made it absolutely impossible for him to move or think of moving.

With the new dispositions Drake, if he knew of them, was far from satisfied. The concentration of a powerful main-fleet in the west was all to the good, but the splendid weapon he saw almost in his grip seems only to have whetted his eagerness to strike a blow with it in the way he knew was right. To add to his restlessness, since his last despatch he had obtained through three different channels unimpeachable intelligence that the negotiations for an armistice had in no way led to any relaxation of the Spanish preparations, and once more he took up his pen, this time writing directly to the queen. His friends had told him how she was singing his praises to everyone, and emboldened by his success he urged her not to be blinded by Parma's diplomacy and once more besought her to let him loose. Captain William Fenner of the 'Aid' was sent in person with the letter further to urge his views.¹ The result of this insistence was a summons to Court to assist the Council in forming a new plan of campaign in place of the one he had discredited; and thither he repaired early in May, leaving his old captains Thomas Fenner and Robert Crosse, who were

though ordered to provide three hoys of sixty tons, sent three of more than double the tonnage. The other East Anglian ports also did well, providing, altogether, instead of the three ships and two pinnaces demanded, four ships and two pinnaces, all very fully manned. The Cinque Ports, instead of five ships and one pinnacle, sent two ships and six pinnaces, but all these thoroughly well manned and found.

Seymour's whole squadron therefore was: 20 ships and large hoys. 1 galley. 19 barks and pinnaces. Total 40 sail.

¹ Laughton, i. 165, April 28. The account in the *Nutwell Court MSS.* has this item: 'Capt. Wm. Fenner's charges to Court with news of the Spanish army.'

now his Vice- and Rear-Admirals, in command of his squadron at Plymouth.¹

Once at Court Drake boldly broached his whole idea, proposing to abandon the defensive entirely and to proceed to the Spanish Coast with the main-fleet. He was opposed by the Lord Admiral, who as yet had been but little under his influence, and being still unable to grasp the revolutionary ideas of his lieutenant, clung to a more sober and time-honoured strategy.² The queen, however, Drake succeeded in winning over entirely. She could seldom resist the vigour of his personality. Hardly ever had it failed to bring out all that was most adventurous in her character. With the queen on his side he quickly triumphed all along the line, and the effect of his ardent directness on the halting and contradictory influences that were swaying the Court we see without doubt in the resolutions of the Council taken on May 10. They were three in number, entirely reversing the policy of those of April 17, and all calculated to further the ideas, which for months past he had been dinning into the government's ears. The first was for the issue of money to form adequate reserves of victuals; the second related to the ships, which the port towns had been ordered to furnish. Those which had but two months' victuals were to remain in the Narrow Seas, and those which were furnished for three

¹ See 'Fenner and Crosse to Drake,' May 12 (Laughton, *Armada*, i. 171). He was at Plymouth on April 28, the day William Fenner was despatched to Court. In the Nutwell Court Account Book, next to the item relating to William Fenner's journey, is one for a message to Plymouth from the Court on the Lord Admiral's arrival there. Next to this is a charge for 66*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* for Drake's journey to Court, 'being sent for by order of Her Majesty.' On May 12, the date of Fenner's and Crosse's letter, Drake had been absent from Plymouth some time and they were anxious for his return. He was therefore almost certainly at Court, when on May 10 the Council passed certain resolutions for the conduct of the campaign.

² 'Howard to Walsingham,' June 15 (Laughton, *Armada*, i. 205): 'Sir, you know it hath been the opinion both of Her Majesty and others, that it was the surest course to lie on the Coast of Spain. I confess my error at that time, which was otherwise. But I did and will yield ever unto them of greater experience. Yet I know it was thought by Her Majesty that we might go into Lisbon to defeat them, which was the strongest place.'

months were to join the Lord Admiral's flag. The third, and most interesting of all, contains the instructions for the combined main fleet. In its wording we can read the struggle that had taken place to get it passed. We can see the efforts to tie the fleet in apron strings to the English coasts, and how the new influence had reduced the timorous counsels to a mere unmeaning formula. Howard was to be left a practically free hand. His fleet was 'to be employed as by his lordship shall be thought meet upon such intelligence as he shall receive from time to time, having care so much as lies in him to impeach any attempt in Ireland, in Scotland and England.' The last words are obviously a mere formality to cover the retreat of the nervous defensive school.

Drake himself now evidently expected some active operations with the combined fleet. He sent down orders to his flag-officers to live on from hand to mouth on petty warrants so as to keep his two months' victuals intact, and at the same time to dismiss all their worst men, as he could well afford to do, so eagerly had the flower of the English mariners flocked again to his flag. It is clear that, having got the Lord Admiral under his influence, he was sure he could persuade him into energetic action, and he returned to Plymouth to prepare for his reception. Indeed a move with the combined fleet towards Spain was already decided,¹ and at daybreak on May 23, Howard was signalled off Plymouth.

The account of the junction which Drake gave Ubaldino is too instructive and too significant of Drake's personality and his attitude at this time to be omitted. In the narrative, which Howard had drawn up apparently when the conduct of the next year's campaign had been taken out of his hands and committed to Drake, he says: 'And after that he [the Lord Admiral] had continued a good time with the army [i.e. the fleet] upon the Narrow Seas betwixt England and Flanders, the said High Admiral by her Majesty's commandment, sent Sir Francis

¹ The Queen to Howard, May 13, and to Seymour; *Foljambe Papers*, p. 116.

Drake into the west part of this realm towards Spain with certain of her Majesty's ships and other ships of the realm to the number of fifty sail great and small there to continue until such time as the Lord Admiral with a great and strong force should repair thither if occasion should so require.' Further on after relating his meeting with the western fleet he adds, 'Whereupon his Lordship commanding that fleet with his own made Sir Francis Drake his Vice-admiral.'

It was this perverted and ungenerous version of the origin and nature of the western movement, that seems specially to have determined Drake to approach Ubaldino with a view of getting him to amend the narrative he had founded on Howard's 'Relation.' The result was that the Florentine historian, who gives continual evidence of true critical power and a real desire to be impartial, wrote an entirely different account, which at almost every point down to minute details of numbers and the like, where Howard even is frequently wrong, is confirmed by the extant papers already quoted. 'In the meanwhile,' runs Ubaldino's 'Second Commentary,' after relating the arguments with which Drake kept urging his ideas, 'the despatch of the High Admiral being discussed, for that he should go towards the west parts, discarding every other scheme previously studied and well thought of (as was said), he too put himself in order and with all diligence made ready, as fresh advices kept coming in of the enemy's proceedings. . . . and accordingly he reached Plymouth, after staying some time in the Channel to observe the Duke of Parma, the 23rd of May, with such number of ships of war, as his fleet amounted to of well furnished vessels, to wit—eighteen great-ships of the Crown, also called Royal; six of his own; sixteen of the London merchants and four pinnaces.' Then, after giving the names of his most distinguished captains and very handsomely eulogising the house of Howard, he proceeds, in very significant contrast with the first account: 'We will return to the High Admiral, who, on his

arrival at Plymouth, whither he had been ordered by the Queen to go and join with Drake, went forward in battle array and in warlike style, displaying his authority by carrying aloft on his flagship the Royal standard, and beside it, in a fitting place on the same ship, the standard destined for the Vice-Admiral already appointed by the Queen. Thereupon at his coming, with intent to display himself in answerable degree, Sir Francis Drake, having been up to that time Admiral on that station, sallied from port to meet him, with his thirty ships in equal ranks, three ships deep, making honourable show of his masterly and diligent handling, with the pinnaces and small craft thrown forward as though to reconnoitre the ships that were approaching, as is their office. The salute was given and returned mutually with friendly plaudits on the one side and on the other, the ordnance being accompanied by the trumpets and drums and by the joyful shouting of the soldiers of all the companies.

‘And at that time Sir Francis Drake, having regard unto the rank and dignity of the office, in deference to the High Admiral now close at hand, lowered his Admiral’s flag to do honour to Howard, who by then had made his appearance. And then the Vice-Admiral’s flag being struck by his (Howard’s) orders, it was sent by one of his own vessels to be conferred upon Sir Francis Drake, for him to bear it as his Vice-Admiral from that time forth in all that expedition with the same authority as is customary for him to have, who rules and commands immediately after the commander-in-chief, according to the tenour of the Royal commission with which we are acquainted.’

How proud, and justly proud, Drake was of the position he had won is evident. Not only had Howard been ordered to carry out his ideas, but he himself had been specially appointed as second-in-command or chief-of-the-staff of the combined fleet to put them in operation. Howard’s casual mention that he made him his Vice-Admiral was certainly inadequate, and how deeply Drake felt the injustice of the slight becomes more evident as

the narrative proceeds. 'Thereupon,' Ubaldino continues, 'Sir Francis Drake, likewise striking his former standard from its place, gave orders for the new one to be received, and using in soldierlike discretion every demonstration of due respect, according to the relation between them, showed himself always of one thought and mind in harmony with his superior admiral.' In Drake's eyes his high sense of his position as the first seaman of his time made his loyal and ready acceptance of the second place a piece of handsome and patriotic devotion that deserved special recognition. 'Yet quite otherwise,' the Italian goes on, 'was it thought for, and belike feared by a certain person, that this union of the two fleets would not be brought about so easily; and at that union were apparent demonstrations of much pleasure among their divers friends; because it was possible to think, that the reduction of rank, carried out with such a display of ceremony and by virtue of authority, according to the practice introduced in the earliest times by the ancient discipline of the Romans, would have sat heavy on the spirit of Drake, a man born and bred in irregular warfare; and still more because, there being taken from him by the change of rank a good part of his emoluments and profitable perquisites, there was taken from him the power of satisfying out of such emoluments divers honourable soldiers, who had taken service with him for friendship's sake or for the renown of his name. In addition to these considerations he had spent on his own account for some weeks past certain sums of money, as well for divers entertainments as for the provisions of things needful, seeing that the Government supplies were sent more tardily than he could have wished. Whereby it may be judged he had looked to being appointed as admiral in absolute command of that enterprise, as being a man belike thought fatal to the Spaniards. Yet though it must have been so, respect being had only to his merit and his known good fortune hitherto, still at the same time at Court it had to be taken into considera-

tion that since intelligence had been received how the Spanish Armada was to have at its head the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, a prince of great consequence in those realms, they should have also to put forward against him a man of noble and illustrious family, ever fertile in men of valour and of warlike reputation by land and sea, made known on many occasions to the enemies of the crown, which also could count eight High-Admirals at various times, whereby the Royal fleet would stand at once in honour and security. All which things being well pondered and considered by Sir Francis Drake, in setting an example of singular self-restraint, he rendered vain all fears which had been felt about the uncertainty of their acting together.'

The passage is of deep interest, not only as showing how Drake regarded the true relation between himself and Howard but also as affording perhaps the clearest insight into his character that we possess. Even when filtered through the academic mind of the Florentine historian, the spirit of the man is still turbid with the same pride of achievement and exuberant sense of devotion that so strongly coloured the last of the great sailing admirals, whose prototype he was and whose ideas and methods we have seen him so often anticipating. As he chafes, yet loyally submits to the superior whom the traditions of the service force upon him, we seem to hear a far-off echo of Nelson in the Mediterranean or the Baltic. It is only when we remember the restiveness of the greatest of our naval heroes under similar conditions that it is possible to appreciate the conduct of a man like Drake, who with a self-confidence as rigid, a spirit as impatient, and an education that was all against him, could display an example of cheerful discipline, which even for the greatest of his successors left something to be learnt.

With the union of the two fleets upon the Western station Drake might well consider himself at the summit of his ambition. He was, as completely as a commoner could ever hope to be, in command of the English navy.

In full council his plan of campaign had been adopted against that of the Lord Admiral, and he was on the eve of directing the great forces he had inspired after his own methods against the arch-enemy of his country and his faith. In some respects, as we have heard him complain, his position was changed for the worse; but as Vice-Admiral he was professional Chief-of-the-Staff and President of the Council of War, and practically commanded the fleet.¹ So jealous and sensible was he of the position his appointment gave him, that it seems to have been a special grievance against Howard that in his 'Relation' he never gives him the title of his rank, and Ubaldino after the junction is proportionally careful never to mention his name without the addition of 'Vice-Admiral.'

It is difficult not to sympathise with his annoyance, and not to regret that the Lord Admiral, in what for such a man, who displayed so much nobility of character, can only have been a passing sense of jealousy and disappointment, committed an injustice that has had so long a life. To speak of Howard's having directed the action of the navy against the Armada is but to perpetuate a constitutional and courtly fiction by which contemporary chroniclers held themselves bound. Abroad the Lord Admiral's name was never so much as mentioned. The despatches of anxious statesmen, watching feverishly as the vital crisis gathered to a head, frankly ignored his existence now that it had come to blows. For them the Navy of England is Drake. It is Drake that is the incalculable factor in Christendom; it is he that the Pope with a strange touch of unholy admiration sees standing forward formidably to cover heresy; it is he who for every statesman and historian in Europe is the real protagonist. At the time Howard himself recognised with a manly

¹ Howard's inner council of war consisted of seven members, with Drake at their head. The others were Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Sheffield, Sir Roger Williams, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Thomas Fenner. Williams was chosen as being one of the most distinguished soldiers of his time; but he did not remain with the fleet, being appointed Captain of the Lances and Major-General on Leicester's staff (Laughton, i. 210; *Foljambe Papers*, p. 52).

humility the delicacy of his position, and was manifestly grateful to find the fears, which Ubaldino hints at, were groundless. 'Sir,' he wrote to Walsingham, a fortnight after the junction, 'I must not omit to let you know how lovingly and kindly Sir Francis Drake beareth himself; and also how dutifully to her Majesty's service and unto me, being in the place I am in; which I pray you he may receive thanks for by some private letter from you.' That an Admiral in command of a fleet should desire his Vice-Admiral to be thanked semi-officially for recognising his position admits of but one interpretation. It was Drake who was recognised and trusted as the real commander, and he stands out at this moment in the stalwart throng of the men he has passed and the men he has made as their unquestioned master. It is to him, as he towers in the zenith of his reputation, that the country securely looks in its hour of danger; and the world salutes him as the embodiment of a new and unmeasured force, on which the future of Europe must turn.¹

¹ See the despatches of the various Venetian ambassadors in the *Venetian Calendar*, viii. *passim*. In No. 729 Gritti gives the following report of what the Pope said to him. "The Queen of England," he (the Pope) remarked, "has no need of the Turk to help her. Have you heard how Drake with his fleet has offered battle to the Armada? with what courage! do you think he showed any fear? He is a great captain!" And with that his Holiness went on to recount Drake's enterprises at San Domingo, at Cadiz, at Lisbon, the fleets he had captured, the riches he had acquired to his great glory.' And again (No. 686), 'His Holiness laid much store by the pluck and luck of Drake.' And again (No. 717), he reports home that the Pope said to him, 'The King goes trilling with this Armada of his, but the Queen acts in earnest. Were she only a Catholic, she would be our best beloved daughter, for she is of great worth. Just look at Drake! who is he? what forces has he? and yet he burned twenty-five of the King's ships,' &c. Cardinal Bentivoglio, in relating the Queen's appointment of Howard, says: 'But she gave unto him Sir Francis Drake for a particular assistant herein, one that was then the most esteemed amongst all the English for sea affairs, and famous likewise throughout all other nations.' *Warres of Flanders*, p. 252.

CHAPTER V

ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK THE ARMADA

THE fleet which was now gathered at Plymouth was practically that with which the Armada had to be fought. In it culminated all the thought and effort during the long period of transition, and the result was the most formidable fleet that had ever sailed the sea.

The force which Howard had brought round with him consisted of eleven great-ships and eight pinnaces of the Royal Navy,¹ and a splendid auxiliary squadron of sixteen great-ships and four pinnaces furnished by the port of London. Ten of these ships were of 200 tons and upwards, and the rest averaged over 150 tons, so that all were of the subsidised register and formed part of the regular auxiliary navy.² Besides these, there was a small squadron of at least seven ships and pinnaces, with Lord Charles Howard in the Lord Admiral's 'White Lion' of 140 tons at their head, which seem to have been private men-of-war lent by him and other owners to the Queen and to have been regarded, at least for the time, as part of the Royal Navy.³ As the Lord Admiral proceeded west-

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 180.

² The official list (*ibid.* ii. p. 327) gives thirty ships and barks as the London contingent. All but four were of 100 tons and over. The last ten formed Bellingham's squadron, which were hastily victualled and got to sea at the end of July (*ibid.* i. p. 339).

³ The official list gives a squadron of ten 'ships and barks,' which 'served the whole time only for her Majesty's pay' (*ibid.* ii. 328). The 'White Lion,' with Charles Howard for captain, appears at their head followed by the 'Disdain,' both of which we know belonged to the Lord Admiral. Four others probably belonged to and had been fitted out by him, since Ubaldino says he had six vessels of his own. Another, the 'Black Dog,' seems to have belonged to the Lord Mayor, Sir Geo. Bond (*ibid.* i. 193).

ward he picked up the vessels, which had been requisitioned from the South Coast ports, and being subsequently joined by others from the Bristol Channel and some of the Western towns, he increased his auxiliary force by some eight ships and a dozen barks and pinnaces.¹ So that his division must have numbered over forty galleons and ships, and a score at least of the minor types.

In announcing to Burghley his junction with the western division Howard says: 'Sir Francis Drake came forth with sixty sail very well appointed to meet with me, and so casting about he put with me into haven again.' These sixty sail he puts at fifty in his later 'Relation.' Both figures are incorrect unless he included the smaller pinnaces, which were really ships' boats without separate crews and usually towed astern of the vessels they belonged to, and never reckoned as independent units of a fleet. Four official lists of Drake's squadron exist giving the private vessels under his command at about thirty.² Of these no less than fourteen were of 200 tons and upwards, and included the 'Merchant Royal' and the galleon 'Leicester,' each of 400 tons, and probably superior as men-of-war to any Spanish great-ship of equal tonnage. Six others were between 140 and 200 tons' burden, and all the rest first-class pinnaces fully manned. Besides the private ships he had his contingent of five Royal galleons or great-ships and two pinnaces, so that his whole squadron may be safely put at forty sail of really serviceable ships.³ The combined

To own a man-of-war seems to have been, both in England and Spain, the most fashionable form for a great man to display his patriotism.

¹ *Ibid.* i. 167, and ii. 329. The details of these are not forthcoming. From Chichester, Southampton, and Lyme were requisitioned one ship each and from Exmouth two ships and a pinnace. Bristol sent the 'Minion' of 230 tons and the 'Unicorn' of 130 tons, as well as two pinnaces. Weymouth provided a galleon of 100 tons, and Dartmouth the 'Crescent' of 140 tons, while Exeter and Topsam (then called Apsam) provided two ships and a well-manned pinnace. See also *Foljambe Papers*, p. 116.

² *S.P. Dom.* cccviii. 56. Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 326. *Foljambe Papers*, p. 115. The fourth is amongst the *Nutwell Court MSS.*

³ Ubaldino says he had thirty ships at the meeting, besides the screen of pinnaces and barks. Other small craft of his squadron we also know were probably at sea towards Spain.

fleet, therefore, cannot have numbered fewer than one hundred sail, of which sixty-nine were galleons and great-ships, including sixteen of the Royal Navy, and from the official lists the total crews would seem to have numbered something like ten thousand men.¹

Meanwhile in Spain the Armada had been entirely reorganised. As we have seen, when it was first concentrated at Lisbon, it consisted of 114 sail, as under :—

Royal Portuguese Squadron : 11 galleons, 2 pinnaces.

¹ The corrected list (Laughton, i. 167) gives the Main Fleet as follows :

Admiral, Lord Howard.
Vice-Admiral, Sir F. Drake.
Rear-Admiral, Capt. John Hawkins.

Royal Navy

1. 'The Ark' . . .	800 tons	Flagship.
2. 'The Revenge' . . .	500 "	Vice-flagship.
3. 'Victory' . . .	800 "	Rear-flagship.
4. 'Triumph' . . .	1,100 "	Capt. Martin Frobisher.
5. 'White Bear' . . .	1,000 "	Lord Sheffield.
6. 'Elizabeth Jonas' . . .	900 "	Sir Robt. Southwell.
7. 'Elizabeth Bonaven- ture' . . .	600 "	Capt. Geo. Raymond.
8. 'Mary Rose' . . .	600 "	" Edward Fenton.
9. 'Hope' . . .	600 "	" Robert Crosse.
10. 'Golden Lion' . . .	500 "	Lord Thos. Howard.
11. 'Nonpareil' . . .	500 "	Capt. Thos. Fenner.
12. 'Dreadnought' . . .	400 "	Sir George Beeston.
13. 'Swiftsure' . . .	400 "	Capt. Edward Fenner.
14. 'Swallow' . . .	360 "	" Rich. Hawkins.
15. 'Foresight' . . .	300 "	" Christ. Baker.
16. 'Aid' . . .	250 "	" William Fenner.
17. 'Advice' . . .	50 "	" John Harris.
18. 'Moon' . . .	60 "	" Alex. Clifford.
23. 'Makeshift,' pinnace, and four others.		

Private Men-of-war lent to the Queen

24. 'The White Lion' . . .	140 tons	Lord Charles Howard.
25. 'Disdain' . . .	80 "	Capt. Jonas Bradbury.
26. 'Fancy' . . .	50 "	Mr. John Paul.
30. Four to six others.		

Private Vessels Chartered and Requisitioned

- 50. London Squadron : 17 ships and 3 pinnaces, &c.
- 83. Drake's Squadron : 20 ships and 13 pinnaces, &c.
- 102. Howaid's Squadron . 8 ships and 12 pinnaces, &c.

Royal Neapolitan Squadron : 4 galleasses.

Recalde's Squadron : 7 ships and 5 pinnaces.

Oquendo's Squadron : 7 ships and 4 pinnaces.

Andalucian Squadron (Pedro de Valdes) : 15 ships.

Italian or Levant Squadron : 9 ships.

Squadron of Hulks : 31 urcas.

The Light Squadron : 1 small galleon, 18 pinnaces.

Of these only the first two squadrons were true men-of-war in the sense that Elizabeth's navy were men-of-war—that is to say, they were the only ones composed of vessels built primarily as fighting ships. Recalde's and the Andalucian Squadrons were all Spanish merchantmen, requisitioned for the service and in the mediæval manner furnished with temporary castles and close-fights to make them fightable. They are thus to be classed with Howard's auxiliaries, which, however, they greatly exceeded in tonnage. The Levant Squadron were of the same character. The hulks, with the exception perhaps of the two flagships of the squadron, were not regarded as fighting ships at all, and were intended for transport, store, and hospital service only. From the whole of these vessels Philip at the beginning of the year thought he could form a fighting fleet of forty-five primary and nineteen secondary vessels, consisting of ten galleons, four galleasses, and the two pinnaces of the Royal Navy, thirty-one armed merchantmen, and all the Light Squadron. With these were to go twenty of the hulks, and on the whole he intended to embark 16,500 troops, besides sailors. Such a force was obviously no match even for the combined English fleet under Howard and Drake, with no allowance made for the Channel Squadron and the Dutch. During the winter, therefore, as the astonishing naval strength that Elizabeth was exhibiting came to be better understood, Philip grew anxious to strengthen his fighting line and to reduce the number of his practically defenceless hulks. Orders were issued for a squadron of twelve galleys to be formed; and not content with this he decided on the extreme measure of adding to the fleet the

galleons of the Indian Guard.¹ By desperate exertions it was thought that all could be ready for sea by February 15. Before that date arrived, however, Santa Cruz's death had thrown everything into confusion. At the same time news of the English strength continued to reach the Spanish headquarters, Drake was daily expected to reappear at Cape St. Vincent, and a swarm of privateers that ever since his destruction of the forts had infested the station were supposed to be only awaiting his arrival for a renewal of the past year's operations. The process of mobilisation therefore was clogged with the necessity of taking measures to prevent his again cutting in between Lisbon and the Andalusian ports, where the reinforcements were being brought forward; and although Medina-Sidonia on succeeding to the command strongly urged the necessity of a powerful galley squadron being added to the Armada, four galleys were all it was found could be spared without leaving the coast open to the attack threatened by Drake's activity at Plymouth. By every other means, however, the strength of the Armada was increased. Every available ship was now to go, including the whole of the hulks, and hundreds more raw troops were raised to man them. The result was that guns, anchors, arms, ammunition, and stores of all kinds were found wanting, and in the middle of March the new commander-in-chief pronounced the fleet wholly unfit for sea until its defects were made good.

Every one now began to see that the dead Admiral, whom overwork and unjust attacks had sent to his grave, was right, and that the King had undertaken a task he had not measured. Drake and his fellows had raised England to a position in European estimation very different from that which she occupied when the enterprise was first broached, and even then Santa Cruz's estimate of the forces necessary largely exceeded those which Philip had been able to prepare. The idea grew that the Armada would never sail. 'It is generally held,' wrote the Venetian

¹ Duro, *Doc.* 50.

Ambassador at Madrid, in April, 'that the King of Spain will not undertake so vast an enterprise, and although his Majesty is justly provoked, it is thought he will not, for the sake of revenge, hazard upon a doubtful and uncertain battle the peace and liberty of his many states and kingdoms. For he knows well how high he must rate a fleet like the enemy's, seeing the number of its vessels, and that the Englishmen are of a different quality from the Spaniards, bearing a name above all the West for being expert and enterprising in all maritime affairs, and the finest fighters upon the sea. . . . The battle, as we may well believe, seeing they are fighting for country, faith, and children, will be fought with so much obstinacy, as is always their wont and as they openly declare is their meaning, that the survivors of the battle will be so few, as in any event that may be pleasing to God, they have no fear their enemy will be able to come near the English shores, so well are they provided against any evil fortune that may befall.' And again: 'The battle will in any case be very bloody; for the English never yield; and although they be put to flight and broken, they ever return, athirst for revenge, to renew the attack, so long as they have a breath of life.' This is the very spirit upon which we have seen the English experts soberly calculating as a strategical factor, and as such it is as true to-day as it was three hundred years ago. But those who believed that Philip was to be daunted by any such consideration did not know the inflexible determination that lay in his strange nature. So far from flinching, he set himself once more with patient energy to mend the defects upon which his faint-hearted Admiral was insisting, more resolute than ever to gain his end.

Still it was not until the middle of May that the Armada was in a condition to sail, but by that time, although far short of Santa Cruz's original estimate, the muster showed a really formidable force. Its total strength in round numbers was 130 vessels, registering nearly 58,000 tons, and carrying nearly 2,500 guns of all kinds. The crews

numbered on paper over 19,000 soldiers and 8,000 seamen. Its organisation was very complete, and entirely worthy of the Spanish reputation for scientific warfare. The system of subdivision was by territorial squadrons. First came that of Portugal, consisting of ten royal galleons and two large pinnaces, and then that of Castille, consisting of ten galleons of the Indian Guard, four ships of the Flota of New Spain, and two pinnaces. These two squadrons were commanded respectively by Sidonia himself and Don Diego Flores de Valdes, and in effect formed one galleon division. For Don Diego sailed in the 'San Martin,' Sidonia's flagship, where he acted as his Captain of the Fleet. The King's orders were that in all matters that related to fleet-movements, the Duke was to be guided by Don Diego's advice. He thus became the real commander of the Armada, and afterwards was very properly held responsible for the failure. Why he was chosen before such fine naval officers as Recalde, Oquendo, and his kinsman, Don Pedro de Valdes, is difficult to understand. He had certainly seen much fleet service, having served constantly during the last twenty years as General of the Fleet of Tierra-Firme, as well as of the new Indian Guard. He was held too for a high authority on naval architecture and hydrography. But he was of a nature notoriously jealous and quarrelsome, and his fighting record was far from good. It was he who had been given command of the fleet that was sent to fortify the Straits of Magellan after Drake's exploits in the South Sea; and it was he whom the heroic Sarmiento had accused of deliberately securing its failure and heartlessly deserting him. Since then, however, he had successfully attacked and destroyed a French settlement in Brazil, and had thereby restored his royal master's infatuated faith in his capacity and loyalty.¹ These galleons, together with the four Neapolitan galleasses under Don Hugo de Moncada, a Low-Country veteran, who had been serving as Lieutenant-general of the Galleys of Spain, and four Lisbon galleys, represented

¹ Duro, *Arm. Inven.* i. p. 214, and *Arm. Esp.* ii. App. 9, *passim*.

the Royal Navy and formed the backbone of the fighting line. Then came forty armed merchantmen organised into four equal squadrons of ten ships each; the 'Biscayan' under Recalde; the 'Andalucian' under Pedro de Valdes; the 'Guipuscoan' under Oquendo; and, lastly, the 'Levant' squadron, consisting of ten Italian 'argosies' under Don Martin de Bertendona. We have thus of vessels fitted according to the ideas of the time to take their place in the line of battle, twenty galleons, forty-four great-ships, and eight of the galley class, or seventy two sail in all. Besides these capital-ships and the dozen pinnaces attached to them, there was a light division under Hurtado de Mendoza of twenty-two sail of various small oared-craft of the pinnacle class; and, finally, there was a non-effective division of twenty-three hulks.¹

At Plymouth no accurate information had been received of these final preparations; but the Admirals knew enough to leave no room for doubt as to what was to be done with the compact and mobile fleet at their command. When Howard joined Drake the last week in May, their

¹ All these squadron-commanders were men of real distinction, with considerable experience as naval commanders.

Don Juan Martinez de Recalde, Knight of Santiago, and the finest seaman in Spain, had served as Superintendent of the Royal Dockyards, as general of the Indian fleets, as second-in-command to Santa Cruz in the Azores expedition of 1582, but was not present at the battle. He afterwards made a reconnaissance of the English seas and landed 1,000 Spaniards in Ireland.

Don Miguel de Oquendo, 'gloria de la marina,' had served in the Oran expedition and at the battle of St. Michaels, where he had greatly distinguished himself, and was thought by his skill and courage to have saved Santa Cruz's flagship from destruction. 'He handled his ship,' it was said, 'like a light horseman.'

Don Pedro de Valdes, Knight of Santiago, had been general in Indian fleets, and admiral of the Galician squadron for the conquest of Portugal, when he was wounded in action with two English privateers. He was also admiral of the fleet sent to blockade Terceira in 1581, where, attempting a landing contrary to his instructions, he was defeated. For this he was arrested on his return, and imprisoned for a short time. On his release he was made General of the galleons of the Indian Guard.

Don Martin de Bertendona, in 1583, during Santa Cruz's absence at the Azores, was in command of the fleet guarding the Portuguese coast.

Duro, *Arm. Inven.* i. App. L & U.

intelligence rightly assured them the Armada was already concentrated and on the point of sailing. The day after the junction, therefore, a council of war had been held to decide what was to be done with the combined fleet. Drake seems to have thought the main lines of the campaign as good as settled, but to his vexation the whole matter was re-opened. The question put, Ubaldino tells us, was 'whether it was better to go and encounter the enemy before he approached the coast of the kingdom, or to allow him to get away from his own territories and enter these confined waters, with which he was not so well acquainted?' Some indeed were of opinion that nothing could be decided until the return of the pinnace which Drake had last despatched to Spain for intelligence.¹ All that day the debate was prolonged, nor was it possible to conclude it before night, owing, says Ubaldino, to the violent opposition of one of them.² The Court had to be adjourned till the following day, and the debate broke out again and continued, until at last, as Ubaldino puts it, 'Sir Francis prevailed with his opinion' that the whole fleet should sail for Spain at the earliest possible moment.

Next day, the 26th, was Whitsunday, and Howard and Drake, who ever since the junction had been seen constantly in each other's company on the best of terms, seized the occasion, says Ubaldino, 'to give the rest a politic and Christian example by receiving the Sacrament

¹ Under Capt. Polwhole, who already had been distinguishing himself with a small light squadron by his activity in obtaining intelligence and intercepting vessels suspected of carrying supplies to the Spaniards. See Laughton, i. 171-3.

² 'Per la contraddittione gagliarda di alcun di essi.' This may have been Frobisher, who, up till then apparently, had not been consulted, and whose attitude towards Drake afterwards was certainly one of 'gagliarda contiaadditione,' though it must be remembered that on June 14 Howard wrote that both Frobisher and Hawkins were then of the same opinion as Drake and himself. 'Gagliarda' is the word Ubaldino uses to qualify an unusually severe gale. It would not be inappropriate to Sir Roger Williams.

together in friendly sort; whereat both fleets assured themselves joyfully of a certain and infallible victory.’¹

Though Drake had thus removed all opposition to his ideas, two difficulties still stood in the way of putting them into action. The wind continued boisterous and contrary, and the Queen’s ships that Howard had brought were short of victuals. He had been promised that his store-ships should follow him in a week, so as to be with him by the end of the month, but in their stead came regrets that they could not sail for at least a fortnight. The Admirals were in despair. Howard wrote in strong protest. He had not three weeks’ provisions left; but so entirely had Drake convinced him of the necessity of taking the offensive, that he stated his intention of sailing as he was and leaving the victuallers to find him if they could. He had fresh news that the Armada was to sail with the first favourable wind, and believed that the weather which was keeping him in port must have already set them on their way. There was not a moment to lose. ‘God send us a wind,’ he wrote, ‘to put us out; for go we will, though we starve. The fault is not mine. We must do as God will provide for us.’ Of the willing spirit of the men under his command he had no shadow of doubt. ‘My good lord,’ he lamented to Burghley, ‘there is here the gallantest company of captains, soldiers, and mariners

¹ His words are ‘nel convenir la Domenica dello Spirito Santo à ricevere i benefitii della chiesa ambi due amichevolmente.’ This can mean nothing but that they were communicants together, and is of further interest as adding another overwhelming argument to those with which Professor Laughton has disposed of the modern and entirely unfounded notion that Howard was a Roman Catholic (see *Dict. of Nat. Biography*, *sub voce* ‘Howard’). All the contemporary evidence that exists shows him as both politically and religiously an unswerving Protestant, as the word was understood in Elizabethan English. To the testimony collected by Professor Laughton may be added that of Otwell Smith, one of Sir Robert Cecil’s correspondents. A letter signed ‘Chas. Howard,’ and relating to a treacherous design to prevent Drake’s expedition of 1595, had been intercepted. In forwarding the information Smith says: ‘I think he (Howard) would rather die than do any such thing, for he loves the Queen and realm, and is a good Protestant and hates the Spaniard. It must be done by some Papist naming himself Chas. Howard.’ *S.P. Dom. Cal.*, September 14, 1595, p. 101.


that I think ever was seen in England. It were a pity they should lack meat, when they are so desirous to spend their lives in her Majesty's service.' Sailorlike, his only fear was for the landsmen. 'God send us,' he concludes, 'the happiness to meet with them (meaning the Spaniards), for I fear me a little sight of the enemy will fear the landsmen much.'

It was not till the end of the month that the persistent westerly winds showed signs of changing, and having scraped together enough victuals to justify a start, Howard put out on May 30 with the whole fleet. Drake's great project now seemed about to be executed; but hardly were they well into the chops of the Channel, when they were met with southerly and south-westerly gales. For seven days they battled with the storm, till with unabated violence it veered to the westward, and on June 6, in fear of being driven to leeward of Plymouth, they ran back into the Sound. There was nothing else to do. While at sea they had received certain intelligence from a homeward bound merchantman that on the 14th a large Spanish fleet had been seen standing out from Lisbon. The weather that had held the English fleet in the Channel might bring the Spaniards up at any moment, and it would never do to leave Plymouth uncovered and to windward.¹

Deep as must have been the disappointment at their failure, it was not to end here. Awaiting them at Plymouth they found despatches, which displayed symptoms of the Court's relapsing into the old timid policy. The

¹ 'Drake to Burghley,' June 6 (Strype, iii. App. No. 54). 'Howard to Walsingham,' June 15 (Laughton, *Armada*, i. 205): 'We lay seven days in the Sleeve. Ubaldino gives the date of the return as June 6. It is at this point that the information he had been getting from Drake appears to end. Thenceforward the second commentary like the first follows the 'Relation' of Howard, except for isolated additions and emendations. Hitherto the narrative had been entirely different from Howard's. We can only guess that the overwhelming labours and increasing anxieties that attended the organisation of Drake's expedition of 1589 left him no leisure to continue to assist Ubaldino in his work, and thus is irretrievably lost all hope of seeing the campaign through the eyes of its director.'

new nervousness seems to have taken the form of suggestions that instead of carrying the fleet down to the Spanish coast it would be better for it to lie somewhere, where it could guard all the threatened points at once. This childish idea, whose futility had been so thoroughly demonstrated to the Council, Howard dismissed with little ceremony. 'It is a thing impossible,' he wrote on June 13, 'for us to lie in any place or to be anywhere to guard England, Ireland, and Scotland.' Drake, perhaps from bitter experience, took a more serious view of the case. At all events a council-of-war seems again to have been called and on the following day Howard sent up a formal statement of the conclusion he had come to in concert with his officers, as to how the fleet should be employed. 'Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Frobisher and others,' he wrote, 'that be men of greatest judgment and experience, as also my own concurring with them in the same, is that the surest way to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast or in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them'; and he further explains there is still time for this course. Of the Spanish movements they had received no later information than that of the homeward bound merchantman which on May 14 had seen the great fleet of ships coming from Lisbon. It was then standing to the westward on a northerly wind. The skipper and his company, so Drake wrote, 'judge it to be the great fleet which the King of Spain hath made ready; for that they saw so many that they could not number them. They say that they saw 150 or 200 sail and yet could not discover the end of the fleet, although they lay to the eastward and the fleet to the westwards.' From this Drake deduced that what had been seen was one of two things. Either it was the whole Armada on its way to England, or else it was the squadrons which had concentrated at Lisbon making for a final rendez-vous with the rest of the Armada at Coruña or Vigo. If the former, the prevailing winds must already have brought the Spaniards in sight of Plymouth. As they had not appeared, therefore,



he argued that the concentration was still incomplete and that the Armada might yet be struck upon its own coast.¹ Howard fully accepted this view. 'Sir,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'I protest before God I would I had not a foot of land in England, so that the wind would serve us to be abroad'; and the same eagerness to be away for Vigo was in everyone keener than ever.

Having sent up a categorical expression of his opinion, that an attack with the whole fleet was still the proper course, the Lord Admiral naturally thought it ought finally to settle the question. The Council in despatching him westward had solemnly resolved that the fleet was 'to be employed as by his Lordship shall be thought meet, upon such intelligence as he shall receive from time to time'; and having stated what he thought was meet and the intelligence on which his opinion was formed, he had a right to think there was no more to be said. Scarcely, however, had his letter left Plymouth, when a pursuivant arrived with a despatch, which threw the admirals into consternation. A complete relapse had set in, and what had hitherto seemed but timid suggestions came now in the form of positive orders. 'My very good lord,' wrote Walsingham on June 9, 'Her Majesty, perceiving by your lordship's late letters to me that you were minded to repair to the Isles of Bayona [off Vigo Bay] if the wind serve, there to abide the Spanish fleet or to discover what course they meant to take, [and] doubting that, in case your lordship should put over so far, the said fleet may take some other way, whereby they may escape your lordship, as by bending their course westward to the altitude of 50°, and then to shoot over to this realm, hath therefore willed me to let your lordship understand that she thinketh it not convenient that your lordship should go so far to the south as the said Isles of Bayona, but to ply up and down in some indifferent place between the coast of Spain and this realm, so as you may be able to answer any attempt that the said fleet shall make either against this realm,

¹ 'Drake to Burghley,' June 6, *ubi supra*.

Ireland, or Scotland.' The ignorance of the most elementary conditions of naval strategy, which this despatch displays, is almost incredible in a woman of Elizabeth's high capacity, and brings home to us how revolutionary and difficult of comprehension at that time were Drake's new ideas. Whatever political considerations may have been behind it, as a military document it is childish. Walsingham's feelings, as it was dictated to him, may well be imagined. From the first he had thoroughly grasped the new system, and indeed most probably had much to do with its development. Still the despatch had to be sent, but seeing that it took nearly a week to reach Plymouth, a distance which the queen's messengers could cover in less than thirty-six hours, we cannot but suspect him of deliberately delaying it, in hopes the fleet would get to sea before it could be delivered.¹ But the adverse winds defeated any such intentions, and the blow fell.

The exasperation it produced in the fleet glows fiercely through the letter which Howard sat down to write in the heat of his resentment. After expressing his profound astonishment that such an order should have been sent to him, he proceeds with a hot protest, which places us in possession of the full height to which Drake and his school had lifted naval strategy. 'Sir,' he says, 'for the meaning we had to go on the Coast of Spain, it was deeply debated by those which I think the world doth judge to be men of the greatest experience that this realm hath; which are these: Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Frobisher and Mr. Thomas Fenner; and I hope her Majesty will not think we went rashly to work, or without a principal and choice care and respect to the safety of the realm.' So he proceeds concisely to explain the general idea which their last movement was intended to carry out. 'If we found they did but linger on their own coast, or that they

¹ For the post times between Plymouth and London see *Hatfield Papers*, v. 387 *et passim*.

were put into the Isles of Bayona or the Groyne [Coruña], then we thought in all men's judgments that are of experience here it had been most fit to have sought some good way and the surest we could devise—by the good protection of God—to have defeated them.' Then he breaks off to deal with considerations not purely naval, which he evidently believed lay behind the disastrous despatch, and protests against any such intention to land as had got Drake into disgrace the previous year. His only aim was to seek out the great force and fight it. 'And so,' he continues, 'should they have known by message; which should have been the surest way and most honourable to her Majesty,' and with that he proceeds to demonstrate the leading strategical blunders inherent in the new orders. 'But now,' he says, 'as by your directions to lie off and on betwixt England and Spain, the south-west wind that shall bring them to Scotland or Ireland shall put us to the leeward. The seas are broad; but if we had been on their coast they durst not have put off to have left us on their backs; and when they shall come with the south-westerly wind, which must serve them if they go for Ireland or Scotland, though we be as high as Cape Clear, yet shall we not be able to go to them as long as the wind shall be westerly, and if we lie so high then may the Spanish fleet bear with the coast of France to come for the Isle of Wight, which for my part I think if they come to England they will attempt. Then are we clean out of the way of any service against them.' As he argues he works himself into a fury and breaks out into angry sarcasm. 'But I must and will obey; and am glad there be such there [at Court] as are able to judge what is fitter for us to do than we here; but by my instructions, which I had, I did think it otherwise. But I will put them up in a bag.' Again he urges the perfection of Drake's design, to which in spite of his previous opposition he professes himself an entire convert; and so concludes with a haughty profession of obedience and a significant prayer that he

may not be compelled to act contrary to the queen's commands. 'God send,' he says, 'the wind do not force us thither.'

As to the actual movements of the enemy, Drake's conclusions were practically correct, although his reasoning was wrong. Poor as was his opinion of Spanish seamanship, he under-estimated the slowness of their movements. The Armada had sailed, and as he had sat writing his last despatch to Burghley, it was huddled helpless in Coruña—all of it at least that had not gone astray—but it was not for the reasons Drake guessed. On May 18, 19, and 20 it had streamed out of Lisbon, but the rendezvous was not Vigo or Coruña. It was the Scilly Islands. The long threatened movement had begun. So badly, however, did the hulks sail on a wind that by June 9 the fleet was still not clear of the Spanish coast, and by this time the galleys and pinnaces were so short of water and so much of the victuals had turned out bad, that Medina-Sidonia felt it necessary to put into Coruña. All the ships that were in sight followed him in, a number more remained outside, while a score or more of transports and other stragglers in ignorance of the changed orders continued on their course for the Channel. No doubt Sidonia considered it unnecessary to stop them, as they might easily be overtaken. That night, however, a gale blew up and scattered along the coast the vessels that had not been able to get into harbour. So great was the damage done, that supported by his whole council-of-war, with the exception of Don Pedro de Valdes, Sidonia reported that including previous losses the Armada was one-third short of its full strength, and in view of the news they had of the formidable preparations that were being made in England for their reception, he urged the abandonment of the enterprise. To this advice Philip would not listen for a moment; orders came back for the Duke to collect his dispersed ships, to refit the shattered ones, to recruit the crews and make good defective victuals. There was nothing to do but obey, and thus for a whole

month the Armada lay helpless and at the mercy of the English fleet.

But at Plymouth things were far from smooth. No victuals came for Howard's galleons, and the men kept so long inactive fell sick in hundreds and had to be discharged and replaced by fresh and less experienced hands. The half-hearted policy of providing victuals for the fleet by the month was bringing about all the evil consequences that had been foretold. Still in spite of every difficulty a week or two's provisions were procured from the country round and another attempt was made to get to sea. On the 19th the wind was fair again and the fleet stood down Channel; but before they were clear out it began to blow up strong from the southward, and since it was useless to hang on in the teeth of the gale consuming the scanty remains of their stores, on the 21st they once more put back to Plymouth. By this unhappy necessity an advantage was lost which would probably have meant the complete frustration of Philip's project. Ignorant of what had happened at Coruña, the deserted hulks with a few other ships in company had continued their way in two squadrons, to the original rendez-vous at Scilly. Some parted company by the way; but those that reached the rendez-vous cannot have been less than a score carrying perhaps some two thousand men. Having reached the coast about the 17th, they waited there for the rest of the Armada the best part of a week. During this time they were sighted and actually engaged by the scouting pinnaces of Howard's fleet, and had he had enough provisions to enable him to retain his station, the whole of them must almost inevitably have fallen into his hands. As it was, news of their presence on the coast did not reach him till too late, and the vessels, having been found by the Spanish officer sent from Coruña to recall them, were able to make good their return unmolested.

As yet it was not known in the English fleet what a chance had been missed. At Plymouth prospects were brightening. Howard's weighty protest against the

queen's orders had had its effect, and the morning after his return a despatch reached him restoring his full liberty of action subject only to the advice of his council-of-war. The adverse weather too had broken, and the same night the victual-ships, which had been so long prayed for, were able to get round. Every nerve was now strained to get the stores on board, and as the men toiled without sleep or rest to get the work done, boat after boat and post after post came in to report the Spaniards were on the coast. The two lost squadrons, seen here by one and there by another, were difficult to identify. It was supposed that three squadrons had been seen, numbering in all nearly forty sail. The admirals, unable to divine what had really taken place, came to the conclusion that the gale which had driven their own fleet from its station, must have broken up the Armada into scattered groups. It was but fresh cause to be out and doing to complete with a vigorous chase the discomfiture which the weather had begun. They had intended to sail on Monday the 24th, but their efforts were now redoubled, and on Sunday evening Howard announced to Walsingham he would be ready to weigh in three hours. So great was the haste that eventually, on the wind coming fair from the north-east, he did not wait to complete the victualling; but ordering the store-ships that were still unladen to follow him, he stood away for Scilly to cut off the scattered squadrons.

Success seemed now assured, but for the third time the wind played false. Before they were clear of the Channel it hove into the south-south-west and compelled them to stand off and on with no possibility of proceeding further. To make the best of a bad job, however, Drake with ten sail took a cast down towards the French coast. But all was of no avail; their quarry had escaped them; and under the belief that the Armada must have succeeded in getting together again, it was decided to await it where they were.

For this purpose the fleet was divided into three

divisions, and here we have the first trace of any squadronal organisation. Large as was the number of ships, the whole fleet seems to have been treated as one body with no divisional arrangement of any kind. When we remember the strict military organisation of the last great English fleet that had taken the sea some fifty years before, with its van and rear and wings like an army in the field, the revolution which the seamen's influence had brought about is very striking. Accustomed to fight only with single ships or with very small squadrons, and impatient of the restraint which a strict organisation placed upon the free movement of their individual vessels, the new school of seamen-admirals, it would seem, could see nothing but the evil of the old military formations and hastily discarded every trace of them.

Even now the organisation so tardily adopted could hardly be called divisional. The mass of the fleet was still undivided and lay in one body in mid-Channel. On the left was Drake with a wing-squadron of twenty ships and four or five pinnaces to watch the fair-way towards Ushant, while Hawkins with a similar squadron lay towards Scilly.¹ So, keeping regular touch with one another, they watched for the coming of the Armada. The position was radically wrong, and based on the old fallacy that a fleet of sailing ships could defend a pass, like an army or a fleet of galleys. Placed as they were, whenever the enemy came it could only be on a wind that would give him the weather-gauge. In vain Drake protested; in vain he urged their proper place was still on the enemy's coast, or in any case further out, where there was sea room to manœuvre for the wind. This time he seems to have been overruled. But as day after day went by and no sign of the Spaniards appeared, he became firmly con-

¹ This arrangement is singular. The traditional place for a vice-admiral was on the right, that of rear-admiral on the left. The probable explanation is to be sought in the fact, that it was believed in the English fleet that the Spaniards intended to steal up the coast of France, and Drake probably took the French station as being the most important and responsible.

vinced that the Armada must be lying somewhere shattered and at his mercy. Every scrap of intelligence the pinnaces could pick up went to confirm his view; his firm faith in his own strategical prescience was deeper than ever; and at last he could endure his chief's wrong-headedness no longer. Stores were running out so fast, that the rations had to be reduced; sickness was making havoc with the crews; numbers died daily; numbers more had to be discharged, and all were growling at their inaction. In desperation Drake took the step he had condemned so severely in Borough and delivered a formal protest to the admiral with his reasons reduced to writing.¹ So strong a measure Howard could hardly ignore, and on the following day the fleet was moved forward out of the Channel and took up a station off Ushant.² Thus for the first time did a modern fleet take up the position, which was to be recognised by a long line of great admirals as the focus of English naval defence towards the Atlantic, and to be hallowed as the scene of some of the greatest exploits of the British Navy. As far as can be gathered the fleet was extended on a wide front towards Scilly, with pinnaces cruising in touch with the land on each flank, while others thrown far forward tried to get contact with the enemy or definite information of his movements. But even here Drake was not content. Fresh intelligence that could not be doubted reached the fleet of what had happened to the Armada; and calculating with much ingenuity the time it would take Sidonia to reassemble his force and get ready for sea again, he continued to press for completing the Spaniards' ruin by attacking them where they lay. Howard and some others seem still to have hung back from the bold move. A great part of the fleet had barely victuals enough to carry them to Coruña, and some

¹ July 4; Laughton, *Armada*, i. 237.

² The exact position is not quite clear, as described by Fenner. 'Ushant,' he says, 'bare of us E.S.E. and Scilly N.W. by N. some 15 leagues of either.' But it must be remembered that charts at this time showed the mouth of the Channel very much narrower than it really is.

thought it was at any rate necessary to revictual at Plymouth before any move could be made. On July 7, the day after they took up their new station, the wind shifted into the north fair for Spain, and so urgent does Drake seem to have become that the council-of-war was assembled to come to a final decision. The debate appears to have been long, but by three in the afternoon Drake and his supporters had prevailed and the signal was given to make sail.

As the great fleet flew southwards, with every man inspired by the belief that at last the Lord had delivered the Spaniards into their hands and knowing they must either starve or revictual from a beaten enemy, the Armada, painfully reassembled and patched into a semblance of efficiency, was waiting in Coruña for a wind to take it out. Formidable as it still remained, it was far from being the fleet that had sailed from Lisbon. With diminished numbers and insufficient crews, dispirited by failure, weakened by disease, and recruited with raw and incompetent peasants, it was no match for the fleet that was bearing down upon it under the terror of Drake's name. Even the officers, though shamed into action by Philip's patient encouragement and Pedro de Valdez's indomitable courage, seem to have been oppressed with a presentiment of disaster, and it is impossible to read their half-hearted despatches of this time with any doubt of what must be the effect of Drake's appearing off the crowded and demoralised port.

Through the night of the 7th and all day on the 8th, while Sidonia was dismissing hundreds of his recruits as worse than useless, the English fleet held on. On the 9th, as he summoned a council to consider whether it were possible to get to sea, it had reached almost within sight of the Spanish coast. Then the fickle north wind began to die away, and not only that; for as they lay thus tantalised, with their prey just out of reach, it came on to blow hard out of the south-west, and they knew the move had failed. Short as they were of victuals, it was

impossible to hang on in the teeth of the weather in hopes of a change, and there was nothing for it but to go about and run for the English coast.¹

¹ Although Camden records it, this movement of the fleet, which entirely alters the received view of the conduct of the campaign, has been disregarded by every historian of the war. There can be no doubt, however, that it was made. In Howard's 'Relation' he distinctly says he sailed for the Groyne, 'which course was held from 8th July 1588 until the 10th of the same with a north wind, at which time the same changed to southerly, 40 leagues short of the coast of Spain or thereabouts' (Laughton, *Armada*, i. 6). Thomas Fenner in his defence of it (*ibid.* p. 242) says: 'The wind being northerly, the 7th of July at 8 o'clock in the afternoon, it was concluded to go for Spain, Ushant bearing of us E.N.E. next hand, some 15 leagues off. The 9th of July being shot some 10 leagues off S. & by W. of Ushant, the wind came up at S.W. blowing much wind. Thereby bare up for England again.' 'Ten leagues off' must mean 'ten leagues off the coast of Spain,' as they had been running from south of Ushant on a north wind since the 7th. Cely confirms this in a letter to Burghley (*ibid.* p. 263): 'My lord was in a good way, if God had not sent a contrary wind. Our fleet was 80 leagues S. & by W. of Ushant. If the wind had holden two days and two nights longer we had had them in the Groyne.' The distance from Ushant to Cape Ortegal is a little more than a hundred leagues, so that allowing for the wide errors of Elizabethan dead reckonings, Cely and Fenner are practically at one. The movement is further confirmed by a Spanish officer, who was returning from a reconnaissance on the English coast. 'On the 21st,' he says, meaning the 11th O.S., 'we saw at three in the afternoon sixty or more English sails, and among them ten very large, each with top-sails (or main top-sails, *sobre-vela de gavia*). They might have been 40 shore-leagues due N. of Llanes and their course N.N.E.' (*Relacion que hecho Pablo de Arambur capitan del galeon San Juan Bautista que . . . fué con dos zabras en seguimiento del armada Inglesa*, Duro, ii. 215.) Llanes is a small port on the north coast of Spain in about 4° 45' W. Long. So that, if the English fleet was only 40 Castilian leagues or little more than 100 miles N. of Llanes on the 11th, and at that time was homeward bound N.N.E., two days earlier on the 9th it may well have been within ten leagues of the Spanish coast, and within forty leagues of Coruña, which is probably what Howard meant. It must be noted, however, that Howard's despatch of the 18th to Walsingham (Laughton, *Armada*, i. 256) says nothing of the movement. This is easily explainable. The despatch in question was written to answer a special complaint of the queen's on the matter of the intelligence department. Howard, it seems, was in some anxiety as to whether he had been exceeding his instructions and had just sent off Sir Edward Hoby, who was serving on his personal staff as Secretary. Hoby says his instructions were 'to signify unto her Majesty what hath passed in all this season and to resolve her Highness of the present state of the army; as also to bring down with me her Majesty's resolution and free liberty how she would have him to lie or attempt aught on the enemy's coast' (*ibid.* p. 262). Further evidence that Howard had left his

With the return of the fleet to Plymouth from its abortive attempt ends the second stage of the Armada campaign, a stage distinguished, in so far at least as Drake was able to influence it, by a sound and sagacious strategy that should raise him to a high rank among scientific sailors. Than that final swoop for Spain at the eleventh hour no more brilliant or daring movement was ever executed by a naval commander. It marks the opening of a great period as worthily as Nelson's heroic chase of Villeneuve adorns its close. The risks were great, but they had been calculated to a hair's breadth. To sail with an unvictualled fleet and stake its existence on being able to replenish stores from the holds of a powerful enemy, to leave England uncovered when actually threatened by invasion, savours perhaps of rashness. But it was not so. A long and able minute from the pen of Drake's mouthpiece and right hand, Thomas Fenner, leaves no room for doubt that it was the outcome of a piece of strategical calculation, as masterly as it was deliberate and profound. The chances had all been balanced, from the demoralisation of the hybrid crews down to the time it must take the Spaniards to replace the water-casks which when emptied it was their custom to knock to pieces. Drake knew too that so long as the wind held fair for the move, it was foul for the Armada to come out, and he knew that if he once got to the southward of their point of departure, so as to have them between him and England, then any wind that was favourable for their voyage must bring them under his lee, so that it was impossible for them to proceed without first beating his fleet; and this everyone knew they could not do, and probably would never attempt. It was a great conception heroically

station lies in the fact that the last messenger from Court had been a week at sea trying to find him (*ibid.* p. 256). The Venetian ambassador reported from Paris that on the 4th to 14th 'the English tired of lying idle so long sailed towards Galicia to look out for the Spanish fleet to give it battle. The leaf of the *Foljambe Papers* which contained 'the proceeding of the two fleets after their meeting' is unfortunately wanting (*Hist. MSS. Com.* xv. v. 122).

undertaken, but the weather and the queen's hand-to-mouth administration doomed it to failure. None the less should it be remembered to Drake's lasting honour and go far to rank him, not only as the father of the art of warfare under sail, but as one of the greatest of its masters.¹

¹ For Fenner's minute see Laughton, *Armada*, i. 238. That Drake was the prime mover of the operation appears from his memorandum of July 4 (*ibid.* p. 237): 'To maintain my opinion that I have thought it meeter to go for the coast of Spain,' &c.

CHAPTER VI

THE FLEETS IN CONTACT

ON July 12 the combined fleet was back again at Plymouth, where its whole energies were at once devoted to revictualling the auxiliary vessels, and generally to getting in trim for sea again at the earliest possible moment. At home exaggerated reports had now reached the Government of the damage suffered by the Armada, and had led to a belief that it still lay scattered in different ports, and that the project had been abandoned for the year. Before turning from the Spanish coast, however, Drake had taken care to leave behind him four pinnaces to get intelligence, and on the way back Fenner had been detached to cruise for the same purpose. The result of these measures were captures, which left no doubt that the Armada had been reassembled, and that Philip was pressing his disheartened admirals to make a fresh start. News that the now unguarded Indies fleet was shortly expected was also obtained, and the game seemed still in the English hands. 'There never happened,' wrote Fenner, 'the like opportunity to beat down the Spanish pride, if it be effectually followed.'

It was resolved to leave no stone unturned to take advantage of the occasion. The details of the plan of operations intended are not quite certain; but the general idea seems to have been to detach a squadron of thirty sail to intercept the Indies ships while the rest of the fleet blockaded and attempted to destroy the Armada in Coruña. The idea was thoroughly sound. Even after detaching a flying squadron the main-fleet would be quite strong enough to deal a crushing blow to Sidonia's

demoralised and weakened force, if it attempted to leave the crowded port into which it had skulked. It seemed only a question of time to achieve a triumphant success. At Plymouth every man threw himself into the work heart and soul. 'Sir,' wrote Howard to Walsingham on July 17, 'I make all the haste I can possible out; and I and all my company that came from London will not stay for anything. Sir Francis Drake,' he adds, as though still in a measure regarding the vice-admiral as commanding an independent unit, 'and some of those ships will be ready, and the rest within three or four days.' On hearing of the first dispersion of the Armada the queen had sent down to suggest that the three great-ships of the first class should be paid off, but now Howard replied he must keep them.¹ So great had grown the sickness, he laments, that he had had to discharge some four or five ships to make up the complements of the rest. 'But,' he protests, still undismayed by his difficulties, 'there shall be neither sickness nor death, which shall make us yield, until this service be ended. I never saw nobler minds than we have here in our forces.'

So rings in every despatch of Howard's a note of undaunted courage that is in fateful contrast with the tone of most of the officers on whom Philip had to depend. If to the Lord Admiral must be denied the honour of having directed the campaign and the frankness when all was over to give credit where it was due, yet for his conduct at the time he deserves a place scarcely lower than Drake's. To a man of his high spirit the difficulty of his position must have been very great: but while the crisis lasted he bowed with fine humility to the subordinate, whom he recognised as the greater genius; and yet in giving way he never once lost dignity or forgot for a moment that it was he who was responsible for the tone of the fleet. From first to last he set an example of untiring labour, of loyal devotion, and of buoyant courage that is hardly to be surpassed and which entirely won the

¹ Camden.

respect of his headstrong and self-confident vice-admiral. If the times demanded a high-born amateur at the head of our Navy, let no one forget what happened to other fleets similarly commanded, or ever cease to be grateful that at this great crisis the man chosen for the post was Lord Howard. His splendid behaviour made the whole fleet one. Whatever was done, was done with all the might of the force. If Drake had been supreme head, the campaign might have been more scientific in design, more dashing in execution, but its success must have been thwarted by the jealousies and friction his masterful spirit seemed incapable of avoiding. To Howard by his birth and breeding and personal character was given the assured tact and high dignity which drew from all sides a ready submission to the great office he held, and which Drake's humbler origin and rough career almost necessarily denied him. 'The Queen,' says Camden, in drawing the Lord Admiral's portrait, 'had a great persuasion of his fortunate conduct, and knew him to be of a moderate and noble courage, skilful in sea-matters, wary and provident, valiant and courageous, industrious and active, and of great authority and esteem amongst sailors.' 'True it is,' says Fuller, 'he was no deep seaman ; but he had skill enough to know those who had more skill than himself and to follow their instructions, and would not starve the Queen's service by feeding his own sturdy wilfulness, but was ruled by the experienced in sea matters ; the Queen having a navy of oak and an Admiral of osier.' That such a man succeeded so splendidly in binding the oaken forces into one stout whole is not to be wondered at. It is indeed hardly too much to say, that in no great national crisis has there ever arisen a commander more highly fitted for his position than Howard, or who more loyally recognised and completely fulfilled the duties of his place.

For a week after their unwilling return to port the Lord Admiral and his officers continued to push on the work of revictualling for a resumption of the offensive in face of every financial difficulty. The loss of men through

sickness and the general expenses of the mobilisation were beginning to tell on the crippled resources of the country, but in view of the great opportunity that offered nothing could be spared. Burghley began to be anxious as to whether the country could bear the strain much longer. Ready money in specie could hardly be procured. 'A man could wish,' he wrote to Walsingham at his wits' end, 'if peace cannot be had, that the enemy would not longer delay, but prove, as I trust, his evil fortune.'¹ They were ominous words. He had hardly penned them, and the last preparations in feverish haste were being still forced on for the delivery of the great blow, when a pinnace came scudding into Plymouth with the astounding news that the Armada was off the Lizard.² The surprise was complete, and so far from being able to deal his well planned blow at the enemy Drake was caught in the very trap he had intended for the Spaniards.

The old story goes that Howard and his officers were playing bowls on the Hoe, when Captain Fleming of the 'Golden Hind' burst into their game with his staggering tale. In the general consternation all looked to Drake for the word, and all he would say was that he meant to finish his game. 'There's time for that,' he said, 'and to beat the Spaniards after.'³ The story may well be true. It is quite natural that the admirals may have been seeking diversion from their toil after the midday dinner, as

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, i. 234.

² 'Howard to Walsingham.' 'Upon Friday [i.e. the 19th], at Plymouth I received intelligence,' &c. *Ibid.* i. 288

³ The oldest authority for Drake's remark appears to be Oldys's *Life of Raleigh*, but Mr. Wright, the Plymouth librarian, has traced the story of the game of bowls back to living memory. In the second part of a tract called *Vox Populi*, a political pamphlet dealing with Prince Charles's escapade to Spain, which was reprinted by J. Morgan in his *Phoenix Britannicus*, there is what purports to be a report of a sitting of the Cortes to discuss the Spanish policy towards England. In this the Duke of Braganza is made to say: 'Did we not in '88 carry our business for England so secretly . . . as in bringing our navy to their shores, while their commanders were at bowls upon the Hoe of Plymouth.' The pamphlet was published in 1624, so that the story must have been current and well known, while men who may have been present were still living.

the custom was, and such a piece of posing to produce an enheartening moral effect was quite in accordance with Drake's methods and character.

'The southerly wind,' wrote Howard as soon as he had time to take up his pen, 'that brought us from the coast of Spain, brought them out.' And on his first sight of them he judged them at 'one hundred and twenty sail, whereof there are four galleasses and many ships of great burden.' In this he was fairly accurate, though it was by no means the same fleet that had sailed from Lisbon. The Portugal and the Castile squadrons had each to leave a galleon behind, and one of the Levanters was gone. Four of the hulks and three of the light division were also missing, while sickness and desertion had reduced the soldiers from 19,000 to 17,000 and the sailors from 8,000 to 7,000. Nevertheless to supply the place of the lost store-ships and prevent the galleys being compelled to seek port again, nine water caravels and seven feluccas had been added to the fleet. It thus eventually put to sea from Coruña 137 sail, but with its principal ships reduced to sixty-nine; and this was not all. In the Bay it encountered weather severe enough to compel Recalde to abandon his flagship and for the whole of the galleys to give up the expedition altogether. How many minor vessels parted company is not known, but probably there were several. 'The fleet of Spaniards,' wrote Drake to Seymour after the first action, when he had had an opportunity of observing it closely, 'is somewhat above a hundred, many great-ships, but truly I think not half of them men-of-war.' We may conclude therefore that as the meeting of the two fleets drew near, in number of fighting units there was little to choose between them.¹

¹ Ubaldino says Valdes told Drake 'that the total of vessels of all classes in the Spanish Armada showed 142 sail (the which number tallies with that admitted by other information) but that 110 were the vessels good for fighting; all the rest were attached to carry victuals, munition and other stores.' For the official list of the Armada as it left Coruña, see Duro, ii. 180 (Doc. 145). That at p. 194, *ibid.* (Doc. 150), which is usually taken as the actual state of the fleet as it finally sailed, is a muster that includes the vessels

The exact number of the English main-fleet at this time is difficult to determine precisely. All we know from English sources is that Howard had been obliged to reduce his numbers in order fully to man the vessels he retained. He tells us himself that when he got clear out of Plymouth Sound he had fifty-four. On the morning of the first fight we know he was joined by a small detachment that had not been able to get clear before. After the junction was effected the Spanish official report says that the English were sixty-four sail, twenty-three large and the rest smaller.¹ This is the lowest Spanish estimate and therefore probably the most accurate, especially as the figures are substantially the same as Howard's. Besides these a few more vessels we know were still taking in stores and fresh hands at Plymouth. After continual reinforcements on the way up Channel, Howard's numbers did not exceed a hundred at the time Seymour joined his flag. So that when he first encountered the Armada his whole force must have stood at about fifty ships and from thirty-five to forty pinnaces and small craft, or from eighty to ninety sail in all. Considering, then, that all these were free to develop the whole offensive power they had, Howard in number of fighting units was not inferior to Sidonia.

In the average size of the vessels the relation of the two fleets is by no means so clear. Till recently it has always been taken that the Spaniards, vessel for vessel, had an undoubted superiority. That the Spanish ships

'which failed to reach the port after the storm.' The 'San Luis,' for instance, of the Portugal squadron, which is known not to have reached Coruña (*ibid.* p. 103), appears in Doc. 150, whereas in Doc. 145 the Medici galleon has been removed from the Levant squadron to fill her place. The totals which Doc. 145 gives are: galleons, 21; pinnaces (Pataches and Zabaras), 26; ships (Naos and Naves), 37; hulks, 21; galleasses and galleys, 8, or 105 sail in all, without the water caravels and feluccas. Some of the vessels not mentioned in Doc. 145 must, however, have joined from the ports where they had taken refuge. The 'San Luis' we know was present at the Isle of Wight action.

¹ Don Jorge de Manrique, August 11, 1588, in Froude's *Simancas Transcripts*, Brit. Mus.

looked larger is certain, and hence the insistence of English naval writers of the time on the moral effect of high-charged ships. The special peculiarity of the English construction seems to have been that not even the high-charged great-ships had a lofty forecastle. It was this characteristic that struck foreigners. When the Duke of Stettin was taken down to Chatham to see the Navy he went over the three largest ships and found them 'all built very low at the head, but very high at the stern, so that it made one shudder to look downwards.'¹ His remarks are fully borne out by the representations of them in the old House of Lords' tapestries and the few contemporary drawings that exist. The weatherliness gained by this form of construction would certainly have been at the expense of an imposing appearance. Still that the best of the Spanish fighting-ships were actually larger is very doubtful. As it has been well observed, the official tonnage is not a sure guide. The Spanish system of measurement as far as it can now be ascertained seems to have given results from 25 per cent. to as much as 45 per cent. higher than that of the English.² Bearing this in mind we may compare the Portuguese and Castilian squadrons, ship for ship, with the twenty-two great-ships of the English Royal Navy, as on pages 180 and 181.

The result of this comparison, it will be seen, is that as far as regards the principal sailing ships of the two Royal Navies the Spaniards even on the official figures had but little, if any, preponderance. Though Howard had but five of the great sort, that is of 800 tons and upwards, against Sidonia's eight, of the 'middle sort' he had eleven to Sidonia's seven or eight, and of the 'lesser sort' six to Sidonia's three. Thus even after allowing for the 'Rainbow,' the 'Vanguard,' and the 'Antelope,' which it will be remembered were with Seymour, the English fleet was on a fair equality with the Armada in the galleon class. Against the four great

¹ *Transactions of the Royal Hist. Soc.* New Series, vi. 65.

² 'Elizabethan Tonnage Measurement.' See *post*, Appendix C.

galleasses, however. Howard had nothing to show, and was therefore in an inferiority by four powerful vessels.¹

A similar comparison of the auxiliary divisions gives a widely different result. Of the forty sail of merchant-

English	Armament		Men	Tons
	Battery	Q.F.		
Triumph	41	26	500	1,100
Bear	54	26	500	1,000
Elizabeth Jonas	50	26	500	900
Victory	36	28	400	800
Ark	—	—	425	800
Elizabeth Bonaventure	30	22	250	600
Mary Rose	28	12	250	600
Hope	23	22	250	600
Rainbow	—	—	250	500
Golden Lion	26	22	250	500
Vanguard	—	—	250	500
Revenge	34	12	250	500
Nonpareil	30	22	250	500
Antelope	20	18	160	400
Dreadnought	24	18	200	400
Swiftsure	26	16	180	400
Swallow	22	18	160	360
Foresight	24	10	160	300
Aid	19	20	120	250
Bull	—	—	100	200
Tiger	20	8	100	200
White Lion	—	—	50	140

men, the number which, including those of the Castilian squadron, Sidonia still had, twenty-seven were of 500 tons and upwards, and the rest of 300 tons and upwards.

¹ It is possible Sidonia had other galleons beside those in the above lists. Dúro's Doc. 145 gives also the galleon 'San Felipe y Santiago' of 530 tons and 24 guns as having left Coruña with him, but the full muster in Doc. 150 omits it. Both these documents, moreover, call the 'N.S. de Begoña' of the Castilian squadron a galleon, but in the final order for concentration at Lisbon (Doc. 109) she appears as a *nao*. Then there was the 'San Juan' of the Andalucian squadron of 810 tons with only 31 guns and 333 men, which is sometimes called a galleon, and finally the Duke of Florence's galleon of 960 tons, 52 guns, and only 383 men. Both the latter, however, were so badly undermanned and had so small a proportion of seamen to soldiers that they can hardly rank with the English galleons.

Against these Howard could not show more than five of 300 tons and upwards and twenty of between 200 and 300 tons, and to make up the deficiency he had at most a score of vessels of from 100 to 200 tons. Thus after making all allowances for the higher results which the Spanish system of measurement gave he was in this class in distinct tonnage inferiority.

The third and most important standard of comparison

Spanish	Guns	Men	Tons
San Juan	50	522	1,050
San Martin	48	469	1,000
San Luis	38	439	830
San Felipe	40	439	800
San Marcos	33	386	790
San Matteo	34	389	750
San Juan Bautista	24	296	750
San Cristobal (Castile)	36	303	700
Santiago El Mayor	24	293	530
San Pedro	24	274	530
San Juan El Menor	24	284	530
Asuncion	24	240	530
Nuestra Señora del Bairro	24	277	530
San Medel	24	272	530
Santiago El Menor	24	293	520
San Cristobal (Portugal)	20	211	352
San Bernardo	21	236	352
Santa Ana	24	153	250
San Lorenzo	50	368	—
Napolitana	50	321	—
Zuñiga	50	298	—
Girona	50	349	—

is the armament, and this unfortunately presents the greatest difficulties of all. For the guns carried by the English vessels we have to rely mainly on Sir William Wynter's report made in 1585.¹ Full as this report is, it is not satisfactory for the present purpose, since, as we have already seen, it can only be used as an indication of the minimum armament. Wherever we get later details

¹ *S.P. Dom.* clxxxv. 34, and *supra*, vol. i. p. 372. It is from this paper the guns in the above list are mainly taken.

we find Wynter's standard greatly exceeded and his whole system changed in the direction of increasing the battery guns at the expense of the secondary armament. For instance, Wynter gives to the 'Elizabeth Bonaventure' and the 'Aid' batteries respectively of thirty and nineteen guns. But in the very same year, when they were put into commission for Drake's expedition to the West Indies, they were armed respectively with thirty-eight and twenty-six guns, and these too of a calibre so much heavier that the battery power was increased between three- and four-fold, while at the same time the secondary armament was reduced from twenty-two and twenty pieces to six in each case.¹ Again, in the case of the 'Tiger,' of 200 tons, which was brought forward for commission the following year, we have seen Wynter certifying for a similar increase.² In these figures we cannot fail to see how the influence of Drake's school was pushing the reforms of the transition to their logical conclusion. The significant reinforcement of the battery, accompanied as

¹ Drake's Indenture. *Q.R. Exchequer Accts.* Bundle 64, No. 9. The details are as follows:

Nature of Armament		'Eliz. Bonaventure'		'Aid'	
		Wynter	Drake	Wynter	Drake
Battery	Demi-cannon . . .	4	4	—	—
	Periers . . .	2	4	—	—
	Culverins . . .	6	8	0	4
	Demi-culverins . . .	8	12	2	4
	Sakers . . .	6	6	8	10
	Minions . . .	2	1	2	4
	Falcons . . .	2	3	7	4
Q.F.	Port-pieces . . .	4	4	{	0
	Fowlers . . .	6	2		4
	Bases . . .	12	0		2
Shot-weight of Batteries . . .		395 lb.	514 lb.	88 lb.	192 lb.

² *S.P. Dom.* clxxxvii., 65, and *supra*, vol. i. p. 394. The details are: 1585, culv., 0; d.-culv., 6; sakers, 10; minions, 2; falcons, 2; Q.F., 8; 1586, culv., 4; d.-culv., 8; sakers, 8; minions, 0; falcons, 2; Q.F., 8; giving an increase of battery weight from 114 lb. to 192 lb.

it is by a reduction of the secondary armament carried mainly in view of boarding, shows the hold which the new tactics were taking in England. How far the revolution had been carried by 1588 we cannot tell, but it was the high-tide of Drake's supremacy in naval matters; we know how heavy was the armament intended for the new 'Revenues,' which under his influence were designed immediately after the defeat of the Armada, and we may be sure no error will be involved in crediting the queen's ships with a large increase of gun-power over that indicated in Wynter's report.¹ The only principal vessels whose exact armament as they fought the Armada we know, are the two latest additions, the sister-ships 'Vanguard' and 'Rainbow' of 500 tons. Their increased scale of armament has been already noticed. The details of it are equally significant.² In the armament designed for these two galleons, although eventually they were armed differently, we have the last word of naval artillerists before the Armada campaign, and it tells of a three-fold tendency—towards increased weight, towards simplicity, and towards guns of long range and high penetration. Each was to have a battery of thirty-six pieces throwing 670 lb., while the 'Lion,' an older galleon of nearly the

* ¹ 'Estimate of ordnance for certain new ships,' December 1588, *S.P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxix. 60, and see *post*, chap. x.

² *Supra*, vol. i. p. 377. Though they were intended as sister ships, the latitude allowed to the Elizabethan builders resulted in considerable differences between them. Their dimensions were by Borough's table (*S.P. Dom.* cxliii. 111, 1592):

'Rainbow,' keel, 100; beam, 32; depth, 12.

'Vanguard,' „ 108; „ 32; „ 13.

By the table of 1602 (Oppenheim, p. 124) it appears that the 'Rainbow' had slightly more overhang both fore and aft than her sister. Their register then was as follows: 'Rainbow,' burden 384, 'ton and tonnage' 480. 'Vanguard,' 449 and 561, and the 'Rainbow's' armament weighed 35 tons against the 'Vanguard's' 40 tons. Seymour, who commanded the 'Rainbow,' objected to the design and said he was forced to alter her decks by cutting them to make her fightable, and then complained she was not fit for sea. He also complained that she wanted two more guns. See 'Seymour to Howard,' August 19, 1588; Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 129.

same dimensions, was given by Wynter's estimate no more than thirty pieces throwing 426 lb. In the new vessels the secondary or quick-firing guns were all of a pattern ; in the old one they were of three. Her battery, too, comprised seven different calibres, that of the new galleons only five, and finally the cannon-periers, of which the 'Lion' had four, disappear in the new type altogether. As these guns, it will be remembered, were intended only for close quarters, the last modification is yet another testimony to the progress of the tactical revolution.

Unhappily, in the case of the Spanish vessels the only complete return we have gives nothing but the number of the guns, and at a time when the types of naval ordnance were so various, number alone affords hardly any criterion of gun-power, and especially where the battery or primary armament is not distinguished from the secondary. In the official lists of the Armada both are included in one total. It is only in the case of the galleasses that we have any details for comparison. They were scheduled as fifty-gun ships, and carried from twenty-nine to thirty pieces in battery and twenty of secondary armament. The battery guns are scheduled as of six different calibres, but the shot carried were of more than twice as many sizes, so that it becomes extremely difficult to calculate the weight of metal that could be thrown.¹ By no calculation, however, can the total for each vessel have averaged more than 600 lb. Moreover, nearly a quarter of these guns were periers. These vessels, then, which were considered as amongst the largest and most formidable in the Spanish service, can have no more than equalled in gun-power the queen's new thirty-six gun galleons, which were probably little more than half their size, and they must have been distinctly inferior to the 'Triumph' and her sisters armed on the new scale.²

¹ Duro, i. 389, 390. Montgomery says they carried six great pieces firing directly forward, four firing directly aft, and twelve on each broadside in one tier ; but his details do not agree with the Spanish official schedule. (*Censura Lit.* v. 260.)

² Montgomery says the galleasses were 'by report of seven or eight

Turning to the Spanish galleons we find the same inferiority running through all grades. Galleons ranging from 700 to 900 tons carried from thirty-six to forty guns all told, while the 'Elizabeth Bonaventure,' of 600 tons, was armed by Drake with thirty-eight guns in battery besides her secondary armament. Again, the large class of 500-ton galleons, which represented Philip's latest efforts in naval construction, carried but twenty-four guns all told, against the thirty-six primary and eighteen secondary of the queen's new galleons; and finally the smallest Spanish class of from 250 to 350 tons had from twenty to twenty-four guns, while the 'Aid,' of 250 tons, carried twenty-six guns in her battery as well as her ten quick-firers. Thus even after making all allowance for the English ships being really larger than the Spanish of the same tonnage-register, the inferiority of the Spaniards in gun-power looks so serious as to suggest a doubt that the secondary armament of the Spanish vessels cannot have been included in the official total of their guns; but except in the case of galleys not only would such a method of registration have been against the universal practice of the time, but every indication we have shows that it was not so.¹ In the galleon class, then, the English had undoubtedly an overwhelming preponderance of gun-power, and that not only relatively to their tonnage, but absolutely in the actual weight of metal they could throw.

When we come to compare the armaments of the armed merchantmen in the two fleets the difficulties increase still further. The only official details we have hundred ton the piece,' but he certainly under-estimated their gun-power, and probably also their size.

¹ In the galleasses, we have seen, the quick-firing guns were certainly included. On the 'N.S. de Rosario,' of forty-six guns, the English prize surveyors found sixteen battery guns, twelve carriages from which guns had been removed, and eleven Q.F. guns. In the 'San Salvador,' of twenty-five guns, only sixteen battery guns were found. In the Levantine 'Anunciada' and 'S. Maria de Vison' the total certainly included both classes (Duro, i. 389).

of the armament of the English private ships is that of a squadron of ten London vessels of the 100-ton class, which were hastily fitted out after the arrival of the Armada. Except in one case, where a demi-culverin was subsequently added, they carried on an average about eight battery guns (minions and sakers) and nearly the same number of quick-firing guns.¹ But this is no criterion of the gun-power of larger vessels regularly fitted out as men-of-war. For Drake's original merchant squadron of twenty ships and thirteen pinnaces we know ladles were issued from the royal stores for the following guns: 3 culverins, 2 cannon-periers, 22 demi-culverins, 86 sakers, 108 minions, 76 falcons, 9 falconets, or a total of 306 guns. Besides these over 600 'forelocks' were issued for quick-firing guns of secondary armament. We may safely assume, therefore, on these figures that Drake's twenty private ships carried on an average at least ten guns each, ranging from minions upwards, besides smaller pieces.² Of the Spaniards we know little more. True the number of guns in each ship is given in the official lists, but it is doubtful how far these armaments existed except on paper. We know that one of the last acts of Santa Cruz's life was to report that the Armada was short of its proper complement of guns, and especially in the Guipuscoan squadron of merchantmen, and that all the king could suggest was that sixty or seventy pieces might be pur-

¹ See Laughton, *Armada*, i. 339.

² *S.P. Dom.* ccxviii. 56. The armament of the smallest ship in his merchant squadron we have exactly—that is, as it was returned by its owner when claiming damages. This was the 'Bear Young,' of the famous Captain John Young, who steered her as a fire-ship upon the Armada off Calais. He claimed for one demi-culverin, two sakers, three minions, two falcons, three falconets, four Portugal bases of brass, and four great fowlers—that is, six great pieces, five small, and eight quick-firing, or nineteen guns in all. Yet she was only 140 tons burden, or 80 tons below the average of Drake's twenty merchant ships (*ibid.* cclix. 48, vii.). It must be remembered that he was a very old-fashioned officer and possibly also may have removed some of his armament before the ship was fired. This case may certainly be taken as a minimum.

chased from the foreign trading vessels that lay in the port of Lisbon. This seems to have been done. At the same time Don Pedro de Valdes reported that the Andalusian squadron which he commanded, although furnished with the proper number of guns, was deficient in large pieces, and requested he might discharge some of the smaller calibres and replace them with heavier guns. To this the king replied that order was to be taken, that his squadron went to sea properly armed, but with no suggestion of where the big guns were to come from. It was the flagship of this squadron that Drake captured. She is scheduled in the Spanish official lists as a forty-six gun ship. On board her the prize-survey found but forty-one guns in all, sixteen of which were of large calibre and eleven quick-firers. Of the remaining fourteen we have no definite report. But the large proportion of heavy guns and the reduced number would look as though Valdes had rearranged his armaments in accordance with his views, at least to some extent, though his proportion of short range and secondary to long range and primary pieces must still have been excessive.¹ The 'San Salvador,' one of Oquendo's squadron, was afterwards captured and found to have one over her specified complement of twenty-five guns, but it had been made up with several old iron pieces that were little better than useless.² Whether or not Pedro de Valdes succeeded in

¹ The prize-survey (Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 190) reported her armament as follows: battery, three demi-cannon, six cannon-periers, four culverins, one basilisk, all of brass, and one minion and a demi-culverin of iron. The eleven Q.F. guns were fowlers, great bases and bases with fifteen chambers belonging to them. Besides these twenty-eight guns, there were twelve empty carriages. Of the guns belonging to them, which were all brass, two had gone to arm a Plymouth pinnace and were therefore probably Q.F., and ten others to the 'Roebuck,' the vessel that had taken her in. She was of 300 tons, so that some of these guns may have been large. One other piece went to the 'Samaritan,' of 250 tons—making in all forty-one guns against her official forty-six ('Cary to Walsingham,' *ibid.* i. 263, 289).

² According to the prize-survey (*ibid.* ii. 154), her armament was fourteen brass pieces and four old iron minions in battery; and for secondary armament, two old fowlers and six harquebuses-a-crock. Professor Laughton (*ibid.* *Introd.* xlvii.) speaks of six of her guns being missing, but this seems

remodelling the armament of his whole squadron as he did that of his flagship, its gun-power cannot have been very formidable. Its scheduled tonnage was 8,762 tons and the total of its guns 240, which gives little better than three guns to the hundred tons, a proportion which we know was greatly exceeded in the most hastily equipped English merchantmen.¹ On the same basis of calculation the Biscayan and Guipuscoan squadrons had less than four guns to the hundred tons, including their secondary pieces; whereas Drake's twenty large merchantmen had five heavy guns to the hundred tons, besides small battery pieces and quick-firers. Thus after again making all allowance for the Spanish system of tonnage measurement and for a possible increase of armament at the last moment, there can be little doubt that the English ton for ton showed as great a superiority of gun-power in the auxiliary classes as they did in the regular galleons.

All that is known of the armament of the Italian squadron still further emphasises the position. Sailors who deserted from the Armada reported these vessels as being specially badly armed,² and this is entirely confirmed by the details we have of two of them. The 'Anunciada,' of 700 tons, carried but six periers and two demi-culverins, the rest of her armament consisting of six small quick-firers called 'esmeriles,' while the 'Santa Maria de Vison,' of 660 tons, carried the same armament less two periers.³ Since, therefore, periers and 'esmeriles,' which formed the bulk of their armament, were of no use, except at close quarters and for resisting

to be due to inadvertently counting the harquebus-a-crock as a small arm. It was certainly a Q.F. ship-gun (see Norton, *The Gunner*, p. 56, and *ante*, vol. i. pp. 368, 374). It was of the culverin class, like a 'base,' and seems to have survived longer than any other form of Q.F. gun in the sea-service.

¹ *Ante*, p. 186, n.

² 'Les Navires d'Italie, nommément les plus grandes, estoient mal pourveues d'artillerie.' (Depositions, *Hatfield MSS.* iii. 343.)

³ Duro, i. 389. Professor Laughton gives the armaments differently, counting the *mascolos* or 'chambers' as guns instead of parts of guns, and the *pedreros* as demi-culverins. (*Armada*, Introd. xlv.)

boarders, it is clear that the Levant vessels, which carried some of the finest officers and troops in the fleet, were for the purposes of a naval action fought after the new English methods, little better than armed transports and not to be compared in relative gun-power with the weakest of Howard's following.¹

One other test of the comparative value of the two fleets still remains. This is the proportion of sailors to soldiers in the crews on which their efficiency as fighting machines against English tactics in a great measure depended. In the Spanish galleon-squadrons the sailors were generally about one half the soldiers, and this was also the proportion in the queen's great-ships; but in the Spanish fleet, owing to the difficulty in obtaining seamen, it was not maintained throughout. For instance, in the Portugal squadron the 'Santiago' carried but eighty seamen to above three hundred soldiers, and the result was that it is never mentioned as coming into action where it was wanted. In the three Spanish merchant-squadrons we find a ratio of but one sailor to three soldiers, while the English vessels of the same class were manned almost entirely by sailors. That the Spaniards recognised the importance of this proportion is clear from the fact that even in the merchant squadrons

¹ It is possible that their armaments may have been increased before they finally left Spain, in view of the alarming reports of the English gun-power. The 'Valencera,' for instance, is registered as a fifty-two gun ship, and though she did not carry her full complement of guns, she had no despicable armament. Her captain, Don Alonso de Luzon, commander of the Neapolitan Tertia, deposed when taken prisoner that she carried thirty-two guns, of which four were cannons of brass, but of what kinds the others were the distinguished soldier professed a contemptuous ignorance ('Examination of Prisoners,' Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 275). With such captains as these, who looked on their veteran infantry as the real fighting strength of their ships and did not even stoop to learn what guns they carried, the true character of these Levant vessels is clear. The Spaniards, however, certainly regarded them as ships fit for the line of battle. The 'Regazzona' and the 'Labia,' respectively the *capitana* and *almiranta* of the squadron, we know to have been ordinary Venetian merchantmen that were requisitioned as they were taking in cargo at Lisbon in 1588, but the King's commissioners reported that they were powerful enough to fight ten or twelve Englishmen. (*Venetian Cal.* viii. and Nos. 631 and 634.)

the *capitanas*, or flagships, seldom seriously transgress the proportion of one to two, and even in the *almirantas*, or vice-flagships, it is pretty generally maintained. Tried by this test the Levantine squadron comes out as badly as it does from the point of view of armament. The proportion these vessels carried of seamen to soldiers was little better than one to four, and even in the two flagships it is the same.

Such then were the two fleets that were about to meet for the long-deferred trial of strength. In Howard's favour were crews, guns, seamanship, and proximity to his base, all indeed but soldiers and tonnage. But for the moment Sidonia had stumbled on an overwhelming strategical advantage. His voyage, as we have seen, had not been entirely prosperous. It had been delayed by calms, followed on July 17, somewhere to the south-west of Ushant, by the flaw of bad weather which had sent all the galleys and the flagship of Recalde's squadron flying for refuge to various French ports. So broken up indeed was the Spanish fleet that Sidonia had to lie by to gather it again. Valdes, however, with his squadron and a score or so of other vessels in company, had kept on as far as the Lizard. On Friday the 19th, having made his landfall, he waited hovering in the wind for the rest of the fleet to come up, and it was these first comers, and not the whole Armada, that Captain Fleming had seen and reported to Plymouth the same afternoon. Here Valdes was found by a pinnace despatched in search of him by Sidonia, who had been waiting to collect his scattered fleet apparently off the Land's End under the impression it was the Lizard, and on the following day the reunited Armada continued its course as far as Dodman Point. Here, within striking distance of Plymouth, and still to windward of it, Sidonia hove-to about four leagues from shore for the fleet to close up. Ashore they could see dense volumes of smoke arising as the beacons flared the news of their presence from headland to headland and hill to hill. The day so long

prepared for was at hand, and the Duke, to inspirit his host, ran up his holy banner at the main; to the sound of the flagship's guns it unfolded on the dying breeze, displaying on the one side the crucified Christ and on the other the Holy Mother, and at that signal, says an officer of the 'San Martin,' 'all our people kneeled down and put up a prayer, beseeching our Lord to give us victory against the enemies of His holy faith.'

It was in this moving hour that Sidonia signalled for his final council-of-war. With the wind at south-west the English fleet in Plymouth seemed to be at the mercy of the Spaniards, as they lay unbroken to windward. A determined attack, prepared with fire-ships and pushed home with the galleasses leading, must have worked havoc in the Sound. The danger was extreme, and to none was it clearer than to the English admirals. There was but one way to avoid it, and that was to get to sea at once in the teeth of the wind. Not an hour was lost. Through the short summer night the vessels that lay in the harbour were laboriously warped out, and by Saturday morning the bulk of the fleet was beating out of the Sound with the wind still steady at south-west.¹ For the times it was a most daring and difficult manœuvre to attempt in presence of the enemy, but thanks to the weatherliness of the English ships and the seamanship of their commanders all went well; and early in the afternoon Howard was out nearly as far as the Eddystone with fifty-four sail in company. Here for the first time they had sight of the enemy.² The morning had been wet and thick, but now through the mist and drizzle the Spanish fleet could be dimly seen to the westward 'as far as Fowey,' some five or six leagues to windward.³ Still, at present nothing further could be done to better the position. With the rain the wind seems to have dropped

¹ Howard, July 21.

² Laughton, i. p. 6.

³ 'As far as Fowey,' Ubaldino interprets 'as far off as the English were from Fowey, that is about twenty-five ordinary miles.'

and Howard struck sail and lay under bare poles.¹ For the English the pressing danger was past and Sidonia's great opportunity had been let slip.

On board the 'San Martin' at this very time, without suspicion of the unparalleled feat of seamanship which the English captains had accomplished, and which never could have been carried out, says the enthusiastic Florentine, without a long and assured experience of naval discipline on the part of the English masters, the council-of-war was leisurely debating how best to take advantage of their position. Up to this time it seems clear they had obtained no definite intelligence of the English fleet.² Of Drake's last attempt to attack them in Coruña and even of Howard's junction with him it is clear they had no certain intelligence. It was still believed, as Pedro de Valdes had pointed out at Coruña in urging the prosecution of the campaign, that the English naval forces must necessarily be divided into two if not three fleets, so as to watch both Parma and the entrance to the Channel.³ Drake was supposed to be stationed in the west, and Howard to be still somewhere to the eastward. On this information Sidonia had been instructed to proceed directly to the Downs, avoiding an action if possible until he had joined hands with Parma. At the same time he was warned that Drake would probably attempt to get in his rear, either by cruising towards the Spanish coast or by fortifying himself in Plymouth and putting to sea as soon as the Armada passed, and that he would then endeavour to crush Sidonia between his own fleet and Howard's advancing from the eastward. This opinion seems to have been endorsed by all the Spanish flag-

¹ Calderon says that when an hour or two later the English fleet was seen from the Spanish tops, it '*estaba amainada*.'

² P. de Valdes in his letter written to Philip a month later says they knew it was in Plymouth, but his whole statement is very untrustworthy. Vanegas, an officer on Sidonia's ship, also says they knew it, '*como se sabia*,' but he seems to refer to what they had been told before leaving Coruña. He does not say they had any fresh information. Duro, ii. 374.

³ '*Perecer de Don Pedro de Valdes*.' *Ibid.* ii. 144.

officers; and, as we shall see, the official order of battle which had been drawn up before leaving Lisbon was expressly designed to meet this disposal of the English forces.¹

As nothing had been seen of Drake at sea, in spite of the wide extent of ground the Armada and its scouts had been driven to cover on its interrupted voyage, there was every reason to believe that he must be in Plymouth bent on carrying out the plan which had been anticipated. It thus became a serious question whether the Armada ought to pass to leeward of Plymouth without some attempt to crush Drake's Western squadron. Leyva, who was Lieutenant-general of the expedition and Sidonia's successor-elect, and some others, warmly urged that he should be attacked where he lay, trusting for success to the surprise and the difficulty of using the shore batteries when the two fleets were closely engaged. How far this bold counsel was supported by such experienced officers as Recalde and Oquendo we do not know. An officer on board the flagship in his account implies that nearly all the admirals were in favour of attacking, and that Sidonia was the chief opponent, urging the danger of entering a fortified port that admitted of only three vessels abreast from which it would be impossible to retire in case of a repulse.² The same authority asserts that the Duke finally took the position which the letter of his instructions justified, namely, that the King had forbidden him to enter a port on any consideration until he had joined hands with Parma; and that upon this all the officers came round to his opinion. This however bears strongly the marks of an attempt to excuse a great strategical blunder, and Valdes distinctly told the King that the Council broke up having decided to make for the port and attack the English fleet if it might be done with advantage.³

¹ 'Sidonia to the King,' May 28. Duro, ii. 102.

² Vanegas. *Ibid.* ii. 375.

³ Laughton, ii. 133. Ubaldino says Valdes also told Drake, when taken prisoner, 'that they had thought it would be an easy thing to make them-

Valdes's version certainly receives considerable support from the ensuing movements of the Armada. When the council broke up it stood slowly on its course towards Plymouth. Owing probably to Howard's having struck sail, the Spaniards as yet had not made out the English fleet and they were still without any definite information of its position. Towards sundown, however, a number of vessels were descried through the wet haze lying to leeward. It was still so thick that, in the failing light, they could not be counted. It was certain, however, that what had been seen could not be anything but Drake's fleet. By some miracle he had escaped from Plymouth and the whole situation was changed. The flag-officers hurried off their pinnaces for instructions, but none were forthcoming. The Duke simply held on his way, waiting for the return of a pinnace he had sent to reconnoitre. The obvious thing to do was to strike sail and lie where they were till the morning broke. They would thus keep the wind and enable the straggling fleet to close up; and this the admirals urged. The Duke, however, was possessed of an idea that he could only keep the weather-gauge by going about and retracing his steps towards the open sea, and it was only by pointing out that if he did so in the dark the rest of the fleet would not follow him, and that in the morning he would find himself alone and the fleet in disorder, that his officers induced him to give in. To add to his troubles, at about one o'clock in the morning his pinnace returned with some prisoners, from whom he learnt for the first time the English movements: how Howard and Drake had united their fleets; how they had returned from their abortive attempt upon Coruña short of victuals; and how they had succeeded in the teeth of the weather in getting to sea. Face to face with a situation for which no provision had been made, and with no possibility of calling his council together to con-

selves masters of Plymouth, because they did not imagine they would have to encounter any prowess (*gagliardo*) at sea that they would not have been able to overcome.

sider it, the Duke at once came to anchor and despatched orders to the various squadron-commanders to form battle order, so as to be ready for an attack from the enemy at daylight.¹

While the Spaniards were thus occupied, the English seized the opportunity afforded them. As the moon rose and probably revealed the exact position of the Armada, they made sail and with the bulk of the fleet stood to the southward straight out to sea across the front of the enemy. By the Spaniards the movement was not seen. Their attention was engaged by the manœuvres of a small squadron on their lee, which they afterwards thought had been detached for that very purpose. All night long they could see its leading light and when morning broke eight ships were discovered beating dead to windward, as though trying to weather them by working between the land and their left wing.² Under the impression that these were the leading ships of the main fleet, Sidonia attempted no counter-movement to prevent his other or seaward flank being turned.

The masterly tactics of the English fleet should be a matter of no surprise. Manœuvres for the wind were as old as the naval art; but the boldness of the determination to uncover the threatened port deserves high praise, and stamps the stroke with genius. The Spaniards it is clear were completely outwitted, while the success of the conception fully justified its daring. As the night wore on the wind shifted more westerly, enabling Howard and Drake, as with the bulk of the fleet they stretched out to sea, to edge continually further to starboard. Thus before dawn the whole of the fifty sail that had got out of Plymouth the previous afternoon had weathered the Armada some two leagues to the west of the Eddystone. At daylight they had gone about, and the first the asto-

¹ Narrative of Calderon, *Froude Transcripts*. Valdes told Philip the fleet was kept under sail all night, but he is clearly trying to prejudice Sidonia and his account contradicts itself.


² Duro, ii. 274.

nished Spaniards knew of the manœuvre, was to see them all to seaward stretched out in line-ahead, and heeling over on the port tack, as they bore down to attack. So complete was the surprise, that at first it was believed to be not the Plymouth fleet, but another that must have come from Dartmouth.¹ Moreover, the impression that the ships which they had been watching all night were the vanguard of the main fleet was now deepened. For the wind having got round to west-north-west some of the largest of the queen's galleons which hitherto had been unable to get free of the Sound were seen coming out. Whereupon Sidonia, seeing himself out-manœuvred and that it was impossible to avoid fighting, ran up the Royal standard at the fore, the signal for a general engagement.²

The formation and movements of the two fleets at this great trial of strength between the Northern and the Southern schools, are questions of deep interest and extreme difficulty. So meagre are the accounts that have come down to us, so ignorant were the chroniclers of the mystery of naval warfare, so secret were its principles kept, so absorbed were individual captains in detailing their own exploits, that all attempt to understand what happened in the Channel battles has long been abandoned.

¹ Duro, ii. 275.

² For the formation of the English fleet, see *post*, p. 208. It has generally been taken that it weathered the Spaniards inshore. But Adams's charts from which Cornelis de Vroom made the designs of his famous tapestries for Lord Howard, show the manœuvres as detailed above, with the smaller squadron only beating to windward inshore. These charts were engraved in 1590 to illustrate Ubaldino's version of Howard's own narrative (Laughton, App. H vol. ii. 388), and are therefore a contemporary authority. They cannot, however, be considered original. They seem to show little or nothing more than could be deduced from Howard's narrative, and entirely ignore the Spanish movements as we have them detailed in the papers collected by Captain Duro. They, for instance, represent the Armada both fighting and sailing in crescent formation at times when we know this was not the case. In the present instance, however, they may certainly be accepted. Howard could never have allowed so great a blunder to pass, and, further than this, it renders the Spanish accounts quite clear, and especially how it was they first saw the English fleet to seaward.



ADAMS'S CHART No. 2

It is even assumed very generally that there is nothing to understand, and by tacit consent the tactics of our first naval war have been ignored as completely as its strategy. But since the publication of the accounts of Spanish and other eye-witnesses, this comfortable retreat is no longer justifiable.

That the coming battles were no haphazard engagements between two formless masses of ships is now abundantly clear. Reading the old authorities in light of the new, we can see traces of well thought out dispositions for squadron supporting squadron, for concentrating attacks upon favourable points, for developing the utmost broadside fire, and the like, which leave no room for doubt that thoroughly scientific tactics were at least attempted. On the Spaniards' side this is only to be expected, seeing the formal traditions yet green from Lepanto upon which their Navy rested. It is even further proof of how deeply their tactics had been studied, that they were thoroughly aware of the revolutionary system they would have to meet. In view of it Philip had been wise enough to leave Sidonia and his council-of-war a free hand as to the details of the battle formations. In his final instructions the Admiral was merely advised to dispose his squadrons so that one could help the other without confusion; to keep the hulks in the centre; to gain the weather-gauge; to board and grapple as much as possible, so as to neutralise the enemy's recognised superiority in gunnery; and finally to beware of their low firing.¹ It has always been repeated that the Armada was formed in a crescent; but in support of this statement, there is in the Spanish despatches no evidence whatever, and much to contradict it. The idea seems to rest on an obscure expression of an English chronicler who obviously had no clear apprehension of what he was describing,² and even he says no more than that the

¹ Duro, ii. 9.

² Camden. 'The next day (the 20th) the English discovered the Spanish fleet with lofty turrets like castles in front like a half moon, the wings

formation was in front like a half-moon. Of the actual order of battle eventually adopted no official record has yet come to light. There exists, however, from the pen of Filippo Pigafetta, a well-known Italian expert in the art of war, a very elaborate battle order, which he published in Rome when the Armada was at sea, as that which had been laid down for it. Though it certainly was afterwards modified, it is of great interest as showing the point which Spanish naval tactics had reached on the eve of the struggle, and also as better enabling us to interpret the hints we can gather of what was finally arranged.¹


According to Pigafetta, two miles in advance of the fleet there was thrown forward a screen of feluccas and frigates to feel for the enemy. The body of the fleet was in four main divisions.² First came the vanguard, consisting of twelve powerful vessels in three ranks. In the first rank were four of the largest of the Levantine squadron with Leyva's 'Rata' on the right flank and the 'Ragazzona,' *capitana* of the squadron, on the left. The

thereof spreading about the length of seven miles.' But this proves nothing; for in the first place it is clear the English sighted the Armada before they had formed battle order. In the second place if Camden meant what he is generally taken to mean he contradicts himself by speaking of a hindmost and foremost squadron, which there could not have been if the fleet was formed line-a-breast in a crescent. He clearly is quite ignorant of naval manœuvres and thinks a van-division was necessarily foremost, and a rear-division hindmost; whereas in all Spanish formations up to this time they were respectively the starboard and port divisions or wings (*cuernas*). Cardinal Bentivoglio (*Warres of Flanders*, p. 254) seems to be the only other authority for the 'half-moon,' but the passage is purely picturesque and is largely plagiarised from Camden. Adams's charts also give the crescent, adopting, apparently, the popular idea in the absence of any information on the point in Howard's narrative. Camden, however, or at least his informant, may have meant something different (see *post*, p. 205).

¹ *Discorso sopra l'Ordinanza dell' Armata Catholica*. Rome, Aug. 27, 1588. His chief military work was a translation of the *Tactica* of Leo the Wise. For a full account of him see Hutchinson's edition of his translation of Duarte Lopez's great work on the Kingdoms of the Congo. He had just published (Rome 1586) a work on the *History and Use of the Compass*.

² He avoids the use of the word 'squadrons,' and says it was divided into four 'stuoli ovvero esserciti, ò schiere ò pure armate che si chiamino (*sic*) compartiti.'

second rank consisted of the four galleasses with their *capitana* second from the right, and the third rank of four of the Portuguese galleons with the 'San Martin,' Sidonia's *capitana*, also second from the right. Between the ranks was an interval of fifty paces, and between the vessels room for two vessels to be interposed, so that each rank occupied two hundred paces. The advantage of this arrangement, says Pigafetta, was that the front rank could attack alone, with the other two ranks as supports, or the second rank, by moving up into the intervals, could attack abreast with the first, having the third in support, or all three could attack together in line-abreast. Sidonia's position in the third rank was to enable him the better to observe and control the movements of the three divisions in his rear. Half a mile astern of the vanguard was the main-battle forming the second division. It consisted of thirty vessels in three ranks. In the first were eighteen sail with room for two, between them occupying a front of 1002 paces, or just over a mile. In the centre was the Portuguese galleon 'San Mateo,' on the right the *capitana* of Bertendona, admiral of the Levanters, and on the left another Portuguese galleon, the 'San Luis.' In the second rank, immediately in rear of the 'San Mateo,' were Medrano's four galleys, and in the third 'eight great galleons under Don Pedro de Valdes,' which presumably were the galleons of the Indian Guard. In rear of all was a support of twenty armed caravels. On each side of the main-battle, and at an interval of three hundred paces from it, came the other two divisions forming the wings or horns, each in two subdivisions with their proper supports. The first subdivision was composed of fifteen ships and galleons, forty paces apart as before to allow for two vessels interposing, the flagship being on the exterior flank. The front they covered was 1,068 paces. A hundred paces in rear of its centre were its supports in three ranks, in the first seven pinnaces twenty paces apart, in the second six urcas, and in the third four pinnaces. At an interval of another hundred paces came



○ Galleons and other sailing vessels.

✱ Galleasses and galleys.

• Other oared vessels.

VANGUARDLEFT WINGFirst Division

15 Great-Ships and Galleons

7 Pataches

6 Urcas

4 Zabras

Second Division

13 Great-Ships and Galleons

5 Zabras

4 Levanters
4 Galleasses
4 Portuguese Galleons

MAIN BATTLE

18 Ships and Galleons

4 Galleys

8 Great Galleons

20 Caravels

RIGHT WINGFirst Division

15 Great-Ships and Galleons

7 Pataches and Zabras

6 Urcas

4 Pataches

Second Division

13 Great-Ships and Galleons

5 Zabras

ORIGINAL 'EAGLE' FORMATION DESIGNED FOR THE ARMADA AS DESCRIBED
BY PIGAFETTA

the second subdivision, consisting of thirteen sail, with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany's galleon in the centre as flagship. Its supports were five pinnaces a hundred paces astern. Unlike the vanguard and main-battle these two wings did not sail in line-abreast, but in a kind of bow and quarter line—that is, the vessels were in echelon with the seaward flagship leading, the bows of each vessel being abreast of the main-mast of the one next it to seaward.¹

Thus, says Pigafetta, the formation was not that of a crescent, as was vulgarly supposed, but the famous 'eagle' formation which we have seen Barbarossa adopting before his great victory over the Holy League. The vanguard was the head, the screen of pinnaces when called in would form the neck, the main-battle was the body, its supports the tail, and the two flank divisions the wings. The idea of a crescent formation he covers with ridicule. Ships, he says, even with oars, cannot sail in a bent or curved formation. The 'ordinanza diritta,' or order based on right lines, is the only one possible, and anything like a crescent he contemptuously dismisses as a mere fantastic and impracticable imagination of landmen. The 'eagle' formation, on the other hand, he regards as so scientific as to enable a fleet adopting it to beat a superior enemy, as Themistocles beat the Persians. Apart from its elasticity, its great advantage, he considered, was that its wide front, covering from flank to flank no less than four miles, made it almost impossible for an enemy to out-manœuvre it so as to attack in rear or in flank, while the powerful vanguard was evidently designed as a development of the idea that had proved so successful at Lepanto, where the galleasses thrown forward like outposts broke up the enemy's attack formation before the action really began. Of the snakelike mobility of a fleet formed line-ahead neither Pigafetta nor any of his school had yet dreamed.

¹ Pigafetta explains it was the formation called by Herodotus ἐπὶ κέρας, and by Polybius κατὰ μίαν ραῦν.

At the time this elaborate order was drawn up, Pigafetta explains that the Spaniards' intelligence led them to believe that the English fleet in three divisions intended to take up a position amongst the Channel Islands, and there await the Armada's attack. Subsequent information, as we have seen, led them to expect from their enemy a disposition entirely different, and it is probable that it was this later intelligence that led to an entire remodelling of Pigafetta's formation.

The plan already referred to, which Sidonia had communicated to Philip from Lisbon as the one that had been finally adopted in view of the strategy that was anticipated from the English, was something quite different.¹ The old threefold division of vanguard, main-battle, and rearguard was retained; but tactically the fleet was really in two divisions only. The base idea of the formation was that the Armada should constitute two quasi-independent fleets, one to act to the rear against Drake, the other to the front against Howard's advance from the east. The leading division was to be composed of the main-battle, the rear division of the vanguard and rearguard, each still retaining its individuality. 'Our fleet,' says a Spanish eye-witness, 'was divided into three bodies.'² Assuming therefore that this was the formation actually taken, with the main-battle leading and the two wings with an interval between them echeloned in bow and quarter line on each flank of the main-battle, we get something which in the distance may well have appeared like a crescent, but which at the same time was a radically different thing from the curved line-a-breast which was what was the current idea of a crescent formation. The mere fact then that landsmen, who were not eye-witnesses and not Spaniards, described the fleet as being thus marshalled is really no evidence that Sidonia's original and elaborate plan was not adopted. And seeing what Sidonia's position was, it becomes almost certain that his battle order was in fact the one he communicated

¹ Duro, ii. p. 102.

² *Ibid.* ii. 255.

to Philip. What he saw when day broke was one fleet threatening his rear, and to his left front apparently the advance-guard of another coming out of Plymouth. It must have seemed to him that the very situation which Philip had anticipated was being developed. That Howard and Drake were both in his rear he had no evidence but the word of some captured fishermen, and in any case when his last orders had been issued it was believed that Drake alone was in Plymouth. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the order of battle he must have adopted was the one devised for the special contingency of being caught between two fleets. And when we see how such a formation alone will reconcile the apparently contradictory accounts of various eye-witnesses, we approach something like certainty.

The details of the dual formation are not quite clear. The composition of the two main divisions is especially difficult to determine. From many indications it seems they were based on groups of the territorial squadrons, but from Pigafetta's account it would appear they were considerably broken up so as to get vessels of all classes in each squadron. On the morning of the Portland action an intelligence agent of Walsingham's, who had recently escaped from Spain and was present with Drake in the 'Revenge,' reported that they were 'divided, as I do see, twelve in a squadron and do keep such excellent order in the fight, that if God do not miraculously work, we shall have wherein to employ ourselves for some days.'¹ Recalde, to whom as Vice-Admiral of the Armada, the 'San Juan,' the second of the great Portuguese galleons, was assigned for a flagship, commanded the rearguard or port wing of the rear or second division. Pedro de Valdes says that he and Recalde sailed in it with the shipping under their charge; so that

¹ Laughton, i. 301. The obscure passage in the letter to which the editor calls attention was apparently meant to read 'they (i.e. their ships) are not in such good order as their putting themselves in battle,' meaning 'their formation is better than the condition of their ships.'

it probably consisted mainly of the Biscayan and Andalusian squadrons of merchantmen which they respectively commanded. The vanguard or starboard wing was commanded by Leyva, who flew his flag on the 'Rata,' one of the Levantine transports, and there are indications that Oquendo, who commanded the Guipuscoan squadrons also formed part of it.¹ To each wing of this rear division Sidonia says he assigned supports, meaning details from the light squadrons, whose duties, as De Chaves had laid them down, were to assist hard pressed vessels, rescue drowning men, and to attempt under cover of the smoke to scuttle the enemy's vessels or disable their rudders.² Further each division was strengthened with one galleasse, as at Lepanto, to act with the four flagships.³ That the rear-fleet should be thus formed of the auxiliary squadrons stiffened with a few regular ships is at least what we should expect. For, as we have seen, it was designed to deal with Drake, and Drake's fleet was known in Spain to be similarly constituted.⁴ That the main force of the galleons should be reserved to oppose Howard with the queen's galleons is equally natural. Further, we know that Sidonia and Diego de Valdes, who commanded the two galleon squadrons, sailed in the same ship, the 'San Martin,' the Portuguese *capitana*, which is in itself evidence that the two squadrons were acting together in one division. Like the rear-division, Sidonia's had its proper light supports, and the remaining two galleasses were told off to stand by the flagship.⁵ To him, too, was attached the whole of the pinnace squadron which had not been detailed to attend other admirals.⁶

¹ E.g., his alferéz or ensign was killed by a cannon shot the first day, so that he must have been engaged. In the Portland and Isle of Wight actions he is always mentioned with the rearguard ships.


² See *ante*, vol. i. p. 42. Their duties were thus akin to those assigned to torpedo-boats in a battle by modern tacticians.

³ Sidonia is not quite clear on this point. His words are: 'Con cualquiera de los cuernos della, con el socorro que allí pongo y dos de las galeazas, que van cubiertas con los cuatro navíos primeros,' which seems from what follows to mean they sailed 'as covering ships with the four flagships.'

⁴ 'Noticias de Inglaterra.' Duro, i. Doc. 86.

⁵ Duro, ii. 108.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 26.



On these indications, then, allowing for certain vessels being detached for the purpose of equalising the several divisions from their proper squadrons, we get something like the formation shown above.

Where so much is mere inference from scattered hints of course no high degree of certainty can be obtained ; but the above scheme is at no point at variance with any direct statement that has come down to us. It has the special advantage, too, of making Camden's account reconcilable with the Spanish official orders. His expression is not that the whole Armada was in the form of a crescent, but that it was 'in front like a half-moon.' Assuming the formation was as shown above, this would be a most natural description for his informant to have given. The front which the English attacked—that is, the front of the rear-division, which had been designed to

meet Drake's anticipated attack from the westward — would have had the appearance of a half-moon, and thus Camden's only mistake may have been that he thought his informant was speaking of the evening of the 20th when the Armada was first seen when really he meant the morning of the 21st when it was first attacked. Further than this the suggested explanation seems to be the only one which makes the subsequent operations intelligible.¹

The formation which the English adopted for their new method of fighting has long remained in complete obscurity. Nowhere is it stated by any contemporary authority; and this has led to a general belief that there was practically none at all, and certainly nothing like the close-hauled line of battle that was to become the keynote of the new sailing tactics. The highest modern authority, in attributing the appearance of the close-hauled line-ahead to the year 1665, comments 'on the instructive fact that so long a time elapsed between the appearance of the large sailing ship with its broadside battery and the systematic adoption of the order which was best adapted to develop the full power of the fleet for mutual support.' 'To us,' he adds, 'having the elements of the problem in our hands, together with the result finally achieved, that result seems simple enough, almost self-evident. Why did it take so long for the capable men of that day to reach it?'² The truth is that it was reached immediately. No sooner was the revolution complete which ejected the ship of free-movement from the fighting line than the new formation appears, and that this was so is no fanciful inference from the scattered hints which Drake and his school have left us. Sir Walter Raleigh actually lays down the new order as the proper formation for a fleet in action. In the general orders he issued at Ply-

¹ The undated order of battle inserted in his collection by Captain Duro (ii. 33) cannot refer to the Armada. It contains names of vessels which never formed part of it, and omits many important ones that did do so. It may have been drawn up for the Terceira expedition.

² Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, p. 115.

mouth in 1617 he says : ' The whole fleet shall follow the Admiral, Vice-Admiral, or other leading ships within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much liberty to the leading ship after her broadside discovered as she may stay and trim her sails ; then is the second ship to give her side and the third and fourth, which done they shall all tack ¹ as the first ship, and giving the enemy the other side shall keep him under a perpetual volley : thus must you do to the windermost (weathermost) ship of the enemy, which you shall batter in pieces or force her to bear up and entangle the rest, falling foul one of another to their great confusion.' Although the tactics here enjoined are far different from the attack line-ahead as it was afterwards developed against an enemy similarly formed, yet we distinctly have in them a close-hauled line of ships attacking in succession, and this only thirty years after the Armada campaign. Since that time no great naval action had been fought, on which Raleigh could have founded his instructions. For the deadly effects of concentrating an attack upon the weathermost ships of an enemy, who still clung to the old galley-formations, his precedent was certainly Drake's tactics against the Armada. It is therefore but natural to expect in the same operations the precedent for his order of battle ; and a careful examination of the English movements can leave no doubt this was certainly the case.

When at daybreak on the 21st the English fleet was first discovered, it is distinctly stated by two Spanish eye-witnesses to have been disposed '*en ala* in very fine order.'² In Spanish naval parlance, as we have seen,


¹ Raleigh writes 'take,' just as 'hackbut' was sometimes written 'hake-but,' and 'lack' lake,' e.g. in *S.P. Dom.* cciii. 79. Gorges in giving these orders as a typical form in his treatise entitled 'Observations and overtures for a sea fight,' &c. 1618, writes 'tack' (*Stowe MSS.* 426). The whole of his remarks are expressly founded on the experience of the Armada campaign.

² Calderon says it was '*puesta in ala con mui buena orden.*' The *Relacion* (Duro, ii. 154) says it was seen '*por la parte de la mar con el viento en su favor y hasta 60 navios en ala.*' Spanish dictionaries of the last century give '*en ala*' as synonymous with '*en fila*,' and translate the phrase

this expression was the opposite of a formation in squadrons and meant that a fleet was formed in one single line.¹ That it was a close-hauled line-ahead is clear from the movements that ensued. Howard was to seaward of the Armada with the weather-gauge and the wind at W.N.W. Sidonia with the van-division at once led off with a well conceived move inshore, standing close-hauled for Plymouth, as though threatening to enter the port, says Calderon, but possibly really with the design of cutting off the squadron that had just come out, since about this time

'en fila o ala' as 'in a file, in a line.' (See especially Conelly and Higgins, Madrid, 1798.) This is the old military signification of 'line.' Before battle formations in line were invented it meant line or column of march, as opposed to the *squadron* or *battaglia*, the received battle formation. It was not till the end of the seventeenth century that the new French word 'column' began to supplant 'line' in technical military phraseology. (See Earl of Orrery, *Art of War*, 1677.) In Spanish military documents of the sixteenth century *fila* as a formation is always opposed to *escadron* or square. At this time it must be remembered 'squadron' did not only mean a mere division or part of a fleet or army, but still retained its old sense of a division of ships or a body of troops drawn up in deep battle order. We have seen Pigafetta scrupulously avoiding the use of the word to express a division of a fleet in battle order. Careful as he is in employing technical terms accurately, he uses 'fila,' 'riga,' and 'ordine' indiscriminately for line-abreast, as though 'line-ahead' was an idea he had never conceived. Since the above was written Mr. Oppenheim has called my attention to a third description by an eyewitness of the English attack formation, which goes far to confirm my interpretation of the other two. It exists in the form of a bald contemporary translation of a letter written by one Pedro Estrada who was a paid officer in the Armada (Lord Calthorpe's MSS. vol. 162). In describing the English attack off Plymouth he says: 'The English did prolong lying close by the wind of us.' From similar jingling renderings in the document we may be sure the Spanish word used was *prolongar*. In the eighteenth century the nautical meaning of this was to 'range along a coast' or 'to come along side.' The earliest instance of this meaning which Jal could discover was in the French Memoirs of Duguay-Trouin 1694. (*Glossaire Nautique, sub voce*.) In the sixteenth century the Spanish technical term for 'coasting along' was *ir costeando* and for 'coming along side' *abordar*. *Prolongar* then meant 'to stretch out' or 'to delay.' It was also the geometrical term for 'producing a line.' 'To delay' in the present passage will hardly make sense, unless he meant that the English spun out the action by refusing to come to close quarters. The only other interpretation possible is that the 'English stretched themselves out in a line close hauled.' In the absence of the Spanish original however no degree of certainty can be reached.

¹ *Ante*, i. p. 45.



ADAMS'S CHART No. 3.

Showing, to the left, the English attack on the point of the Spanish weather-vane off Plymouth, July 21; the frustration of the attempt by the Spanish centre to relieve Recalde; and the rear of the English fleet bearing up in regular order to support the van attack. To the right is shown the chase after the engagement, and Drake's change of course on the night of July 21-22.

it showed its real character by going about and making for the main body. The manœuvre may further have been designed as an attempt to recover the weather-gauge, since the wind in veering W.N.W. had thrown the English too far to seaward.¹ Their progress, however, formed as they were in close order of battle and hampered by the ill-sailing hulks, must have been very slow, and they were completely out-sailed. Coming up in very fine order the English passed their vanguard, which formed the starboard and leeward wing of the rear division, firing upon it at long range as they went, and fell upon the rearguard, a manœuvre they can only have executed close-hauled in line-ahead.² No better movement could have been devised. As this was the weathermost part of the Spanish formation, to relieve it was extremely difficult.

The effect was immediate. The Spanish inshore and windward movement was headed off, and a number of the rearguard captains began crowding in a disgraceful panic upon Sidonia's division before the astounding rapidity of the English fire.³ To check the rout Recalde, like the stout old seaman he was, came up into the wind with more valour than discretion and held his ground. None but the great 'Grangrin,' *almiranta* of his own squadron, followed his lead, and in a moment he was cut off and surrounded. Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and several other vessels were there pouring into him at musket-shot a murderous fire such as never before had been seen at sea.

¹ All the Spanish writers attribute their loss of the weather-gauge to the change of wind; but if, as they also all agree, the English were to seaward of them, a shift of wind to the northward was rather in their favour. Had it remained at S.W. and W.S.W. the Spaniards would have been dead to leeward.

² *Diario*, &c., Duro, ii. 230. 'El Armada del enemigo pasó coñeando nuestra vanguardia . . . que fué á dar en [i.e. 'in order to attack'] la retaguardia.' Cf. Captain Vanegas, *Relacion*, *ibid.* p. 376.

³ Froude thought the charge of cowardice made by Vanegas (Duro, ii. 378) was directed against Sidonia himself, but from Calderon it is clear it was meant for the captains who deserted Recalde and fled for the shelter of Sidonia's galleons. Vanegas praises Sidonia, and says he did all he could to assist Recalde (*ibid.* p. 377).

On him for two hours fell the brunt of the whole action. Pedro de Valdes was also engaged, but he admits it was at long range. The English, indeed, just as Raleigh enjoins his captains to do, seem to have confined themselves to the ship they had cut off, and not to have pressed home the attack on the broken squadron. Apparently at this time their idea was mainly to prevent the enemy entering Plymouth and to pluck his feathers until the remainder of the fleet, which was still victualling in the harbour, could join them. Seeing the desperate position of his vice-admiral, Sidonia, whose inshore move had probably brought him more a-weather than the rest, hauled to the wind to stand by him and rally the panic-stricken rearguard. Another galleon from the leading division, the 'San Mateo,' also made a bold attempt to beat up to Recalde's rescue, but by this time the detached English squadron had worked to windward and joined the rest; and now, passing by the fight that raged round the 'San Juan,' it fell upon the 'San Mateo.' As Sidonia came into action he was engaged by two of the queen's galleons and another ship, and indeed everywhere we see unmistakable signs of the tactics of Raleigh's orders, the germ of those to which the English Navy was to owe so many victories. The whole force of the attack was brought to bear on a small part of the Spanish fleet which could not be relieved by the rest, and as the leading ships toiled slowly to the rescue, they too were met with an overwhelming fire. It was not until Recalde had stubbornly born his punishment for two hours and had his vessel completely disabled, that Sidonia succeeded in getting up a sufficient force to relieve him.

Then as the rallied rearguard and the bulk of the main-battle came into range, Howard flew from his yard-arm the signal to discontinue the engagement. In this he was perhaps well advised. It must be remembered that as yet he had with him little more than two-thirds of his fleet, and though the Mayor of Plymouth was sending off fresh hands as fast as they could be got together, the gaps in his crews had not been filled up, and he was possibly right

not to risk a general action. Still there is little doubt he was sufficiently impressed by the formidable appearance of the Spanish vessels, and might perhaps have held on to Recalde a little longer. 'We durst not adventure to put in among them,' he wrote, 'their fleet being so strong.' Drake, in writing to Seymour, dismissed the action contemptuously. 'The twenty-first,' he wrote, 'we had them in chase and so coming up with them, there hath passed some cannon shot between some of our fleet and some of them, and as far as we perceive they are determined to sell their lives with blows.'¹

For a while the English lay-to about half a league to windward, satisfied apparently that the Armada was falling to leeward of Plymouth and with watching Sidonia's efforts to recover the wind. Suddenly, however, there was a loud explosion in the Spanish ranks and a vessel was seen to have blown up. It was the 'San Salvador,' the largest of the Guipuscoan squadron, carrying the Paymaster-General of the Armada and his chests.² The two upper decks of her poop were destroyed and her stern blown out, and she was seen to drop out of the fleet in flames.³ The opportunity was seized immediately. Howard signalled for the fleet to make sail and stood away for the shattered vessel, and once more, in order to save the burning wreck from complete destruction, Sidonia had to bear down to meet the threatened attack. A fresh engagement seemed imminent, and Recalde,

¹ Hawkins's report to Walsingham ten days later is equally laconic. 'We met with the fleet,' he wrote on the 31st, 'somewhat to the westward of Plymouth upon Sunday in the morning, being the 21st of July, where we had some small fight with them in the afternoon.' He thus seems to ignore the main attack on the rearguard, which all the Spanish authorities agree took place in the morning, and to mention only the second undeveloped attack which took place in the afternoon. The probable explanation is that it was he who brought out the belated ships, and possibly did not get the 'Victory' into close action till the afternoon.

² Some Spanish authorities call it Oquendo's *almiranta* or vice-flagship, but in the official lists another vessel, the 'N.S. de la Rosa,' holds this place.

³ Ubaldino relates that the explosion was caused by a Flemish gunner in revenge for an injustice done him by a Spanish captain of soldiers.

incapable of defending himself, had to call for assistance. But these unprepared manœuvres seem to have thrown Sidonia's formal ranks into some confusion. The wind, too, was increasing and the sea getting up, and in trying to work to the vice-admiral's assistance Pedro de Valdes came twice into collision with some hulks and was reduced almost to a wreck himself. Still, so finely did the rest of the squadrons take up their positions, that Howard again signalled to retire, and leaving the Spaniards to extinguish the burning vessel undisturbed lay-to in his former position.¹

So the first day's operations ended. More perhaps might have been done; but Plymouth had been saved and the enemy forced to leeward. Some, no doubt, were dissatisfied. 'The majesty of the enemy's fleet,' wrote one who was present, 'the good order they held and the private consideration of our own wants did cause, in mine opinion, our first onset to be more coldly done than became the valour² of our nation and the credit of the English navy, yet we put them to leeward, kept the weather of them and distressed two of their best ships.'³ These words may serve admirably as a summary of the whole affair, and considering how complete was the surprise and how unprepared the English fleet, the admirals might congratulate themselves on a good day's work. On the other hand Sidonia too might be well satisfied. His instructions were not to fight until he reached the Downs, unless he were attacked. His main objective was to join hands with Parma off Dunkirk. To prevent this junction the enemy's efforts were directed: but in spite of their terrible fire and bewildering tactics he had beaten them off, saved both his mangled ships, and was free to continue his way.

¹ 'Torno a amainar y pusose de mar en traves' (Vanegas, Duro, ii. 378). Literally 'Set themselves again to take in sail and placed themselves with the sea a-beam.' '*Mar en traves* se dize quando in algun temporale se amaynan las velas y se dexan estar hasta passar el tiempo.' *Instrucion Nautica* by Dr. Diego Garcia de Palacio. Mexico, 1587.

² Or 'value.'

³ 'Whyte to Walsingham,' Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 63.

CHAPTER VII

PORTLAND AND THE ISLE OF WIGHT

For a time the two fleets lay-to in sight of each other, some two leagues off Plymouth, while Sidonia endeavoured to succour his injured ships and Howard summoned his council-of-war.¹ Recalde and the 'San Salvador' were soon in a condition with assistance to proceed, and the Armada made sail. But as the wind and sea continued to increase Valdes's foremast went by the board and fell foul of his mainmast. He made signals of distress, and Sidonia, finding it impossible to stop the whole fleet, which was now streaming away up Channel, detached a galleasse and two or three galleons with orders if possible to take him in tow or else to receive him and his crew and abandon his ship.²

Meanwhile on board the English flagship the council-of-war was considering the next move. The problem of the Armada's destination was now considerably simplified. Clearly neither Scotland, Ireland, nor any western port was its objective. There remained only the south-east coast or the Isle of Wight. For some time past the most sagacious observers had inclined to believe that it was upon the Wight the first blow would be directed.³ They had the precedent of the last great attempt at

¹ 'Sidonia to Parma,' July 31; Froude's *Transcripts*.

² Valdes told the king he was deserted purposely by Sidonia without any attempt to save him, but the 'Petition of the Captain, Master and Lieutenant of the "Margaret and John"' confirms the statement that at any rate a galleon and a galleasse did stand by him (Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 106).

³ 'Reasons why the Spaniards should attempt the Isle of Wight.' *Ibid.* i. 190.

invasion in Henry's time to support them, and it was the last point where any large fleet coming up Channel could find a harbour of refuge. For every naval expert it was a strategical axiom that for the success of an expedition against England the acquisition of a harbour and advanced base in the Channel was essential. The Spanish seamen knew it as well as the English. They were fully alive to the radical vice of the plan which the king had forced upon them, and once clear of his influence they were quick to convert Sidonia as Drake had converted Howard. They convinced him that to attempt a junction with Parma without first securing a harbour of refuge was to ignore the essential limitations of naval warfare and they urged him to modify the royal plan of campaign. Recalde, who clearly saw the impossibility of getting the complete command of the sea from a maritime power like England, went so far as to advise seizing a port as far west as possible, and to form there a naval station, whence they might cover the necessary flow of support from the base in Spain. It was the plan which had the sanction of Menendez's great name, and Recalde when assisting him in 1574 must have been convinced that it was the only one to follow. His proposal, however, was probably regarded as too violent a departure from the king's instructions, and eventually as a compromise it was decided to proceed direct to the Isle of Wight, and there stand fast till concerted action with Parma could be accurately adjusted.¹

For the moment, then, the Isle of Wight occupied the chief attention of both sides. The business of the English was clearly to engage the enemy with their

¹ 'Sidonia to the King,' Duro, ii. 221. 'Recalde to the same, *ibid.* p. 169. This was the day before the battle of Plymouth. Immediately after it Sidonia wrote to Parma saying the English tactics seemed to be designed to delay his voyage, but that he meant to continue his way without turning aside for anything 'until I have news from your excellency what is to be done and where we are to join' ('Sidonia to Parma,' July 31, Froude's *Transcripts*). Although he does not tell Parma of his intention not to pass the Isle of Wight, there is nothing in his letter to show he had changed his mind.

whole force at the earliest possible moment. On board the 'Ark,' therefore, it was decided to give chase so soon as ever the whole fleet was together. To every captain were given detailed instructions as to his station and course, and to Drake was assigned the honourable duty of leading the fleet through the night. By midnight Howard was able to give the signal to make sail.¹

For awhile all went well. The 'Revenge's' great poop-lantern burned brightly ahead and every vessel could follow it: but presently the look-out men were bewildered by an incident for which Drake has been severely blamed. In the dead of the night, as every eye was strained upon the 'Revenge's' light, it suddenly disappeared. Some captains very properly hove-to, others shortened sail, but Howard, with the 'Bear' and the 'Mary Rose' in company, held on; and as with the close of the short summer night the Armada could soon be made out he continued the chase with more zeal than judgment.² The fleet was thus thrown into some confusion, since many of the captains were at a loss to know whether to follow Howard, or obey their last orders and wait for Drake's lead. When the sun rose the 'Revenge' was nowhere to be seen. Off Berry Head, barely a cannon shot to leeward of the admiral, was the whole Armada, and far away to windward were the leading ships of his own fleet hull down. What had happened no one knew. As the morning wore on the fleet began to close up on the 'Ark.' A ship of London came in and reported that from nine o'clock the previous night to midnight, when the admiral gave the signal to chase, she had stood by Pedro de Valdes's ship and that it was a

¹ 'Petition of the officers of the "Margaret and John,"' Laughton, ii. 107.

² Some authorities have said that by Drake's default Howard mistook the Armada's lights for Drake's. If so his look-out must have been very bad. He certainly does not say so himself. Ubaldino, on Howard's authority apparently, for it is in his first narrative, says he followed '*ajutato non dimeno dalla chiarezza dell'aria la quale in quel tempo dell'anno grande suole essere in Inghilterra per tutte.*' Ubaldino is probably right. The sun rose about four, dawn would be about three, and the previous night the moon rose (Froude says) about two. It was certainly light enough for Drake to make out the German hulks that led him astray.

helpless wreck. As the captain was urging the admiral to let him return and take possession, a pinnace came alongside and reported that Drake, regardless of his duty, had stood by the disabled ship all night and captured it in the morning with all its guns and treasure.¹ To many such a piece of conduct was inexcusable. It seemed the act of an incorrigible pirate. The enemy were fast nearing their goal, every hour was of importance, and from sheer greed of plunder the great vice-admiral had sacrificed the chance of dealing them a deadly blow for almost a day.

Though Howard himself nowhere makes directly any such accusation, it was certainly widely believed. From many of the English vessels Valdes's disaster had been seen, and Drake's enemies believed he had deliberately doubled back behind the fleet to capture the prize for himself. Frobisher, according to one of Drake's men, was particularly incensed, and vowed he would have his share of the spoil or make the coward spend the best blood in his belly.² Drake's action certainly needs some defence. His own explanation was as follows. According to the 'Revenge's' crew, no one on board had seen that Don Pedro was in difficulty. Without any thought of prize they had stood on as leading ship, till in the growing light they descried three or four strange sail stealing past them to seaward: whereupon Drake put out his light and tacked towards the strangers to ascertain what they were. 'The vice-admiral,' says Ubaldino, 'was moved to this action, it may be believed, by a certain watchful zeal and soldierlike suspicion bred in his mind by a sure and very reasonable inference from the relevant circumstances, and gave them chase thinking they were enemies.' Having overhauled them and ascertained that they were merely some German merchantmen and not as he doubted a squadron of the enemy trying to weather him, he let them pass and was proceeding to resume his station,

¹ 'Margaret and John' petition, *ubi supra*.

² Starke's deposition, Laughton, ii. 102.

when in company with the 'Roebuck,' a ship of Raleigh's attached to his own squadron, and one or two pinnaces that had conformed to his movement, he fell in with Don Pedro's disabled vessel. A pinnace was at once sent to summon the Spaniard to surrender. He refused and demanded conditions. For answer, says Ubaldino, he could get nothing but the words of a free lance. Drake told him, in short, he had no time to parley and that he must instantly surrender at discretion or fight. As the code of warlike honour then went, for the proudest Don that ever sailed it was rather a distinction than a disgrace to yield to the most renowned captain of his time, and Don Pedro struck without more ado. With forty of his officers and all his treasure he was brought prisoner on board the 'Revenge,' where, as Speed tells his story, first giving his captor the *congé*, he protested that he and all his had been resolved to die in their defence, had they not fallen into Drake's power, 'whose valour and felicity was so great that Mars and Neptune seemed to attend him in his attempts, and whose generous mind towards the vanquished had often been experienced, even of his greatest foes.' Whereupon Sir Francis, 'requiting his Spanish compliments with honourable English courtesies, placed him at his own table and lodged him in his own cabin.' Then, ordering the 'Roebuck' to escort the prize into Torbay, he set sail to rejoin the Lord Admiral's flag.¹

That Drake's story was generally accepted there can be little doubt.² Indeed that a man of his wealth and position at the zenith of his ambition would turn aside at such a moment from the heels of his life-long enemy for the chance of plunder and ransom is quite incredible. Inadequate as his own explanation may seem to us, it was probably not so to his contemporaries. There is

¹ Speed's account is confirmed by Ubaldino, who in his second commentary inserted a long description of Valdes's surrender and of Drake's magnanimous treatment of his distinguished prisoner.

² 'The German hulks' are accepted by Howard in his 'Relation' and by Camden. In Howard's original 'Brief Abstract' he does not even mention the incident.

reason to believe that he was only following the established practice of the time, and that this is the explanation of his having been acquitted of blame for his strange conduct. In 1596 Sir Thomas Baskerville, having beaten off a superior Spanish squadron that was endeavouring to intercept his retreat from the West Indies, found himself followed at night by a part of it, and the author of the narrative, which had Baskerville's official sanction, notes as specially praiseworthy that although the enemy were abeam and to windward he kept his cresset light burning all night. In this case the enemy was known to be inferior, but the inference from the narrative is that Baskerville was nevertheless taking a very bold course out of tenderness for his smaller vessels, and that had he thought it necessary he would have been justified in extinguishing his light.¹ Drake's position, it must be remembered, was not so simple. If what he saw were really an attempt of the enemy to weather him he was clearly wrong to go on. Yet to go about with his light burning, and so compel the whole fleet to tack, was a serious responsibility to take unless he was quite sure of the necessity. We have seen how even the Spaniards with their strict order dreaded a change of course at night, and such a move on Drake's part, with scores of undisciplined merchantmen at his heels, would certainly have thrown the whole fleet into confusion and risked wholesale collisions.² It is conceivable, therefore, that he considered his best course out of the dilemma was to act on what was the ordinary practice of the service when an enemy was discovered within gunshot at night. Some confusion he must have known would ensue, which, as Ubaldino says, might have proved serious if they had had to

¹ Captain Savile, *A Label of Spanish Lies* in Hakluyt.

² It is a remarkable fact that no general orders, such as were generally issued in view of such contingencies, exist for this fleet. It is difficult to believe that none were issued, and almost as difficult to believe that if they had been they would not have been preserved. The absence of such orders would quite explain Drake's difficulty, but at the same time would convict him and Howard of a grave omission.

do with an enemy more at home in those seas. But on this Drake was entitled to count, and further he was not to know that the confusion would be increased as it was by the Lord Admiral's failure to carry out his own orders. The trouble was mainly caused, as Howard himself admits, by the captains not knowing whom to follow. If therefore he had hove-to instead of trying to take the lead out of Drake's hands the fleet at least would have been kept together. If blame lies anywhere it must then be shared by Howard for allowing the ardour of the chase to get the better of his judgment. At the same time, although it is difficult to see how Drake could have acted otherwise for the better, yet it is impossible to acquit him of having failed to deal adequately with the situation.

Still, after all, it must be put to his credit that nothing but good came of his action. The day was far from wasted. To the spirits of the English, damped as they certainly were by the formidable front which the despised Spanish seamen had opposed to their first attack, the capture of Valdes's flagship was welcomed rapturously as a presage of what was to come. Ubaldino could even regard it as a special manifestation of God's providence, that Drake had been led astray as he was, and so brought to the splendid prize, which otherwise must have escaped to some French port. Nor did Howard's zeal in pursuing have a less happy result. As he lay waiting for his straggling fleet to close up, the shattered 'San Salvador' made signals of distress. She was pronounced to be sinking, and Sidonia decided to clear and scuttle her. When everything that was not already under water had been taken out of her, she was allowed to fall away, but so soon as the feluccas that had been detailed to sink her approached they were met and driven off by some English vessels. Whereupon Lord Charles Howard and Hawkins were ordered to take possession, and finally she was carried into Weymouth.

On the other hand Sidonia too made the best use of the respite. Recalde's ship was found to have been so

roughly handled that he was quite unable to resume his station until he had repaired damages. Leyva was therefore ordered to form the two rear wings into one rear division and take command of it, but the original order of battle was not changed. Though Howard and Drake were now known to be together, Seymour was still unaccounted for. Sidonia therefore retained the main-battle as a leading and front division, contenting himself with reinforcing the rear with one or two more galleons. Its strength was thus brought up to forty-three of the best ships in the Armada, which was thought to be enough to enable Leyva to face the enemy and hinder them from checking the advance.¹

Thus reorganised the Armada continued its advance and all day Howard kept on in touch. It was thus not till evening that the English fleet could get together again and by that time the wind had fallen to a calm, so that it was impossible for them to take their proper stations, and they were spread in disorder. As night fell both fleets lay motionless between Portland and St. Alban's Head, little more than a cannon-shot apart. When the moon rose bright and clear and lit up the scene, a group of English ships was seen to be lying apart from the rest of their fleet. To assist them was impossible. Now if ever was the hour for the galleasses, and Leyva, Oquendo, and Recalde hurried off to the admiral to urge him to order them to attack. At last they saw a chance of forcing on a close action: for from whatever quarter the morning breeze should come, it would be impossible, they thought, for the English ships to rescue the detached group without laying themselves open to being boarded. The advice was excellent, but unfortunately a few hours before Don Hugo de Moncada, who commanded the galleasses, had made a formal request to Sidonia to be allowed to attack the English admiral.² In those days this was the jealously guarded privilege of the commander-in-chief, and Sidonia refused permission. Now Don Hugo was a Catalan knight of

¹ *Diario*, Duro, ii. 232.

² Meteren in Hakluyt.

high position ; his father was Viceroy of Cataluña and Valencia, and as captain-general of the Italian galleasses he probably considered himself the most important flag-officer in the fleet. To ask such a man, still smarting under a rebuff, to act as a mere stalking horse for the galleons was a very delicate matter. So great, however, was the importance which the admirals attached to the projected move, that Oquendo undertook in person to carry the order to the offended officer with authority from Sidonia to promise him an estate of three thousand ducats a year if he did well. But the dignity of the knight of Santiago was not to be so easily smoothed, and when morning broke his squadron was seen away inshore more than half a league from either fleet. He had apparently made no attempt to carry out his orders, and now with daylight a breeze began to blow up out of the north-east and the chance was gone. Still fortune had not entirely deserted the Spaniards. With the wind as it was they found themselves suddenly in possession of the weather gauge. Though contrary for the continuance of their voyage, it gave every hope of at last bringing their nimble foe to handy-strokes. Once more the great standard gave the signal for a general engagement, and the English, only too eager for a real trial of strength, did nothing to avoid it.

Of all the engagements of the Armada campaign none is more difficult to unravel than the battle of Portland. Camden himself was at a loss to understand it. 'It was managed with confusion enough,' he says, and so fills the gap with the thunder of the guns. Still, from the English and Spanish variants it is possible to dissect points of contact, through which may be traced the general lines of movement during the long summer day.

About five o'clock in the morning the English led off with a reach inshore towards the north-west, as a first move towards regaining the weather-gauge.¹ Sidonia at once followed suit, and stood away on the same tack with

¹ Lord Howard's narrative is here chiefly followed, checked by the *Diario* and Vanegas's account in *Duro*.

his flagship, the four galleasses taking up the movement in advance of him and the greater part of the Armada at a considerable distance astern. Howard soon saw his inshore move was checked, and thereupon he went about and stood away to the eastward on the opposite tack.¹ The movement brought him close to the Spanish rear division, which possibly he hoped to weather, but Leyva immediately altered his helm and bore up upon him with the greater part of his division. Still Howard boldly held his course, followed closely by Hawkins in the 'Victory,' Sir Robert Southwell in the 'Elizabeth Jonas,' Thomas Fenner in the 'Nonpareil,' and about eight others, the rest of the ships which had followed him easing off a few points and giving the enemy a wider berth. Thus for awhile he was advancing close-hauled across the front of Leyva's division as it came on before the wind roughly in line-abreast with the fastest ships forging ahead. The leading Spaniards seem to have been chiefly Levanters and some of Oquendo's Guipuscoans, no two of them probably a match in gun-power for one of Howard's immediate following, and as the ships neared one another so murderous was the fire he poured in that the Spaniards, as he says, 'were content to fall astern of the "Nonpareil," which was the sternmost ship.' Here once more we have an unmistakable picture of the English admiral leading his consorts in line-ahead. To the Spaniards, who probably did not grasp the meaning of the new tactics, the episode had a totally different complexion from that which Howard gives it. Don Bertendona, they say, admiral of the Levanters, in his flagship the 'Regazona,' a vessel of 1,200 tons with over 300 soldiers on board, made so bold an attempt to board the 'Ark' that in order to escape Howard was forced to give way and run to leeward, followed

¹ If his first board was about N.W. and his second about E. the wind was probably about N.N.E. In the charts it is represented between N.N.E. and N.E.



ADAMS'S CHART No. 5.

Showing, to the left, the English fleet closing up on Howard, July 22. To the right is the first stage of the action off Portland, July 23, showing Howard tacking to seawards, and engaged with Leyva's division. Frobisher is being left to windward, and part of the English fleet is executing a weathering movement independent of Howard's.

by all his consorts.¹ The truth is obvious. Both sides had failed—the English to keep their course to windward, the Spaniards to board; and each tried to make the best of his failure. On the whole the advantage was with the Spaniards. Their ‘falling astern of the “Non-pareil”’ must mean that, as they claimed, their leading ships had cut off Howard and his immediate following from his fleet, and it seems clear he now bore away seawards to rejoin the rest of his ships, followed by the Spanish rearguard in general chase.

So broken was the English fleet that Frobisher in the ‘Triumph,’ with five other vessels, chiefly large London merchantmen, had got himself engaged with some strong Spanish vessels and entirely cut off from the rest of the fleet close to Portland Bill, where he was very awkwardly placed.² It was to this part of the action that Sidonia was directing his attention. When Howard tacked, the Spanish admiral, leaving his rearguard to deal with the new move, had held on his inshore course until he came up with the galleasses, and running alongside Moncada’s flagship addressed to him words which, says Vanegas, ‘were understood to be the reverse of complimentary.’ Where Frobisher lay isolated with his five consorts he pointed out to the galleasse commander an opportunity of retrieving the chance he had lost, and so, in Howard’s words, ‘the galleasses took courage and bare room with them and assaulted them sharply.’ Four galleasses were more than a match for the six English vessels, and by all the fleet Frobisher and his consorts were seen to be in great danger.

¹ Vanegas (Duro, ii. 382) in describing this engagement with the rear division says, ‘al principio de esta escaramuza huyeron once navíos del enemigo, los quales se apartaron de su Armada. Yéndose tambien ella allargándose de la nuestra porque de nuestra parte se hacia fuerza de cerrar con ella.’

² ‘So far to leeward and separated from our fleet’ Howard says, but he cannot mean he was to leeward of the English fleet or there would have been no difficulty in rescuing him. It looks as if Howard had written ‘leeward’ for ‘windward,’ and that the galleasses had cut off the weathermost ships of the English.

Up to this time we hear nothing of Drake or any of his captains except Thomas Fenner in the 'Nonpareil.' Indeed Howard, it must be reluctantly said, seems henceforth deliberately to avoid the mention of his name. There can, however, be little doubt what Drake was doing. After the action had proceeded some time, the wind, says Howard, 'shifted to south-eastwards and so to south-south-west, at what time a troop of her Majesty's ships and sundry merchants assailed the Spanish fleet so sharply to the westward, that they were all forced to give way and bear room'—that is, to fall to leeward. On the Spanish side, Vanegas tells us that 'the enemy's *capitana* with other fifty ships got the wind of us, and that they could well do because of their extreme nimbleness and the great smoke that came from the artillery, and they charged upon the right wing of our Armada.' These two passages seem certainly to refer to the same incident. Throughout the Spanish accounts it is clear they did not know which was Howard's ship, and they call any leading ship vaguely 'a *capitana*.' The flagship, which Vanegas saw lead the turning movement against the right flank, was clearly neither Howard's nor Hawkins's, since we know they were engaged elsewhere. It must therefore have been the 'Revenge.'¹ What very possibly had happened was that when Drake saw Howard give up his inshore move and go about in order to weather the Armada on the opposite tack, he, instead of uselessly continuing his course and tacking in succession, at once tacked independently like Nelson at Saint Vincent. He must have seen that Howard's attempt, bold as it was, could not possibly succeed, and would naturally have kept away on a more southerly course in order to get a better offing before he attempted to pass to windward. In Adam's chart a squadron of English ships led by a flag-officer are actually represented taking such an independent course, and it was possibly in anticipation of such an obvious move that Sidonia's admirals had followed the inshore move so cautiously, seeing how it laid them open

¹ See *post*, p. 226, n.

to being weathered to seawards by the sternmost or starboard ships of the English fleet. The hypothesis gains colour from the fact that as the English fleet stood inshore its starboard division would be in rear, and this is where Drake would naturally have been. Assuming he did take such an independent line it would be quite enough by itself to account for Howard's very remarkable silence, and especially if it proved successful. And this the nameless *capitana* with her fifty consorts certainly was. For after some manœuvres, which were hidden by the dense clouds of smoke that hung upon the sea, we are told she did succeed in weathering the most seaward Spanish ships, and as the wind veered from south-west to south-south-west 'attacked to the westward.' Here it was she compelled them by the fury of her assault to 'bear-room,' and by thus preventing them keeping their advantage as the wind worked round, so completely turned the tables on the Spaniards that they were forced as fast as they could to resume their defensive formation.¹

The effect of this move, which we will assume was Drake's, combined with the rapid veering of the wind into the south-south-west, was to deprive the whole of the Armada of the weather gauge. In isolating Frobisher in one direction, in chasing Howard and his consorts in another with intent to board, and in endeavouring in a third to parry the main English weathering movement, the Armada had been widely scattered, and we gather that it was now running generally towards the north east in order to re-form on the most leewardly ships and to prevent the rescue of the isolated English group. Here Frobisher was still valiantly maintaining his unequal struggle with the galleasses, but by the shift of wind his position was entirely changed. He was now, it is clear, to leeward, and easily to be reached by the bulk of the

¹ In saying that these fifty vessels attacked 'our right wing,' Vanegas almost certainly meant the seaward wing. Throughout they seemed to regard their true front as up Channel, to the eastward, so that their starboard wing was always to the southward and seawards.


English fleet. Howard saw the chance as well as the new danger, and signalling to the half-dozen galleons about him to follow his flag he stood away to the rescue.¹

Perceiving Howard's design, Sidonia bore down 'with sixteen of his best galleons'—that is, probably, with his whole division—to intercept him; but no sooner had the movement begun than it had to be abandoned. Away to windward Drake was seen to have again cut off Recalde in his crippled ship. The English vessels that had attacked from the seaward were circling by him, and one after the other plunging in their broadsides. His predicament was now worse than Frobisher's. The Spanish closing movement was stopped, and all the principal ships of Leyva's division came up into the wind to stand by him. Nor was this all. They were all to leeward of Recalde: to get to his assistance was a matter of time and difficulty; and Sidonia, who was to windward, found it necessary to detach the whole of his own following to the rescue. He himself kept on his course to reinforce the galleasses, and was thus himself isolated between the two parts of his fleet.² Now was Howard's time; and altering his course he made straight for the rival admiral. In honour Sidonia could not give way to the Lord Admiral's flag, and signalling for support he came up into the wind and awaited the attack.³ His punishment was terrible. For not only did Howard and his following rake him through and through as they passed and re-passed: but as soon as the galleons came up to relieve

¹ The galleons with him were the 'Elizabeth Jonas' (Southwell), the 'Galleon Leicester' (George Fenner), the 'Golden Lion' (Thomas Howard), the 'Victory' (John Hawkins), the 'Mary Rose' (Edward Fenton), the 'Dreadnought' (Beeston), and the 'Swallow' (Rich. Hawkins), and 'so they went in order into the fight.' The nameless *capitana*, then, which at this very time was leading the attack that headed off the Spanish right wing was certainly neither the 'Ark' nor the 'Victory,' and was therefore almost certainly the 'Revenge.'

² Doc. 165, Duro, ii. 234.

³ That he expected support seems clear, because after this day he appointed staff-officers in pinnaces to see the ships kept their stations, 'because many of them had kept away without seeking to support the *capitana*.' Duro, ii. 258.



ADAMS'S CHART No. 6.

To the left, the second stage of the Portland action, showing Howard's movement to Prober's relief, and an indication of the decisive attack on the weather-flank of the Spanish van. To the right, the English reorganised in

Recalde, Drake left him and led his motley following on to treat Sidonia in the same way. So as Howard passed on towards Frobisher, Drake took his place, and one by one nearly the whole of the vessels that had attacked with him poured their fire into the helpless flagship. The finest of Sidonia's officers struggled to his assistance, but before they could get up the 'San Martin' was in a desperate plight. The holy standard was ripped in two, her rigging was cut to pieces, and she was making water fast through shot holes. Round their crippled admiral the best of the Spaniards crowded as the last of Drake's following came up, shrouding him with their smoke and taking the broad-sides of the English as they passed, 'at which assault,' says Howard, 'after wonderful sharp conflict the Spaniards were forced to give way and to flock together like sheep.'¹ Vanegas admits a loss in this one conflict of fifty killed and sixty wounded, and when the last of the English vessels had passed, Sidonia fired a gun to gather his Armada about him and cover the crippled ships. Howard, the Spaniards say, did the same. The galleasses as he approached had disengaged and made off, and so short were his ships of powder and shot after the long engagement that he dared not renew it. So about five o'clock the action came to an end. Though both sides claimed it as a victory, there was little to choose, and neither side, it is clear, had any desire to continue. The Spanish vessels no doubt had suffered most, but the English had really effected but little, and to all appearance the great Armada after that twelve hours' fight was almost as formidable as ever.

The main impression left by the confused picture that

¹ Howard says nothing of Drake's division attacking, and implies that he and his seven consorts defeated Sidonia and his sixteen, and so brought the action to an end. But all the Spanish accounts agree that Sidonia had detached his galleons to Recalde's relief, and was alone and to windward of all the Spanish fleet, when he was attacked. They also agree that as the galleons came up the English ships that had been attacking Recalde (which were also those that had attacked the right wing) left him and attacked Sidonia. Sidonia, says one account, was an hour exposed to the whole English fleet. It is clear Howard has omitted the final effort of his starboard division, of which all the Spaniards speak.

it is possible to restore is of a certain elaboration of tactics and an amazing missing of the opportunities they afforded. It seems clear that Sidonia practically cut Howard's fleet in two, and then threw the advantage away by permitting a wild chase of a part that he knew could easily outsail him. Had he concentrated his van division upon Frobisher and his consorts, he must have compelled Howard either to turn and fight the intercepting rear division on their own terms or to leave Frobisher to his fate. On the English side we see the fleet split into three parts without organisation of any kind, each acting independently of the others, and the bulk of the merchant auxiliaries conforming to the movements of Drake without regard to those of the Lord Admiral. This, no doubt, is the confusion of which Camden speaks, and from it the English learnt a lesson which was the priceless result of their otherwise wasted action.

The impossibility of handling so large a number of ships without some squadronal organisation, and the inevitable tendency of such a structureless mass to fall into unequal groups each working for its own hand, was brought home to them. At the same time the tactical advantage of the independent action of squadrons had been as convincingly demonstrated. To the Spaniards, at any rate, it was clear that what had turned the fortune of the day and snatched a victory from their grasp was the attack of the squadron which had stolen to windward of them under cover of the smoke. To the more experienced English officers it must have been equally evident. Frobisher, it is true, was generally regarded as the hero of the day, and rightly so, for sheer hard fighting. His long and brilliant defence of the isolated English vessels against the four galleasses was certainly not surpassed in the whole course of the war, unless by the last fight of the 'Revenge.' But to tacticians, who were painfully working out their half-formed ideas, it must have been evident that such examples of splendid isolation were not the whole of naval warfare.

But whatever the immediate cause, on the following day we see the English admirals carrying out an elaborate reorganisation. As they lay waiting for fresh supplies of men and ammunition from the shore, the fleet was formed into four squadrons each composed of a proportion of royal galleons and merchantmen. The first Howard himself commanded; the second was assigned to Drake; the third to Hawkins; while Frobisher's re-established reputation was recognised with the command of the fourth. This was the real and lasting result of the long day's fight, and its lesson must have been emphasised by the constant reinforcements which the fleet had been receiving on its way up Channel. So much had these increased the numbers of its untrained auxiliaries, that even without the experience of the Portland action the necessity for marshalling them in squadrons if they were to be handled with any effect must soon have become evident. The previous day Sir George Carey had sent out from the Solent four ships and a pinnace, and the Spaniards, as they counted up their own losses, saw with alarm that Howard's numbers were constantly increasing. Fourteen vessels, they say, joined him this day, bringing his fleet up to about a hundred sail, and the English chroniclers love to tell how out of every port flowed a continuous stream of high-sounding names and adventurous spirits to put new heart into the exhausted crews, 'flocking thither as unto a set field, where immortal fame and glory was to be attained and faithful service to be performed unto their prince and country.' With all these undisciplined elements craving for distinction it is easy to see how the swollen fleet was in danger of becoming a disorderly mass of vessels, bold and willing enough, but useless against a marshalled enemy. We know from several sources how deeply the English officers had been impressed with the way in which the Spanish squadronal system enabled them to control the action of their great fleet, and this no doubt had not a little to do with the reorganisation.

The fourfold arrangement is curious and points perhaps to a revolutionary spirit, which though it recognised its mistake in entirely breaking with the old traditions refused to return to the stereotyped forms: though possibly the controlling influence may have been a desire to give Frobisher a divisional command. The tactical idea, however, is clear. Hitherto the formation of the Spaniards had defied the English attacks. So long as the Armada had kept on the defensive it had been found practically unassailable, and now Howard's council resolved to try if it could not be thrown into confusion by engaging it in four places at once. To this end it was arranged that during the night six merchantmen from each squadron should attack simultaneously at different points, so as to keep the enemy from rest and loosen his ranks for a true attack at daylight with the whole weight of the four squadrons. As ill luck would have it, however, the experiment could not be made, for the wind fell again to a dead calm and the ships could not move.

According to the English authorities, on this day, Wednesday the 24th, no fighting worth relating took place. From the Spanish accounts, however, it is clear there was a sharp little action in the early morning. At daylight, it seems, the advanced English ships found themselves within range of the rearmost Spaniards and opened fire, mainly upon Recalde, who had repaired his vessel sufficiently to resume command of his half of the rear division, Leyva taking the other half. The light air served the English ships well enough to enable them to draw continually nearer and finally to cut off and surround the *capitana* of the hulks, which now had a place in the rearguard. All the chief officers of this division became engaged, as well as two of the Indian galleons with which it had been further reinforced, and the affair threatened to develop into something serious. Sidonia, therefore, went about with his division in support; whereupon Howard seems to have signalled to discontinue the action.¹

¹ The fullest account of this engagement is given by Vanegas (Duro, ii.

In spite of the silence of all the English authorities on the affair the Spaniards say themselves they received serious damage. The *capitana* of the hulks had forty shot through her, and the total loss in killed and wounded is put down at seventy killed and as many wounded.

Later in the day a breeze sprang up and the Armada formed to continue its voyage. 'The Spaniards,' says Meteren, 'in their sailing observed very diligent and good order, sailing three and four and sometimes more ships in a rank and following close up one after another and the stronger and greater ships protecting the lesser'—by which we gather, since the Armada can hardly have sailed in one long column, and is always described by the English authorities as proceeding in a 'plump' or 'roundel,' that the various squadrons formed independent columns of from three to five ships abreast. The formation must have taken some time to complete, but no sooner was it done than the English, who for the last four hours had been lying-to, made sail and bore up to attack, compelling Sidonia to re-form battle-order. Until Howard had got his fresh supplies of ammunition he could not fight. It was quite enough to delay the enemy's advance, and without touching them, he went about and lay-to again in his former position to windward. This manœuvre it was open to the English to repeat to infinity, and Sidonia in desperation called his council-of-war. The result of its deliberation was that forty vessels were told off as a permanent rearguard to sail in battle order, so that at any moment it could face a threatened attack without checking the advance of the rest of the fleet; and in this

385). Both he and the other chief authorities say the English *capitana* was engaged and had her 'main-yard' (*entena del arbol mayor*) cut in two. This clearly cannot have been the 'Ark,' but the flagship of the squadron engaged. For had Howard himself been under fire and suffered honourable damage he certainly could not have preserved the complete silence that he does. Hawkins in his account (Laughton, i. 358) also omits all mention of the affair. The *capitana* in question, therefore, was probably the 'Revenge.' Drake, being in command of the van, would naturally have been nearest the enemy. It may, however, have been some other large English galleon which the Spaniards mistook for a *capitana*.

order the Armada continued its way with Howard in chase until both fleets were becalmed about six leagues south of the Isle of Wight.¹

The Armada had now reached the point beyond which Sidonia had determined not to proceed until communications had been established with Parma. It was the point, too, which in England was generally believed to be its immediate objective. At all hazards, then, it must be vigorously attacked. Still the dawn brought no change of weather. The morning broke dead calm, and it was only by the most daring manœuvres that the English succeeded in bringing on an action. Whether this was wise is very doubtful. Calm weather was all in favour of the Spaniards, while a fresh breeze was necessary to bring out the full advantages of the English methods. So confused and contradictory, however, are the extant accounts of this engagement that criticism is hardly possible. We cannot even restore with certainty the bare outlines of what took place—a matter greatly to be regretted, seeing that this was the first attempt of the new school to formulate an order of battle suitable to their tactics. Still a careful examination of the ascertained facts permits a probable conjecture of what was attempted.

That it was Hawkins who opened the day is clear. 'The next morning,' says Howard, 'being the 25th of July 1588, there was a great galleon of the Spaniards short of her company.' This, say the Spaniards, was the 'San Luis,' one of the Portuguese galleons that had been told off to reinforce the rearguard. From them also we learn that the 'Santa Anna,' the hulk of the Andalucian squadron, was similarly isolated. 'They of Sir John Hawkins his squadron being next,' Howard continues, 'towed and recovered so near that the boats [i.e. which were towing] were beaten off with musket shot: whereupon three of the galleasses and an "armado" issued out of the Spanish fleet.' It was Leyva in his *Levanter*, the 'Rata,' says the 'Diario,' that accompanied the galleasses

¹ 'Sir George Carey to Sussex,' July 25 (Laughton, i. 323).

to the rescue 'with other vessels.' Howard—whose squadron presumably was next Hawkins's and as we shall see to starboard—had himself towed to meet them, and with him went Lord Thomas Howard in the 'Golden Lion.' They fought the galleasses, the Lord Admiral tells us, 'a long time and much damaged them, [so] that one of them was fain to be carried away upon the careen and another by a shot of the "Ark" lost her lantern which came swimming by and the third his nose. There were many good shots made by the "Ark" and "Lion" at the galleasses in the sight of both armies which looked on and could not approach, it being calm; for the "Ark" and the "Lion" did tow to the galleasses with their long boats.' Still, as the Spaniards claim, the galleasses achieved their object and rescued the isolated vessels from the crowd of enemies that surrounded them. There can be no doubt, however, that they suffered severely. Howard affirms that it was not till it began to blow a little gale and the Spanish fleet edged up to succour them that they got off, 'after which time the galleasses were never seen in fight any more, so bad was their entertainment in this encounter.'¹

From what quarter the little gale blew he unfortunately does not say, nor does anyone else. The charts represent it at about south-west or south-south-west, but Spanish authorities say it changed a little during the action. Two Spanish accounts say the Armada at the beginning had slightly the advantage of the wind, and Howard says that Frobisher near Dunnose was to leeward. According to the Spaniards the Armada attacked and the English fled. This alleged flight, however, we may assume was really some manœuvre for the wind, since the English eventually secured the weather-gauge. All these facts are explained if we picture the wind at about south shifting to south-west and the English fleet

¹ Ubalдино's comment on this is: 'Sono ordinariamente i bombardieri [gunners] Inghilesi nelle loro navi membri principalissimi, et cagion d'ogni lor buon successo.'

slightly inshore of the Spaniards, which is just where we should expect them, seeing that they believed they had to deal with an attack on the Isle of Wight. On this assumption we may follow the action in its second and most important phase.

From Howard, after the wind got up, we learn but little more. 'Then the fleets drawing near one to another,' his 'Relation' proceeds, 'there began some fight but it continued not long.' The Spanish 'Diario' has much more to tell. 'At the same time that the rearguard was engaged in the skirmish,' it says, 'the *capitana* of the enemy with other great vessels, charged our *capitana*, which was in the vanguard.' Calderon explains that Sidonia had come up to rescue the galleasses, which were suffering severely, but that only the fourth galleasse, the vice-flagship of the squadron, followed him, the galleons of his division remaining to windward. That the English *capitana* which he engaged was not the 'Ark' is quite clear, for in his own narrative Howard says nothing of having engaged Sidonia.¹ It must have been the flagship of one of the other squadrons, and presumably not Hawkins, as he also was engaged with the rearguard. 'They came much closer than the first day,' continues the 'Diario,' 'firing their largest pieces in the lower deck:² and they cut the halyard of the mizen-yard [of Sidonia's flagship] and killed some soldiers.' In so critical a predicament indeed was the 'San Martin,' through the van galleons not conforming to her movement, that she was only saved by a number of the rearguard coming to her assistance and placing themselves between Sidonia and his assailants. Upon this the enemy were seen to draw off, 'leaving their *capitana* much cut up and

¹ In the 'Brief Abstract' (Laughton, ii. 56) he says, 'he bare up towards the Admiral of the Spanish Fleet,' but does not say he engaged him (see next page).

² The meaning of this is, as Raleigh explains, that the English ships were so much over-gunned that they could only open their lower tier ports in the smoothest weather (see his *Obs. concerning the Royal Navy*, 'Of Great Ordnance').

rather to leeward of our Armada.' Sidonia seized the opportunity, and with a crowd of vessels bore up upon the deserted flagship, 'leaving to windward the enemy's fleet, which was turning its back upon its *capitana*, and she was in such sore need, that she was towing with eleven launches and lowered her ensign and fired three guns to call for assistance.' Calderon says that she had had her helm injured and would not steer, and that the nearest English captains in answer to her signals of distress sent their launches to take her in tow. Howard it seems was out-manceuvred and could give her no assistance. 'Our *capitana*,' the 'Diario' continues, 'and the *almirante* (Recalde) and the other vessels reached so far that they prevented the enemy making any show of coming to her assistance, wherewith it seemed certain that that day we should board them, which was the only means of victory. At this point the wind began to freshen in favour of the enemy's *capitana*; whereupon she was seen to sheer off from ours and cast off the boats that had been towing her, and therewith the enemy's fleet went about to recover the weather-gauge, since it had just begun to get to leeward of ours.' Comparing this with other accounts there can be little doubt what this *capitana* was. Another Spanish authority says they fully expected to capture one of the three *capitanas* which the enemy had, since it had got left deep in amongst them.'¹ Yet another authority calls the vessel which the 'San Martin' attacked and which was saved by eleven shallows, not 'the *capitana*,' but 'the largest ship in the enemy's fleet.'² This suggests at once that it was the 'Triumph,' and turning to Howard again we are told that Frobisher, having managed once more to get left to leeward, did find himself exactly in the position described. 'The "Triumph,"' he says, in describing the close of the fight, 'to the Northward of the Spanish fleet was so far to leeward, as doubting that some of the Spanish army might

¹ Duro, ii. 268.

² *Ibid.* p. 249.

weather her, she towed off with the help of sundry boats and so recovered the wind.’¹

With this point settled we get on surer ground as to how the English fleet was formed, and can begin to discern something of Drake’s movements. For so far Howard’s narrative has been taken up almost entirely with the exploits of himself and his kinsman. For Hawkins he has a brief notice, but again for his vice-admiral nothing but a complete and significant silence. It is only by elimination we can so much as fix Drake’s position. Clearly Frobisher, being to the northward, had the port squadron, which would be his natural position as junior flag-officer. Howard as commander-in-chief would certainly be in the centre, and Hawkins, as we have seen, was next him. To Drake is thus left the starboard flank, which was his by right as vice-admiral. Examining now the part that each squadron took we find that Frobisher attacked the inshore or true left wing of the Spaniards. ‘At this time,’ says Vanegas, meaning while Hawkins’s opening attack on the rearguard was proceeding, ‘the enemy’s *capitana* with fifty vessels made head against the left wing of our Armada. The good Oquendo, and the good *almirante* and the vice-flagship of the galleasses [the other three, as we have seen, being engaged to the southward] and two other galleons and our *capitana* made head against them, although with little wind. We had already got the enemy’s *capitana* almost within musket shot, when nine launches got her under way and conveyed her out of our hands with such rapidity, that it was a thing of wonder.’ As for Howard, he must have been next, since some of the same ships, which first engaged him, after-

¹ The ‘Brief Abstract’ which Howard sent to Walsingham on August 7 confirms this. ‘The Lord Admiral,’ it says, ‘espying Captain Frobisher with a few other ships to be in a sharp fight with the enemy near Dunnose part of the Isle of Wight,’ &c., and then proceeds to describe the action as though it had been brought on with the attempt to release Frobisher (see Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 56). A copy of this, conjecturally dated July 28, is in the *Belvoir Papers*, *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. iv. 254. In his subsequent published ‘Relation,’ Howard omits all mention of Frobisher’s ‘sharp fight.’

wards attacked Frobisher, and two of his squadron, the 'Bear' and the 'Elizabeth Jonas,' were the first to bear up to the 'Triumph's' relief. Hawkins we know was to the southward, and Drake therefore must have been still further to the south. After Hawkins's first attempt to cut off the isolated vessels in Howard's immediate neighbourhood he disappears as completely as Drake: and the question arises how were they occupied during the four hours the action lasted. That the two finest seamen in England, the two most dreaded scourges of Spain, were doing nothing is incredible. Nothing, moreover, that as yet we have been allowed to see at all explains this apparently aimless action and its sudden end, and a suspicion is unavoidable that it must have been by their unrecorded operations that the day was decided.

From English sources we learn no more till the actual conclusion of the action. Howard, it is clear, after his first encounter with the galleasses took little or no part in it, having no doubt plenty of damages to repair and being, as we have seen, apparently out-mancœuvred. 'The fight,' he says, 'after that continued not long, saving that the "Nonpareil" and the "Mary Rose" (Thomas Fenner and Edward Fenton) struck their topsails and lay awhile by the whole fleet of Spain very bravely.' The 'Diario' gives the conclusion thus: 'The Duke, seeing it was no good proceeding with the attack he was making and that he was in the neighbourhood of the Isle of Wight, fired a piece and went about to continue our voyage, the rest of the Armada following him in very good order, the enemy remaining far behind [*muy traseros*].' Now as we know Sidonia had determined to remain at the Isle of Wight until he had got touch with Parma, his arrival there is a very bad reason for continuing his voyage. We cannot but suspect that the real meaning of Vanegas's curious expression is that Sidonia saw in the neighbourhood of the island some peril upon which he had not counted. Lying where he did, somewhere south of Dunnose with the wind settled at about south-west, the dangerous

banks called 'The Owers' were dead under his lee. In such a position a vigorous attack on his weather flank would have put him in present danger of a crushing disaster. It remains then to see whether there is any trace of the English having made this their favourite move.

That in what we have hitherto seen of the action there was nothing to account for Sidonia's retreat is indisputable. Howard's 'Relation,' which confines itself almost entirely to the attempt in the early morning to capture the straggling vessels of the Spanish fleet and to the subsequent cutting off and rescue of Frobisher, where he himself was engaged, in no way explains it. But there are two Spanish accounts which differ entirely from all the others, saying nothing of these two incidents, and showing they formed only a phase, and that not the decisive phase, of the action. One of them is very short. It says the Spaniards had rather the advantage of the wind; that they therefore attacked in grand form, and the English fled refusing to close. The result was a long cannonade, in which the Spaniards suffered so severely without being able to do their enemy much damage, that Sidonia signalled to continue the voyage.¹ The other is much more valuable and explicit. It is written by a seaman, master of one of the Seville ships. 'On the 4th August,' he says, 'off the Isle of Wight we found the wind fair and were aweather of them,² going very near them and they flying. We had them broken and the victory three parts won,³ when the enemy's *capitana* turned upon our Armada, and the galleon "San Mateo" which had the point of the weather wing gave way to it, retreating into the body of the Armada. Seeing that, the enemy took heart and turned with his whole fleet or the greater part of it, and charged upon the said wing, in such wise that we who were there were driven into a corner [*nos hizo arrinconar*], so that if

¹ Duro, No. 171.

² Or 'were upon them,' that is, 'attacked them' [*fuimos sobre ellos*].

³ Or perhaps 'we had them broken and in two halves—the victory very apparent' [*lo llevabamos rompido é per dos partes la victoria muy conocida*].

the Duke had not gone about with his flagship, instead of conquerors that we were, we should have come out vanquished that day. Seeing that, those of his Armada that had been cut off, bore up to rejoin.' ¹

Here, thanks to the skipper's honesty, we have something as much like a defeat from superior tactics, as the worsted party would ever be likely to acknowledge. It is clear that the action was decided by an overwhelming attack on the weathermost ships of the Spanish vanguard. To these, since the whole of their rearguard was engaged to leeward round Sidonia and Frobisher, the squadrons of Drake and Hawkins must have been opposed, and it now becomes easier to understand why Howard says so little of their share in the latter part of the action and omits all mention of the decisive attack on the 'San Mateo.' That he would deliberately ignore it altogether is inconceivable, and it is only fair to conclude that the 'Nonpareil' and the 'Mary Rose,' which he describes as lying awhile by the whole fleet of Spain very bravely, were the vice-admirals and leading ships respectively of Drake's and Hawkins's squadrons. And this is no mere assumption. The 'Nonpareil' we know was in Drake's squadron, and her commander, Thomas Fenner, had been vice-admiral of his original division on the western station. And as for Fenton, we know his ship, the 'Mary Rose,' was in Hawkins's squadron, and he would be a very natural choice for Hawkins to make for his senior flag-officer, since he was his brother-in-law and a man in whom he placed high confidence.²

On the whole, then, there can be little doubt that in Howard's reference to the gallant behaviour of the 'Mary Rose' and the 'Nonpareil,' of which he made no mention in the original 'Brief Abstract,' we have the real key to the action; and that while the two port squadrons were occupying the attention of the Spanish rearguard Drake

¹ Duro, No. 170.

² He afterwards became his assistant in the office of Treasurer of the Navy.

and Hawkins were working to windward for a decisive attack on the weather flank of the van, with a view to driving the whole Armada upon the Owers. It was thus, it will be remembered, that forty years before Lord Lisle had designed to deal with the French. It is exactly this form of attack, too, which both Monson and Raleigh lay down as fatal to the regular Spanish formations. And finally it explains why Sidonia's galleons and great-ships were so reluctant to conform to his leeward movement against Frobisher. Their more experienced officers, watching the manœuvres of Drake and Hawkins, would have seen the mistake their admiral was making, and to avoid again falling into the trap which had defeated them in the action off Portland, would have held their ground and tried a-weather of him to form front to the impending attack.¹

The blow, as we have seen, when it fell was entirely successful. The weathermost ships were forced in upon the rest, and the whole division was thrown into confusion. With the Owers to leeward there was no room to give way and re-form, and the only possible escape from the threatened disaster was to fall to the eastward. Thus it becomes clear why Drake's attack was not pressed home, and how Sidonia's last movement saved the vanguard from destruction. For the attack on the van must have thrown the English starboard squadrons slightly to leeward of the Spanish rearguard, and in order to prevent Sidonia's weathering them Drake and Hawkins must have been compelled to haul to the wind and reach back

¹ Calderon's words are: *Refresco un poco el viento, y así se travo la escaramuza con las galeas. Y la capitana vino con su vanguardia al socorro, la qual se halló sola con la galea patrona, a cuyo barlovento se pusieron las naos de batalla.* (The wind freshened a little, and so the skirmish with the galleasses grew hot. And the capitana came up in support with her vanguard, but it left her alone with the patrona of galleasses, and the ships of the main-battle formed to windward of her.) The *naos de batalla*, it is assumed, mean the squadrons of Sidonia and Diego Flores, which formed the main-battle or centre of the fleet as a whole, and its van division in the dual formation. It should be noted the words are 'su vanguardia,' not 'la vanguardia.'

to the westward across his front. They would probably hold on this course till they had joined hands with Howard again, and thus we see how it was, that when the Spaniards re-formed to leeward and continued their course, the English were 'very far behind.'

For five hours the Armada had held its position, threatening an occupation of the refuge it had reached, but by ten o'clock in the forenoon it was in full sail for Calais with the English in distant chase, and by three o'clock both fleets were out of sight from the Isle of Wight to the eastward.¹ 'Thanks be to God,' wrote the Governor from Carisbrooke Castle the same evening, 'there hath not been two of our men hurt'—a statement to be taken with reserve, when he also says that for five hours 'the shot continued so thick together that it might rather have been judged a skirmish with small shot on land, than a fight with great shot at sea.' Vanegas with official consistency again puts the Spanish loss at fifty killed and seventy wounded. The Seville skipper, though he stoutly claims the victory, fears the English did more harm than they suffered.

It is indeed clear that the Spaniards narrowly escaped a signal defeat. Had Frobisher and Howard succeeded in treating the rearguard as Drake and Hawkins were dealing with the van, and so prevented the movement to its relief, it is difficult to see how the whole Armada, as the skipper confesses, could have escaped an irreparable disaster.² Even as it was the English had won a great

¹ 'Carey to Walsingham,' July 25; Laughton, *Armada*, i. 324.

² There is a curious passage in Meteren's account, inserted apparently as an after-thought, which seems to suggest that someone at the time had blamed Frobisher for his conduct this day, and that Meteren had been asked to defend him. 'In the meanwhile,' he adds after relating the final flight of the Spaniards, 'Captain Frobisher had engaged himself into a most dangerous conflict. Whereupon the Lord Admiral coming to succour him, found that he had valiantly and discreetly behaved himself and that he had wisely and in good time given over the fight.' That he had behaved himself valiantly no one will doubt, but the rest is by no means so clear. Certainly it was only by signals of distress that he had saved his ship, and the necessity of supporting him to leeward had rendered an attack on the weather wing of the rearguard impossible for Howard.

strategical success. Theirs was the victory. It had been won, not by hard fighting, but by masterly and well executed tactics, and hence it was that, as too often happens, the feat passed unrecognised in popular estimation. Still it was certainly this battle which practically decided the fate of the 'Enterprise of England.' Sidonia had been driven from the position he had intended to occupy in order to remedy that radically defective conception of a union with Parma off Dunkirk. Now Drake had forced him on into his master's impossible scheme, and the unhappy admiral had nothing to do but to hurry off despatches to Parma to tell him in despair he must put to sea at once and join him at Calais.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BATTLE OF GRAVELINES

THAT the engagements in the Channel were disappointing to the English seamen there can be no doubt. They dismiss them as mere cannonades hardly worth mentioning. Ashore as the great Armada advanced step by step and almost intact to its goal all was anxiety and impatience. To all appearance Sidonia had succeeded in carrying out his master's instructions, and in defying the utmost endeavours of the greatest seamen of the age to stop his advance up Channel; and now he was almost within touch of Parma. Still the Armada was not what it seemed. Since leaving Coruña it had lost seven powerful vessels, and so hot had been the daily engagements that the crews had been considerably thinned and ammunition showed signs of giving out. Worse than this the whole fleet was growing seriously demoralised. The rapidity and accuracy of the English fire had proved even worse than had been expected, and it had to be admitted that the overwhelming boarding strength on which the Spaniards relied for victory was useless against the English tactics. The handling of the enemy's vessels compelled them to an unwilling admiration. Whether going free or on a bowline they were always outsailed, and the rapidity with which the sailor-manned English ships went about was a revelation. Even when by chance one of them would seem at their mercy, it slipped through their fingers, as if by magic. Frobisher's last escape had clinched their sense of the futility of their efforts. 'The fastest vessels in the Spanish fleet as they

pursued him,' says Calderon in despair, 'looked as though they were at anchor.'

This repeated emphasising by the Spanish authorities of the vast superiority of the English fire and seamanship must of course be received with some allowance. When all was over, the disastrous failure had to be excused, and it was well to put it down, as much as possible, to arts which Spanish chivalry regarded as base and mechanical. Yet it is certain the inferiority existed and was felt, and combined with the obvious incapacity of the admiral and the ignorance of essential conditions with which the whole campaign had been planned, it had reduced the spirit of the expedition to the lowest ebb. We can see it in the despairing cries to Parma to save the fleet that had come to protect him. Message after message was sent for shot for the heavy guns, for a squadron of flyboats that could match the English in sailing. It was in such a spirit of helplessness they approached their goal and the crisis of the long prepared crusade.

On board the English fleet all was different. Instead of crying for help, Howard was turning away scores of musketeers, who had been sent out to him by the queen's orders and for whom he could find no room. As yet not a single ship and very few men had been lost, and besides the damage he had inflicted on the enemy he had frustrated what appeared to be two attempts to secure a footing on the English coast. On the morrow of the action off the Isle of Wight, as the two fleets lay becalmed in sight of one another, the victory of the day before was celebrated on the 'Ark' after the old fashion. In presence of the baffled enemy Howard made his knights. Those selected for the honour were his kinsmen, Lord Thomas Howard and Lord Sheffield, both of whom as far as hard fighting went seem thoroughly to have deserved the distinction; next came Mr. Roger Tounshend, whose special services are unknown; and then the three most distinguished seamen, Hawkins, Frobisher, and

Captain George Beeston of the 'Dreadnought,' a regular naval officer who had grown grey in the queen's service. Drake the Lord Admiral had no power to reward.¹

No sooner was the ceremony over than a vessel from the Guise port of Havre was spoken, from which it was ascertained that there was no sign of hostile movement from France.² At the same time they heard the first of those reports, which sent all over Europe news of a great Spanish victory in which the English fleet had been completely defeated. At this they could well afford to laugh. The danger of Guise co-operation with the enemy had always been the Lord Admiral's bugbear, and all fears on this head were now at an end.

As the day closed in the south-westerly breeze revived, and with all anxiety for their rear allayed, the English could now concentrate their whole thought on what was ahead. Through a stormy night the chase went on. When the morrow broke dull and lowering, through the blinding squalls of rain the Spaniards could see the enemy still dogging their track, hardly a cannon-shot away. In the afternoon Calais hove in sight, and now the enterprise lay out in its naked folly. They had no news of Parma; the weather was breaking up; there was no port to go to; and Sidonia found himself in the most dangerous part of the Channel at a loss what to do. To proceed further in hopes of finding Parma ready, his pilots declared was madness. Once in the unknown North Sea they refused to be responsible for the fleet; and as in despair he hove athwart Calais, Sidonia suddenly gave the signal to anchor. Howard immediately did the same, bringing up within culverin-shot dead to windward.


Here while Sidonia was sending off fresh messengers

¹ Howard by his commission had only the usual authority of a Queen's Lieutenant-General to make knights. Drake, of course, might have been raised to the degree of Knight-banneret, but the practice of making them had gone out of fashion. Sir Ralph Sadler, the last Banneret made in England, had died the year before. (Baker's *Chron.* p. 376.) Beeston had commanded the Channel-guard as early as 1562.

² Ubaldino.

to Parma to explain at what risk he lay, the Spaniards' uneasiness was increased by the sight of a squadron of thirty-six sail, amongst which were five fine galleons, joining Howard's flag. It was whispered through the fleet that this was 'Juan Achines,' the most dreaded name in a Spanish seaman's ears until Drake's eclipsed it. He had been watching Parma from Dover, they thought; but as we know it was not Hawkins. It was Seymour.

On Tuesday evening as he lay at anchor in the 'Rainbow,' 'a quarter seas over against Dover,' a caravel which Drake had despatched with the news of the first encounter off Plymouth reached him. He at once sent off to the Dutch and Zeeland squadrons to join him, and to his own shores with urgent entreaty for ammunition and victuals; and then with Wynter and the rest of his squadron he worked down to Dungeness to look out for the fleets. He was in no very contented mood. Weary with his long blockade, he was bemoaning his forced inactivity. 'I am most glad,' he wrote on the first news of Howard's successes, 'of this most happy beginning of the victory obtained of her Majesty's enemies; but most sorry I am so tied I cannot be an actor in the play.' He was dissatisfied, too, with the smallness of his command. He complained he had been promised seventy-eight sail and at no time had he had more than thirty-six. The Netherland squadron had never joined his flag; and now he had but twenty sail and only eight royal ships besides the pinnaces. The orders, however, to join the Lord Admiral, which Drake had conveyed, put him in a better frame of mind. But further annoyance awaited him. Off Dungeness special orders from the queen reached him that he was to send Borough with the galley 'Bonavolia' into the Thames to take command of a flotilla that was being organised to protect the river, while he himself, in spite of any previous instructions he had received, was to return and lie off Dunkirk. In this last order we see again how incapable was the Government of grasping the elements of the naval art. Both Seymour



ADAMS'S CHART No. 8.

Showing (1) the resumption of the chase, July 26; (2) the relative position of the fleets as they anchored off Calais, and Seymour joining from the Downs, July 27.

and Wynter protested. They explained that for the blockade of Dunkirk and the adjacent ports Dover was the proper station. To lie close off the Flemish coast was to be wrecked or driven northward clean off their station by the first gale, while from Dover they could attack Parma on any wind that would bring him out. This was on Saturday morning.¹ Some craft coming from the west reported they had seen no sign of the fleets ; so, pending a reply to his protest, Seymour felt he might safely run to the Downs and see if his victuallers had arrived. As the Armada was so long in coming both Seymour and Wynter made sure Sidonia must be attempting the Isle of Wight, and there seemed plenty of time before them. Hardly, however, were they come to anchor, when a pinnace came flying into the Downs with the news that the two fleets were between Folkestone and Boulogne. For Seymour it carried urgent orders from the Lord Admiral to join him immediately. Without waiting for the revocation of the queen's last commands and with no more than three days' provisions on board his ships he weighed on the spot, and started to beat up with his whole force and join hands with the main-fleet.² In taking this responsibility he was acting in the best spirit of the service. It was the obvious thing to do ; and on the following day the queen signified her pleasure, that he should do what he had already done. For Seymour to make the junction was as obvious as that the Spaniards should prevent it. Yet Sidonia did not stir a finger, and between seven and eight o'clock, after a hard piece of beating, the Channel squadron came to anchor beside the port division of the main-fleet. As though to proclaim its contempt for the inertness of an enemy that had let slip

¹ *Armada*, ii. 330, 332. Professor Laughton supplies the word 'evening' conjecturally where the date of Wynter's despatch is torn. But it must be 'morning.' The Armada was a league from Calais by about 4 P.M. (*Duro*, ii. 360). Cruising as he was in mid-Channel, Wynter must have seen it long afore 6 o'clock in the evening.

² 'Seymour to the Queen,' Laughton, ii. 1. 'Wynter to Walsingham,' *ibid.* p. 7.

so fine a chance, one of the new arrivals bore close in to the Spanish rearguard and gave it a raking broadside, and passed on as the two rear-galleasses 'returned thanks' with their stern-culverins.¹

Thus as the night closed in there was gathered to windward of the harassed Armada the whole available strength of the English marine. 'Now,' says Howard, 'that Lord Henry Seymour and Sir William Wynter were joined with us, our fleet was near about one hundred and forty sail of ships, barks, and pinnaces, &c.' After the action off the Isle of Wight the Seville skipper had counted ninety-four sail in Howard's fleet, and when Seymour had joined another Spanish authority put the total at one hundred and thirty. Next day the skipper counted one hundred and thirty-six sail, of which forty-six were great-ships, the best he had ever seen in his life both for armament and sailing power. 'The worst of them,' he

¹ Duro, ii. 388, where the incident is assigned to Sunday. Seymour's squadron on August 1 was as follows (see Return in Laughton, ii. 5):

The Queen's Ships

The 'Vanguard'	. . .	500 tons	Sir William Wynter.
„ 'Rainbow'	. . .	500	„ Lord H. Seymour.
„ 'Antelope'	. . .	400	„ Sir Henry Palmer.
„ 'Bull'	. . .	200	„ Jeremy Turner.
„ 'Tiger'	. . .	200	„ John Bostocke.
„ 'Tramontana'	. . .	150	„ Luke Ward.
„ 'Scout'	. . .	120	„ Henry Ashley.
„ 'Achates'	. . .	100	„ Greg. Rigges.
„ 'Merlin'	. . .	50	„ Walt. Gower.
„ 'Sun'	. . .	40	„ White or Buckley.
„ 'Cygnet'	. . .	30	„ Ward or Sheriff.
„ 'George Hoy'	. . .	100	„ Hodges.

Total, R.N. 12, whereof five 'good ships,' three 'mean' (medium-sized barks), and four pinnaces. The 'Bonavolia' was in the Thames, and probably the 'Brigantine' also (see *supra*, p. 137 n.). The missing pinnaces would be most likely away on despatch or observation duty.

Besides these he had fourteen ships and four pinnaces from the Cinque Ports and east coast towns, or forty sail in all. Some of these, however, had parted company on the Friday night, and perhaps were not with him now. The eight London ships under Nicholas Gorges mentioned in the return, did not join him in time for the Battle of Gravelines ('Gorges to Walsingham,' July 31; *ibid.* l. 357). The Spanish statement that he had thirty-six sail including five galleons is then probably correct.

exclaimed in a burst of admiration, 'without their main-course or topsails can beat the best sailers we have.'¹ These estimates must be fairly accurate. The queen's galleons, which were now all with the fleet, numbered twenty-four, and to these may be added about as many merchantmen of 200 tons and upward that were really formidable. Moreover, deducting from the complete official list of the vessels that served in the campaign those which are known not to have been present on this occasion, we get a result which so nearly corresponds to the Spanish skipper's estimate that 136 may well have been the actual total. The Spanish numbers he sets at no more than 108: 'the rest,' he says, 'were wanting.' An English skipper, however, says that 124 sail were counted as the Armada lay in Calais Road.²

The situation with which the English admirals had now to cope cannot have been unforeseen. Indeed there is evidence that measures had already been taken in anticipation. Some days previously Walsingham had sent down orders to Dover for a number of fishing craft to be collected there and a quantity of pitch and faggots to be requisitioned. The meaning of these orders can only have been the preparation of fire-vessels, and presumably they were given upon a suggestion from the main-fleet, when it was found how unassailable was the Armada formation. That Sidonia would have eventually to anchor somewhere in the Narrow Seas in order to arrange a combination with Parma was certain. Before he had time to do this he would have to be dislodged, and

¹ Duro, ii. 260, 176.

² 'Tomson to Walsingham,' Laughton, i. 346. The grand official total of all the English vessels employed is 197; from these must be deducted the 'Bonavolia' and the 'Brigantine,' 18 of Gorges's and Bellingham's squadrons which had not yet joined, 15 victuallers that went westward, and 10 of Seymour's coasters that had been discharged in June (Laughton, i. 255). This makes 45, reducing the total to 152. Further deductions must be made for 'voluntary ships' that had not yet joined; for those which had been discharged at Plymouth; and finally for those which were employed in bringing off stores and on other detached duty. So that the maximum of the combined fleet cannot have been much over 140 sail.

to dislodge a fleet with fire-ships, as we have seen, was by this time an ordinary device of naval warfare which the Spaniards themselves had practised on Hawkins and Drake twenty years before as well as the previous year in Cadiz harbour. So soon as Wynter had come to anchor and had had time to see how strong was the position of the Armada, as it lay just east of Calais cliffs, 'very round and near together, not far from the shore,' he too saw what was wanted. In the midst of his study of the situation, shortly before nine o'clock, a pinnace from the admiral came alongside to carry him on board the 'Ark.' There he at once imparted to Howard his views. 'His Lordship,' he relates, 'did very well like of it and said the next day his Lordship would call a council and put the same in practice.' Howard was still listening thus deferentially to the old admiral's advice, when the crash of a collision interrupted them. So badly had Howard's squadron been brought up, that the 'Bear' had swung aboard the 'Ark' and three more vessels were foul of them, 'who,' says the old seaman, 'were all tangled together so as there was some hurt done by breaking of yards and spoil of tackle.' His opinion of such seamanship is not difficult to imagine. 'A great favour of God showed,' he quaintly says, 'that it had not made a destruction of many of our ships.' Small wonder if he thought his commander was in need of elementary instruction, and, ignorant of the preparations Walsingham had ordered to be made, he left Howard's cabin under the impression that the idea of the fire-ships was all his own.

The first thing on Sunday morning the flag of council was flying from the 'Ark.' The flag-officers assembled, and it was decided that an attempt should be made that night. Sir Henry Palmer was at once despatched in a pinnace to Dover to bring away the necessary vessels and material, which they evidently expected to find in readiness; but no sooner was he gone than somebody pointed out he could not possibly be back in time, and urged that rather than let so favourable an occasion slip, when wind

and weather were all in their favour, it would be better to make shift with the material they had with them in the fleet. Drake set an example by offering for the service a ship of his own of two hundred tons called the 'Thomas.'¹ Hawkins did the same. Five in all were offered from Drake's old West-country squadron, all of 150 tons and upwards; and these together with three others were hastily made ready for the service—so hastily, indeed, that not even their guns and stores were removed.²

Meanwhile on board the Armada things were going from bad to worse, as, haunted by a sense of some impending catastrophe, the Spaniards watched the glowing lights to windward where 'El Draque' and 'Achines' lay together. 'We rode there,' wrote one of the gentlemen of Sidonia's household, 'all night at anchor, with the enemy half a league from us likewise anchored, being resolved to wait, since there was nothing else to be done, and with a great presentment of evil from that devilish people and their arts. So too in a great watching we continued on Sunday all day long.'³ To add to their uneasiness the Governor of Calais, while treating them with all civility, sent off to warn them of the dangers of the roadstead where they lay. Moreover, certain movements in the English fleet began to raise a disquieting

¹ *Nutwell Court Account Book, MS.* He afterwards claimed £1,000 compensation for her, as being 'burnt at Calais with her ordnance and victuals and sundry other provisions in her.' See also for this and the other vessels, Laughton, ii. 287. The claim cannot have been excessive, for Captain Yonge claimed for his 'Bear Yonge' of 140 tons—that is, 60 tons smaller than the 'Thomas'—the sum of £1,018 17s. 8d. (*S.P. Dom.* cclix. 48.)

² The names of the captains who undertook the dangerous service Camden gives as Young and Prouse. The former was one of Drake's captains. (For an account of his services since Mary's time, see his 'Book,' *ubi supra*.) The fact that so many of Drake's squadron were taken does not necessarily imply that he was the prime mover of the affair. It may have been that having the starboard division his vessels were more directly to windward of the Armada, and could be prepared where they lay without exciting suspicion.

³ *Relacion* of Don Luis de Miranda; Duro, ii. 269 and 81.

apprehension of what was coming. Nine suspicious-looking vessels were reported as having joined the enemy, and one of the English squadrons, which was probably Drake's, as being next the land, was seen with some of the new arrivals to move nearer inshore as though to bring itself dead to windward of the Armada.¹ As the Spaniards with deepening anxiety read these ugly signs, their attention was diverted by an incident that did little to raise their spirits. About four o'clock in the afternoon a pinnace from the English fleet was seen making for them. With the utmost impudence it bore for the royal *capitana*, and when it was as near as it could get fired four shot into her and then went about and returned to her fleet with no damage but a culverin shot from the flagship of the galleasses through her topsail. 'It was much noted,' says the Spanish narrator, 'for its daring impertinence, and more than ever we saw how by the use of very good and very light ships, it was possible for them to come and go any way they pleased, the which we could not do.'

As the day wore on a messenger came off from Calais, and the news spread through the fleet that he was from Parma's camp. The report he brought was bad enough. To send ammunition or light vessels was out of the question, so closely were the Dutch vessels blockading the Flemish ports, and as for joining Sidonia in force the army could not be ready to embark for at least a week. Nothing could have been worse. To prevent the evil effects of the tidings, a rumour was allowed to circulate that Parma would be with them on the morrow, and there was a general revival of hopes. 'But,' says Sidonia's gentleman, 'as though the enemy scented or heard, they thereupon determined to play us one of

¹ *Diario*, Duro, ii. p. 240. These movements are not mentioned by the English authorities. The new arrivals were of course not fire-ships. Most of those that were used are known to have been already with the fleet, and five of them in Drake's squadron. The suspected vessels may have been Seymour's victuallers, and some of them may have been requisitioned as fire-ships.

their tricks.' For the Staff, of course, Parma's message was but a cause of deeper anxiety. So strong grew the presentiment of the coming danger as the night closed in dark and moonless, that, as the Duke says, he issued special orders for the protection of the fleet by a flotilla of patrol boats in order that fire-ships might be intercepted, and told off one of his most trusted officers to see it done.

Towards midnight the tide turned and was soon swirling through the crowded Spanish vessels like a mill-race, dead from where the English lights were once more ominously glimmering. The wind too was unchanged; it was blowing with the tide and freshening; and every vessel had two anchors out. Midnight passed; and then suddenly the look-out men were aware of two suspicious fires rising where the enemy lay. As they grew, others like them broke out, and soon every eye in the fleet could see eight fire-ships with their sails set coming rapidly down upon them with wind and tide. Terror exaggerated their size, and in a moment all was panic. The patrol boats dared not touch them. The memory of the 'hell-burners,' which at Antwerp but three years before had blown to pieces a thousand of the flower of Parma's army, was still green.¹ From the wizard admiral and his devilish people it was only natural to expect infernal machines still more terrible. So they came flaring on, as a Spaniard describes it, with wind and tide straight for the heart of the Armada, 'spurting fire and their ordnance shooting, which was a horror to see in the night.' To weigh was impossible; to remain seemed destruction; and Sidonia gave the fatal order for cables to be cut. The result was an indescribable confusion. 'Every vessel,' wrote a Spanish officer, 'was forced to shift itself thence as best it could, flying from so great a peril as that which stared us in the face.' On the flood they were riding head to wind, and as they wore in the dark and made sail, ship fell on ship and cries of panic and the crash of spars mingled with the sound of the fire-ships' exploding guns.


¹ Duro, ii. 403.

The *capitana* of the galleasses fell athwart the cable of a *Levanter* and wrenched her helm clean off. Sidonia himself, as he tried to wear, found his way blocked by a knot of vessels that had fouled each other. The flare of the fire-ships glowed rapidly nearer and brighter; his officers urged him to abandon his ship and escape to shore; he bravely refused and at last got free. So in a gradually loosening mass the tide swept the great fleet clear of the fire-ships' track, and soon they were seen to pass over the abandoned anchorage and burn themselves out harmlessly to leeward. Yet they had done their work. 'Fortune,' wrote an officer, 'so favoured them that there grew from this piece of industry just what they counted on, for they dislodged us with eight vessels, an exploit which with one hundred and thirty they had not been able to do nor dared to attempt.'¹

When morning broke the Armada was seen to have drifted away to the north-east and to be scattered along the coast towards Dunkirk with no trace of formation. So soon as Sidonia had seen the fire-ships drift clear, he had brought up and anchored, firing a gun as a signal for the rest of his fleet to do the same. His idea was that at daylight he would be able to return to Calais Road to pick up the moorings from which he had been driven. One of the finest of the Portuguese galleons, called the 'San Marcos,' and one or two other vessels that were in close company, obeyed the signal; but the bulk of the fleet, having lost two anchors and being unable to get at their spare ones in time, had continued to drift along the coast to the north-eastward and to leeward, and were now near Gravelines some two leagues from shore.² When the first light of day revealed the position, it was made obvious to the Duke that his idea was impracticable. The wind was at south-south-west with a tendency to veer: so that, far from his ships being able to recover their anchors, it was impossible for them even to close up on the flag-

¹ Duro, ii. 283.

² Don Jorge de Manrique; *Froude Transcripts*.



ADAMS'S CHART No. 10.

July 29, showing Howard and another squadron (probably Seymour's) temporarily out of action endeavouring to secure the disabled galleasse at Calais, and the final battle off Gravelines. Its various phases are represented as taking place simultaneously. The squadron in mid-Channel probably represents Howard rejoining the bulk of the fleet with his pinnaces after the galleasse was abandoned.

ship for hours. Sidonia therefore very properly weighed and ran down in order to form battle-order on the most leewardly ships.¹

Such was the sight which greeted the English admirals as they strained their eyes for dawn to reveal the effect of their stratagem. To dislodge the fleet they knew was only a beginning. At Sunday's council-of-war everything had been arranged for a hot attack before the enemy could recover from their confusion and re-form. As usual, we are not given the plan of action. Seymour tells us only that Howard was to give the first charge, Drake the second, and himself the third. This order, however, was certainly not observed, nor does it exhaust the whole scheme. The squadronal division of the fleet was certainly retained. Drake as vice-admiral must have been to starboard and next in shore. Then apparently came Hawkins, and then the Lord Admiral. To port of him would be Frobisher and then Wynter and Seymour, who, we are told, had anchored a little to the westward of the admiral and so furthest from the enemy. Directly the seamanlike move of the Spanish admiral was seen, it was clear if the Armada was to be fought before it could re-form there was not a moment to lose, and Howard at once gave the signal to weigh and led off for the enemy.

As ill luck would have it, however, as he came athwart Calais the growing light revealed to him the crippled *capitana* of the galleasses labouring along close under the French shore with her oars and foresail to gain the shelter of the Calais guns. She was the finest vessel, laments a contemporary Spaniard, on the whole face of the sea: and for Howard she proved too tempting a bait. To capture so splendid a prize seemed to his mediæval instincts more worthy of a Lord High Admiral of England than to carry out the scientific movement his council-of-war had been trying to make him understand. In the

¹ The 'Diario' says the wind at this time was N.W. (Duro, ii. 241), but this must be a mistake. From this quarter it would have been favourable to the Spaniards. Wynter says distinctly it was S.S.W. (Laughton, ii. 10).

account of the campaign which he has left behind him we can trace no grasp of any higher conception than plucking the enemy feather by feather. Of his admirals' second great scheme for destroying the whole Armada at a blow he had no clearer comprehension than he had of the first design at the Isle of Wight.¹ The brightest feather of the foe was within his reach, and like Drake he fell. At the psychological moment of the whole campaign, he turned aside and made for the helpless galleasse. The galleons of his squadron followed his lead. Thomas Howard, Lord Sheffield, and the Earl of Cumberland, who had just taken possession of the 'Bonaventure,'² all turned aside and its motley tail of merchantmen went too; and so at that great crisis a whole squadron was out of action. It was a blunder beside which Drake's sinks into insignificance, and it was he who retrieved it. At this moment, when his whole career seems to culminate, he had seized the post which Howard had deserted, and crowding all sail he was leading the fleet to the grand attack.

Meanwhile as Sidonia ran to leeward his pilots grew nervous. The body of the Armada, still unable to anchor, continued to drift, and by this time his leeward ships had fallen so far to the eastward that the anxious pilots assured him if he formed his order of battle upon them he would be in present danger of being driven on the Dunkirk banks. It was an opinion there was no disputing, and Sidonia, according to the official 'Diario,' took an heroic

¹ The Spaniards certainly believed that the manœuvres of the English fleet were directed to this end, 'to drive us upon the banks in order to complete the destruction of the whole of our Armada that day.' (Duro, ii. 284.)

² In the lists of the fleet Cumberland is usually given as captain of the 'Bonaventure,' but this was not really so. Her captain officially was George Ryman or Raymond. Cumberland came off to join the fleet on the 25th with his sporting friend, young Robert Carey. On hearing the Armada was in the Channel they had ridden post to Portsmouth, followed the fleets in a frigate, found themselves at night in the middle of the Armada, escaped, and joined Howard in the morning. Finding him already so well attended that there were no cabins to spare, they left the 'Ark' and went aboard the 'Bonaventure,' which was one of the same squadron. (Carey's *Memoirs*, p. 18.)

resolve to save his fleet. 'Sending pinnaces,' it says, 'to warn them to haul their wind, for that they were already going upon the Dunkirk banks, he determined to face the whole fleet of the enemy, and he went about presenting to them his broadside and turning his back on his own fleet.'¹ Thus for a time, while the rest of the fleet were bearing down to join him, he was alone with the 'San Marcos' and one or two other vessels that were by him: and it was for this isolated group that Drake was steering.

The exact lines upon which the English attack was made are difficult to determine. 'The enemy's fleet,' says Vanegas, who was on board the 'San Martin,' 'seized the occasion by the forelock, and seeing the flagship alone and the rest of the Armada to leeward, charged upon her with three *capitanas* leading.'² Howard gives but little new light. 'Sir Francis Drake,' he says, 'in the "Revenge" accompanied by Mr. Thomas Fenner in the "Nonpareil" and the rest of his squadron set upon the fleet of Spain and gave them a very sharp fight. And within a short time Sir John Hawkins in the "Victory" accompanied by Mr. Edward Fenton in the "Mary Rose" and Sir George Beeston in the "Dreadnought" and Mr. Richard Hawkins in the "Swallow" and the rest of the ships appointed to his squadron bore into the midst of the Spanish army and there continued a hot assault all that forenoon. Sir George Beeston behaved himself valiantly.' He then tells how he himself eventually got into action, saying nothing of Frobisher or Seymour. Seymour himself says: 'Sir Francis Drake gave the first charge upon the Spanish admiral, being accompanied by

¹ For this movement Captain Duro severely condemns him, saying any seaman would have known that the right thing to do was to run down and form on the most leewardly ship (*Introd.* p. 98). Upon this rule, however, Sidonia appears clearly to have intended to act; but it must be remembered the rule is necessarily subject to there being sufficient sea-room, and when Sidonia's pilots assured him there was not, it is difficult to see how he would have been justified in persisting in his movement or how he could have acted differently.

² 'Con tres capitanas delante,' Duro, ii. 389.

the "Triumph," "Victory" and others. Myself with the "Vanguard" and the "Antelope"¹ charged upon the tail, being somewhat broken, and distressed three off of their great ships,' and Wynter says it was his fortune to charge the enemy's starboard wing. From several indications it is clear the Channel Squadron did not get into action much before Howard's, owing probably to their having anchored 'somewhat to the west.' We thus get a picture of an attack made by squadrons abreast. Seymour's remarks about the order of sailing would suggest an intention to dispose them one after the other in line ahead; but it seems clear the actual formation was approximately with the squadrons abreast, or rather in quarter-column, with the starboard leading, and the three 'Capitanas,' which were seen heading the attack, must have been the flagships of Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, each at the head of his squadron.

It was as he saw the English lines thus sweeping down upon him that Sidonia had weighed and begun to run to leeward. At first the affair had the aspect of a chase, and it was not till the 'San Martin' hauled her wind that Drake could get within range. Still not a shot was fired. So much ammunition had been expended uselessly during the recent engagements, and so short was the English supply, that it seems to have been the order of the day that there should be no long bowls. So in grim silence the 'Revenge,' closely followed by three of her consorts, held on, as the 'San Martin' stood close hauled to the westward athwart her course.² As the sun rose Drake drew into effective range, and plunged his bow battery into her towering sides. Then, hauling to the wind, he gave her his broadside and passed on. For away to the north-east there was more important work to be done. Here the best of the Spanish vessels, in answer

¹ The flagships of Frobisher, Wynter, and Sir Henry Palmer.

² 'Dandoles el costado.' Duro, ii. 241. The report from Calais (*Venetian Cal.*, viii. p. 389) says the action began by four English ships attacking Sidonia, probably the four R. N. ships of Drake's squadron.

to Sidonia's signals, had hauled to the wind and were standing out from the shoals in order to form on their admiral in deep water. To stop this movement was of the utmost importance. The isolated group might safely be left to the squadrons that were following, and there seems no doubt that Drake held on to head off the rest of the armada.¹

Hawkins, it would seem, took his place and remained fighting the isolated group until it became the centre of the gathering Spanish fleet. For, unsupported, Drake had been unable to do more than check the off shore movement, and the best part of the Armada was slowly getting up to Sidonia's relief. As Wynter followed the leading squadrons he could see the bulk of the Spanish fleet bearing north-north-east of him and 'making into the depth of the Channel.' By nine o'clock, when he got into action, they were athwart Gravelines, forming 'into the proportion of a half moon,' and this is the first time any expert authority mentions that they did so.² 'Their

¹ 'Then Sir Martin Frobisher began some speeches as touching the service done in this action. Who uttered these speeches following, saying: Sir Francis Drake reporteth that no man hath done any good service but he; but he shall well understand that others have done as good service as he, and better too. He came bragging up at the first, indeed, and gave them his prow and his broadside; and then kept his luff and was glad he was gone again like a cowardly knave or traitor (I rest doubtful [which], but the one I will swear)' (Mathew Storke's deposition; Laughton, ii. 101). This curious paper must of course be received with caution; but there is no reason to doubt that Frobisher did say this of Drake, though possibly not so strongly, or that he believed what he said. Drake's alleged cowardly behaviour is quite explainable on the supposition that he saw the important thing was to check the windward movement and prevent the leeward Spaniards coming up to Sidonia's support. He could safely leave the 'San Martin' to one of the other squadrons. It is possible Frobisher did not appreciate the position. He was new to war, and, as we have already seen, whenever he becomes conspicuous in previous actions, it is by getting himself cut off to leeward, where he saves himself by sheer hard fighting or daring seamanship, thoroughly worthy of his fame as an intrepid explorer, but in no way marking him as a sagacious fleet officer. The explanation of Drake's action which is adopted in the text is the one suggested by the received account which Camden gives. 'Drake and Fenner in the meanwhile perceiving the Spanish fleet to gather together again, set upon them with great violence.'

² Sir H. Palavacino, in his 'Relation,' says they had put to sea in disorder, but had afterwards arranged themselves in their usual order of fight. This

admiral and vice-admiral,' says Wynter, 'they went in the midst and the greatest numbers of them; and there went on each side on the wings, their galleasses, Armados of Portugal and other good ships, in the whole to the number of sixteen in a wing, which did seem to be their principal shipping.' How exactly it was done we cannot tell; but it is certain that eventually, in spite of Drake's efforts, some fifty ships succeeded in getting into some kind of battle order about the 'San Martin.' Recalde, with Pedro de Valdes's successor, the son of Drake's old enemy Don Martin Enriquez, formed up on his weather or port flank, and Leyva and Oquendo on the other. Still it is clear that the Spanish formation was very incomplete, and that some ships had been cut off entirely from the main body. The mass of the fleet was scattered to leeward for miles along the coast, struggling to get clear of the Flanders banks. Indeed, in spite of what Wynter says, it is clear from the Spanish accounts that at the time the action became general they considered they had not been able to form any regular order. Drake's magnificent attack had gone far to save the situation. Had Howard done as well, it might have been that the dawn of the English naval supremacy would have been marked with one of the most brilliant battles of all times. That it partially miscarried was no fault of Drake's. As admiral and as captain he did all that man could do. With what fury he fought we are allowed a glimpse through the roar and the smoke. 'That day,' says Ubaldino, 'Sir Francis's ship was riddled with every kind of shot, and was letting fly every way from both her broadsides, so that she seemed to repeat her fire as rapidly as any harquebusier.' So the 'Revenge' won her first renown, and though the glory with which she covered herself in her last hours was so bright as to obscure the more solid fame she won in the heyday of her life, yet it may be doubted is sometimes taken as evidence that their usual order was a crescent, but in technical details Palavacino is too inaccurate to carry much weight, especially as we know he had not been present at any of the other battles (Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 205).

whether her highest claim to immortality is not that it was she with whom Drake led the new English navy to its first decisive victory.

The very fact that the fifty main vessels of the Armada which took part in the action were prevented from assuming a definite battle order, makes the course of the battle very difficult to follow. The first brunt of it had been borne by the 'San Martin,' supported by the 'San Marcos' and 'San Juan,' the two other galleons that happened to be near her. Nor for the greater part of the day were they suffered much respite. Sidonia's friends claimed for him that he received the fire of the greater part of the English fleet, and this may well be true. For each of the leading squadrons probably gave him its fire, like the 'Revenge,' trying either to put him out of action before the rest of the Armada could join him, or else to force him to ease off and fall to leeward. 'But,' says one in his praise, 'he kept luffing up continually upon the enemy's fleet, transfigured and shrouded in the smoke of his guns, which he ordered to be fired with the greatest rapidity and diligence,' as though—and other passages tend to confirm it—some Spanish officers still regarded the masking of their ship with smoke as the primary and most valuable function of naval gunnery. 'He did not alter his course,' says another, 'for a long time, although in the opinion of many he did wrong; but, in truth, if he had not held on upon that tack so long, it was not possible but that the greater part of our Armada must have run ashore and been the end of all.'¹ It was a case no doubt of being between devil and deep sea; yet with all his faults Sidonia must be credited with having taken a bold and wise line, and persisted in it in order to cover the rest of his fleet in its effort to get an offing.

As the re-formation of the Armada developed, the action seems to have resolved itself into a running fight, in which the Spaniards strove to maintain the defen-

¹ Duro, ii. 284.

sive in a close and compact formation, and so work northwards into the open sea; while the English endeavoured by repeated attacks to cut off the weather-most ships and force the rest to leeward towards the Zeeland banks.¹

That the usual order of fight, which Palavacino says they had assumed, was not the regular crescent formation, is clear from his description of the engagement. The English fleet, he says, had the wind, 'and gave always occasion to the enemy to open out and to fight; but they chose rather to be followed and to bear away as well from Calais as from Dunkirk than to open out and permit the fight to become general . . . but in the continued assaults which they (the English) gave on them without entering, they made them feel our ordnance; and if any ship was beaten out of their fleet, she was surrounded and suddenly separated from the rest.'² The official Spanish accounts, or those at least which are favourable to Sidonia, represent the affair as though it were the English who refused a general action because they declined to board. The general impression throughout the Armada, however, seems to have been that it was Sidonia who refused. 'The fight,' says a Spanish prisoner, 'continued eight hours along the Channel to the North, all which time the English pursued the Spanish fleet in such sort, as if they had offered to board the Spanish fleet, he saw the Admiral so fearful he thinketh they had all yielded.' Stories, too, were afloat of how Sidonia's officers had tried to goad him with insults into boldly offering battle. Under the advice, however, of Don Diego Flores de Valdes—by whom, it will be remembered, Philip had directed him to be guided in all strategical and tactical matters—he clung obstinately to his idea of remaining on the defensive and refusing a battle except on his own terms and at his own time.

¹ The Calais report (*Venetian Cal.*, viii. p. 389) describes 'both fleets drawing gradually away to the open sea' as the action proceeded, 'till at Calais both sight and sound were lost in the distance.'

² Sir Henry Palavacino's 'Relation' (Laughton, ii. 207).

In order to force him from this attitude the English, as usual, seem to have sought to throw his close formation into confusion by concentrating their whole strength upon his weather flank, and crowding it in to leeward upon the rest. This we may assume from the fact that later on in the action the 'San Martin' found herself unmolested through her former assailants having passed on against ships known to have been in the weather part of the Spanish line; and from the number of English vessels which the Spaniards say were firing on them, there can be little doubt that the whole of the squadrons, except Howard's, were sooner or later gathered there.¹ 'The said wing,' wrote Wynter, 'found themselves as it did appear, to be so charged as by making of haste to run into the body of their fleet, four of them did entangle themselves one aboard the other. One of them recovered himself and so shrouded himself among the fleet: the rest, how they were beaten I will leave it to the report of some of the Spaniards that leapt into the seas and were taken up and are now in custody of some of our fleet.' It was upon these vessels that the heaviest weight of the fight had already fallen. One was the Portuguese galleon 'San Felipe,' which in the first stage of the action had been cut off and surrounded. Another Portuguese galleon, the 'San Mateo,' which had borne the brunt of Drake's weather attack in the battle of the Isle of Wight, coming to her rescue had been caught by another squadron; and both were torn to pieces with a concentrated fire until Recalde, with several other vessels, made a diversion in their favour and succeeded in including them into the solidifying formation. Still they

¹ Wynter, who says he attacked the right flank, engaged there two galleons, which from their subsequent fate we are able to ear-mark as the 'San Mateo' and 'San Felipe,' and these immediately before were engaged by, at least, two other squadrons. Recalde, who commanded what Wynter called the 'right,' was busy the whole time, while Leyva, who commanded the opposite wing, is only mentioned in action when he came up at the end to relieve Sidonia in the centre. What the Spaniards called their left, Wynter seems to have called the 'right,' because it was opposite the English left.

were to know no rest. With undiminished fury the English squadrons, now probably reinforced by the arrival of Seymour and Wynter, pressed home their attack on the weather flank; and then it must have been that took place that forcing in of the weathermost ships into the mass of the formation which the old Queen's officer describes as happening when he got into action.¹

About ten o'clock, then, we may picture the fifty fighting ships of the Armada, in something like their old order about opposite Gravelines a few leagues to sea, still valiantly striving to keep up to the wind, with the double object of getting into the open sea and keeping to windward of Dunkirk. Upon their left and left-rear hung the Queen's galleons and those of the private ships that were disciplined enough to keep their stations, forcing them by a tremendous concentration of fire further and further to leeward. The rest of the merchantmen were probably harassing the rest of the line as they could. It was upon the point of the weather flank that the weight of the attack must have told most severely, and in the confusion caused by the crowding in of the outermost vessels, the injured galleons, which had been recovered into the formation, as well as other ships near them, were forced out of their stations and fell behind.² Thus it was that a second time the 'San Mateo' and 'San Felipe' were cut off and surrounded, and with them the 'Nuestra Señora de

¹ He says he got into action at nine o'clock. The Spaniards say the collision between the 'San Juan de Sicilia' and the Biscayan 'Maria Juan' took place at about ten. Duro, ii. 284, and *post*, p. 269 n.

² The Spanish accounts speak of these vessels 'attacking' again shortly after they were rescued. The Estrada MS. (*Calthorpe MSS.* 162) says of this part of the action: 'The galleon St. Philip remained all alone tarrying that they might lay her aboard and did not shoot off any piece till such time as they did very evil intreat her, for all that passed did shoot at her. The galleon St. Matthew remained in her succour, who likewise passed much evil.' It is inconceivable that crippled as they were they would leave their stations in the line deliberately. The picture which Palavescino gives us of them, dropping behind like wounded birds out of a covey, is almost certainly the truth.

Begoña' of the Castilian Squadron, and the 'San Juan de Sicilia' of the Levantine.¹

The two Portuguese galleons, with their rigging cut to pieces, their fire silenced and their crews decimated, were unmanageable, and by the renewed impetus of the English attack were forced helplessly upon the next ships to leeward. The 'Nuestra Señora de Begoña,' the Spaniards themselves say, was not so deeply engaged as the others, and thus got clear first, just as Wynter relates. The 'San Juan de Sicilia,' crowded with troops and lightly armed as she was, must have suffered terribly. She may well have been the Italian ship which some deserters said they saw through her port-holes all full of blood which yet maintained the fight in her rank three hours after.²

Other ships besides these four fell out and were similarly treated. The carnage, indeed, was fearful, and the heroism with which the Spanish officers fought their shattered ships no less. Wherever a vessel was in charge of one of the old naval captains or the commander of one of the famous *Tertias* its defence was magnificent; but of all who upheld the renown of Spanish arms that day the palm by general consent was given to the Portuguese galleons, the 'San Felipe' and the 'San Mateo.' On the first was Don Francisco de Toledo, a veteran soldier commanding the *Tertia* of *Entre Douro y Minho*. 'He,' says a friar who was in a vessel close by, 'fought neither more nor less than most valiantly, placing himself in the hottest of the fight and fighting with twelve or fifteen galleons without help except from God, and moreover close enough to use his muskets.' The friar's own vessel, when it drew near, 'was received with such a hail of balls that it was cut to pieces aloof and aloft.' 'Yea, in the end,' he continues, 'I saw myself that day in such sore straits that it was a miracle of God we escaped; for since the ships were so scattered

¹ In most of the Spanish accounts nothing is said of their having fouled one another, as Wynter describes; but the narrators confess the smoke was so thick they could not see how it happened.

² Laughton, ii. 80.

and could not help one another, the enemy's galleons came together and charged us in such numbers that they gave us no time to draw breath.'¹ On the 'San Mateo' was Don Diego Pimentel, who commanded the *Tertia* of Sicily, the flower of the Spanish army. He, too, was in the hottest of the fight, with his vessel cut off by another squadron of 'thirteen or fourteen galleons,' says the friar, and there she fought for hours till 'she was a thing of pity to see, riddled with shot like a sieve; and had it not been that the Duke afterwards sent off his divers to her to get the water out of her she must have gone to the bottom with all hands. All her sails and rigging were torn and sorely destroyed; of her sailors many perished, and of her soldiers few were left in the galleon.'² Yet to the end Pimentel had never a thought of surrender. With his upper-works all shot away, his helm shattered, his spars about his ears, his guns dismounted, and the water pouring in through shot-holes, he continued the fight with musketry. Feeling at last his ship was sinking under him he made desperate efforts to grapple and board the nearest enemy. Not one was he allowed to approach; but, struck with his heroism, an English officer on board one of his assailants sprang with sword and buckler into the top, clear of the smoke, and offered quarter to the remnant of his splendid command. 'Soldiers so fine,' cried he, 'should surrender to the Queen *á buena guerra*.' For answer, a musketeer levelled his piece; the Englishman fell, and amidst the derisive taunts of the Spaniards, daring them to board, the enemy drew clear and the carnage began again.³

Meanwhile, since Hawkins had passed on from the centre where his first attack had been made, the 'San Martin,' temporarily put out of action, had been trying to

¹ Una Carta del Padre Geronimo de la Torre. Duro, ii. 405.

² *Ibid.*

³ Calderon attributes this scene to the 'San Felipe,' but he was near the 'San Martin,' and says they could see nothing of this part of the action; whereas the Padre Geronimo says he was close by and heard the offer of quarter. Duro, ii. p. 407.

stop her leaks with leaden plugs. Amongst others she had a fifty-pound shot clean through her at the water line, and aloft she had suffered as severely as in her hull. To windward of her was the bulk of the English fleet in a dense cloud of smoke; and, mingled with the roar of the cannon, a rattle of musketry told the Duke that somewhere in the thick of the fight some vessels of his must be in sore trouble. Though two shot-holes between wind and water were yet unstopped, he bore down and led the way to the rescue. He was met at once by a squadron, that beset him and his consorts on every side and stopped the move. 'Another "Capitana" and "Almiranta," of the enemy,' says Calderon, who was in a vessel beside the 'San Martin,' 'with other galleons that immediately came up, placed themselves athwart her bows, at her side, and under her stern, and for four hours made her suffer the tempest of their shot.' Nevertheless Sidonia's movement seems for a moment to have relieved the pressure round the 'San Mateo' and 'San Felipe,' but the place of their previous assailants was taken by Seymour and Wynter and their case was as bad as ever. The wind had begun to veer, and it became more and more difficult for the ships that were to the eastward to get into action. Leyva, with some of the vanguard, struggled hard to the rescue of the Duke, but before he could reach so far, he too was cut off. 'There bore down on them,' says Calderon, 'three "Almirantas" and one "Capitana," with ten or twelve other great ships.' These can have been nothing else but Howard arriving at last to retrieve his unpardonable blunder.¹ He came into action, he says, 'near the place where the "Victory" had been before'—that is, in the centre—and with him sailed the 'Bear,' the 'Bonaventure,' and the 'Lion,' which from their size and

¹ The battle lasted eight hours. Howard got into action about three hours after Fenton and Hawkins (Laughton, *Armada*, ii. p. 64)—that is, nearly four hours after Drake's opening, and in the middle of the action. Sidonia was engaged with the squadron that surrounded him four hours, or for the second half of the action.

the gorgeous banners and music of their noble captains, Calderon may well have dubbed *Almirantas*.¹

Thus at last some four hours after Drake's leading attack, the action became general, and was raging with unexampled fury. We may still see it dimly, as in the dense clouds of smoke the English ships wheel and circle about the Spaniards they have isolated. Meteren has left us a picture of them constantly moving in short boards under their fighting sails, ranging up close one after another to deliver the one broadside and going about to deliver the other. 'The English ships,' says he, 'using their prerogative of nimble steerage, whereby they could turn and wield themselves with the wind as they listed, came oftentimes very near upon the Spaniards, and charged them so sore that now and then they were but a pike's-length asunder; and so continually giving them one broadside after another they discharged all their shot both great and small upon them, spending one whole day from morning till night in that violent kind of conflict.' By three o'clock most of the isolated vessels lay at the mercy of their assailants. 'They sustained the enemy's attack,' says the '*Diario*,' 'to the utmost possibility; and in such wise all those vessels were left sore mishandled and almost without power of making further resistance, and most of them even without shot to fire.'

Turning from details to a general view of the latter part of the action, we see the bulk of the English fleet acting by orderly squadrons, well under control and capable of being readily brought to bear at any given point. We see them until the Spaniards abandon their effort to keep up to the wind, still pressing in the weather flank and forcing vessel after vessel to fall out of the formation. We see them cutting off these isolated details, reducing them to helplessness by sheer weight of metal, and without wasting time and lives in taking possession

¹ Howard, however, says the Earl of Cumberland in the '*Bonaventure*' engaged a galleon astern of him, and that the galleon was afterwards beaten by Seymour and Wynter. This was the '*San Mateo*' or the '*San Felipe*.'

of them, passing on to meet every movement made to their relief and there repeating the same tactics. So well, indeed, had they learnt their lesson from the enemy's squadronal organisation, and so brilliantly did they improve on their master's methods, that, in the end, of the fifty Spanish ships that had managed to get into action, some fifteen or sixteen, including the 'San Martin,' were entirely cut off from the rest of the fleet.¹ For these there seemed no salvation. The battle was on the eve of returning a harvest of prizes as rich as did Trafalgar, when suddenly, in the Spaniards' last extremity, a squall swept down upon the contending fleets and changed the face of the day. As the English saw it coming they abandoned their victims to prepare to meet the danger.² All hands were wanted aloft, and with the squall came torrents of rain that rendered further firing impossible. Thus for a while the shattered Spaniards were left unmolested, and apparently, while their assailants held up to the wind, they were compelled by their hurts to run before the squall.³ But so fierce was the wind that even this shift did not save them all. A large vessel of Recalde's squadron, which had been engaged by Captain Crosse of the 'Hope,' foundered. Eighty souls, which were all that remained whole of her crew of two hundred and seventy, were saved, and the rest, dead and dying, went down with the wreck.⁴

The squall lasted but a quarter of an hour; but by the time its violence was over and the English could

¹ Vanegas, Duro, ii. 390.

² 'Los contrarios, como vieron dar a vuelta dejaron los navíos.' Duro, Doc. 171, ii. p. 284.

³ Duro, ii. 284 and 390. Vanegas says: 'Serian poco más de las tres de la tarde, quando commenzó a mollismar y a entrar la mar y con alguna cerrazon.' The 'Relacion,' No. 171, says 'Vino un grande aguacero que duraria un cuarto de hora.'

⁴ *Ibid.* and pp. 271 and 400. She was the 'Maria Juan,' of 665 tons, and 24 guns, 172 soldiers, and 100 sailors. She was the vessel that had been in collision with 'San Juan de Sicilia' (Duro, ii. 284). It is Meteren who says that Crosse assaulted the 'Great Biscayan' that was sunk. Howard, in his 'Brief Abstract' or 'Declaration' (Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 58), places the incident on the 30th.

attack again, the enemy had managed once more to get together, and, having resumed their old close formation, were fairly flying to leeward of Dunkirk. Thus were the English robbed of the prizes which they had expected to take possession of at their leisure.¹ Even the great galleasse, for the sake of which Howard had squandered during the critical hours of the day three or four of the most powerful ships in his force, was not theirs. Seeing the Lord Admiral's move she had run herself aground on the Calais banks under the guns of the castle. Howard sent off his boats with a hundred men to capture her, and stood off and on watching, while they, in company with a swarm of merchantmen, fought for an hour or more with the disabled leviathan. It was not till Moncada fell with a ball between the eyes that the gallant resistance ended and the English swarmed up her towering castles. Then at last, as they gutted her from end to end, Howard seeing the prize in full possession of his men, made sail with his consorts to where Drake for an hour or two had been furiously engaged. No sooner, however, was his back turned than the Governor of Calais sent off to claim the vessel as a wreck in his own waters. Intoxicated with plunder and the exhilaration of their exploit, the English seamen only laughed at his officers and plundered them too. Whereupon the Governor very properly opened fire from the Castle and the captors had to beat an ignominious retreat, but not before they had secured 22,000 golden scudi from the treasure chest, besides a quantity of other rich plunder.²

With the squall the battle ended. Except for some desultory fire at long range nothing further was done.

¹ The complete silence of the English authorities on this squall is very significant. Whenever the weather turned against them they seem always to avoid mentioning it, as though reluctant to admit that Heaven was not entirely on their side. It is this same sentiment that led to the defeat of the Armada being always officially represented as due to the act of God. As a matter of fact, throughout the campaign the weather distinctly favoured the Spaniards. This was especially so at and after the battle of Gravelines.

² Ubaldino.

The English victory was complete enough. They had driven the Spaniards out of the Channel ; by a well-timed manœuvre they had frustrated their attempt to return ; and finally, when as a last resource they tried to make into the deeps of the North Sea, they had beaten them back into shoal water by sheer hard fighting. The crisis was past. Forced to leeward of Dunkirk it was impossible for Sidonia to make a junction with Parma. But this was far from all. The course which the crippled Armada had been forced to take seemed in all human reason to condemn it irrevocably to total destruction. The squall, which had robbed the English of their expected prizes, bade fair to deliver the whole fleet into their hands. During the long hours of the fight, as the wind drew more and more into the west, it is clear a deal of easterly leeway had been made. When immediately before the 'San Martin' bore down for her last effort she sounded, the lead had given but eight fathoms, and now the wind had settled rough with a nasty sea at west-north-west dead on the treacherous Zeeland banks. The English admirals could therefore well afford to rest their exhausted crews, content to wait and watch, while the weather gave them the fruits which their great struggle had earned.

And a hard struggle it had been. If the fighting ships of the Armada were almost without power of defence, the English were almost as destitute of means to attack. The firing had been unexampled in history ; old hands could say that Lepanto had been child's play to Gravelines ; and in those squadrons which had been engaged all day the English ammunition was nearly exhausted. 'I deliver it unto your honour,' wrote Wynter to Walsingham three days later, 'upon the credit of a poor gentleman, that out of my ship there was shot five hundred shot of demi-cannon culverin and demi-culverin ; and when I was furthest off in discharging any of the pieces, I was not out of shot of their harquebus and most times within speech one of another, and surely every man did

well.' 'Sir Francis Drake's ship,' says Meteren, 'was pierced with shot above forty times and his very cabin was twice shot through, and about the conclusion of the fight the bed of a certain gentleman lying weary there-upon, was taken quite from under him with the force of a bullet.'¹ And many other such accidents, he adds, befell the English ships, showing how hot had been the fight. Yet in this and all the other fights the highest estimate placed our loss at not above a hundred men.² 'God hath mightily protected Her Majesty's forces,' wrote Fenner, 'with the least losses that ever hath been heard of being within the compass of so great volleys of shot, both small and great. I verily believe there is not three score men lost of Her Majesty's forces.'³ On the other hand, so deadly had been the effects of the English low fire, that the Spaniards admitted a total loss in this action alone of 600 killed and 800 wounded.

Soon after the squall had passed and the hopeless situation of the Armada was seen, Howard signalled for the fleet to re-form, content by hanging on the weather quarter of the Armada to hold it upon the fatal course it was pursuing. It was now about six o'clock, 'in the which time,' says Wynter, 'the Spanish army bear away N.N.E. and N. by E. as much as they could, keeping company one with another. I assure your honour in very good order'; and so beneath a lowering sky, as the English watched their beaten enemy driving helplessly to its fate, closed in the day on which the fate of Europe had hung.

As the night drew on the wind and sea increased, and one by one the cripples dropped out of the Armada's ranks. First the 'San Mateo,' then the 'San Felipe,' both of which drifted to the Zeeland coast and were taken, while a third unknown was cast ashore and lost. The rest could see no better fate in store for them. 'Hardly a man slept that night,' says the friar; 'we

¹ Ubaldino also tells this story.

² Meteren.

³ To Walsingham, August 4; Laughton, ii. 40.

went along all wondering when we should strike one of those banks.' The weather grew worse and worse; they knew they were making leeway hopelessly, yet anything was better than the terror of the fleet that hung upon their course; and through the bulk of the Armada there was no thought but to fly blindly from its glimmering lights under every sail their splintered masts could carry.¹ In vain Sidonia set a better example. Finding the water continually shoaling on him, he shortened sail and came up as close to the wind as he could hold his shattered ship. One or two of his best officers did the same, but the rest held on sullenly as they were. Thus it was that when morning broke the 'San Martin' once more found herself alone, with not a vessel near except the three or four that had obeyed her lead. Two leagues to leeward was the rest of the fleet, driving headlong under a press of sail for the Zeeland banks. In gunshot to windward hung the English fleet. All night long they had been dogging his light, and no sooner did the dawn reveal his position than once more they swooped upon him. His end now stared him in the face. In vain he signalled to his fleet to go about to his support; they paid no heed and kept their press of sail. Some urged him to surrender, it is said, or at least to save his life in a pinnace. But again he refused. With the two or three galleons that were with him, and the three remaining galleasses, he boldly made some show of meeting the last attack, and so having confessed himself with his officers prepared to die like a Christian soldier. Then it seemed to them God suddenly blinded their enemy; for the English fleet, seemingly without cause, held off and did not attack. But we may remember how Drake had served his hard apprenticeship with the old coasting skipper in those perilous seas, and that he must have known the danger of pressing his enemy too close. To this at least the Spanish seamen attributed the English action. In new alarm they sounded, and found they had

¹ Padre Geronimo, Duro, ii. 407.

but six fathoms. The pilots were once more summoned in despair. Their reply was only the same dogged assurance as before. With the wind as it was nothing could save a single vessel from the banks. They were at the mercy of God. To gather the Armada together and turn to attack the English was equally impossible. Oquendo and Leyva, who had hauled to Sidonia's support when they saw the attack threatened, ranged alongside and called him coward and taunted him with insults to make him fight the retiring enemy, and cried to the soldiers to throw overboard Don Diego Flores, his captain-of-the-fleet. Nothing would he do, but held on as he was, with the enemy aweather watching in silence till they should see him strike. The 'Patrona,' or vice-flagship of the galleasses, sounded and found but five fathoms. The pilots in amazement, they say, vowed that ships so large had never passed those waters before; every moment now they looked to be their last. 'It was the most fearful day in the world,' so wrote a Spanish officer, shuddering at the memory, 'for all the people were now in utter despair of a happy issue and stood waiting for death.'¹ But the end was not yet. Suddenly, as by a miracle, the wind eased off a point or two. A shout of joy went up; the pilots told them they were saved; and before noon the whole fleet was together again, standing fair out to the northward into the deeps of the North Sea.

To the Spaniards it seemed an interposition of God, and the English captains bowed in silence to the inscrutable will that had robbed them of their prey. 'The reason best known to God' had been Drake's only comment when he missed the Plate fleet by twelve hours. Now there is not even so much. From no English mouth have we one word of this terrible disappointment. The subject seems avoided by tacit consent as passing man's understanding. Their work was all to begin again, but no note is heard that is not a cheery determination to carry it through

¹ Don Luis de Miranda, Duro, ii. 271.

mingled with eager cries for ammunition. Only from Seymour's pen is heard a complaint, and that little to his discredit. In the afternoon, when it was clear the Armada had escaped them, Howard called a council, and at this it was decided that the Channel squadron must return to its station, while the main-fleet pursued the flying enemy. To Drake was again given the post of honour in the chase, and Seymour was furious. 'I found my lord jealous,' he wrote to Walsingham to vent his feelings, 'and loth to have me take part of the honour of the rest that is to win, using his authority to command me to look to our English coasts'; and, again, 'I pray God my lord Admiral do not find the lack of the "Rainbow" and that company, for I protest before God and have witness for the same, I vowed I would be as near or nearer with my little ship to encounter our enemies, as any of the greatest in both armies: which I have performed to the distress of one of their greatest ships sunk, if I have my due.' Nevertheless, at sunset he had to return; and Drake, whom he seems never to have forgiven, watched that night upon the enemy.

Drake himself was all cheeriness, and that, too, in spite of his having been ordered to send ashore Don Pedro de Valdes and the other valuable prisoners, whom all this time he had been keeping aboard the 'Revenge' with one eye at least to their ransom. 'We have the army of Spain before us,' he wrote next day, 'and mind with the grace of God to wrestle a pull with him. There was never anything pleased me better than the seeing the enemy flying with a southerly wind to the northwards. God grant you have a good eye to the Duke of Parma: for with the grace of God, if we live, I doubt not, but ere it be long, so to handle the matter with the Duke of Sidonia as he shall wish himself at St. Mary Port among his orange trees. God give us grace to depend upon him,' he concludes, almost as though his faith had been tried past bearing, 'so shall we not doubt victory, for our cause is good.' From Hawkins we have no comment at

all beyond urgent and repeated entreaties for powder and shot and all such stores as the injuries of his beloved ships demanded ; ' for this,' said he, more deeply impressed with the danger than his younger kinsman, ' is the greatest and strongest combination, to my understanding, that ever was gathered in Christendom.'

So the main-fleet held on in chase. When once the Armada was seen in full flight from the Flemish coast, the old spectre of some enterprise against Scotland arose again. An idea was current that the Spaniards dared not for their lives return to Spain with nothing accomplished, and Howard and his officers did not know how secure diplomacy had made the Scottish alliance. For two days they continued to dog the enemy's course, now and again threatening a new attack and compelling the Duke to shorten sail and reinforce his rearguard ; but still never firing a shot. Until the fresh supplies that were being sent out reached them, the little ammunition they had must be reserved to impeach any attempt at landing. Indeed, there was small necessity for further fighting. Should the Armada attempt to anchor in the Firth of Forth, they knew it was at their mercy. A stratagem was in readiness for the expected event, the intention being apparently to dislodge them again with fire-ships, and so deprive the Spaniards of all the ground tackle they had left.

By Friday morning, however, the situation had assumed a fresh development. They had reached as high as Newcastle and about sixty miles from shore, the wind being about south-south-west, and the Armada still holding its course north-west and by north. As day broke a flag of council was seen flying on the ' Revenge.' Up to that time Howard seems to have had some idea of making a final attack upon the Armada to complete its discomfiture. But Drake apparently had ascertained that in his own and the other squadrons that had been engaged all day at Gravelines nothing like a sufficient quantity of ammunition could be collected, and, further, he was able to

point out that an action was now unnecessary. From the course the enemy were keeping the Forth could not be their immediate objective. If any point in Scotland were aimed at, it must be somewhere in the far north. Seeing, therefore, how short many of the ships were of water and other necessities, it was decided to run for the Forth themselves. In this way they would be able to supply their most pressing needs before continuing the chase, and at the same time by a naval demonstration before the capital encourage the Scottish king to resist any attempt of the Spaniards upon his realm. At noon, therefore, the course was shifted to the westward.¹ The Armada paid no heed to the movement but continued as it was, as though bound for the Orkneys or Shetland. To make sure, however, that no mistake was being made, Drake's caravel and a royal pinnace were told off to keep the enemy in view until they were beyond the Northern Islands.² If by any change of wind the Spaniards shaped another course, their orders were at once to report it in the Firth of Forth, and if the fleet were not there to seek for it southward along the English coast. Thus secured Howard held away on his new course, but not for long. Next morning the wind hauled round to the north-west, and once more entirely changed the outlook. It was now impossible for the Spaniards to reach any part of the British coast north of Hull. South of that place as far as the Thames the coast was considered to be so

¹ See 'Fenner to Walsingham,' August 4; Laughton, ii. 38. Howard says 'he had determined to fight with them again on the Friday, being the 2nd of August, but by some advice and counsel his lordship stayed that determination.' 'This is surely official optimism,' Professor Laughton comments. 'It appears certain that he had little or no ammunition left.' This, however, is doubtful. Howard's squadron, it must be remembered had been engaged only half the day at Gravelines. Carey confirms Howard, though with some confusion of dates. 'It was resolved,' he says, 'on Wednesday night, that by four o'clock on Thursday we should have a new fight with them for a farewell; but by two in the morning there was a flag of counsel hung out in our Vice-Admiral, when it was found that in the whole fleet there was not munition enough to make half a fight.' *Memoirs*, p. 21.

² Laughton, ii. 99.

inhospitable that if the Spaniards dared to attempt it with their large ships, it would almost certainly end in their destruction. If, therefore, they had heart left for anything but flight, their most probable course would be to return to the Channel on the favourable wind and make one last effort to join hands with Parma. With small hesitation, therefore, it was decided by the council of war to run for the North Foreland, where they hoped to find the stores and ammunition that had missed them and so be in a position to fight the Armada again.¹

As they ran southward growling that the parsimony of the Government had bereaved them 'of the famousest victory that ever our navy might have had at sea,' the wind continually increased, until off Norfolk it settled down to a westerly gale that scattered the fleet into various roads from Harwich to the Downs. Considerable as was the damage done to their spars and boats, this storm completed the security of the English officers. Drake, hardly able to keep his eyes open for weariness, wrote off to tell Walsingham he was now certain that Sidonia would now have neither the mind nor the means to return. Still both to him and the queen he urged that the fleet should not be broken up at once. It was possible the Duke had made some Danish port, where he might conceivably refit to some extent and at Parma's urgent entreaty return. This was the day after the storm. Two days later, on the 10th, he wrote again, strongly insisting on the probability of the Spaniards having run for Denmark, since not only would the gale have naturally driven them there, but also Sidonia would never be so mad as to attempt the ocean route home north-about in his crippled condition. There was still danger, he argued, especially from Parma. 'I take him,' said he, 'to be as a bear robbed of her whelps.' So great a soldier must take some desperate course, he thought, to

¹ See 'Fenner to Walsingham,' August 4. Howard, in his 'Relation,' says little or nothing of what determined the movements of the fleet. See also his letter to Walsingham, August 7.

save his clouded reputation, and therefore he says they had decided immediately to make a demonstration before Dunkirk to let him know they were back and ready to treat him as they had treated Sidonia.

For the queen this was enough. The enormous cost of the protracted campaign was causing her the gravest anxiety. Great as had been the victory, it had produced little to enter on the credit side of the account. Already she had sent Richard Drake, one of her equerries, who claimed kinship with Sir Francis, to inquire amongst other things why no Spanish ships had been boarded, and how much treasure and how many prisoners had been taken.¹ Since that time the battle of Gravelines had brought in almost nothing; and eager to stop the drain at the first possible moment, she peremptorily summoned the Lord Admiral to attend in his place at the Council. This sudden step seems to have been received with some anxiety in the fleet, and Drake sat down at midnight to pen to his old friend Walsingham a kind of testimonial for himself and the admiral, which was to be shown to the Queen. 'Most honourable,' he wrote, 'the sudden sending for my very good lord, my lord admiral, hath caused me to scribble these few lines. First most humbly beseeching your honour to deliver this letter unto Her Majesty, as a testification of my lord admiral's most honourable using of me in this action, when it hath pleased his good lordship to accept of that which I have sometimes spoken, and commended that little service which I was able, much better than in either of them both I was able to deserve. Wherein, if I have not performed as much as was looked for, yet I persuade myself his good lordship will confess I have been dutiful.'

This was the same day that one of the 'Revenge's' men swore he heard Frobisher openly abusing Drake in Lord Sheffield's bedroom at Harwich in the presence of

¹ Memorial for Richard Drake. Laughton, i. 355. This disposes of the Spanish idea that the Queen had ordered that none of her ships should attempt to board.

Hawkins and others.¹ The ascendancy which Drake had obtained over Howard grows clearer at every point. The Lord Admiral, it would seem, had practically surrendered to him the command of the fleet, and the jealousy of such men as Frobisher and Seymour was undisguised. The latter, urgently sent for by Howard the next morning, refused to come on the plea that he had an independent command in the Channel. 'But if my lord himself should come into the Narrow Seas,' he wrote, 'and that Sir Francis Drake should attend as Vice-Admiral, I pray you let me be called home; for by that I find, by experience, by good observation, some seers of antiquity are not the same persons they are deemed.'² To the high credit of men, who could feel so bitterly, let it be remembered that nowhere do we find a trace of these private animosities interfering, as amongst the Armada officers, with the execution of their duty upon the enemy.

It was not till the 15th that Howard went to Court, and with him apparently he took Drake and Hawkins.³ The admirals were now as eager as the Queen that the fleet should be paid off. Nothing more had been heard of the Armada, and a violent epidemic had broken out. The men were dying like flies, and the ships were in so bad a condition that all required overhauling before they were really fit for further service, and, for some of them, dry-docking was an immediate necessity. The result therefore of the Council's consultations with the sea-officers was that the fleet should be reduced at once to a hundred sail. Drake and Hawkins hurried down to Sheerness to carry out the order. Here, however, they found the disease spreading so terribly that regardless of the Council's limitation they began discharging the auxiliaries wholesale as fast as they could. Howard followed on the 21st, and immediately summoned the

¹ Laughton, ii. 101; and see *supra*, p. 259, *n*.

² 'Seymour to Walsingham,' August 12, 1588; Laughton, ii. 108; and cf. 'same to same,' August 19, p. 128, 'I know I am envied, being a man not suitable with them,' &c.

³ 'Howard to Walsingham,' August 22.

council-of-war to deal with the appalling mortality. Until certain news arrived of what had become of the enemy, it was necessary to keep a substantial force in commission. The only thing that could be done to check the disease was to divide the fleet into two divisions, one to be stationed in the Downs and the other at Margate. In this way at least it would be possible to feed the men properly and refresh them ashore in detachments.

But no sooner were these resolutions taken than Sir Edward Norreys, who it seems had been following the Armada, brought certain news that it was returning. Howard immediately stopped the paying off, retained all the discharged ships he could, and clamoured for fresh men and ammunition. To add to his apprehension three or four of his best ships had been detached to Havre to cut out the flagship of the Biscayan squadron, which had never succeeded in rejoining the Armada after the gale in the Bay, and had now taken refuge in the Guise port. As for Drake, he refused to credit the intelligence. All kinds of contradictory rumours had reached the fleet, and his faith in his own instincts was firmer than ever. 'The uncertainty of the reports,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'make me rather to rest upon mine own conjecture than upon any of them.' His 'poor opinion' was that if the enemy were returning it was only because the wind had prevented them getting back to Spain north-about. Then with admirable clearness he sums up the strategical situation. For successful co-operation with the Flanders army, it was necessary that Sidonia should arrive at a moment when the spring should be at its highest, the weather good, the wind fair, and Parma ready to embark—all in one day—a concurrence of favourable conditions upon which he considered no man could build. Sure enough on the very next day two pieces of intelligence reached the fleet to prove Drake's judgment was sound. Parma had given up the game and had retired to Bruges, leaving orders for his flotilla to be dismantled; and the Armada had been seen by one of the pinnaces to the

westward of the Orkneys.¹ Two days later all thought of danger from either Parma or Sidonia was over. With the exception of a small squadron out of Seymour's division, which was retained under Sir Henry Palmer for a Channel guard, the whole of the ships were ordered to be paid off. At the Queen's summons Howard and Drake went back to Court, leaving the discharge of the fleet in the hands of Wynter, Hawkins, and Frobisher; and so the first great naval campaign of England came to an end.

The news that the Spaniards were taking their way home by the back side of Scotland and Ireland was soon confirmed. Short of water and stores and ground-tackle, and decimated with sickness as they were known to be, they caused but little anxiety; and seeing the condition of the English ships, and the terrible drain the campaign had already made on the seafaring population, there can be little question of the wisdom of making no attempt to intercept the perilous retreat. The weather and the dangers of the navigation could be trusted to complete the work of the English guns. As the year wore on, wholesale wrecks were reported on the ironbound Western coasts. By the end of September Sir Richard Bingham, a Lepanto veteran who was Governor of Connaught, was able to report twelve ships cast away on the coasts of his own province, besides others which were reported to have sunk in sight of land. The whole of their crews were drowned except about a thousand men, who landed and were massacred. Other great wrecks were reported from Munster and Ulster, and some from Scotland and Cornwall. Of all who escaped the sea scarcely one was spared.

¹ 'Edward Wynter to Walsingham,' August 24. He says: 'Young Norreys that was sent after the enemy's fleet to discover which way they meant to take' brought the good news. He must, therefore, have been a different person from Sir Edward Norreys, who assured Howard the Armada was returning. Ubaldino says the news was brought by two men called Harris and Pots, the latter perhaps being the Newcastle man, who furnished a ship of 180 tons and a bark of 30 tons. (See his petition for payment, Laughton, ii. 254.)

Whom the wreckers left alive the local governors executed, and the remnants of these, to whom mercy was shown, were condemned to death by higher authority. Of the hundred and thirty sail that put out from Coruña scarcely a half ever reached Spain again. Nor did the admirals fare much better. Leyva, the idol of the king and the fleet, perished off the Irish coast. Sidonia got safely back, and was allowed to hide himself from the fury of the nation amongst his orange trees at St. Mary Port. His unhappy adviser, Don Diego Flores, was thrown into prison. Recalde and Oquendo returned only to die broken-hearted in their beds, while around them hundreds of the wretches whom the sea had spared were perishing of sickness and their wounds. For the time the crusading spirit in Spain was completely crushed. 'It is a common bruit,' swore a Portuguese prisoner, 'among the soldiers, if they may once get home, they will not meddle again with the English.'¹

So the great crisis had passed. The long-expected trial of strength between the old and the new had come and gone, and Europe gazed in bewildered admiration on the new factor in politics. From Ubaldino's pen we can gather how the thing was measured, when men had had time to think. 'The Spanish Armada,' he writes, 'in its passage through the Channel made from July 19, when it arrived off the Cape of Cornwall, till the 30th or 31st, when it was deprived of all possibility of joining its forces in Flanders, had lost about eleven good ships, and some 8,000 men of all sorts, and a large sum of public money; while of the English ships had perished not one, and of their men (a thing marvellous to relate) little more than 100 in all the actions that took place.' 'To whom,' he asks, 'should be given the glory and honour of such an exploit?' And 'setting aside,' as he says, 'all the tales which by divers persons have been sung in foolish flattery and scattered in print,' his answer is this: 'that all the weight of defending the coast of England from the hostile invasion,

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 223.

and all the work of impeaching the Spanish Armada from joining hands with the Duke of Parma, and finally of not permitting it to take a moment's rest at anchor in any part of these seas, rested upon the sagacity and technical grasp of the naval art possessed by the English officers, who had command in the Royal Navy according to their ranks, and by those who under them commanded their particular vessels. These men making good use of the trustworthy quality of their excellent and fast sailing vessels, which were not encumbered with useless soldiers but free for the guns, so that at any moment they could play without fail upon the enemy, knew ever from moment to moment what was best for them to do.' In other words, he attributes the victory mainly to the fact that England relied for her defence upon a regular trained navy of specially built warships, and this must still be the verdict.

Much has been said and sung of the prowess of the English privateers who swarmed out boisterously and swept the formal Spanish navy from the seas. This is but pleasant romance. It was England who had the formal navy, not Spain, and it was the navy not the privateers that decided the campaign. Here and there individual cases of private ships distinguishing themselves occur, but often they were doing more harm than good. For scouting service and perhaps for a certain moral effect they were of use, but the men who fought the campaign hardly counted them as battle units. It was their boast afterwards that 'thirty of Her Majesty's own ships of war and a few of our merchants' had done the work.¹ 'I dare assure your honour,' wrote Wynter to Walsingham, after Gravelines, 'if you had seen that which I have seen, of the simple service that hath been done by the merchant and coast ships, you would have said we had been little holpen by them, otherwise than that they did make a show.' Even more clearly than the queen's officers

¹ See *post*, p. 287.

we can see it now. The English had invented a new art ; they had created a new machine to put it in execution ; by long and hard service in the open sea they had trained hands to work it, and over all to direct its untried energy there had arisen a master-spirit of the highest order. It was not the first time that such a convergence had changed the course of empire, nor can it be the last.

CHAPTER IX

THE LISBON EXPEDITION

SINCE the great day at Gravelines three centuries have passed, and from our distant standpoint we are able to see the thing in its true proportions, as one of the decisive military exploits of the world. At the time it was not so regarded. The actors, as though dazed with the exhausting struggle, could not see at first what they had done. A note of grave disappointment runs through their utterances. In the exuberant confidence of its lusty youth the new-born power, which so long had insulted its patient enemy with impunity, had looked to sweep gaily from the seas any force that the clumsy efforts of Spain could get together. 'If I have not performed as much as was looked for,' we have seen Drake writing when all was over, 'yet I persuade myself his good Lordship will confess I have been dutiful.' 'Some,' wrote Howard, 'made little account of the Spanish force by sea, but I do warrant you all the world never saw such a force as theirs was.' Montgomery, who was now moved to draw up another memorial on naval affairs, is of the same opinion. 'We never supposed,' he wrote, 'that they could ever have found, gathered and joined so great a force of puissant ships together, and so well appointed with their cannon, culverin, and other great pieces of brass ordnance. . . . Never was there any such navy that came against England before this time.'¹

In public, it is true, this grave note was not allowed to be heard. When out of France came, as was assumed

¹ *Censura Literaria*, v. 139.

from Mendoza's cabinet, a false account of the campaign favourable to the Spaniards, it was answered from England in all the old boisterous high spirits. Howard wished his kinsman, the ambassador in Paris, to 'let Mendoza know that her Majesty's rotten ships dare meet him with his master's sound ships, and in buffeting with them, though they were three great-ships to one of us, yet we have shortened them some 16 or 17, whereof there is three of them a-fishing in the bottom of the seas, God be thanked of all!' Eventually a full reply in the truculent and reckless style, which the journalism of the day approved, was published, telling 'how their Navy, which they termed Invincible, consisting of one hundred and forty sail of ships, not only of their own country, but strengthened with the greatest argosies, Portugal carracks, Florentines, and large hulks of other countries, were by thirty of Her Majesty's own ships of war, and a few of our merchants . . . beaten and shuffled together from the Lizard to Calais, and from Calais chased out of sight of England round about Scotland and Ireland'; and the writer exults to boast how 'with all their great terrible ostentation they did not, in all their sailing round about England, so much as sink or take one ship, bark, pinnace, or cockboat of ours, or even burn so much as one sheepcote on this land.'¹

But in whatever light a patriotic policy might represent the Armada campaign, now as an easy triumph for English arms, and now as a final judgment of Heaven in favour of the Reformation, in official circles its effect was different. Here the tone is one of a sobered consideration that dwells on the small damage done to the

¹ 'A Pack of Spanish Lies sent abroad into the world, translated out of the original and now ripp'd up, unfolded, and by just examination condemned, as containing false, corrupt, and detestable wares, worthy to be damn'd and burnt.' The pamphlet has been attributed to Drake, but, though the style is his, the evidence of his authorship is not clear. Others attribute it to Raleigh, apparently on the ground that a passage very similar to that quoted above occurs in a report of the last fight of the 'Revenge,' which Hakluyt says was from his pen.

enemy, and on the measures for increasing our strength at sea, in view of the surprising power Spain had developed. We have seen how Sidonia's friends, to cover his failure, dwelt on the excellence of the English gunnery; but his soldiers, on the other hand, it is said, considered it very poor,¹ and this was certainly the view of the English experts. It was this shortcoming to which, after the lack of powder, was attributed the failure to complete the destruction of the Armada. On the ground of the lamentable waste of ammunition that had taken place for want of trained hands at the guns, the petition in favour of a revival of Henry's old Corporation of Gunners was renewed. 'If it had pleased God,' the petition runs, 'that Her Majesty's ships had been manned with a full supply of good gunners . . . it would have been the woofullest time or enterprise that ever the Spaniard took in hand.'² Thus early was it brought home to us how useless are the best of guns and ships without an adequate supply of trained men to work them. To the new school of naval warfare good gunnery was essential. Drake alone seems to have understood this; and when he had a free hand at Plymouth, he had exercised his men so assiduously at target practice, as to call forth from Howard a suggestion that he had better be told to spare his powder. Raleigh, on whom of all men Drake's mantle fell, was emphatic on the point, urging the waste and folly of loading up the Royal ships with heavy guns, with but a tithe of the gunners necessary to serve them.³ Montgomery, too, in his summary of the lessons of the campaign, dwells strongly on the necessity of dealing with the proper manning of the fleet. The strength of the crews he thought should be increased from one man to every two tons, which was about the complement

¹ See the 'Notes of Padre Juan de Victoria' in Duro, ii. 442. The Padre is hostile to Sidonia.

² Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 269.

³ *Observations on the Navy*. § *Of Great Ordnance*.

during the campaign, to two men to every three tons.¹ One quarter of these and no more were to be soldiers, and the rest gunners and mariners. In action mariners were to work with the gunners 'to traverse, run out, and haul in the guns.' In a 1,000-ton ship he held the gunners should number sixty instead of forty; to a 900-ton ship he allots fifty-six, and so on, reducing the gunners by two for every fifty tons' diminution in size, whereby a middle-sized ship, such as the 'Revenge,' would get forty gunners instead of the twenty-four with which she fought the Armada.

The next important lesson which the campaign appears to have taught was one we have already seen—the comparative uselessness of the armed merchantmen in the new line of battle. As the growth of the new naval art tended more and more to the differentiation of men-of-war and trading vessels, and to the elaboration of more scientific tactics, it was inevitable that thinking men should see it was on a regular navy that maritime power must rest. Montgomery has nothing to recommend but a substantial increase in the Royal Navy. Instead of the thirty odd ships, at which it now stood, he considered it should be fifty, and the additions he recommends are almost entirely in the largest class. Of ships of the first class—that is of 700 tons and upwards—the queen had five; these he would increase to sixteen. Nor is this all. Attention has been called already to the prevalence amongst naval writers after the Armada of a preference for high-built ships, mainly because of their moral effect. As an immediate result of the campaign Montgomery is found to be of the same opinion. He would have the new ships built not so high as to make them unweatherly, and yet not too low 'for disgracing.' The queen's ships he considered should carry such grace and countenance as to be a terror to her enemies; and when we remember that these views were shared by such men as Monson, Raleigh,

¹ This was the old proportion used by the Spaniards. See 'Instructions of Charles V. to Gonzalo Fernandez de Corduba.' Duro, *Arm. Esp.* i. 12.

and Richard Hawkins we cannot put his opinion down to the bias of an old-fashioned officer. For the time it is certain that a reaction set in against Hawkins's far-sighted policy of cutting down the lofty cage-works that had cramped the naval art throughout the middle ages.

There is another curious feature in Montgomery's new programme which shows how the old ideas lingered. With much earnestness, and at some length, he recommends the addition to the navy of two galleasses to row and sail. 'It was the galleasses,' he says, 'that did the best service against us,' and he confesses he would advise more 'but for the rareness of their building, which is very long and low waisted,' and so unfit for foul weather. Still he urges that galleasses, being of higher free-board than galleys, were really high enough, as was shown by some of them surviving the stormy retreat to Spain, and this was undeniable. All the old arguments in favour of their tactical value he repeats with firm conviction, pointing out the special advantage of the oared vessel for calms, pursuit, and getting the weather gauge, and especially where this free movement was applied to vessels large enough to carry whole cannons. He calls to memory how the galleys in Cadiz harbour had saved themselves by their power of free movement from the havoc Drake had wrought, and shows how amply the benches might be manned from the watermen and bargees of the Thames. Yet fondly as he lingers over the obsolete types, it is only for two moderate-sized galleasses of 600 tons that he pleads. For the smaller rowing classes he is satisfied with the descendants of Henry's row-barges. 'As for galleys,' he says, 'galliotas, foystes, frigates, or brigantines, I speak not of them, for that our long rowing pinnaces in my judgment for our service and seas are more convenient.'

Montgomery's ambitious programme was not adopted. As yet probably the resources of the country were not quite equal to it. His ideas, however, differed little from those of the admirals who had served through the campaign. That the Royal Navy must be immediately

increased was regarded as indisputable. In November a committee, consisting of Drake and the great officers of the Navy, together with the two chief master-shipwrights, had reported that four additional great-ships should be at once taken in hand. 'First, a ship of 100 feet by the keel, of 35 feet in breadth, and of 15 feet depth in hold, which shall have the countenance and form of the "Revenge," but exceeding her in burden 200 tons.¹ The second in all points to agree with the mould of the "Revenge." The third and fourth to be made bastards between a galleasse and a galleon,' that is, as Burghley notes on the margin, 'of length 100 feet, of breadth 30 feet.'² The meaning of this is clear. The 'bastards' are not intended, as Montgomery would have them, as a reaction towards oared capital ships, but clearly as an attempt to get the advantages of the galleasse-built 'Vanguard' and 'Rainbow,' without the defects they had developed. It was a new experiment, and Burghley, with characteristic caution, amended the programme by substituting another 'Revenge' for one of the proposed 'bastards.' Here, then, we have a further emphasising of the sailor influence in the English navy in the preference for the middle-sized ship; and that Drake was its warmest adherent may be assumed from his flagship having been taken as the type of the class.

In this interesting document we seem to see in progress under our eyes the way in which the modern man-of-war was still in process of development from the

¹ This is not at first sight very intelligible. A vessel of the specified dimensions would be, according to the English system of strict measurement, 525 tons. (See Monson, *Naval Tracts*, p. 316; 'A Treatise on Ship-building,' *temp. Eliz.*, MS. in the Pepysian Library; Borough's Report, *S.P. Dom.*, ccxliii. f. 110 and *post*, App. C.) The dimensions of the 'Revenge,' as given by Borough, are 92 x 32 x 15, which made her strictly a ship of 441 tons; she was, however, rated at 500 tons. The 'Ark,' which was of the same dimensions as those proposed for the new ships except that she had one foot more beam and was, therefore, strictly a 540-ton ship, was rated at 800 tons. What the committee, therefore, probably meant was that a 700-rater should be built on the lines of the 'Revenge.'

² The 'depth-in-hold' is torn off.

merchantman. In the discussion over the new type, which was to be longer than a galleon and not so long as a galleasse, we see the Elizabethan warship as a compromise difficult of exact adjustment between the 'round-ship' and the 'long-ship.' But the interest of the programme does not end here. Besides the four capital-ships provision was made for meeting a fresh attempt from Spain with galleys. The suggestion was 'to make four "crompsters" as well to attend the galleys as to defend the river, which otherwise shall put Her Majesty to great charge.' What a 'crompster' was exactly is not known, but from its being designed to act with galleys and for river defence it must have had oars. Finally, we have six long-boats recommended, which were to be 55 feet on the keel with a 7-foot beam, being thus, like Henry's row-barges, longer in proportion to their beam than galleys. On the whole, then, we see the leading naval authorities, after the first great test their ideas had undergone, still staunch to the principles of the English school, and while still regarding oared vessels as desirable for tenders and coast defence, denying them a place in the fighting line.

As for the armament of the new galleons it shows no departure from the principles to which the Queen's officers were committed. It was proposed to give the largest galleon 40 guns in battery, the new 'Revenge' 36 guns, and the proposed two bastard-galleons no less than 48. The crompsters were to have 16 guns and the long-boats four. The shot-weight of the galleon batteries varied from 500 lb. in the new 'Revenge' to 700 lb. in the bastards, showing a slight increase of gun power over the last additions to the Navy. The details of the armament show an even greater advance on the lines that had been adopted before the campaign. For the types of guns are reduced to four, and the proportion of guns of high penetration still further increased with a slight reaction against over-doing guns of extreme range. One of the most important and lasting lessons which the Armada campaign taught English seamen was the futility of long-range

firing at sea, and from this time we may date the enduring love of all our greatest admirals for close action.¹

Nor were the strategists far behind the constructors. An anonymous writer in the following year formulates, perhaps for the first time, the modern doctrine of the command of the sea. Starting with the premise that the Spanish power existed on its Indian trade, he lays it down that the King could never adequately protect the source of his power unless he were 'perpetually master of the seas,' and that to obtain this he must crush the English naval power. The conquest of England then, he argues, with a precocious appreciation of the great naval problem, is essential to the continuance of the Spanish power. Philip himself had tried to persuade the Pope that for his own purposes this was not necessary. 'If I make myself master of the sea,' he said, 'and am able to ensure the safety of the convoys from the Indies, I may very well avoid undertaking so difficult an enterprise [as the conquest of England], while I shall be perfectly safe and unassailable myself.'² Menendez had been of the same opinion. But the English critic was right. Drake's exploits had shown

¹ The details of the proposed armaments are as under :—

—	D.-Cannon	Culverin	D.-Culverin	Sakers	Total
First galleon .	6	12	20	2	40
Second galleon .	4	12	18	2	36
Bastard galleon	8	20	12	8	48
Crompster. .	—	8	6	2	16
Long-boat .	—	—	2	2	4

In the galleons it is specified that four of the culverins and four of the demi-culverins are to be but 9 feet long instead of the usual 12 and 11 feet. In the 'bastards' all of them are to be from 8 to 9 feet, and the same in the crompsters. The reason of this reduction in length is explained by a passage in Monson (*Naval Tracts*, p. 314). 'No ship,' he says, 'commonly carries greater pieces than a demi-cannon, and the rest of her pieces ought not to be above 7 or 8 feet long, unless it be in the chase or stern : they are easier in charging, easeful to the ship, besides better in traversing and mounting.'

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, p. 657. (Translation amended.)

how difficult was the task of making yourself master of the sea until you had swept your rival from its face and established a naval station at his gates ; and Philip was now to have his unlearnt lesson still further enforced.

The queen's idea for following up her victory was to send a squadron on a cruise for the Indies fleet, and the object of Drake's mission to Court was to persuade her of the impracticability of the scheme. The ships, after their long period of service, were in no case for a voyage to the Azores until they had been overhauled, and this work could not be completed till too late in the season to be of any use.¹ Hawkins again put forward his plan for conducting the war by maintaining a permanent cruising squadron on the Indian trade-route, and so leaving the country in peace to recover itself without fear of a renewed attack from Spain.² No note of exultation comes from his pen. Exhausted with the long strain of his administrative duties, that had earned him more abuse than praise, he was weary of it all and only wanted rest. 'God, I trust,' he wrote, 'will deliver me of it ere it be long, for there is no other hell'; and, again, 'If I had an enemy, I would wish him no more harm than the course of my troublesome and painful life; but hereunto and to God's good providence we are born.'³

It was Drake who, in spite of all the jealousies and bad blood that his vehement self-confidence aroused, took complete possession of the war. The late campaign had only served to confirm and deepen his far-sighted convictions. No cruise for plunder, nor even a systematic campaign against the Spanish trade, would satisfy his instinct for what was wanted. It was on nothing less than the complete destruction of the maritime power of Spain that his mind was fixed. It was as though the defeat of the Armada had been but an episode that interrupted his plans. He knew no rest. No sooner was

¹ 'Howard to Walsingham,' August 27; Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 167.

² 'Hawkins to Walsingham,' September 6; *ibid.* p. 213.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 114 and 178.

the danger past, than once more he was scheming for an heroic offensive. In the interval his views had gained shape and cohesion, and it was on Lisbon itself that his eyes were now fixed. The reasons that he had given a few weeks before for not attacking it no longer existed. It was there his genius told him lay the heart of the enemy's naval position, and it was there he meant to strike. To persuade the queen to so vigorous and direct a policy, now that the acute danger was past, he must have regarded as impossible. Even if he could have prevailed with her, it would mean again a high-born commander over him, and the Council's apron-strings. He had a plan more to his mind than that. The Chief-of-the-Staff for the land defence had been a man of like nature to himself. This was the now famous Sir John Norreys, his old brother-in-arms of the Irish wars. To him he went; and three weeks after his arrival at Court the two had laid before the Government a project for prosecuting the war.

Their idea was to undertake it themselves by the aid of a public company. The queen, as usual, was to be a principal shareholder. She was asked to provide six of her ships and two pinnaces, all found and manned; a small siege train; arms and armour for the troops; four months' victuals; wheat for three months more; and, finally, 20,000*l.* in cash. Drake and Norreys each undertook to find 20,000*l.* more, and asked for a general commission for the defence of the realm and for an envoy extraordinary to be sent in the queen's name to request the co-operation of the States. The plan of campaign proposed was that which so long had been Drake's dream—to capture Lisbon and the Azores in Don Antonio's name, and to establish him on the throne of Portugal, or at least in the Islands. One important stipulation Drake made, taught by bitter experience, and that was—that so long as the expedition was kept in port by contrary winds the queen would feed it, and that should she at any time countermand it she would pay the whole cost. Never

before and never again was the Tudor system of delegating operations of state carried so far. No less amazing than the proposal, which practically relieved the Government of the conduct of the war, is the fact that it was accepted.¹ Norreys in person was accredited to the States with authority to treat for the loan of some of the veteran English companies of horse and foot, as well as ships; the queen paid up her money; the City subscribed 10,000*l.*; Drake's previous company, which had not yet wound up the accounts of the great carrack, gave 5,000*l.*; and, thus splendidly supported, he threw himself heart and soul into the organisation of his ambitious undertaking.

That Howard should have felt hurt at the arrangement is only natural. On a similar occasion some years later he actually tendered his resignation in a passionate letter to the Queen. 'I think he liveth not,' he then wrote incoherent with mortification, 'that in any age that any man was seen in this realm where any landing of men was, but it did ever belong to the Admiral of England, as in Scotland sundry times, in France, Tréporte, Brest, St. Valerie, yea and by admirals of my name.'² To a man of so much passionate pride and devotion to his office it must have been an almost unbearable indignity to see himself pushed aside to make room for his own second in command. Nor can we wonder if his cordial relations with Drake were unable to withstand the shock, and were for a time replaced by a jealousy unworthy of his nature. That this was indeed his feeling is unmistakable between the lines of the 'Relation' or narrative of the campaign, which he caused to be drawn up about this time from his own point of view, and which has so long passed as official. It was the obvious consolation for him to seek, and, small justice as his personal apology does to the men who served him best, it is hard

¹ Walsingham announced the queen's decision to employ Drake and Norreys as early as October 19. *Hardwicke Papers*, i. 367.

² Howard to Sir Robert Cecil, April 13, 1596. *Hatfield Papers*, vi. 144.

not to sympathise with the soreness of heart that cries from every phrase.

A special interest of the great scheme by which the Lord Admiral found himself supplanted was that now for the first time were united the two most strenuous forces which the English defence of the Reformation had developed. Trained to arms in the Huguenot wars under the Admiral of France and perfected as we have seen him in the ruthless Irish wars, Sir John Norreys was now one of the most famous and accomplished captains of his time. When Drake was starting for his raid into the South Sea, his Irish comrade had been made Colonel-General of the English volunteers who were flocking to the Prince of Orange's standard, and at the battle of Rymenant, after having three horses killed under him, had proved with 3,000 Englishmen that the renowned Spanish infantry was not invincible. Two years later he became Marshal-of-the-Field or Chief-of-the-Staff to Count Hohenlo, the States Commander-in-Chief, and subsequently he commanded the army of Friesland. In Alençon's time he was again Colonel-General of the English Infantry, and in 1588, when the Armada was on the coast, his position as the first professional soldier in England had been marked by his being made Marshal-of-the-Field to the whole of the queen's land forces. As Drake represented the wild energy of the sea from which our modern navy sprang, so Norreys was the type of the unruly military spirit which had been seeking a vent in the Netherlands; and in fighting against Parma, the founder of modern warfare, it had established the famous school of Low Country soldiers who were the fathers of our modern army. Numbers of the most famous of them crowded in for a commission, bent on restoring the lustre of their profession, which of late years had been thrust into a second place by what in jealous contempt they called the 'Idolatry of Neptune.'¹ They were men after

¹ See 'A true discourse written (as is thought) by Colonel Anthony Wingfield,' in Hakluyt. This is the chief authority for the present expedition.

Drake's own heart, learned in their profession, reckless in courage, untamable in spirit. 'Black John Norreys,' nobly born, quarrelsome, intractable, and defaced with wounds, may well have furnished Shakespeare with a model for his 'Harry Hotspur.' Second to him was his great rival, the renowned Welsh captain, Sir Roger Williams, who, with his professional pedantry, his quaint and forcible turns of speech, his vanity and cool valour, was another 'Fluellen.' There, too, was John Norreys's brother Edward, with the scar on his forehead which a drunken Dutch nobleman had given him with the lid of a tankard; and others like him who live for us still in the pages of the Elizabethan dramatists. To them as to Drake a joint expedition of the two great Protestant Powers had been for years an absorbing desire, and they flocked to the musters with an enthusiasm that filled the whole country with a warlike fever. In his colleague's absence Drake secured the support of most of the great seaports; the Court was as ready as the burgesses; and everything promised for the united forces an overwhelming success.

All was to be ready for Don Antonio and his suite to embark by February 1, but, as usual, Drake's preparations are a story of difficulty, delay, and disappointment. Norreys came back with the promise of 600 English cavalry, thirteen companies of veteran English infantry, and ten companies of Walloons; but Burghley was still doubtful if it would be safe for them to leave the Netherlands.¹ The Queen herself seemed to grow alarmed at the magnitude of the forces she was letting loose, and began to assume more and more control over the arrangements. She could not make up her mind to sign the commissions, and when she had done so, she hesitated to pass them under the Great Seal. The Earl of Northumberland, the most influential courtier who had joined the venture, withdrew, as he said at the queen's command, both his person and his subscription, and

¹ *S.P. Dom.*, cexix. 37.

society followed his lead.¹ The promised siege-train was not forthcoming. The troops furnished by the Counties came in only half equipped; the Walloons were induced to mutiny, and refused to sail. None of the Low-Country cavalry ever arrived, and, after a long delay, the two generals secured but half the English Infantry and only six companies of Walloons.²

Owing to all these difficulties it was not till March that Drake was able to go down to Dover and hoist his flag. Here were gathered his navy-ships and a squadron of merchantmen, that formed the London and East-Counties contingent. Other details had been gathered in various Channel ports, but owing to the failure of six Dutch men-of-war that had been promised and other causes, he still found himself without enough shipping to carry all the troops that had been raised. Still bent on commanding an expedition that should rival the Armada, he took characteristic measures to make good the deficiency. Strangely enough, it happened that the very day Drake set sail from Dover for Plymouth, which was the port of concentration for his whole force, there came sailing by a fleet of sixty Dutch fly-boats in ballast with Spanish passes, 'most of them new and strong,' as Drake wrote, 'twenty of them, as I think, built within these three months; whereupon we thought meet by consent to stay them.' He further explains that having taken this measure he induced their skippers voluntarily to attach their vessels to his fleet as transports, and no doubt his persuasions were hard to resist. With this splendid windfall he continued his way to Plymouth, where he arrived about March 20, to find nearly the whole of his

¹ Major Hume, in his *Year after the Armada*, suggests that many of these promises of support had been obtained by official pressure, and that this accounted for the defection; but it does not appear there is any credible authority for this view.

² See mem. by Norreys and Drake, *Hatfield Papers*, iii. 233. It is dated February, 1586-7, and so placed in the Calendar. But this is obviously a mistake. In the original list of the Hatfield Papers (*Hist. MSS. Com. Rep.*, v. 261a), it is dated February 5, 1588, but this is equally impossible. Its real date is clearly February 15, 1588.

ships assembled, except the Bristol and Southampton contingents.¹

No sooner did he appear in his own West Country with his train of Dutchmen, which everyone seemed to regard as prizes, than from far and wide hundreds of adventurous spirits flocked to his flag. Crowds of gentlemen and whole companies of soldiers came to offer their services, and he had not the heart to turn them away. In a fortnight his force was nearly doubled. By the first week in April it nominally numbered over 23,000 men, of whom some 17,000 were soldiers and pioneers, 3,200 English sailors, 900 Dutch sailors, and 1,500 officers and gentlemen volunteers. The fleet that was to convey them consisted of six ships and two pinnaces of the Royal Navy, sixty English armed merchantmen, and the sixty Dutch fly-boats, or nearly 130 sail of ships besides pinnaces.²

That so large a force could be ready for sea within a few months of the last campaign is a remarkable testimony to the military resources of the country. Though in the end probably not more than 15,000 men all told actually sailed, for the purposes of an invasion the expedition fell little short of the great Armada itself, that had been years in preparation and with all the other calls upon her had nearly exhausted Spain. Even now she was only just lifting her head for a new effort. Yet for England

¹ 'Drake to Walsingham,' March 20; *S.P. Dom.*, ccxxiii. 24.

² See *S.P. Dom.*, ccxxiii. 74. When the fleet subsequently sailed from Coruña, though many ships had parted company, it numbered 146 sail. (See *post*, p. 318.) The numbers of the men are taken from the same paper. They must have been purposely exaggerated, as at this time the generals were pressing for more victuals and money. The force can never have reached these totals except on paper. A return in *Lansd. MSS.* 60, i., which purports to be the actual muster taken on April 16 for each regiment, gives the nominal total of soldiers and pioneers as 16,483, and the total of those present at the muster as 12,194. Some of the regiments were short by nearly half their men. Of 1,200 pioneers only 295 were present. Two-thirds of the regiments, moreover, were mustered 'by estimation' only, so that Colonel Wingfield, in *Hakluyt*, is probably not far wrong in his estimate of the numbers that actually sailed. In trying to minimise the losses in the expedition, he says by strict musters the men never numbered more than 11,000 soldiers and 2,500 sailors.

Drake's fleet did not represent anything like all of which she was capable. The finest ships in the Navy were lying at Chatham ready for sea at the shortest notice. Frobisher was keeping the Narrow Seas with a squadron of three royal ships and three pinnaces, and stopping the passage of war material to Spain. Sir George Beeston had another Royal squadron of three sail for the same purpose and to convoy the 'Stade' fleet;¹ while the Earl of Cumberland with the 'Victory' and six other vessels was preparing for a cruise on the Spanish trade-routes.

No less striking a testimony to the unexpected aptitude for war that England was displaying is the elaborate organisation which Drake and Norreys applied to their force. The soldiers, who formed 115 companies, were grouped according to the latest fashion into fourteen regiments. It was, indeed, the first purely English army that ever saw service organised on the regimental system. The staff was equally elaborate and abreast of the times.² Everywhere we read the influence of the new

¹ When the Flemish ports became entirely closed to the English, the great Company of Merchant Adventurers had endeavoured to keep open their communications with Central Europe by an arrangement with Hamburg. The Hamburgers, however, thinking themselves masters of the situation, were so long in coming to terms that they suddenly found their position turned by the English Company having come to an agreement with a forgotten little free port between them and the sea, whose harbour had long been silted up and her streets grown with grass. This was Stade, a day's journey from Bremen; and here in 1587 the English established a factory, dredged the harbour, repaired the roads, and rapidly created an important mart with which the outwitted Hamburgers were powerless to interfere. So it was by this enterprising stroke that the English Central European trade suffered hardly at all by the long war with Spain. John Wheeler, *Treatise of Commerce*, Middleburgh 1601.

² See two lists, one in *S.P. Dom.*, ccxxii. 97, and the other later in ccxxiii. 74.

The Colonels of the regiments were :

Sir F. Drake.	Capt. Jas. Hall.
Sir J. Norreys.	" Ed. Umpton.
Sir Roger Williams.	" Ralph Lane.
Mr. W. Devereux.	" Ed. Huntley.
Sir Ed. Norreys.	" Ed. Wingfield.
Sir Hy. Norreys.	" Thos. Brett.
Capt. Thos. Sidney.	" Medkerk (Dutch).

school of Low-Country soldier, and nowhere more than in the organisation of the fleet itself. The Armada campaign, as we have seen, had taught the sailors the danger of entirely discarding the old military methods; they had learnt the strength that the Spaniards gained by their squadronal system, and under the soldiers' influence we find an elaborate scheme for 'squadronising' the fleet that is something entirely new, and obviously founded on the existing military system.

As the companies were grouped into regiments, so were the ships grouped into squadrons. Each was composed of about fifteen English merchantmen and fifteen Dutch fly-boats, with a queen's ship, like a colonel's company, at its head, and each was commanded by a Squadron-Colonel. These 'Colonels of Squadrons' were chosen from the chief flag and general officers of the expedition, and each, like a regimental colonel, had his staff, consisting of a 'Lieutenant of the Squadron,' a 'Corporal of the Squadron,' a 'Captain of the Watch,' and a 'Principal Master.' All these officers except the Principal Masters held the substantive rank of Captain. The pinnaces were constituted a separate light division under a 'Master of the Discoveries' (who corresponded to our Chief Intelligence Officer), with the rank of 'Lieutenant-Colonel of the Pinnaces.'

The Colonels' companies were nominally of 200 men; the rest of 150.

Sir F. Drake and Sir J. Norreys, as Generals of the Army, had a headquarter staff consisting of a Sergeant-Major (Captain Wilson), Provost-Marshal (Captain Cross), Quarter-Master-General (Captain Deathick), Treasurer, Commissary or Surveyor-General of Victual (Marmaduke Darrell), Muster-Master (Ralph Lane), Scout-Master, Carriage-Master, Forage-Master, and Corporals-of-the-Field or Aides-de-Camp, besides a Treasurer and Mr. Ashley, the Queen's secretary and agent.

The divisional commanders were: W. Devereux, General of the Horse; Capt. York, Lieut. of the Horse; Sir Ed. Norreys, Master of the Ordnance or General of the Artillery; Jas. Spencer, Lieut. of the artillery; Sir Roger Williams, Col.-Gen. of the Infantry; Capt. Crounward, (?) Lieut. of the Infantry.

The details of the squadrons are as follows :—

Squadrons	Colonels	Lieutenants	Corporals	Cpts. of the Watch	Chief Masters
'Revenge's' .	Sir F. Drake	T. Drake	Yonge	Webbe	T. West
'Nonpareil's' .	Sir J. Norreys	Sackville	Sayer	Champnoll	Wignoll
'Dreadnought's' .	V.-Adl.T.Fenner	Gaston	Baker	Jefford	Bennett
'Swiftsure's' .	Sir R. Williams	Goring	Myles	Geo. Drake	Robt. Hart
'Foresight's' .	Sir E. Norreys	Wynter	Crispe	Norwood	R. Talent

The sixth queen's ship was the 'Aid,' commanded by William Fenner, Rear-Admiral of the Fleet. To her no squadron was attached, for as a note in the General Orders explains: 'The "Aid" of Her Majesty's being appointed Rear-Admiral is left out of the squadrons, in that it doth pertain unto Captain William Fenner's office to see all the squadrons observe their prescribed orders.' On the staff Fenner was assigned precedence between the colonels and the lieutenants of squadrons. Below these officers came the Secretary of the Navy, the Surveyor-General of the Victuals, the Vice-Treasurer of the Navy, the Surveyor of the Navy, the Captain General of the Watch, the Lieutenant of the Ordnance, the Provost-Marshal, the Muster-Master, the Master of the Discoveries, the Transport-Master, and the Clerk of the Stores, and all these officers, except those civilians who held the purely administrative posts, bore the rank of captain. Don Antonio, being an ecclesiastic, held no command, nor did any of his suite.

Such was the first attempt to remedy the vices of the radical revolution which the sailor-admirals had brought about. That it smacked too much of the camp to please the seamen is not to be doubted. Excellent as it looked on paper, for some reason it took no hold; and for a thorough and lasting fleet system the English navy had

to wait till half a century later, when the exploits of the new school of soldiers had so entirely weaned the country from its 'idolatry of Neptune' that Cromwell and his soldier-admirals were able to force their ideas upon the seamen. How far the proposed organisation was Drake's it is difficult to say; but we know on Prince's authority that he had a special affection for soldiers, and this in all probability was a genuine attempt to apply the qualities he admired in them to the sea service. True, he was afterwards accused of never having put the new scheme into practice. It may have been he approved it rather by study than from conviction; but it is more probable that the enormous difficulties he had to overcome in other directions left him no time or opportunity for drilling his captains into the unwonted constraint.

The large additions to his force had alarmingly increased his expenses and the consumption of provisions. For a fortnight the fleet lay in Plymouth Sound unable to put to sea for contrary winds, and in spite of the queen's undertaking to feed the force so long as it was windbound, little or no provision had been made by the Royal officers. While waiting for the concentration to be completed, John Drake and young William Hawkins had taken a cruise, and the sale of the prizes they brought in helped matters a little; but as the wind still held against them the two generals were compelled to represent their condition to the Government. Their report was received with the usual grumbling about extravagance, and they could only reply that the fault was all the Queen's, for not keeping her promises and for the time she had wasted by not being able to make up her mind about the expedition in the first instance. In the midst of the wrangle that ensued the wind shifted fair, and, short of victuals as they were, the generals put to sea.

The spirit in which Drake sailed we can read vividly in a hastily scribbled note of his position, which he left behind him to be forwarded to the Government. He has, he says, 20,000 men, of whom he can arm

16,000 with good weapons, but victuals only for a month, or at most five weeks. 'By the end of the month,' he adds, 'harvest will begin both in Spain and Portugal, which doth put us in good hope of relief, yet twenty thousand persons are not satisfied with small means.' 'Upon my credit with your lordship,' he continues, 'there was never army in better order than this, nor greater hope of good, if God grant relief of victual, which I distrust not. The might of God is as great as Himself;' and then follows the pious postscript in spite of his haste. 'P.S. God bless us and give us grace to live in His fear, so shall the enemy have no cause to triumph over us.' So it was always with him. Get all you could from the latest science of the day, and for the rest there was prayer. It was thus in the very spirit of Cromwell he went out to humble God's enemies, with a Bible in one pocket and a military text-book in the other.

But a sore trial of his faith was in store. No sooner had he cleared the harbour, than the wind chopped round again and he had to put back. The generals were now desperate, as well they might be. Something had happened which bade fair to stop the expedition altogether, as so many had been stopped before. Essex, the most cherished solace of the lonely queen in the decline of her life, had disappeared from Court. Behind him he had left letters relating how, made desperate with debt and idleness, he had gone to win fame and wealth or perish in the attempt.¹ Sir Roger Williams, in the 'Swiftsure,' had not put back with the fleet; and in view of Drake's letter to Essex two years before, there can be little doubt that although he denied all knowledge of the flight, the admiral knew where the truant was. Sir Francis Knollys, who was sent posting down the great west road

¹ As an instance of the spirit which animated the younger nobility at this time it may be noted that our sporting acquaintance, Robert Cary, also meant to play truant with Essex, but to his great disgust got left behind. To console himself for the disappointment he backed himself to walk to Berwick in twelve days, which he did, and won thereby 2,000*l.*, equal to about 15,000*l.* now.

bringing the queen's thunder in his hand, was immediately despatched in chase with a pinnace. It could not weather Ramehead, at the mouth of Plymouth Sound, and had to return. The Earl of Huntingdon, the queen's own kinsman and most trusted friend, came next with still more peremptory orders for Williams's arrest, and Knollys was sent off again. The generals wrote detailing the measures they had taken to stop the runaways and protesting their own innocence, and close on the heels of their messenger they were forced to despatch another carrying letters from each and both to the Council and their friends in the Council urging their desperate condition. Unless a month's provisions were supplied immediately, they flatly said, they must turn their 20,000 men, unpaid and unfed, loose upon the country, and then Heaven help it! In spite of the queen's anger at so peremptory a remonstrance, in spite of her irritation at the increased expense and the favourite's escape, the argument was unanswerable. Orders were sent for the expedition to be fed at the queen's expense till it sailed, according to her contract, and for a month's victuals to be made ready forthwith to follow it to sea. Still, for a week, or even longer, the wind held obstinately in the adverse quarter, and it was not till April 18 that there was any sign of change. Then, leaving his old flag-officer Crosse to see that the reserve victuals came, Drake put to sea, and after beating for two days in an obstinate effort to clear the Channel, he had the wind fair from the north. So hard a task had it been that a number of his transports, containing nearly 2,000 troops, had been unable or unwilling to weather Ushant. But he would not wait, and fearing to waste the northerly wind, perhaps even still dreading a recall, he kept on his course without them, to do that on which his mind was set.¹

¹ Of the 12,194 troops that had been mustered on April 16, he was short by nearly 3,000, viz.: Passed into France 574, separated from the fleet 1,211, deserted 600, left behind in Plymouth 600. Total 2,983. *Lansd. MSS.* 60, f. 1

The commission under which he was sailing was not the general one for the defence of the realm, for which he had asked. It was something much more circumscribed ; and not only this ; for unhappily it was further modified by special instructions which forced upon him a plan of campaign that was not his own. In view of what subsequently took place the exact terms of these instructions are highly important. Fortunately they are extant, and leave no room for dispute.¹ The 'Commission,' after reciting the late attempt on the realm and its probable repetition, empowers the generals to raise certain forces, and with them to invade the Spanish dominions and destroy their forces in preparation. The 'Instructions' attached are very full. The objects of the expedition, they recite, are twofold—firstly, to distress the King of Spain's ships ; and secondly, to get possession of some of the Azores, 'thereby to interrupt the convoys of treasure that do yearly pass that way to and from the East and West Indies.' In carrying out the first object they were to begin with an attempt on the shipping in Guipuzcoa, Biscay, Galicia, and Lisbon. During these operations they were to ascertain how the Portuguese were affected to Don Antonio, and what Spanish forces were in the country. If the conditions were found to be favourable for a restoration of the Pretender, they might attempt it ; if not, they were to proceed at once to the Azores. In view of an occupation of the country in the Pretender's name having been found feasible and effected, they were to retire so soon as his Government was established, but not before they had arranged for all the passes on the Spanish frontier being properly held and fortified ; and for this purpose an experienced officer was to be left behind to see that it was done. Before withdrawing they were also to endeavour, if possible, to get from Don Antonio a reimbursement of the expenses of the expedition, in accordance with an agreement he had entered into with the adventurers.² They were further to endeavour

¹ *S.P. Dom.* ccxxii. 88 and 89.

² *Ibid.* f. 99.

to arrange with him, as a return for the reconquest of the Azores, for the occupation of one of the islands by her Majesty's forces as a naval station, the occupation to last during the continuance of the war. Then follows the fatal injunction, as peremptory as it was ill-advised. 'Before you shall attempt either Portugal or the Azores,' it runs, 'our express pleasure and commandment is that you distress the ships of war in Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Galicia, that they may not impeach you in such enterprises as you are to execute upon his [the King of Spain's] dominions, and so that they may do us no harm in your absence.' Finally, they were enjoined to take the greatest care of their men, and to seize all contraband of war and victuals consigned to Spanish ports.¹

¹ In the *Venetian Calendar*, viii. 456, is a Spanish report of the English movements. The Ambassador says he obtained it from 'a good source,' but it is full of inaccuracies and entirely false statements. It concludes with what purports to be the terms of the compact between Elizabeth and Antonio. By this it appears that, in return for his restoration, Antonio had agreed to see his kingdom reduced to a province of England. The information is said to have come from an English gentleman who deserted to the Spaniards; but Major Hume has traced it to a Castilian source. The alleged agreement is obviously apocryphal, a transparent trick to prejudice the Portuguese against the Pretender. This is especially plain in the clause which provides that all the bishoprics and archbishoprics are to be filled by English Catholics, an unmistakable and clumsy device to alienate the ecclesiastics, who were the Pretender's chief supporters. The merchants are frightened with a proviso that the English are to be allowed to trade throughout the Portuguese dominions on equal terms with natives. The people generally are threatened by a twelve days' sack of Lisbon, to which Antonio is said to have agreed, as well as by a provision for the payment of an enormous indemnity and a large annual subsidy. For the military, is a clause that all the chief forts and castles in the country are to be occupied permanently by English garrisons. Each class of the community in turn is thus threatened with the terrors of an English occupation, and that so clumsily as in itself to be enough to condemn the genuineness of the document. It is unnecessary, however, to rely on its inherent improbability; for almost every clause is made demonstrably false by comparison with corresponding clauses in the above-quoted 'Instructions' and 'Note of Agreement with Antonio.' Unaware, apparently, that the actual draft of the convention existed, Major Hume's judgment on his interesting discovery is as follows: 'However correct or otherwise in detail this agreement may be, it is certain that some such terms were made' (*The Year after the Armada*, p. 21). But it seems more reasonable, in face of the unimpeachable English official documents, to assert that it is certain no such terms were made.

This was far from being the generals' idea of how the campaign should be conducted. Theoretically, no doubt, the preliminary destruction of the shipping was sound enough. For the ultimate operations intended, the command of the sea was essential. But this had been already obtained. The navy of Spain had been crushed the previous year. Now was the time to reap the fruits of victory, and not to waste it in destroying a fleet that could not move. It was on the part of the Government an excess of caution due to exaggerated reports of renewed activity in the Spanish ports, which Drake's unerring judgment assured him might be neglected. His own idea had been to make a dash at Lisbon, and seize the heart of the Spanish maritime strength and the capital of the disaffected maritime province by a *coup de main*.¹ Had this been permitted, we now know Lisbon must have fallen. As it was, the generals, contrary to their better judgment, considered themselves bound by the queen's emphatic order, and made for Santander. According to the story, however, which they told when they were afterwards called to account, the wind backed so much as they proceeded that they were unable to fetch so far to the eastward; and therefore, having obtained intelligence that a number of vessels had put into Coruña, they made directly for the Galician capital, and on April 24 were before the town.²

¹ 'If we had not been commanded to the contrary, but had first landed at Lisbon, all would have been as we could have desired it.' 'Sir Francis Drake to Walsingham' (*S.P. Dom.* ccii. f. 7), dated 'Second of June, 1587,' but should be 1589. See note, pp. 94, 95. And cf. 'Same to Burghley,' from Cascaes, June 2, 1589 (in Strype, *Annals of Eliz.* iv. 9): 'We are all of opinion that if we had come first to Lisbon, the city had been ours;' and 'Sir Roger Williams to Walsingham' (Motley, *United Neth.*, ii. 528 n.).


² 'Answers of the Generals to the Articles against them' (*S.P. Dom.* ccxxvii. 35), and 'Norreys and Drake to the Council' (*ibid.* ccxxiii. 64). Major Hume's comment on the change of course is this: 'Instead of obeying the queen's strict injunctions—for Drake was a far better hand at commanding than obeying—and landing poor Don Antonio . . . they bore down on Coruña.' And, again, 'Drake's sole reason for going to Coruña all against his mistress's orders was to satisfy with loot the mutinous rabble on board his ships' (*op. cit.* pp. 29, 41). Drake's army was raised exactly like

Coruña is situated on the west side of a deep bay that opens to the north, and like Cadiz it is built upon what would be a rocky island but for a low neck of land connecting it with the mainland. The place itself consisted of two parts, a high-town and a base-town or Pescaderia. The high-town occupied a promontory jutting out from the mass of the island in a south-easterly direction, and forming with the connecting neck of land an inner harbour. Off the point of the promontory, still further enclosing the port, lies a smaller island, which was strongly occupied by the castle of San Antonio. The base-town was upon the connecting neck of land, and formed the commercial quarter. Owing to the nature of the coast, the whole place was inaccessible except from the mainland and the harbour, where the base-town lay open to a boat attack. The high-town was cut off from the rest of the island by strong defences across the base of the promontory on which it stood, and the base-town was similarly defended across the shore-end of the isthmus. In the harbour were lying the 'San Juan' of 1,050 tons, 'Almiranta' of the Portuguese galleons, one large hulk, two fine ships, and two galleys, besides smaller craft.

According to Drake's usual practice, his intention was to attack immediately. A strong advance-guard was at once embarked in the boats and pinnaces, and made its

any other army of the time, and why it is called a 'mutinous rabble' is not clear. Indeed, as it was officered by the flower of the Low Country soldiers and consisted largely of volunteers, it was probably above the average. As to the alleged breach of orders and its motive, the learned author seems to have missed the official instructions and the meaning of Elizabeth's subsequent reprimand, as well as of Windebank's letter referring to it (cited *ibid.* p. 36). 'She thinks,' wrote Windebank, 'they went to places for their own profit, rather than for her service.' It is clear from the generals' 'Answers,' &c. (*ubi supra*), that the cause of her anger was not that they went to Lisbon and Coruña, but that they did not go to Santander as well, before landing Don Antonio. (See especially answers to Articles 1 and 2.) As we have seen, the queen's express orders were that they *should* go to Coruña, not, as Major Hume says, that they should not. It was against their will and solely in consequence of her orders that they went there at all.

way to the east side of the bay opposite the town, to seize a landing-place. Here, in spite of the rocky nature of the coast and of buildings which afforded excellent natural defences, the advanced party were suffered to land unopposed, and laboriously climbing in their armour the stone walls that traversed the ground, they advanced forthwith towards the base-town.¹ In half a mile the

CORUÑA AND ITS ENVIRONS²*Walker & Boutall sc.*

skirmishers were in contact with the enemy in the suburbs that lay along the bay, but as the English supports came up, they were quickly driven within the defences. The weather, however, turned so wet and stormy that nothing further could be done, and the troops quartered that night

¹ See 'A Project for a Form of Defence against a Landing of an Army' (MS. in the Pepysian Library), where details of this landing are given by an eye-witness as an example.

² The fortifications shown are modern, but are upon the site of those existing in 1589.

in the hamlets, villas, and mills they had seized.¹ Holding the position they did, they barred the way against any attempt from the garrison to oppose the completion of the landing operations, and that night and next morning the Spanish ships and galleys did their best to dislodge them with their guns. Norreys, who was in command, at once sent off to the fleet for artillery, and directly the guns arrived and were placed in position to batter the ships, the two galleys fled to Ferrol in the adjoining bay, and the fire of the other vessels was quickly silenced.

Meanwhile Norreys had made a complete reconnaissance, and concerted with Drake a plan of attack on the base-town. The general idea was an escalade at two points of the isthmus wall, supported by a boat attack from the harbour. At the west end of the isthmus Captain Richard Wingfield, Norreys's lieutenant-colonel, and Captain Sampson, Drake's lieutenant-colonel, were told off with a 'forlorn' of 500 men to endeavour at low tide to repeat the successful manœuvre in which Sampson had played a conspicuous part at Cartagena three years before. If, however, it was found that the water was too deep to admit of their passing round the end of the wall, they were to proceed by *escalada*. The other escalade was to be at the opposite or harbour end of the wall, under Colonels Umpton and Brett. The boat attack was to be made by 1,200 men under Colonel Huntly and Vice-Admiral Thomas Fenner, the officer who had led the boat attack with Frobisher at Cartagena. The remainder of the day was spent in organising the details of the attack and getting the rest of the troops ashore. By dark all was complete, and shortly before low tide the 1,200 troops were embarked in the boats and pinnaces. At midnight the two guns in position ashore were fired as a signal for the assault, and all three attacks were developed simultaneously. The boats, preparing the ground as they advanced with a

¹ It should be remembered that until the introduction of percussion caps fire-arms could not be used in the rain.

heavy fire from the guns they carried, effected a landing with little difficulty and hardly any loss, and so well did they distract the attention of the garrison that Umpton and Brett made their escalade without blow or shot. On the further side of the isthmus, however, away from the boat attack, the two lieutenant-colonels, unable to turn the defences by wading, were forced to escalade in the face of a very stout opposition. Thrice they were driven back, nor was it until a party from the boats took the defenders in reverse that an entry was effected. The base-town, like Nombre de Dios years ago, was now resounding with the yells and music of the victors, as they raged through the tortuous streets. The Spaniards, according to previous arrangement, retired before them into the high-town, and so confusing were the intricate ways that the English were unable to cut them off. Still, owing to a blunder, the retreat was not made with complete success, and some 500 unhappy wretches were caught and put to the sword, according to the law of arms when a place had been taken by storm. Only a few men of higher rank were made prisoners, and among them Don Juan de Luna, the military commandant of the town.¹

¹ According to Wingfield, the prisoners reported there was in the town a garrison of seven companies, and that two more came in from Betanzos. He gives the names, and they correspond with those in the Spanish official list of the Armada captains and companies that returned to Galician ports in the 'San Juan' and other vessels (Duro, *Armada Inven.* ii. 333). Three of them can be identified as belonging to the Sicilian Tertia and two others to the Tertia of Mexia. The Venetian Ambassador in his reports to the Doge (*Venetian Calendar*, viii. p. 433, *et seq.*), says most of the soldiers were away on furlough; but he admits he only can give the gossip of the Court, as all letters from Coruña were intercepted, and wherever we are able to test his details of the Spanish forces and movements he is almost invariably inaccurate. Here, however, Wingfield to some extent confirms him. For he says in the seven companies there were no more than 500 men. Still, it is clear Coruña was far from defenceless in spite of the surprise. The official report by the secretary of the Marquis of Seralva or Ceralba, Viceroy of Galicia, who was in supreme command, will be found *ibid.* p. 442. He says it was a sheer miracle the town was not lost. 'I will only say,' he adds, 'we have not more than 300 men of the Seville reserves [*sic* in translation] and some few of the district.' It must be remembered, however, he was eager for reinforcements and in fear of Drake's return, who had then

The base-town was thus won. For the soldiers there was at present nothing further to do, and finding a storehouse full of wine, that was being collected, as was said, for the new Armada, they fell to drinking themselves incapable and speechless. It was to this unhappy chance that was afterwards attributed most of the sickness and demoralisation which went far to ruin the prospects of the expedition.

Fortunately the Spaniards took no advantage of the situation. Resolved to concentrate their strength on the defence of the high-town, they next morning double-charged the galleon's guns, set her on fire, and abandoned all the rest of the shipping, leaving the English to plunder unmolested. In the base-town and ships were found some 2,000 quarters of meal, quantities of wine, oil and arms, and from the country round foraging parties brought in droves of cattle and other provisions every day, so that every ship's captain who was not too drunk or too careless was able thoroughly to replenish his stores, and Drake's pious trust in the might of God to give relief of victual was justified.

So far as the queen's orders went, their work at Coruña was now complete. They had destroyed its stores and shipping, and according to their instructions should have proceeded at once to take in hand another port. 'We trust in God,' wrote Thomas Fenner, 'the like shall befall them in other places to the beating down of their practices against that little isle.'¹ But the wind was foul and they could not stir. The fleet as it lay at anchor was continually annoyed by the batteries of the high-town, and Norreys, nothing loath, undertook to attempt its capture. Accordingly a breaching battery was con-

anchored two leagues from the city, and naturally made the worst of his position. As printed in the Calendar, the secretary's report gives the military commandant's name as 'Lusia.' Wingfield, however, always calls him 'Luna,' and we know that a Don Juan de Luna, captain of a free or unregimented company of *harquebusiers*, reached Coruña in the 'San Juan' (Duro, *Arm. Inven.* ii. 39, 80, 333).

¹ To Burghley. *S.P. Dom.* cccxiv. 13.

structed and armed, and on the 28th, when the guns were in position, the garrison was served with a summons to surrender, in accordance with the usual practice. As the flag of truce advanced, however, he was fired upon from the walls and his drummer fell. The commandant was in Drake's hands; the scene at San Domingo no doubt had not been forgotten; and within the city were old soldiers of Italy, to whom the rules of war were a religion. Before the English could move to resent the outrage, a man was swinging from the ramparts and a parley sounding. It was accepted, and the officers of the old Tertias politely explained that the hanged man was the drummer's murderer. Some negotiations followed, relating mainly to the person of Don Juan de Luna, but to a capitulation they would not listen, and the siege was ordered to proceed. Towards the north end of its landward defences Norreys found a place where a tower could be mined, and to the south a battery was established with the best guns that, in default of the promised siege train, they could get into position. In five days, after one unsuccessful attempt, the mine was pronounced perfect, and the breach which the cannon had made, practicable. Both were to be assaulted simultaneously, while with the flotilla Drake threatened the island castle of San Antonio. When all was ready the mine was sprung. Half the tower was seen to fall, and the northern storming party, according to their orders, dashed upon the ruins. But all too soon; for as they mounted, the rest of the tower tottered and crashed down upon them. At the same time the other party crowded to the breach so eagerly and in such numbers, that just as the foremost came to push of pike with the defenders, the rubbish up which they had climbed gave way beneath the weight of men, and left them facing a half-breached wall. With the fall of the tower a panic seized the stormers on that side, and they fled back from their officers. At the breach there was nothing to do but retire, and so, with considerable loss, the gallant attack was repulsed.

There seems to have been every intention of renewing the attempt on the morrow, but as it happened intelligence was obtained from a prisoner of a new danger that was threatening them. To the east of the bay the river Mero falls into the sea, barring the approach to Coruña except at a point where, at a village called El Burgo, some four miles from the town, the Betanzos road crossed it by a narrow stone bridge. Here their prisoner told them an army was gathering to drive them into the sea. Eight thousand men, he said, were already on the spot, and without an hour's hesitation the generals resolved to attack. Leaving Drake with five regiments to guard the siege works and hold the garrison in check, Norreys, with the remaining nine, numbering some 7,000 pikes and muskets, early the following morning went out to clear the enemy from their position. By ten o'clock it was in sight. Across the river was a strongly intrenched camp. The village, on the near side, was occupied as a *tête-de-pont* and strengthened with stone walls. Sir Edward Norreys, who in Sir Roger Williams's absence led the vanguard or first brigade, at once was ordered to attack. Throwing forward his musketeers by three different ways, in about three-quarters of an hour he had cleared the village and its defences and forced the enemy to retire to the bridge. A heavy fire quickly drove them to the further end, but here they made their stand behind a formidable breast-work flanked by houses filled with musketeers. Upon the bridge there was but room for three men abreast, and it was two hundred yards long; but Sir Edward did not hesitate. Placing himself pike in hand at the head of his men, under a rain of musketry he charged across the bridge, leaped the barricade at the end, and thrust so violently with his pike at the leading defender that he overreached and received a sword cut in the head. Colonel Sidney at his side ran his assailant through and rescued the wounded general. The struggle grew hotter and hotter. Twice and thrice the English were driven back. Then Sir John Norreys, though he was but in doublet and hose, seized a pike and

rushed in person upon the bridge to his brother's support. It was a mad stroke of courage, such as Sir Philip Sidney's death had made the fashion, and so fiercely did it fire the young gentlemen volunteers that, charging once more three and three in a rank, they swept the stubborn defenders from the works before their pikes, and in one rush carried the camp.

Though the greater part of the Spaniards were probably but raw levies, most of the fighting had been done by tried old soldiers, and the battle of El Burgo Bridge must be claimed as a brilliant feat of arms.¹ It was followed by a vigorous pursuit till the troops could pursue no more. A thousand of the flying enemy the victors claimed to have put to the sword, and yet were not content. 'If we had had horse,' wrote the two generals, thinking perhaps of their first exploits together under the elder Essex, 'or a few companies of Irish kernes to pursue, none would have escaped.' For miles round the country was laid waste in accordance with the practice of the time, and so in the evening, laden with the spoil of the camp, they returned to their lines, with the Royal Spanish standard borne in triumph before the victorious general.²

During all this time the wind, as Drake wrote to Burghley, had been contrary, 'blowing very much, with a great sea and continual showers of rain.' But now there

¹ Drake told Burghley the Spanish Army consisted of old soldiers and country people (*S.P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 24). The Spanish accounts, according to Major Hume (*op. cit.* p. 39), say Count de Andrada's force was only 'a hasty levy of undrilled and practically unarmed countrymen.' We know, however, the Spaniards did their best to make light of the English successes, and that several other companies of old soldiers besides those accounted for in the Coruña garrison had put into Galician ports on their return from England (*Duro, Arm. Inven.* ii. 333).

² For this action, see Wingfield's account in Hakluyt; Ralph Lane's despatch in *Stowe MSS.* clix. f. 170; Thomas Fenner's despatch, *S.P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 13; the generals' despatch, *ibid.* 15; Ashley's, *ibid.* 14; 'Drake to Burghley,' *ibid.* 23; Sir William Knollys' report, *ibid.* 44. Full details of the English force are given *ibid.* 47. It is interesting to note that Norreys on his triumphant return must have passed over the battlefield of 1809, and close to the spot where Sir John Moore fell.

was a break in the weather, and having secured their retreat by the battle, they resolved to re-embark without further attempting the town. Besides the destruction they had wrought, the spoil was considerable; for over and above wine and provisions, they had between fifty and sixty great brass pieces, besides lesser ordnance and small-arms, and three thousand stand of pikes. The re-embarkation was accordingly effected next day without hitch or loss; the base-town with all its storehouses was given to the flames, as well as all the shipping except three vessels that were taken away, and having thus rendered the place useless for a port of concentration for the new Armada, the generals summoned a council to consider the next movement. Lisbon, there is no doubt, was the point upon which every eye was fixed, but the orders were first to destroy the shipping in the northern ports. In Santander the bulk of what was left of the old Armada seems to have been collected, and this point was the queen's chief anxiety. It is clear they saw their strict duty lay there. Drake, however, argued that it was impossible to destroy shipping under batteries unless the batteries were taken; Norreys said he could not hazard such an operation without siege guns; and finally the chief masters flatly refused to take so large a fleet so deep into the Bay as Santander without being assured of a safe harbour against westerly and northerly gales when they got there. Such reasoning was more than sufficient to salve all consciences, and on May 9 the signal was flying to make sail, with the *Berlingas* for a rendez-vous.

As the fleet left Coruña it is said to have numbered, including prizes and pinnaces, about a hundred and fifty sail;¹ but owing to the strong westerly winds it encountered outside, a number of vessels containing some two thousand men seem to have fallen to leeward and taken refuge in English and French ports.² On the other hand,

¹ Advertisements from Cascaes. *S.P. Dom.* ccxiv. 86 gives the total as 146, Seralva's secretary as 154 (*Venetian Cal.* p. 444).

² Sir Roger Williams's Report, in Motley's *United Neth.* ii. p. 528, n.

six of the missing transports rejoined,¹ but still nothing had been heard of the 'Swiftsure.' On the fourth day, however, as they beat laboriously southward, she was seen bearing towards them with six sail in company in search of them. She had been as far down as Cadiz, and hearing no news of the fleet there, had been making a little campaign on her own account.² Cruising off Cape St. Vincent she had picked up three hulks laden with corn and wine, and three pinnaces; and on her return northward, Essex, Williams, and others had landed at Bayona and driven in the coastguards. After this auspicious meeting it was still four days before the Berlingas were made and the operations against Lisbon could commence.

Under Cape Carvoeira, off which the islands lie, is the town and road of Peniche, some fifty miles from the capital, and here it was determined to effect a landing. On one side of the bay was the landing-place, commanded by the castle, and upon it, as the fleet stood in and anchored, a strong garrison was seen to be drawn up. On the other side was the Beach of Consolation, which was also practicable, but it was encumbered with rocks and a heavy surf was breaking over them. To attempt a landing at this point seemed madness, but nevertheless, to the Spaniards' amazement, they were suddenly aware that a flotilla from the fleet was heading for it. It was Essex and Sir Roger Williams who were in command of the advance-guard. The expedient was desperate; several boats were capsized in the attempt; others were dashed to pieces on the rocks, but it was Essex's first exploit and he would not fail. Leaping into the surf, he himself led the way, and, wading breast-high, gained dry ground in safety. So complete had been the enemy's surprise that not a man got up in time to oppose the landing, nor was opportunity given them to recover their mistake. Scaling the steep cliff that rose abruptly before them, the English reached a sandy plateau stretching up to the town. Here

¹ *S.P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 86.

² *Ibid.*

half the party were left to cover the general disembarkation while the other advanced over the sand hills towards the town to hold in check the troops that were now hurrying to the point of danger. The original intention had been merely to hold the landing place until the full force was ashore. But Sir Roger Williams, like the dashing officer he was, saw his chance and would not wait. Charging the troops before him, he came at once to push of pike. There was a sharp encounter as they met, with loss on both sides. Captain Pewe, of Essex's regiment, and a score of Spanish soldiers fell pike in hand, but in the end the enemy had to give way before the Welsh Captain's furious onslaught and retire, leaving the landing to be completed in peace. So severe had been the lesson that the town being open was at once evacuated, the Spanish troops retreated into the interior, and the same night the castle upon summons was surrendered by its Portuguese garrison to Don Antonio.¹

So much time had been lost already by adverse weather that but one day was allowed for the organisation of the land force. Drake, it is said, was altogether opposed to the operation. His object in putting into Peniche, we are told, was not to land the troops, but to capture a rich Indiaman which was reported to have taken refuge there, but had sailed again three days before his arrival.² No man had ever displayed so high a genius for combining land and sea forces, and as a point for commencing shore operations he considered Peniche radically vicious. Without a baggage-train, field-guns, or a proper complement of cavalry so long a line of approach was obviously a mistake. Moreover, as a sailor, he knew the difficulty of combining the operations of a fleet and a shore force when they had once lost touch. He was therefore for proceeding direct to the Tagus, where with

¹ The Pepysian MS. entitled 'A Project . . . against a Landing,' gives details of this landing also, as an illustration. The Portuguese account is given by Major Hume (*op. cit.* p. 43). Ralph Lane's despatch (*Stowe MSS.* clix. f. 170) gives many interesting details.

² *Venetian Calendar*, viii. p. 441.

exact precision the army might operate from Cascaes in time with him, as under cover of fire-ships and a land attack he forced the defences at the mouth of the river with the fleet. It was St. Julian's Castle, the powerful work that covered the difficult entrance, that was the real key of Lisbon for a naval power, and upon this the land forces should have been directly thrown. But Don Antonio was burning to prove the loyalty of his subjects; the soldiers, bent on an exploit that would rival the recent feat of the seamen, were as eager for the daring march, and before the unanimous opinion of the political and military experts Drake had to give way.¹ On the 17th the general's troop of horse was landed and the disembarkation completed; and next day Drake, as the whole of what remained of the fourteen regiments marched past him, took leave of Don Antonio and the officers, promising, if the weather permitted, to meet them with the fleet in the Tagus.

Accordingly, having detailed a ship and a couple of the fly-boats for the service of the garrison that was left to hold Peniche, he took the fleet down to Cascaes, arriving there on the 22nd. It was the anniversary of the day the ill-starred Armada had put out of Lisbon to conquer England. To the ignorant Portuguese the arrival of the English fleet was a portent that told them the hour of vengeance had come, and the panic was complete. Without a blow Drake took possession of Cascaes. The wind held fair for entering the river; and had his advice been taken an immediate attack upon Lisbon might have been made both by sea and land. The result is hardly to be doubted. The city was half deserted by its inhabitants in spite of every effort of the Spanish authorities to detain them, and it was only by establishing a ruthless reign of terror that Philip's Viceroy, the Cardinal-Archduke, could prevent those that remained from rising on the Spanish garrison. Numbers of the chief Portuguese

¹ Hume (*op. cit.* p. 45), and cf. Drake's view of the defences of Lisbon as given by Ubaldino. (*Supra*, p. 92).

suspected of favouring Antonio's cause were executed; the people were forcibly enrolled to man the incomplete defences; and nothing but a vigorous assault was required for the heroic violence of the Archduke to bring the city about his ears.¹ But Drake could not move. To carry the fleet into the Tagus without the well-timed co-operation of the land forces was not war. And as yet he had no tidings of Norreys's progress. If he failed it would mean not only the destruction of the fleet, but the loss of all means of retreat for the army. And even if he succeeded in forcing the batteries, without a diversion from the land side he would risk being wind-bound in the river at a moment when perhaps the army was in retreat and most sorely needed him outside. He decided, therefore, to stay where he was and endeavour through friendly Portuguese to get into touch with Norreys. For this he was afterwards most unjustly condemned. In thus securing a retreat for the land forces, bent on what he regarded, and rightly regarded, as a rash and desperate enterprise, and for himself a point for getting in communication with them before he attacked, it is impossible to blame him. To modern eyes, in view of the false strategy that had been forced upon him, it seems all that a wise and sagacious commander could have done.

His caution was certainly largely justified by the actual facts. Suffering terribly from heat and want of proper transport, and from the weakness incident to a long confinement on ship-board, the little army at this time was still painfully making its way towards Lisbon. Of actual opposition there was little. The local levies were easily driven before it, and even at Torres Vedras, where the English looked for a hard fight, no attempt was made to oppose them. As a demonstration of Philip's weakness the march was in every way satisfactory, but of a Portuguese rising there was no sign. In spite of their success and Don Antonio's promises, hardly a man joined his standard, and every day sickness and

¹ Hume, *op. cit.*

fatigue diminished the English force. Still Norreys persisted, relying on Don Antonio's continual representations that his subjects were merely waiting till the English were before the gates of Lisbon. As they neared the capital a few skirmishes took place, but in spite of all opposition by the 25th they had taken possession of the suburbs, compelling the enemy to fire their well-filled store-houses to prevent them falling into the English hands—a measure which eventually proved a very serious loss to the Spanish Government, and threatened the country with famine.¹ Still neither from without nor within the city was any assistance forthcoming. The following night, on the contrary, there was a sortie of the garrison in force, but after doing some damage it was repulsed with heavy loss, and the enemy chased triumphantly to their very gates. Even this produced no result, and the English officers began to lose patience. Ammunition was running short; a careful muster showed their force was reduced by about 1,000 men, and of the 9,000 that were left, little more than two-thirds were fit for duty. In council-of-war some were for retreating at once to the ships; others for sending half their force to fetch up stores and guns, while the rest held the position in the suburbs. Norreys, however, considered that without a national movement for the Pretender the whole affair was a failure, and, mindful of his instructions, told Don Antonio plainly that as his restoration was a mere incident in their programme they must pass on to complete their work. The unhappy prince begged for one more day, promising that 3,000 men would join them next evening. To this Norreys consented.

Meanwhile Drake had apparently ascertained his colleague's position; but now came out the main defect of Norreys's plan, which must have been apparent from the first to every sailor. The wind was foul for entering the river, and Drake could not move. All he could do was to summon his captains and masters in

¹ *S.P. Dom.* ccxxv. 6.

council to consider the question of carrying the fleet past the batteries. Unanimously they pronounced against it, on the ground of the weakness to which their crews were reduced. Drake, however, would not listen. Now that he saw success depended on the risk he had deprecated, he was ready to take it, and, determined at all hazards to keep his promise, he ordered two-thirds of the English ships into the outer channel, so as to be ready to pass in, the moment the wind came fair. The remainder were to stay outside to guard the anchorage and the Dutch fly-boats. Next morning the wind was blowing from the south-west. It was the right quarter, and Drake was on the point of making his daring attempt, when news reached him that the army was in full retreat on Cascaes.¹

Hardly a man of Don Antonio's promised forces had appeared, and Norreys had carried out his threat. Owing to Spanish suspicions that the retreat was merely a stratagem to draw them from the city, no serious attempt was made to interrupt the movement except from the galleys in the river. These did little damage, and with the loss of some of the sick and a few stragglers, the whole force was successfully withdrawn. When they reached Cascaes, Drake, in order to secure a quiet re-embarkation, was already attacking Cascaes Castle, which still held out. On the arrival of the army it was closely invested, as the commandant refused to surrender unless he was battered.²

¹ Camden says Drake was accused of cowardice for not keeping his promise, and that he excused himself on the ground that the inner channel was impassable by reason of the guns of St. Julian's Castle and a number of galleys that lay under them, and that the outer channel was too difficult and dangerous from shoals. The defence, however, which he himself gave officially is that in the text (see his Answers to the fourth Article; *S.P. Dom.* cccxvii. 35). Ralph Lane, who afterwards most severely blamed Drake, had no doubt at the time that the fleet was on the point of going in. 'If we had not wanted powder and match,' he wrote from Cascaes, 'we had not returned from Lisbon before Sir Francis Drake's passing St. Julian's' (*Stowe MSS.* clix. f. 170).

² Ashley, the queen's agent, says Drake forced it to yield with 1,000 soldiers and sailors (*S.P. Dom.* cccxiv. 79). Wingfield implies the army took over the siege when it arrived.

The Portugal adventure had thus failed. The firmness and energy of one man had saved Lisbon. Early in the spring, when Drake was first preparing to sail, energetic measures had been taken for his reception; but as the months went by and he did not put to sea, everything was relaxed, and when at last he appeared on the coast, the Spaniards were taken completely by surprise.¹ But for the Cardinal-Archduke Lisbon must have surrendered, in spite of the error in the English operations. Still it was a failure not without glory. 'The world will speak,' wrote Sir Roger Williams, 'how five thousand Englishmen dared the Spaniards to battle at the gates of Lisbon, not stealing (on them) but after giving leave to arm three months.' In deference to Don Antonio no plundering had been allowed; 'but had we made enemies of the suburbs of Lisbon,' Colonel Wingfield lamented, 'we had been the richest army that ever went out of England.' Nor must it be forgotten, in justice to the two generals, that had they been allowed, as they wished, to begin with an attack on Lisbon, had the weather even delayed them a few weeks less than it did, there can be no doubt—so entirely had the Spaniards been thrown off their guard—that not even the Archduke's vigorous rapidity of action could have saved the situation. Lisbon would have seen an English occupation in Don Antonio's name, and with a few thousand men supported from the sea, Sir Roger Williams believed, and not without reason, that he could have held it indefinitely against any Spanish force that could have been brought against it.

But for all the luck that had been against them, the generals were not yet beaten. There still remained the project of the Azores, and in spite of their reduced forces they resolved to persevere. In the midst of their deliberations came news that gave them a flash of new hope. A friar reported the enemy had advanced in force as far as

¹ *Venetian Calendar*, viii. p. 433, *et seq.*

St. Julian's, about six miles up the river from Cascaes, and were proclaiming they had driven the English from the gates of the capital. In the fantastic spirit of that time, which was still hovering between the middle and the modern age, Black John Norreys immediately sent the Spanish commander by a trumpet a formal cartel, giving him the lie direct and challenging him to fight the next morning on his own ground, army to army. The Earl of Essex, not to be behind, sent a challenge on his own account, offering to fight the best man they had, or, if that did not please, he would try their mettle six to six or ten to ten, or any other number they would name. At three in the morning the general marched in eager expectation of a fight, but when the ground was reached nothing but a hastily deserted camp was to be seen.

Without further interruptions the work of re-embarkation was pursued. Guns were brought to bear on the Cascaes Castle and it at once surrendered; so that without any loss all that was left of the army was got on board the ships. It remained to decide on the next move. Recent events had destroyed the harmonious spirit that formerly had existed between the military and naval officers. Each service blamed the other for the miscarriage, and as they lay at anchor off Cascaes blockading Lisbon, council after council met in vain endeavour to agree upon a plan. The chief difficulty was that as yet no tidings had come of the fleet of storeships, which Crosse had been left to bring after them. But as they lay thus undecided a great stroke of luck was in store. The last day of May a large Hanseatic fleet appeared in the offing, making for the Tagus under convoy. Drake at once swooped upon it. The escort ships and a few others escaped into Lisbon, but of the rest the English captains made a clean sweep. Most of the prizes proved to be laden with corn and contraband of war, and many of the vessels were new and in ballast as though intended for the new Armada. By going round Scotland north-about they had eluded Frobisher's squadron and there

was no doubt of their guilt.¹ Every ship was seized, and when the work was over sixty sail were added to the fleet. Upon this the Dutch skippers were dismissed with an offer of corn in payment of the freight that had been agreed upon. But this, as the wind came fair, they elected not to wait for, and with the sick and wounded and all that was not required departed forthwith homeward bound.

Hardly were they gone a day when an English squadron appeared bringing the first instalment of the supplies which had been so anxiously expected, and what were less welcome, letters from the queen breathing all her anger against Sir Roger Williams, and ordering the generals to send Essex home immediately if he had joined them. 'If you do not,' she said, 'ye shall look to answer for the same at your smart; for these be no childish actions.'² Accordingly on June 6 Essex was sent home with an apology from the generals that they had not sent him before because the 'Swiftsure' could not be spared. Williams made a show of wishing to accompany him;

¹ Camden. 'Drake to Burghley,' June 2 (in Strype, *Annals*, iv. 9); William Fenner's despatch (in Birch, *Memoirs of Eliz.*, i. p. 60).

² The exact terms of her letter, as actually sent, we do not know. A draft of it, however, exists, corrected by her own hand (*S.P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 6). In this the following passage occurs, dealing with Sir Roger Williams's guilt in abetting Essex's escape and deserting the fleet with his ship. 'In which point we take his offence to be (for which the Queen substituted "In which point his offence is") in so high a degree, that the sin deserveth by all laws to be punished by death.' If the generals have not already inflicted the punishment of death, he is to be deprived of his command and placed in arrest at their peril. 'For as we have authority to rule, so we look to be obeyed.' The draft concludes with a sharp reprimand to the generals for carelessness in letting Williams escape and for not having stopped him at Falmouth, where it seems he lay while Drake and Norreys were wind-bound in Plymouth. The whole of this, however, is scratched across by the Queen as though in angry haste. Walsingham had strongly urged the Queen's secretary, Windebank, that the draft should not be sent, 'though it was in as mild terms as could be expected.' Sir Roger Williams, he said, was so popular that his arrest would probably lead to a fatal mutiny. 'The two generals,' he adds, 'are wise and men of courage, and will venture rather to hazard her Majesty's dislike than to overthrow the action' ('Walsingham to Windebank,' *ibid.* f. 6, May 2, endorsed 'His opinion not to send the letter,' &c.).

but the generals boldly ordered him to remain, on the ground that as Norreys's successor-elect he could not leave the army. At the same time they informed the Council that so far from abandoning the enterprise they had resolved to sail for the Azores to recruit their invalids at the risk of great privation of victual.¹

The following day, hearing that Crosse was in search of them off Cadiz with the second squadron of victuallers, they put to sea with the reorganised fleet to pick them up. They had got no further, however, than Cape Espichel, when the wind fell away and the fleet in some disorder lay becalmed off the mouth of the Tagus. The day before a squadron of nine galleys from Andalusia had been seen to enter the river to join the twelve that had been lying there under the guns of Saint Julian's without making any attempt against the English ships. United they now took heart to make the best of the opportunity that had befallen them, and all twenty-one sailed out against the scattered fleet. A Plymouth bark² was quickly cut off, and then two hulks were taken in hand. On the first, a Captain Minshaw fought them with desperate valour till, with his

¹ A curious incident occurred at this time of which little further is known, but which suggests that the generals' real idea was to renew the campaign in concert with the Emperor of Morocco. 'At this time,' says Wingfield, 'was the Ambassador from the Emperor of Morocco, called "Reys Hamet Bencasamp" (Qy. Reis Hamed Ben Hassan) returned; and with him Monsieur Ciprian, a gentleman of good place and desert, was sent from Don Antonio, and Captain Ousley from the generals, to the Emperor.' Sir Roger Williams, in writing to Walsingham, June 1, shows he anticipated some such design. 'We are ready to sail, I fear me,' he says, 'with the commodity of the winds, either towards Cadiz, so to Barbary, there to re-victual and to retrench our army to do other exploits, as our numbers and the generals will permit' (*S.P. Dom.* ccxiv. 77). Camden says Don Antonio asserted he had been promised assistance from Muley Hamet, Emperor of Morocco, and the Venetian Ambassador refers frequently to rumours that the 'Sherifa' was to act in concert with the English against the Spanish African possessions opposite Gibraltar and elsewhere. This or a similar design was part of Robert Hitchcocke's plan of operations set forth in 1581 (*Lansd. MSS.* cxix., and see *supra*, p. 63, n.).

² Birch says it was the 'William,' Captain Hawkins (*Mem. of Q. Eliz.* i. 59). Probably Richard Hawkins, son of Sir John.

ship burning under him, he could fight no more. On the second, a nameless lieutenant saved his vessel after repelling an attempt to board him. Meanwhile the Queen's ships were making a strenuous effort to save the threatened hulks by towing towards them with their boats, and the galleys turned their attention to another hulk that lay a league away from the fleet; but here, again, they were met with so bold a front that they retired into the river, for fear probably of being intercepted by the English galleons. Three or four vessels at most, it seems, were cut off, and for this loss Drake by some was severely blamed.¹ Had he attended to the proper 'squadronising' of his fleet, they said, it could not have happened. 'His neglect,' wrote Ralph Lane, 'gave the galleys such an advantage against us, as if Almighty God had not taken their senses and courage from them, not four but forty of our fleet must have burned or sunk in the seas before our eyes, as those others did without possibility of any rescue.' On the whole, then, as he succeeded in bereaving the galleys of their senses and courage, there seems just as much reason to praise Drake for saving his fleet as to blame him for exposing it.

On June 11 the voyage southward was continued, and next day Crosse's squadron of victuallers was met returning from Cadiz. There was now nothing to prevent Drake sailing westward in search of 'some comfortable little dew of Heaven,' as he calls it, as a solace for his misfortune.² All was soon now in order for the Azores, except the wind, and that continued so unsettled that Drake had to issue alternative courses. For the next week the sailing orders were to ply for the Azores whenever the wind was northerly; whenever it was southerly they were to make for the Bayona Islands off Vigo Bay. After beating up and down the coast for four or five days

¹ Esp. by Ralph Lane (see his letter to Walsingham, *S.P. Dom.* ccxxv. 42); but it must be said that he was a captious critic, with a genius for grumbling at his superior officers. Cf. his letters about Sir Richard Grenville (*infra*, p. 353).

² See *supra*, p. 94, n.

the fleet encountered a gale in which the 'Aid' and twenty-five other sail parted company. The rest with Drake holding on a southerly wind reached Bayona on the 17th. Not finding the missing ships there he stood out to the westwards, and in two days put back again to find the lost squadron had arrived that very day; whereupon he ran the whole fleet up a mile above Vigo and anchored. They had now been seventeen days at sea since their last embarkation, and during that time disease and wounds had played such havoc that 2,000 sound men were all that could be mustered. Nevertheless with these next morning, under cover of a bombardment, a landing was effected. Attacked on one side by Sir Roger Williams and on the other by Drake in person, the entrenchments which defended the town were evacuated, and the place occupied without opposition. In the afternoon, after detaching a force to burn the adjoining fishing village of Bouzas, the generals met to consider their position. In spite of the terrible state of the force and, above all, of the loss of his old friend William Fenner, the rear-admiral, who had succumbed to his wounds,¹ Drake would not even yet own himself beaten. It was arranged that out of the ruins of the fleet he should organise a flying squadron of twenty vessels, and with them, while Norreys conducted the rest home, he should make a dash for the Indies fleet. Accordingly, having burned Vigo to the ground and laid waste the whole country round, the generals made sail for the islands in the mouth of the bay, where the new squadron was to be equipped. Hardly, however, had the leading vessels got clear of the narrows, when the most violent storm they had yet encountered burst upon them. Thirty-three vessels, with Sir Edward Norreys in the 'Foresight,' were driven back into the bay and compelled to anchor. The rest Drake led clear out to sea, but there the next day they were hopelessly scattered. Two vessels were wrecked, and young William Fenner, pursued by galleys, held away to the Madeiras in hopes of finding

¹ Birch, *Mem. of Q. Eliz.* i. 59.

the rest of the fleet. Crosse did the same, and so did some of the last batch of victuallers.¹ John Norreys got back to Bayona, where, at a loss what to do, he agreed with his brother to keep to the proposed plan and make the best of his way home. Drake, however, was unable to carry out his part of the arrangement. In the height of the storm the 'Revenge' sprang a leak and became separated from the rest of the fleet. So serious was the injury that it was with difficulty she was kept afloat, and there was nothing for it but for the Admiral to make the best of his way to Plymouth, where he arrived at the end of the month in a sinking condition.²

So ended the voyage of the great English Armada, almost as miserably as that of Spain. It was said that 16,000 men had been lost by sickness alone; but this is certainly an exaggeration. As we have seen, the expedition certainly never reached 15,000 men all told, and of these at least 3,000, counting soldiers and sailors, became separated from the fleet at various times. By September 1, 102 ships had returned home with 3,722 men, and these vessels probably did not include some of the best manned, which sailed for the Azores.³ Still not more than 6,000 seem ever to have returned, and the whole affair was widely regarded at home as a disastrous failure. The survivors barely received their strict pay. Beyond private loot, the plunder was almost confined to about 150 brass guns and the Hanseatic prizes which sold for 30,000*l*. Yet those most concerned proclaimed that in comparison with what the Spaniards had done it was a success greater than many that had been hailed as victories and richly rewarded.

¹ Birch's *Memoirs of Eliz.* i. 60; William Fenner's despatch.

² See *Observations of Sir R. Hawkins, Hakl. Soc.* p. 91. 'Upon the coast of Spain she left her fleet, ready to sink with a great leak.' This is the only passage which affords an explanation of Drake's abandonment of the voyage. The incident is not expressly referred to this year, but it was between 1586 and 1591, and this year, 1589, was the only one between those dates when the 'Revenge' was on the coast of Spain.

³ *Jansd. MSS.* ix. f. 5.

'In this short time of our adventure,' wrote Colonel Wingfield in his fine defence of his two commanders, 'we have won a town by escalade, battered and assaulted another, overthrown a mighty prince's power in the field, landed our army in three several places in his kingdom, marched seven days in the heart of his country, lien three nights in the suburbs of his principal city, beaten his forces into the gates thereof, and possessed two of his frontier forts.' Nor was this all. For Crosse and Fenner, though they missed the Indies fleet, took and plundered Puerto Santo in the Madeiras. Yet both Drake and Norreys were court-martialled, as we should say; that is, they were called upon to answer articles charging them with disobeying their instructions and other matters.¹ There is nothing to show their answers were not considered satisfactory. They were certainly very complete; and in any case the articles themselves entirely dispose of the strictures which Monson, the contemporary historian of the war, made upon the conduct of the campaign, and which most modern historians have accepted as conclusively condemning it. His main charges against the generals are that they attacked Coruña instead of proceeding directly to Lisbon, and that they presumptuously undertook the expedition with insufficient means, especially in the matters of victuals, money, and artillery, all which he regards as proving the folly of private men engaging in so great an undertaking without the support of the Crown. But, as we have seen, the whole of the blunders and defects he mentions were directly due either to the express orders or to the default of the Government itself, and are in no way attributable either to want of judgment or to neglect on the part of the generals. To us it seems that in spite of hindrance where they deserved and were promised vital support, in spite of having had forced upon them a plan of campaign which they knew to be unsound, they achieved, when all was said and done, a gain greater than all they lost; and if all else be left

¹ *S.P. Dom.* ccxxvii. 35.

undecided, we at least may safely endorse the summary of the most judicial historian of that time. 'Most certain it is,' writes Camden, after discussing every aspect of the case, 'that England was so far a gainer by this expedition, as from that time to apprehend no incursions from Spain, but rather to grow more warm and animated against that country.' As a demonstration of the inherent weakness of Spain, which it had been Drake's life's work to teach his countrymen, it was final and complete.

CHAPTER X

DRAKE'S DISGRACE

HOWEVER much the more loyal and far-seeing spirits of the time may have striven to enhance the results of the late campaign, to the country it brought an irreparable loss. And this was the disgrace of Drake. His conduct of the Armada campaign, crowning as it did his previous exploits, had finally lifted him above the heads of all the men who regarded themselves as the natural leaders of the country in arms. The deep and powerful discontent that the Queen's revolutionary step aroused we have already heard with no uncertain sound. In spite of all opposition and all precedent, Elizabeth had committed her sword to the new man, and bidden him at his persuasion strike the home blow from which she had shrunk so long. The provocation that she felt the King of Spain could never forget had been given. All hope of peace was gone, and for all she could see it was herself and not her enemy that was crippled by the outcome. For her and the older school, who honestly enough no doubt distrusted the seaman-admiral and his methods, Drake had failed. For such revolutionary principles as his there can be no defence but success. Leicester, the most powerful of his friends, was dead. Walsingham, the only man who ever really understood him, followed the next year, exhausted with his profitless labours. So for Drake there was no redemption, and without a murmur that has come to our ears he met his hard fate and retired into his unmerited disgrace. Thus for the best and ripest years of his life his services were lost to a country that

could not understand its greatest captain; and nothing shows more clearly the wonder of his work than the course into which the war drifted when his master hand was taken from the helm.

It is Drake's disgrace that marks a second point at which the conduct of the war was again entirely changed. From the naval point of view, the new phase was one in which the plausible but unsound ideas of Hawkins were allowed to supersede the more drastic doctrine of his pupil. From the level of offensive operations in grand form the war sank to mere commerce-destroying; and the lessons to be learnt from the new state of things are amongst the sharpest and most valuable which it has for the modern student.

The causes which led to the new departure were complex. Undoubtedly the comparative failure of the Portugal expedition, and, above all, its unsatisfactory financial result, had given a shock to the 'idolatry of Neptune.' On Drake the failure of the army was laid; while Norreys and the soldiers, though by no means escaping blameless, were held to have reaped all the glory that there was. Coincident with this was the opening of a brilliant field for the employment of the land forces. Within two months of the fleet's return the assassination of Henry III. of France had completely altered the situation. With the Huguenot King claiming the throne, and the Catholic League in hostile occupation of Paris and some of the finest of the Atlantic ports, Philip saw within his grasp a more tempting prize than even England or the United Provinces could offer. Under colour of assisting the League to establish their nominee on the French throne, he resolved to add France to his vast empire. The rest would then follow. For by means of the proposed conquest not only would he secure a land communication with the revolted Netherlands, and be able to act against them with France instead of Spain for a base, but by the establishment of a naval station at the mouth of the Channel he would be on a strategical

equality with Elizabeth at sea, and thus both England and his revolted provinces must fall into his mouth.

Elizabeth's policy was obvious. It was a situation after her own heart. Without risk or great expense to herself, and with every prospect of large gains, she once more was in a position to make war, as it were, under another Prince's flag to reduce the over-greatness of Spain. With two or three small forces operating from the Channel coasts in concert with the Huguenot King, she could hamper every movement which Parma might make from the north; while with a squadron of her fleet acting on Philip's line of communications with his Colonies, she could hope not only to starve his treasury but to fill her own. The advantages of this half-hearted but economical naval policy had been further emphasised by the success of the Earl of Cumberland's cruise the previous year. As Drake's shattered fleet was returning in dribblets, the Earl had sailed for the Azores with the 'Victory' and a few private vessels, and, being there joined by other privateers including the 'Drake,' he not only captured a number of prizes at sea, but cut out several from under the Spanish guns, and seized Fayal itself and held it to ransom. In this way he was able to maintain his station the whole summer, and it was only by sheer bad luck that he missed a rich haul both from the East and the West India fleets.¹

The system of trans-Atlantic commerce, and the methods which the Spaniards adopted for its protection, we have traced already up to the time when Drake was preparing to turn it by a raid into the South Sea, and when Pero Menendez, the first General of the 'Armada of the Indian Guard,' died.² By 1590, when our organised commerce-destroying began, it had been considerably elaborated under Recalde and the two Valdes, and others.

¹ See accounts of this voyage in Hakluyt by Ed. Wright and John van Linschoten, chap. 99.

² The full title was *General de la Armada de la Guardia de la Carrera de las Indias y sus costas*.

When Drake came home from his triumphant circumnavigation, and all kinds of schemes were on foot for following in his steps, nine new galleons for the Indian Guard were laid down in the Biscay yards, and to keep the fleets more compact, the slow hulks of the Hansa and Flemish type were forbidden the Atlantic voyage. At all the points, such as the Canaries, St. Domingo and Cartagena, where the two *flotas* and the East India carracks called either on their outward or homeward voyage, regular squadrons of galleys and frigates had been established as guardships, and the fortifications of the ports considerably strengthened. And besides the regular galleons of the Indian Guard, it had become the custom in times of special danger to maintain a strong squadron on the St. Vincent station to keep it clear of hostile vessels, and to receive stragglers from the home-coming convoys. In addition to these precautions there was now a regular Atlantic postal service carried on in light vessels called *Avisos*, which, with oars and sail, could make the passage from Havana in twenty-eight days. This service was extended by a corresponding local system in the Indies, so that the fleets could be kept fairly well posted in the movements of hostile squadrons, and be warned as to the safest course to take. Eventually as the English got command of the sea, these ocean posts sailed as often as once a fortnight.¹

This elaborate and well-conceived system had been dislocated by Drake's campaigns of 1585 and 1587, and by the diversion of the main elements of its strength for the service of the Great Armada. For a time it was impossible to protect the usual fleets. No galleons were available even for the transport of bullion. As a make-shift, ten or twelve of the best ships of the *flotas* were ordered to discharge their cargoes and equip as men-of-war; but already the officer in command at Havana had hit a new plan of conducting the treasure trade.

¹ 'Report of Spinola taken by the merchants.' (*S.P. Spain*, xxix. 54.) Dated (from internal evidence) 1591.

This was Pero Menendez Marquez, son of the elder Menendez, upon whom pre-eminently the great Admiral's cloak had fallen. Seeing the vice of embarking enormous quantities of treasure in large and comparatively slow-sailing-vessels, he conceived the idea of constructing in his own dockyard at Havana, a new kind of man-of-war specially designed for treasure-carrying. As a model he had the frigates of his father's time, in which, as we have seen, the local West Indian trade was conducted, and which Drake had preferred to his own vessels of a similar class. In 1589, by modifying this type for the end in view, Menendez succeeded in turning out five fast vessels of about 200 tons burden, for which he seems to have suggested the name 'Gallezabras.' From this we may guess they were much on galley lines, but rigged like zabras. These new and enlarged 'frigates' (for so they were always called) could use sweeps when necessary, but they were, nevertheless, essentially sailing vessels, and in them we probably have the real origin of the famous type of cruisers, with which the name came finally to be associated. They proved a striking success. The same qualities that made them good treasure-ships, made them invaluable as cruisers and convoy guards, and Menendez was constantly receiving orders for more. They soon became an indispensable part of every fleet. Orders were issued that before crossing the Atlantic merchants must disembark all treasure at Havana, where Menendez's frigates would call for it, and henceforth we hear of the *Armada*, *fregatas* and *flotas* of the West Indian trade sailing independently, the *fregatas* being armed with twenty guns, and quite able to fight anything they could not run from.¹

The capacity for naval construction thus opportunely

¹ See a letter from Mexico August 4, 1592 (*S.P. Spain*, xxx.), and two intercepted letters in Hakluyt about these frigates, one from the General of the fleet, and one from the Governor of Havana. Also Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. p. 459. In England it was reported they were built 'after the Zabra fashion, but the keel long galley-wise and therefore called Galley-Zabras, made on purpose for swift sailing with oars.' Birch, *Memoirs of Elizabeth*, i. 82.

developed in the Colonies must have come to Philip like a gift from Heaven. Already he was straining his own and his subjects' resources to breaking point in his heroic determination to reconstruct a navy. In 1589 a contract was signed with one Julián de Isasti to build twelve galleons on the English model in Biscay, which were afterwards known as the 'Twelve Apostles,' and nine others on the Portuguese model were laid down at Lisbon.¹ The following year with special view to an improved Indian Guard, another contract was made with two Ragusan captains, called Pedro and Esteban de Ivella, to serve the Spanish crown for twelve years with twelve galleons. There still remained the Flemish trade and the communications with Brittany to be provided for. To this end therefore, beyond his measures for a regular navy, Philip determined to adopt Elizabeth's system of private squadrons, with certain modifications adapted to his more methodical methods of government. In return for a subsidy of 150,000 ducats, and certain commercial privileges, one Alonso Gutierrez in April 1590 contracted with the government to form an armed auxiliary fleet of forty-two sail out of vessels of the class that plied ordinarily between Spain and Flanders. The crews as under the English system were to be fed, but not to receive regular pay, and the contractor was to provide the Captain-General.²

Owing mainly to the difficulty of obtaining shipwrights and material the whole programme was carried

¹ Duro, *Op. cit.* p. 459, and *Venetian Calendar*, viii. No. 899.

² Duro, *Op. cit.* ii. 460. The details of the fleet contracted for, as sent home by the Venetian Ambassador, were :

1 Capitana	400 tons
1 Almiranta	350 "
25 Ships of 200 tons	5,000 "
15 Ships of 150 "	2,250 "
<hr/> 42	<hr/> 8,000 tons

Gutierrez was bound to provide equipment and crews (both soldiers and sailors) for three voyages a year to the English Channel. This contract was for six years. (*Venetian Calendar*, viii. No. 919.)

out but slowly. Nevertheless the Spanish navy was growing into something quite different from anything that had been seen before. In 1591¹ a spy reported its strength as follows:

‘At Ferroll. Thirty-two sail ready, small and great.

‘At Santander. Eight new galleons, the least eight hundred tons. Four already launched, four to be launched within a month.

‘At Bilbao. Ten ships pressed for the king.

‘At the River of Portugal—[i.e. at Lisbon]. Nine new galleons and ships. Four about one thousand tons, the rest from eight hundred to seven hundred tons each. Eight already launched, the other to be launched in a month.

‘At Passages. Fifteen great ships of which thirteen were in the Armada of three hundred to five hundred tons.


‘In all about seventy-five to rendezvous at Ferroll.’

In 1592 the English agent Andrada reported that some forty galleons were in course of construction in the various Spanish yards, and all or most of these were designed on English or French models, and under the direction of Englishmen in the Spanish service.

While the Spaniards were thus absorbed in their heroic effort to recover their command of the sea, the English were as active in seeking to take advantage of the position they had won. Measures were taken to get information as to the movements of the fleets; regular reports came in from spies, and accurate drawings of the new treasure frigates were sent home with their distinguishing marks that the English cruisers might know what to look for.² Some of these reports are of high

¹ Or perhaps 1592. (See *S.P. Spain*, xxix. No. 2.) The paper is dated March 7, 1591, but in English reports from Spain it is not always clear whether new or old style is meant. It is probably 1591, for in December of that year the headquarters of the fleet were changed from Coruña and Ferrol to Lisbon. (See *ibid.* No. 50.) Moreover by the end of 1591 two large ‘stately ships’ had been built by the general of the galleys at Gibraltar, which the paper in question does not mention.

² See especially *S.P. Spain*, Bundle xxix.



A SPANISH TREASURE FRIGATE OR GALIZABARRA.

Reduced from the Original Drawing (State Papers, Spanish, xxix. 56) sent home by an English spy.
 The legend aft reads : 'The arms of Santiago, a special note to know it.' The legend forward reads : 'A place of musket defence for their musketeers to play, notwithstanding their great ordnance.'

interest, and one especially, received about this time, gives a particularly full account of the Spanish system. It is as follows :

‘The fleet of New Spain or Mexico departeth for the Indies from Spain about the 25th of June.

‘It returneth for the Havana with treasure about the 15th of May ; goeth from the Havana about the 1st of August, within four days more or less.

‘There are in this fleet some five of the king’s ships-of-war with two hundred soldiers apiece, in which they bring the treasure.

‘The rest of the ships are laden with hides and cochinilla, and they have no great defence but the mariners. Sometimes they are thirty, thirty-five, and forty ships.

‘The fleet of Terra Firma or Peru goeth from Spain the 15th of January. They bring no treasure but of particular men [*i.e.* except treasure belonging to private owners] when they come from Nombre de Dios to the Havana.

‘This fleet containeth six of the king’s ships-of-war, every of them having three hundred soldiers apiece. They go from Cartagena for the Havana with the treasure about the 20th of April.

‘This fleet cometh one year and stops another.

‘When they have knowledge of any English enemies they part from the Havana between the 15th and 25th of December, and when they have no news of enemies they part thence three days before the feast of St. John Baptist [*i.e.* about Midsummer day].

‘The *Pataos* of advice [*i.e.* *Avisos*], which the king sends, keep the height of 44° when they have news of English enemies, and when they have none they keep the 40th. And till these *Pataos* come to the Havana to tell them the height they shall keep, the fleet never comes forth.’¹

To complete the picture of the situation, when the

¹ *S.P. Spain*, xxix. 58. Assigned conjecturally to 1591, but it bears no date. It is in a Spanish hand. Another report is in *ibid.* xxx. 8.

commerce-destroying phase of the war began, the East Indian trade, which had been annexed with Portugal, must not be forgotten. Its centre was still at Lisbon, and unlike the American trade it was carried on in a few vessels of heavy burden. These were the world-renowned carracks, and it was one of them that Drake had captured in 1587. Of these vessels there seem to have been usually two squadrons, each sailing one year and returning the next. They had no guard beyond their own armament. The practice was for each vessel to leave its last port of lading in India and proceed alone as far as St. Helena. Here it lay a fixed time for the others to appear, and then in company those that had reached the rendezvous sailed for the Azores to await the convoy of the galleons of the Indian Guard. Where no convoy was available, and the seas specially unsafe, despatch boats were usually sent to meet them with orders to divert their course from the islands direct to Spain.¹

Such then was the course and order of that world-wide colonial trade upon which the Spanish Empire rested. Like everything that was stamped with Philip's mind, it was well thought out but cumbrous, elaborate but of defective workmanship. Still, the mere existence of such a system must emphasise an error too generally current, by which we regard our first great naval war as though it were a kind of fairy tale in which a youthful and untaught hero belaboured at his will a clumsy giant. How hard had become the task which the English Government had set itself and how little its difficulties were understood remains to be seen.

The first great fault committed by the assailants was in letting the favourable period slip. Still the failure to deliver an organised attack on Philip's great system

¹ Where no special reference is given the documents from which the above account is mainly derived will be found calendared in *Appendices* Nos. 8 and 9 of Duro's *Armada Española*, vol. ii.; and see also *Galeones y flotas de las Indias* in the same author's *Disquisiciones Nauticas*, 1877, *La Mar descrita*, p. 165.

before it recovered from the blows of the last three years, was no fault of the English seamen. Besides the havoc they had made in the West Indies, in the South Sea they had established a reign of terror. Starting in 1586 to follow in Drake's track, Mr. Thomas Cavendish returned in 1588 with an immense booty, having completed the circumnavigation. In the following year Mr. John Chidley sailed to repeat his exploit and the colonists saw their worst fears being fulfilled. 'All this country,' wrote one of them from Panama in 1590, 'is in such extreme fear of the Englishmen our enemies, that the like was never seen nor heard of: for in seeing a sail presently there are alarms in all the country.'¹ Now at home while troops were being hastily raised for France and escorted across the Channel by Frobisher's and Palmer's squadrons, every preparation was being made for carrying out the naval part of the programme in the spring of 1590.

As a blockade of the Spanish colonial trade had long been the scheme of action which Hawkins had pressed upon the Government, it was natural to commit the work to his hands. With him was associated Frobisher, a man entirely without experience in the work. But Drake's disgrace had once more raised his rival to pre-eminence. Although the two commanders pushed on the work energetically all through the winter, the sailing of the expedition was long delayed. All seems to have been ready by the end of February 1590, but then for some reason the enterprise was countermanded, and poor Hawkins in disgust to see his toil and money wasted lamented to Burghley 'he was now out of hope of doing any royal thing.' But for this unhappy delay he or Frobisher almost inevitably must have captured the bulk of the last year's produce of the American mines, which for safety had been landed at Terceira and was not cleared again till March 19.²

¹ See these voyages in Hakluyt, and the intercepted Spanish letters (*ibid.*).

² 'Hawkins to Burghley,' March 1, 1590, *S.P. Dom.* cccxx. 2; and Linschoten in Hakluyt, cap. 99.

In holding the expedition back the Government doubtless had in view the naval preparations in Spain.¹ Reports were coming in of a powerful fleet of warships and transports that was being concentrated at Coruña under Don Alonso de Bazan, brother of the famous Santa Cruz. Its object was supposed to be either the capture of some port in the queen's dominions, or else the conquest of Brittany, which both for political and for strategical reasons afforded an ideal opening for Philip's operations against France and Henry of Navarre, as well as against England. Under the circumstances a defensive policy was the height of folly. As yet England was practically in command of the seas; the Spanish waters swarmed with privateers that were scouring Spanish commerce from Havana to Cape St. Vincent, and a powerful flying squadron vigorously handled might easily have crushed Philip's efforts to reorganise his trade-defence. Fortunately in a month or so better counsels prevailed. Some one seems to have persuaded the Government that the home forces were well able to defend the coasts, and early in May Drake went to Plymouth with orders to fortify it. Here he gathered a quantity of combustibles and shipping with the intention of attempting to destroy the Spanish fleet should it appear.² About

¹ Capt. Duro says the Spanish navy at this time consisted of a hundred sail either complete or in course of construction, with a tonnage of 48,000 tons and 981 guns. It was being organised in ten squadrons. Six of them were galleon squadrons; two, 'felipotes' or fly-boats; and two, pinnaces (*pataches* and *zabras*). These were all exclusive of the Indian Guard, the *avisos* and the galleys. (*Armada Española*, vi. 79.)

² *Coke MSS.*, *Hist. MSS. Com.* XII. i. 12 and 13, May 2 and 9. The question of fortifying Plymouth was on the agenda of the Council on March 1 (*S.P. Dom. Cal.* p. 652), and from now onward Drake was constantly superintending the works. It was at this time he undertook his memorable work of bringing fresh water into Plymouth by the Leat, for which his memory is still honoured by an annual ceremony (see *Hist. MSS. Com.* IX. i. 278, and X. iv. 539). Recently there has been a difference of opinion on the subject amongst local antiquaries, some considering that Drake so far from being a benefactor to the town, was guilty of a job by which he greatly profited. This opinion is based mainly on the fact that he was paid for his contract by the corporation and received in further consideration the lease of certain mills. The charge, however, has not been

a month later Hawkins and Frobisher sailed, and Drake had the mortification of seeing his rival's flag floating over the 'Revenge.'¹ His own sea service this year, although a report reached Spain that he was cruising in the mouth of the Channel with forty sail, seems to have been confined to a reconnaissance on the Breton coast. In the autumn some Spanish troops were landed there and Elizabeth seems to have feared the French king was neglecting that part of his kingdom. Drake's mission was to learn the truth. A letter is extant written by him in November 1590 to Henry de Bourbon, who was the king's representative in the province, saying that he had been ordered to the coast of Brittany in a despatch vessel to ascertain what the common enemy was doing there, and begging for information. The prince replied in a handsome letter telling 'the illustrious knight' that the common enemy had occupied Hennebon and was fortifying the adjacent port of Blavet (near where the great naval port of L'Orient was afterwards created), and at the same time begging him to use his authority and favour in support of the royal application to Elizabeth for assistance.²

Unfortunately it was Hawkins and Frobisher, not Drake, who had now the authority and favour. It is impossible to avoid a regret that the positions were not reversed, and that Drake in the ripeness of the experience which so much success and failure had given him, should have been denied in his prime the opportunity of perfecting what he had begun so well. Hawkins, though in

established clearly enough to overcome the contrary evidence and the local tradition. The whole work seems to have been part of Drake's pet project for making Plymouth a powerful naval station. For this good water and properly conducted flour-mills were essential. His personal interest in the matter was no doubt a desire to regain the favour of the queen in the way that was always most effective with her—that is, by undertaking mainly at his own expense imperial work, which she ought to have done herself.

¹ The time of their sailing is uncertain. Frobisher was thirty leagues E. of St. Michael's at the end of July (*S.P. Dom.* ccxxxiii. f. 79). Linschoten saw him arrive at Terceira on August 7 (see in Hakluyt).

² Rymer, *Fœdera*; Camden, *Life of Elizabeth*.

administrative labours unequalled, was now too old and rusty for dashing work at sea. Frobisher's record, for all his splendid qualities, was one which gives us no sign of a genius for handling a fleet. Throughout the Armada campaign as we have seen, whenever he became conspicuous it was by having failed to keep his place in the line or to conform to the movements of the admiral; nor on this occasion did he do anything to improve his reputation. Still, that the enterprise did not achieve all that was expected from it, must not be attributed entirely to the admirals. Though the force committed to them was adequate, it was very insufficiently found. To each commander was given a squadron of about twenty sail of ships, of which five only were the queen's; but with a fatuity that to us is inconceivable after the late experiences, they were allowed no more than two months' stores.¹

The details of the campaign have not been preserved; but the general idea seems to have been to constitute a double blockade by maintaining an inner squadron on the Spanish coast and an outer one at the islands. Monson says the object was to keep a fleet on the Spanish coast and to hamper Philip's naval preparations and also to intercept his fleets from the Indies. To Hawkins was assigned the inner station, while Frobisher took the other.² Meanwhile the fleet of Don Alonso de Bazan had been completed, and was lying in Coruña ready for sea with orders to proceed to the islands and convoy the India fleets home.³ It was not, however, till a month

¹ The estimates were for six R.N. ships under Hawkins, and eight for Frobisher (*S.P. Dom.* May 7, 1590, ccxxxii. 13-15). Monson says they had between them ten R.N. ships in two squadrons. Linschoten says Frobisher's squadron was twenty ships, of which five were the queen's.

² 'Estimate . . . for 1,340 men under Sir John Hawkins, on the coasts of Spain and Portugal,' November 7, 1590 (*S.P. Dom.* ccxxxiv. 9). Sir R. Hawkins mentions his father having been on the coast of Spain with a fleet in 1590. See his *Observations*, § iv.

³ Monson says he had twenty sail, Linschoten 'forty great ships of war.' The Venetian Ambassador also says forty ships (*Venetian Cal.* viii. No. 980).

after Frobisher had appeared off Terceira, that it put to sea and then only to be driven back by contrary winds when it had almost reached the Azores. Nor did it sail again; for off the Spanish coast orders reached the admiral to return to his station at Coruña. From the West Indies had come news that an English privateer squadron, fitted out by a merchant called Watt, of long experience in the business, had been lying in wait about the Yucatan Channel, and as the Mexico fleet was passing to the rendezvous at Havana had fallen upon it and captured two of its richest vessels.¹ So powerful was the force which Watt had gathered that once in port the Spanish vessels dared not stir. Havana was protected by three forts, two galleys, and a thousand troops. 'Yet for all this,' wrote a Spaniard, 'the audacious Englishmen being without all shame are not afraid to come and dare us at our very doors.' An *aviso* was sent home for instructions, and Philip, seeing that two powerful squadrons were lying in wait on this side for anything that escaped Watt, felt compelled at the risk of national insolvency to order both the West India fleets to winter at Havana and not to attempt to come home.² An *aviso* sent with a similar order to the East India carracks was captured off Corvo, the most westerly of the Azores, but in some other way warning reached them, and by departing from the usual course and not touching at the islands they reached Lisbon in safety.³

With the recall of De Bazan's squadron the English were in complete command of the seas. Besides the royal squadrons and that of Watt, a swarm of privateers were hovering about the islands and Cape St. Vincent,

¹ Watt seems to have been a citizen of London. An adventurous merchant and shipowner of that name occurs constantly in the State Papers and elsewhere as an organiser of privateering ventures. References to this squadron will be found in Hakluyt. See under 'Certain Spanish Letters intercepted by Ships of the worshipful Master John Watts,' &c.

² Intercepted letter in Hakluyt; *S.P. Spain*, xxix. 51; *Venetian Cal.* viii. No. 980.

³ Linschoten.

and acting more or less in conjunction with the queen's officers. Numbers of prizes were taken. Linschoten, a Dutch merchant who at this time made a prolonged stay at the Azores, tells us that in defiance of the royal orders many of the West Indian ships stole homeward and nearly all these were captured. 'A whole day,' says he, 'we could see nothing else but spoiled men set on shore (at Terceira), some out of one ship, some out of another, that pity it was to see all of them cursing the Englishmen and their own fortunes, with those that had been the causes to provoke the Englishmen to fight.' Still owing to Philip's precautions nothing of any great value was met with. Though by their captures the admirals were able to prolong their cruise till October, they had nothing tangible to show for their pains or to cover expenses. Off the Spanish coast, Sir Richard Hawkins tells us, his father would have captured a whole Spanish squadron intended for the Brittany expedition, but for his vice-admiral having attacked prematurely without orders before Hawkins could get into position to cut off their escape. At the islands Frobisher seems to have sadly wasted his opportunities. All we know of his action is that he appeared off Fayal and sent a trumpet to the Governor with a demand for supplies. The trumpeter was promptly shot and the demand refused. Instead of resenting the outrage and laying the place in ashes, Frobisher sailed away threatening to return and exact retribution, and this he never did.¹ It was not so Drake had made the English name respected.

Still, although the tangible results of the campaign were so small, and although Hawkins considered his cruise a failure, much had been accomplished. The Spanish colonial trade was almost entirely stopped, and the shock which the blockade gave to Philip's finance seriously hindered his work of naval reconstruction. For the first time on record the East India carracks were not able to make their voyage; while the injury suffered by

¹ Linschoten.

the West India ships through wintering in tropical seas led, as we shall see, to one of the greatest disasters the American trade ever suffered. The main effect however, though never placed to the credit of the navy, was seen in France, where Parma's movements were paralysed. To so low an ebb was his master's credit brought that he was not able to raise money to pay his troops, still less to provide the necessary stores for an invasion of France; and while all his energies were consumed in a struggle against famine and mutiny, Henry IV. was left free with his English allies to defeat the League at Ivry and lay siege to Paris. Even when Parma at Philip's peremptory orders succeeded in moving to its relief it was all he could do, and he had immediately to retire to Flanders for want of support, and leave Henry to recover all he had lost. There are even indications that it was the movements of the English squadrons that compelled Philip to defer his invasion of Brittany till the following year and thus give time to Henry of Navarre to find his feet.

In England, deep as was the disappointment at the results of the campaign, it had no effect upon the vicious naval policy. The only effect was to bring the sailor-admirals into complete disrepute, and to re-establish the favour of the Howards and the older school of commanders. Hawkins and Frobisher found themselves branded like Drake, as men who had failed. Like him they had to stand by and see others take their place, but their plan of campaign was repeated. So soon as news reached England that the West India fleets were not to come home till the spring, it was resolved to send a squadron to the islands to intercept them, and so came about one of the most famous fights in naval history. The man chosen for the command was Lord Thomas Howard, with Sir Richard Grenville for his vice-admiral. Neither officer was a man of great experience. Howard was but thirty years of age and until 1588, when he had commanded the 'Golden Lion' with conspicuous bravery, had seen no

service at sea, nor had he been afloat since. It was to his birth and courage that he owed his appointment and in no way to any knowledge of his profession. Grenville, around whom clings the undying interest of the campaign, was a man of widely different stamp, the typical figure of a class of men distinct from either Hawkins, Drake, or Frobisher, whom yet we must honour with them as among the fathers of the English maritime power. It was a class that had in it more of the fabled knight-errantry of the middle ages than of the naval science or the militant and adventurous commerce of Tudor times. Since the rise of the great sailor-admirals the fame of these men had been overshadowed ; but in Elizabeth's early years it was on them and their fierce warfare against all Catholics that the cause of England as a Protestant nation seemed to hang. In those days the Narrow Seas rang with the daring and excesses of the Cobhams, the Horseys, and the Strangways, the Carews, the Tremaynes, and the Killigrews, and all the other wild and lawless gentlemen of the western and southern coasts, whose restless passion for adventure was turned, as in the days of their crusading ancestors, into a war for the religion they so ardently professed and as ruthlessly transgressed. There exists a poem written about the middle of the century by a Sir Richard Grenville of a former generation, which well voices the real spirit that inspired them :¹

Who seeks the way to win renown,
Or flies with wings to high desire,
Who seeks to wear the laurel crown,
Or hath the mind that would aspire—
Let him his native soil eschew,
Let him go range and seek a new.

And so for half-a-dozen stanzas he sings the love of renown and the passion for warlike adventure, which was at the bottom of all the wild work in the Narrow Seas in Mary's time, and which from the first in Spanish eyes

¹ He was probably the Sir Richard who was Marshal of Calais to Henry VIII., and grandfather to the Sir Richard of the ' Revenge.'

made Elizabeth a pirate queen.¹ Though Sir George Carey, Governor of the Wight, could openly regret even in 1588 that the Spanish prisoners in his custody had not 'been made water-spaniels when they were first taken,'² the civilising influences of the time had no doubt done much to soften the methods of the younger generation to which Howard's vice-admiral belonged. No act of cruelty such as sullied the fame of the older men is laid to his charge; and yet there seems to have been a savage side to his courageous nature, which showed his breed.³ He was a man of fierce temper, 'very unquiet in his mind and greatly affected to war. His own people hated him for his fierceness and spoke very hardly of him.' So says Linschoten, who had it from English prisoners. The Dutch merchant tells us too how he was well known in the islands and greatly feared there. He even seems to have taken a grim pride in his notoriety and to have affected the tricks of a Captain Kidd. For it was his humour, says the same authority, to have his prisoners to dine with him and before them to chew and swallow glass in a bravado till the blood ran from his mouth. While in command of Raleigh's first expedition to Virginia he seems to have quarrelled with most of the gentlemen in the service, and unjustly, as Ralph Lane the governor of the new colony thought. Lane accused him of tyrannical conduct from first to last. He told Walsingham it was through Grenville's great default that the action had been made most painful and perilous, and sent home particulars of the admiral's 'intolerable pride, insatiable ambition, and proceedings towards them all,' and

¹ *Sir Richard Grenville's Farewell*, Add. MSS. 2497. Printed by E. Goldsmith in his *Bibliotheca Curiosa*.

² 'Carey to Walsingham,' August 29; Laughton, *Armada*, ii. 186.

³ It has been supposed by some that he was the man who tortured Sarmiento and his crew when they were captured on June 23, 1586, by two of Raleigh's pinnaces (see Clements Markham, *Voyage of Sarmiento*, Hakl. Soc. p. 339), but it seems clear from Hakluyt (*A Voyage to the Azores—wherein was taken . . . Pedro Sarmiento*, &c.) that Grenville was not in command.

himself in particular. Lane, as we have seen in Drake's case, had a genius for quarrelling with his superior officers, but there can be no doubt his charges had some foundation. Though coming of a long line of captains, and known as early as 1574 to the Spanish ambassador as a 'notable pirate,' Grenville's name does not appear in the list of sea-captains, which was drawn up at the beginning of the war, nor although active in organising his county contingent of vessels for Drake's fleet, was he given a command against the Armada; but this may have been simply because, as a natural leader in the West, his services were considered indispensable ashore in the organisation of the land defence; or possibly because of the ill-luck that hung to his name. For his father had been in command of the 'Mary Rose,' when through his carelessness she sank at Spithead in 1545 and her captain had gone down with her. Monson calls Sir Richard a stubborn rash man, and seemed to feel no admiration for him: and, indeed, there is no reason to doubt he had the defects of his splendid qualities. The very nature of his courage tells of a man passionate, proud, headstrong and obstinate. On his return from Virginia he fell in with a large Spanish vessel richly laden. He had no boat to board her, but that would not deter him. He made one out of the ship's chests, and so frail was the craft that as he and his men sprang out of it to climb the Spaniard's sides, it fell to pieces and sank. Such was the fire-eating dare-devil that the young admiral was given to guide and temper his inexperience.¹

In view of the energetic measures of Philip to restore the Spanish navy, the force committed to their charge, though of high quality, was wholly insufficient. At its head was the 'Defiance,' one of the sister ships to the 'Revenge,' which had just been turned out under the programme of 1588. Grenville flew his flag on the 'Revenge' itself. Besides these the royal squadron included the old 'Bonaventure' of 600 tons, which had

¹ Cf. Mr. David Hannay's appreciation in the *New Review*, May 1897. For Grenville's work ashore in 1588, see *Foljambe Papers*, *passim*.

been Drake's flagship in 1585 and 1587, and was now commanded by his old captain, Robert Crosse; the 'Crane,' one of the new 'Crompsters' of the 1588 programme, Captain Duffield; the 'Nonpareil,' Sir Edward Denny; and the 'Charles' and 'Moon' pinnaces.¹ There was also a contingent of half-a-dozen armed London merchantmen with the 'Ba k Raleigh' and some pinnaces. This fleet, however, did not comprise the whole of the season's arrangements. The idea of the double blockade was still maintained. The original intention had been to commit a second royal squadron to Raleigh, but subsequently it was abandoned.² In its place Drake seems to have organised a private squadron to act on the Spanish coast as jackal to Howard's force. It consisted of seven private ships, with the 'Garland' of her Majesty's, another of the new 'Revenge,' for a flagship.³ The command Drake and his partners had destined for one of the Fenners, but on his falling sick, the adventurers entrusted their ships to the Earl of Cumberland.⁴ Besides these a number of privateers encouraged by Watt's success sailed for the West Indies for a cruise about the Yucatan Channel, amongst others a powerful squadron organised in London and another by Sir George Carey, Marshal of the Household and Captain of the Wight.⁵

¹ *S.P. Dom.* cccxxxix. 102, July 21, 1591, and cccxxviii. 150, May 15.

² *S.P. Dom. Cal.* pp. 41, 300, and *ibid.* cccxxviii. 17.

³ She was built by Chapman in 1589-90, but was larger than the 'Revenge,' from which the original specifications were taken. Her dimensions were—keel, 95 feet; beam, 33 feet; depth, 16 feet. Her tonnage by dimensions was 484 tons, but she was rated at 700 tons. Her armament in 1599 was sixteen culverins, fourteen demi-culverins, four minions, and four quick-firing pieces.

⁴ *S.P. Dom. Add. Cal.* March 12, 1591.

⁵ Hakluyt. One of Carey's vessels, the 'Content,' of six guns and a crew of only thirteen sound men under Captain Nicholas Lisle, fought a Spanish squadron of three galleons and two galleys for eleven hours and made good its escape—the men encouraging themselves between the bouts with prayers and singing 'the first part of the 25th Psalm,' which runs thus in Tate and Brady's version:

To God in whom I trust
 I lift my heart and voice.
 O! let me not be put to shame,
 Nor let my foes rejoice.

It was not till April that Howard got finally to sea, and then it was only to meet with weather that drove him back into Falmouth. Grenville alone kept the sea, and after doggedly riding out the gale off Ushant, proceeded to the rendezvous off Cape St. Vincent, where it seems to have been the intention that the fleet should cruise for the treasure-frigates that were on their way from Havana. Off Finisterre he took a small prize and on April 13 off the Berlengas fell in with a detachment of Howard's light vessels vainly chasing a large Hanseatic hulk. To the 'Revenge' she immediately surrendered and proved to be a Lübecker of 1,000 tons, laden with some 10,000*l.* worth of masts, timber and all that Philip most urgently needed for his new fleet. At St. Vincent the whole squadron gathered again, and having heard that the treasure-frigates which they had come to look for had got safe into San Lucar some weeks before, they sent their Hansa prize home and held away for the Azores.¹

At home by this time the mistake that had been made was declaring itself. Reports of the strength of Philip's new navy began to alarm the Government, and a Spanish squadron was reported to be cruising in the mouth of the Channel. Palmer was immediately reinforced; Cumberland, who had not yet sailed on his cruise, was ordered to operate against the enemy; Raleigh was hastened down to the west to organise a privateer fleet, and in London every nerve was strained to reinforce Howard. George Fenner and Thomas Vavasour with the 'Lion' and the 'Foresight' of her Majesty's were ordered to join him, and seven of the finest of the London merchantmen were rapidly brought forward to follow under Flick. The rendezvous Howard had given was between 37° 30' and 38° 30', some sixty leagues west of Fayal, that is, a little

¹ See an interesting letter from an officer of the 'Revenge,' Philip Gawdy, in *Hist. MSS. Com.* vii. 521, and cf. Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. 485. The gold reached Lisbon in March, and was taken overland to Seville. The silver arrived in April.

to the south-west of Flores, where he intended to cruise for the West India convoy till August 30. After that he meant to take the inner station on the coast of Spain.¹ So long however were the Londoners getting clear of the Channel that they proceeded straight to the Spanish coast, where they encountered a ship of Lord Cumberland's and hearing that De Bazan with a powerful fleet had put to sea to reinforce the galleons of the Indian Guard, and that Howard had not arrived, bore away for the islands.

Meanwhile Howard, 'almost famished for want of prey, or rather like a bear robbed of her whelps,' had been fruitlessly cruising off Flores.² Philip, it would seem, knowing the peculiar difficulty of feeding English sailors, who in those days had a reputation on this head like that of the modern British soldier, had again postponed the sailing of the West India convoys, trusting to time to compel Howard to abandon his station.³ This must have been known to Howard; for on the way from St. Vincent he had captured one of the despatch vessels that had been sent to warn the authorities at the islands,⁴ and he clung on in daily expectation that the London ships would come to his relief. But August wore away and still there was no sign of them. The time for the great convoy to arrive was close at hand, but nevertheless Howard was compelled to leave his station and bear up for Flores for water and to refresh his disease-stricken crews. His force at this time, having been joined by Fenner, consisted of six of her Majesty's galleons, six London victuallers, the 'Bark Raleigh' and two or three pinnaces, some sixteen sail in all;⁵ but most of the ships' companies were so badly crippled and reduced by disease as to be little better than half their nominal strength.

Meanwhile Don Alonso de Bazan on August 15 had arrived at Terceira. His force consisted of some fifty sail in all, of which thirty were great-ships and galleons,

¹ See report of Robert Flick, admiral of the London ships, in Hakluyt.

² Philip Gawdy, *ubi supra*. ³ Monson.

⁴ Philip Gawdy.

⁵ Linschoten and Raleigh in Hakluyt.

including some of the new 'Apostles,' ten were Dutch flyboats requisitioned to carry home merchandise that had accumulated at the islands, and the rest barks and pinnaces.¹ By Howard and Grenville no precautions seem to have been taken to prevent a surprise from their rear; but Captain Middleton, another of Cumberland's men, had kept De Bazan company, and on the last day of August he was able to warn Howard of his danger. At this time the English fleet was lying between Flores and Corvo.² A large proportion of the ships' companies were ashore changing ballast and getting in water and provisions, so that all the ships were in disorder and most of them very light for want of ballast. Hardly had the warning reached them when about five o'clock in the evening the Spanish fleet was seen rounding the island of Flores which hitherto had shrouded their approach. The surprise was complete. Howard was greatly outnumbered and in no trim to fight, and to make the best of his carelessness he immediately signalled to recall his shore men and weigh. The Spaniards were advancing in four squadrons, but whether in the old line-abreast or in the new English formation is not clear. So near had they stolen that several of Howard's ships had to slip their cables in order to get to windward, but eventually the manœuvre was successfully accomplished. Howard got the weather-gauge and was able to refuse an action.

Grenville unfortunately had not followed his lead. Some say he believed Don Alonso's fleet to be the West India ships for which they had cruised so long; others that out of sheer love of fighting and disdain for the Spaniards he deliberately intended to force Howard into an engagement.³ Whatever his motive he was so

¹ According to Duro, De Bazan's fleet was 55 ships with 7,200 men, and was reinforced on the eve of sailing by a squadron of eight Portuguese flyboats (*Arm. Españ.* iii. 79).

² Linschoten says they were at Corvo; Raleigh, at Flores. Duro says between Corvo and Flores.

³ There is no suggestion in the authorities that he could not get his shore men on board, as the others did. The idea that he stayed behind the

long in weighing that before his anchors were up the weathermost squadron of the Spaniards was reaching to windward of him. He was only under his fighting sails, and some thought that by setting his courses he still might have weathered the enemy, or at all events have run clear and then beaten up to his admiral. His master urged him to do so, but he swore he would cut down the first man who offered to touch a sail. He vowed he would rather die than so dishonour himself, his country, and her Majesty's ship, and told his men he was going to carry them between two of the Spanish squadrons and defy them to stop him. It was sheer madness; the act of a Quixote rather than that of an officer to whom a Queen's ship had been entrusted. The manœuvre was impossible. As he advanced close-hauled, the leading ships of the Spaniards gave way and fell under his lee. But the great 'San Felipe,' a galleon of 1,500 tons, held on, and ranging up a-weather of him took the wind completely out of his sails. Under her towering cage-works the 'Revenge' lay practically becalmed; she lost all steerage way, and the ships she had weathered hauled their wind and ranged abreast of her to leeward. Thus about three o'clock in the afternoon began that memorable fight. The 'San Felipe,' says Raleigh, was a three-decker with eleven pieces in every tier, besides her eight chasers and her stern guns; but one discharge of the 'Revenge's' lower tier loaded with cross-bar shot forced her to fall away and stop her leaks. The two ships

rest for this purpose rests on a passage in the account which Hakluyt attributes to Raleigh. 'Sir Richard Grenville was the last weighed to recover the men that were upon the island which otherwise had been lost.' Mr. David Hannay (*ubi supra*), is of opinion that this means that the 'Revenge' was told off as the fastest ship to bring off the shore hands of all the ships, and he is inclined to think that Raleigh is correct. But it is almost demonstrable that it was not so. Neither Linschoten nor any one else so much as hints that any men were left behind. On Mr. Hannay's hypothesis therefore the 'Revenge' must have saved them all. This she certainly did not do. Her normal complement (which Mr. Hannay has overlooked) was 250 men; on her books at this time she carried 260. In the fight she had less than 200 hands aboard all told sick and sound.

astern at once took her place and two more were already on the other beam. And so till dark and far into the night the fight continued. Again and again the Spaniards tried to board; but though even at the commencement of the action the 'Revenge' had but a hundred men who were not lying sick on the ballast, and the Spanish vessels had an inexhaustible supply of soldiers, she continually beat them off. The movements of the rest of the English fleet at this time are not explained. Camden says Howard was for going into the thick of it to Grenville's rescue, but that the master refused to expose the Queen's ships to certain destruction. Nevertheless he tells us that Howard and the rest did make a diversion in the 'Revenge's' favour so long as they could keep the wind, and that Thomas Vavasour in the 'Foresight' fought by her for two hours; but the manœuvres of the unengaged Spanish squadrons eventually compelled them, it would seem, to bear away to save themselves. Perhaps the admiral was right to leave the madman to his fate. To have attempted his rescue was certainly to sacrifice the whole squadron, but it is impossible not to admire Grenville's splendid folly before the admiral's unimpeachable prudence. One ship alone, the 'George Noble,' one of the original contingent of London victuallers, stood by to offer help; but Grenville bade her captain save himself; and so alone in the midst of the Spanish squadrons the 'Revenge' was left to her last fight.

As the storm of shot tore away her upper works, the crew became more and more exposed to the showers of musketry that rained upon them from the enemy's tops and cage-works. An hour before midnight Grenville himself was struck in the body, and while the wound was being dressed, his surgeon was shot dead and Grenville hit again in the head. But still the fight went on. By three o'clock in the morning, it is said, fifteen ships had attacked the 'Revenge' and been beaten off; and of these two had gone to the bottom at her side, one afterwards sank at St. Michael's, and a fourth was run ashore to save the

crew ; while the Spaniards themselves acknowledged a loss of 400 men in killed alone. And now, as the day broke, the 'Revenge' was seen lying still defiant, with not a mast standing, and all her upper works shot away down to the main deck. Not a barrel of powder had she left, all her pikes were broken, forty of her crew were dead, hardly a man of the rest was unhurt, her commander was mortally wounded, and round her in a silent ring lay the Spanish ships scored with the marks of her teeth.

For twelve long hours, with never less than two of the enemy engaging her, she had fought them and defied their utmost efforts. But now further resistance was impossible, and Grenville, knowing his master-gunner's resolute spirit, gasped to him an order to split and sink the ship. The master-gunner was ready to obey and so were many others, but the flag-captain and the master, covered with wounds, urged that all possible lives should be spared for the Queen, to avenge that day's work. Thus arose a great controversy among the company whether to sink or surrender. In the midst of it the master put off to the Spanish admiral, and obtained such terms as the unparalleled defence deserved. So against his will the dying captain was forced to yield. The master-gunner tried to kill himself, and had to be locked in his cabin. Grenville was carried on board the 'San Paolo' the Spanish flagship, where everything possible was done for him by his admiring enemies. But all was in vain. He slowly sank, and the Spanish captains and gentlemen came to see him and give him comfort, 'wondering at his courage and stout heart, for that he showed not any signs of faintness nor changing of colour.' So says Linschoten the Dutchman, and thus describes how he made his end with a confession of the fierce faith of his race. 'Feeling the hour of death to approach he spake these words in Spanish, and said : " Here die I, Richard Grenville, with a joyful and quiet mind, for that I have ended my life as a true soldier ought to do, that hath fought for his country, Queen, religion, and honour ; whereby my soul most

joyfully departeth out of this body, and shall always leave behind it an everlasting fame of a valiant and true soldier that hath done his duty as he was bound to do. But the others of my company have done as traitors and dogs, for which they shall be reproached all their lives and leave a shameful name for ever." When he had said these, or such other like words, he gave up the ghost with a great and stout courage, and no man could perceive any true sign of heaviness in him.¹

So perished the last of a race of soldiers of the sea to whom our naval traditions owe a golden legacy. Strongly as we may condemn the obstinate presumption to which the 'Revenge' was sacrificed, it is certain that unless an officer be touched with a breath of the spirit that sped that day on the 'San Paolo' in the midst of the enemy, he is unfit to command a ship-of-war. Without a glow of its fire, ships become but counters and tactics sink to pedantry.

Where he was buried no one knew, but his obsequies were marked fittingly by a holocaust of Spanish ships. His last wish had been that the famous 'Revenge' should not remain a trophy in the Spaniards' hands, and his wish was soon fulfilled. For a fortnight longer De Bazan remained at Corvo waiting for the West India convoys to gather to his flag, and by that time he had under his wing 140 sail. As they were on the point of sailing for Terceira a cyclone of unparalleled violence struck them. For a whole week it raged, and the West India ships, worm-eaten and decayed by the long detention abroad which the English operations had enforced, were quite unable to withstand it. The carcass of the 'Revenge' was dashed to pieces on Terceira, and

¹ Linschoten's authority is probably high; for he had his information, he says, from the mouths of Bertendona, who commanded the Biscayan squadron of the fleet, and from the captain and master of the 'Revenge,' whom he entertained at his house at Terceira. The last sentence of the speech as reported by him the English translators discreetly suppressed, and we are indebted for its resurrection to the industry of Mr. Hannay (*op. cit.* p. 501).

with her were lost her prize crew of seventy men and some English prisoners that were still on board. Between the Indies and Corvo the West India fleets had lost already by tempest and capture by the English privateers that dogged their track, some seventy vessels; and now about the wreck of the 'Revenge' were scattered over a hundred more. Of the 140 sail that had gathered at Corvo, not a half ever reached home. Thousands of bodies littered the shores of the islands, and many estimated that even in the Armada itself the disaster had been less. So, says Linschoten, the taking of the 'Revenge' was justly revenged upon them; and the islanders began to doubt the power of God. Her ferocious captain seemed to them to be fighting still in hell against them. 'So soon,' says the Dutchman, 'as they had thrown overboard the dead body of Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Grenville, they verily thought that, as he had a devilish faith and religion and therefore the devils loved him, so he presently sank into the bottom of the sea and down into hell, where he raised up all the devils to the revenge of his death. Such and the like blasphemies against God they ceased not openly to utter, without being reproved of any man.'¹

In spite of these tempests Howard's and Flick's

¹ An examination of certain prisoners in England (in Hakluyt) gives the details of the disaster differently. The whole fleet that rendezvoused at Havana, they say, was 77 sail of from 1,000 to 200 tons. Of these only 48 reached Corvo in company. These presumably were the 48 vessels of the American convoys, which Capt. Duro tells us arrived together under Aparicio de Artega. Eleven others arrived under Antonio Navario (*Armada Española*, iii. 81). De Bazan's fleet, that he brought from Spain, was 63 sail, which added to the above two squadrons (after deducting those lost in action with the 'Revenge') gives nearly 120 sail. Some stragglers probably joined independently; so that the whole fleet at the time of the gale cannot have been far short of Linschoten's 140. The prisoners deposed that the whole number that should have arrived that year was 125. Captain Duro, in his *Noticia de Naufragios* (*Arm. Esp.* ii. App. 10), gives the wrecks of the New Spain convoy alone at 17, including the *capitana*, and 16 vessels he says were cast away on the one island of Terceira (*ibid.* iii. 81). The Venetian Ambassador said it was forbidden under severe penalties to speak of these losses, yet he had ascertained that thirty-one merchantmen and three men-of-war were missing, besides nine which the English were known to have captured (*Venet. Cal.* viii. No. 1117).

squadrons held their station, and many of the Spanish vessels unaccounted for fell into their hands; so that the voyage eventually nearly paid its expenses. Cumberland did but little; for though he captured several rich prizes, nearly all of them were lost or retaken with their prize crews, and finally De Bazan's putting to sea had forced him to leave his station and to return to England after detaching the pinnace to warn Howard. His excuse for doing no more was that the 'Garland,' which was on her trial voyage, proved a bad sailer, and far from an improvement on the 'Revenge.'¹

Next to Grenville's fight, the most brilliant action of this year was fought by the 'Centurion,' a London merchantman. Since Harboard's successful negotiation of a commercial treaty with the Porte, the Levant Company, in spite of the war, were pushing their trade in the Mediterranean with growing activity. Determined as far as possible to thwart the dangerous intimacy between his two arch-enemies, Philip had stationed a squadron of twelve galleys under Doria at Gibraltar. The previous year the Levant fleet of ten vessels, of which the 'Centurion' was one, had been attacked in the Straits by Doria's squadron, and after a six hours' action had put it to flight, so roughly handled that, although the Englishmen were detained several days about the Straits by contrary weather, the galleys were in no condition to renew their attack. This year the 'Centurion,' under the command of one Robert Bradshaw, of Limehouse, was alone, except for a few smaller vessels that had begged her convoy from Marseilles. Near Gibraltar they encountered six Spanish galleys, part of a squadron of twelve that were on their way to Cartagena to conduct the Spanish Ambassador to Rome. The little 'Dolphin' alone of Bradshaw's consorts stood by him, and five of the galleys attacked and grappled the 'Centurion.' She had a weak

¹ The 'Garland' often appears as the 'Guardland.' This was possibly an opprobrious nickname current amongst the seamen, which had been given her as a ship unfit for the high seas.

crew of but forty-eight men and boys ; but for nearly six hours she resisted every effort to sink, board, or fire her ; ' during all which time there was a sore and deadly fight on both sides, in which the trumpet of the "Centurion" sounded forth the deadly points of war, and encouraged them to fight manfully against their adversaries. On the contrary part,' the narrator contemptuously continues, ' there was no warlike music in the Spanish galleys, but only their whistles of silver, which they sounded forth to their own contentment.' An English seaman of that time loved his music only second to his guns ; he must fight to measure, as he danced. Stirred by their lusty trumpet, again and again, as the Spaniards swarmed upon the 'Centurion's' shattered sides, her crew flung them, 'with their silk coats and great plumes of feathers in their hats,' back into the sea. Her masts were tottering ; many times she was on fire ; but still the trumpet blew and the fight went on. At last the Spanish shot gave out ; hammers and the chains of the galley-slaves came flying at the stubborn Englishmen ; and when these were done the galleys let go like beaten dogs and made off. Meanwhile the sixth galley had attacked the little 'Dolphin,' but sooner than surrender she blew herself up with every soul on board. The 'Centurion's' loss was but four men killed and ten wounded. The soldiers in the galleys suffered very severely, and when next day the remainder of the galley squadron came up they looked at her and let her alone. In its way it was a fight worthy to stand beside the 'Revenge's' ; and Bradshaw's name is one to be remembered wherever Grenville's is honoured.¹

¹ See 'the Valiant fight performed . . . by the Centurion of London,' in Hakluyt. Also the Venetian Ambassador's account in *Venet. Cal.* viii. No. 935. So great was the respect with which the English ships inspired the galley captains at this time, that Philip found it necessary to give them special encouragement. Strype (iv. 43) prints a letter of 'Spanish Intelligence,' dated at Cadiz, February 2, 1590 (perhaps 1591), which says that six galley captains are to be beheaded, 'for that in August last they met two English ships between Lisbon and St. Mary Port and durst not set upon them, being in the whole fourteen galleys.'

The loss of the 'Revenge' proved a great shock to the Queen, and during the two following years her naval policy grew more and more nerveless. Information from Spain, moreover, pointed consistently to the fact that, at any rate until his affairs in France were settled, Philip had abandoned any idea of invading England, and had fallen back on the alternative policy of the elder Menendez, with which he had tried to force the Pope's hand before the Armada. This was to establish in the Narrow Seas a naval station from which he could hold the English marine in check and leave the seas free for his Indian trade; and unable to arrange with his French ally for a suitable port in Brittany, he was again contemplating the seizure of some point in the western parts of the Queen's dominions.¹ During the spring reports became more definite. The new Armada was said to be ready, and 15,000 men embarked on it for Brittany or Ireland, possibly for Wales. Under these circumstances the Queen's policy was directed mainly to keeping Philip busy in France by assisting Henry, and with the exception of a small squadron that was required for this work, the navy was kept at home ready to meet the threatened attack. Even the operations against the Atlantic trade were continued in a half-hearted way. Early in 1592 Raleigh was permitted to organise an expedition with Robert Crosse for his vice-admiral and Sir John Borough for his general of the land forces. The object was some attempt on the West Indies, and especially Panama, on the old lines which Drake had laid down, and the Queen provided two ships, the 'Garland' and the 'Foresight.'² Before, however, the weather permitted him to clear the Channel, Raleigh was recalled and Frobisher sent down to supersede him. The result was a complete break-up of the expedition. Neither Crosse nor Borough would

¹ See especially 'Saintman to Phelippes' (*S.P. Dom. Cal.* February 3, 1592), and cf. *S.P. Spain*, xxviii. 45.

² A complete list of the fleet is in the *Burghley State Papers* (Murdin, p. 654). Besides the two Queen's ships, it consisted of ten private men-of-war and armed merchant-men and four pinnaces, or sixteen sail in all.

serve under Frobisher, and they went off with the 'Foresight' and some of the merchantmen for a cruise to the islands; while Frobisher, with but two or three vessels in company, sailed for the coast of Spain.¹ The division was fatal. Together they might have accomplished something; divided, each was too weak. By this time Philip's new system was almost completely constructed. As a result of the English operations of 1590, the Casa de Contractacion had undertaken to provide permanently a fleet of galleons for the protection of its trade, which was known as the 'Armada de Avería' from its being maintained by an assessment of 'general average' (*avería*).² This was now ready, and notwithstanding the many calls upon it, De Bazan, as Captain-General of the Ocean, had a really formidable navy at his disposal. Frobisher arrived at St. Vincent only to find the station untenable, and was compelled to return with little or nothing to show for his cruise. Crosse, on the other hand, consorting with some vessels of Lord Cumberland's that had preceded him, fell in with one of the great East India carracks, which the crew were driven to fire in order to prevent her falling into the hands of the English. Another was hourly expected, and so was De Bazan. Fortunately, however, the Spanish admiral disobeyed his orders, and

¹ This is Monson's account. Camden says Raleigh went as far as Finis-terre and there heard that the King had issued orders for the West India convoys not to sail that year, whereupon he divided his force into two squadrons under Frobisher and Porrough and returned. Monson, however, is the higher authority, as being a captain at the time well versed in the ways of privateers, and Camden is often inaccurate in navy matters (e.g. he calls Vavasour's ship, that tried to help the 'Revenge,' the 'Providence'). Moreover an order from Burghley and Howard to Raleigh, dated May 23 (*Hatfield Papers*, iv. 200), contradicts Camden. By this it appears that Raleigh had abandoned the idea of Panama in favour of intercepting the Plate Fleet in the summer, which, as Burghley was informed, was expected the first week in August, and he is ordered to place Frobisher in command of his own ships and the Queen's. In Duro's Appendix (*Armada Española*, ii.) no order appears forbidding the fleets to sail; but that of Mexico was ordered to wait at Havana till July 5-15, which shows Burghley's information was accurate.

² Duro, *Arm. Españ.* App. 9. The city of Seville subscribed 80,000 ducats towards it.

before he reached Flores, Crosse, after a hard fight, had captured the second. This was the famous 'Madre de Dios,' perhaps the largest ship afloat, carrying on her seven decks a cargo worth 150,000*l.*, besides what was pillaged before she was surveyed by the Queen's officers.¹ For a hundred leagues De Bazan pursued the captors, but in vain, and he had to return empty to Spain, a disgraced and broken man.

Still, although Spain had now shown herself for the first time as a real oceanic naval power, and had driven all the Queen's vessels from their stations, in 1593 the usual summer expedition again took place, this time under Cumberland, with Monson for his flag-captain and Sir Edward Yorke for his vice-admiral. With the 'Lion' and 'Bonaventure' and seven private ships, he sailed for the coast of Spain, where he captured two French ships of the League that returned his shareholders threefold their venture. Here he continued cruising till the galleons of the Indian Guard put to sea, and he knew the East India fleet was at hand. Then, hoping to repeat the exploit of the previous year, he held away to Flores in order to snap up the carracks before the galleons arrived to protect them. His bold and clever move was rewarded with the capture of another valuable prize, and the very next day the galleons of the Guard appeared. He was able, however, to give them the slip, and having kept the station till he had certain intelligence that all the carracks had passed, he returned in triumph to England.

The havoc made with the Spanish trade during these years, though but few treasure-ships had been captured, must have been very great. Pepper became a drug in the London market, and at one time it was said the Spanish-

¹ She was 165 feet from stem to stern. Well-proportioned East-Indiamen of that length registered in modern times 1,257 tons. Their beam was about one quarter their length, while the beam of a carrack was certainly as much as, if not more than, a third of its length. The 'Madre de Dios,' therefore, was probably over 1,500 tons, and perhaps nearly 2,000. (See Hedderwick, *Naval Architecture*, 1830.)

American trade was almost destroyed. Yet the very success of the operations should have emphasised the vice of attempting to coerce a great power by preying on its commerce. During the years of Drake's disgrace and the abandonment of his policy of offence, Spain, in spite of all that had been done, had been constantly growing more powerful at sea. A fleet amply sufficient to protect the Indian trade had been formed, as Lord Thomas Howard had learned too well. Galleons on the English model and fit for work in the Narrow Seas were being continually turned out, and Philip's operations for securing a base in Brittany had already begun. Troops and supplies were being sent to the assistance of Mercœur, who was holding Brittany against the King, and at Passages, deep in the extreme angle of the Bay of Biscay, where a naval attack was extremely hazardous, an Armada was being brought forward on a scale that would not only make the conquest certain, but would enable a further step to be taken immediately the new base was secured. The result of Hawkins's policy, in short, was that England found herself confronted with the prospect of a new invasion still more formidable than the last; but fortunately there were already signs of a reaction to better things.

During all these years Drake had remained in retirement at his seat at Buckland Abbey, near Plymouth, which he had bought of Sir Richard Grenville. While watching the disastrous effects of the abandonment of his naval policy, he had not been idle. We have seen him from time to time actively furthering the various expeditions that sailed, and loyally employing his energies in superintending the new fortifications at Plymouth and Scilly, and his resources in completing his famous scheme for supplying the town with water. All that was in his power to do against the evil days which a vicious naval policy threatened, he did. In default of a determined attempt to destroy Philip's growing power at sea, the best possible measure was to meet his operations with a powerful naval station in the west, where fleets could

rapidly supply their necessities and find a secure advanced base. His efforts were not without reward. As failure after failure attended the commanders by whom the Queen had sought to replace him, she seems again to have turned to the man whose name was associated with the greatest naval glories of her reign, and accordingly in November 1592, after the third abortive attempt upon the Spanish trade, he received a summons to Court. Report said it was 'about some sea service.' This was undoubtedly 'the pretended voyage for Nombre de Dios and Panama,' which Sir Richard Hawkins tells us delayed his own sailing for the South Sea.¹ During the autumn he and Drake had been sitting on a commission with Sir Robert Cecil, Lord Burghley's son, for settling the accounts of the prize carrack, and the result was eminently satisfactory for the royal purse. They had, no doubt, taken the opportunity of impressing the rising minister with their views. During the winter Drake continued in high favour about the Queen, carrying everything before him as in the old days. On New Year's Day he presented her with an account of his first memorable expedition to Nombre de Dios, and it began to be whispered that some new resolution was in the wind.²

In February 1593 Parliament met to provide the sinews of war, and the case was laid frankly before it. To the Peers the Lord Keeper set forth 'the great malice of the King of Spain,' and described how, taught by his failure in 1588, he was building ships 'of a lesser bulk after another fashion, some like French ships, some like the shipping in England, and many he had gotten out of

¹ *Observations*, ii.

² Birch's *Memoirs*, i. 90; dedication of *Sir Francis Drake Revived*; and Philip Gawdy to his brother, *Hist. MSS. Rep.* vii. 5246: 'Sir Francis Drake is at the Court, and all the speech is that he goeth very shortly to sea. My Lord Thomas (Howard) is now there, but he stayed but two days, and Sir Martin Frobisher, but Sir Francis Drake carryeth it away from them all. My Lord is somewhat out of countenance and Sir Martin is in reasonable good favour.' Dated December 8, 1594. It should be 1592, since it refers to Parma's recent death, and Frobisher was not alive in 1594. 'The stir about the carrack's goods' of which it speaks was also at the end of 1592.

the Low Countries.' 'He is now,' he added, 'for the better invading of England planting himself in Bretagne.' 'This province,' said Sir Robert Cecil in the Commons, 'he especially desireth, for it lieth most fitly to annoy us, whither he may send forces continually and there have his navy ready to annoy us, the which he could not otherwise so easily do, unless he had the winds in a bag.' 'Besides, having this province, he will keep us from traffic to Rochelle and Bordeaux.' The speech smells throughout of the sea, and savours suggestively of his recent intimacy with Drake. The Subsidy Bill led to a long debate. In support of it Sir George Carey announced as an inducement that her Majesty was resolved to send Sir Francis Drake to encounter the Spaniards with a great navy. Raleigh spoke hotly for the bill in order that active naval operations might be set on foot.¹ Sir E. Stafford opposed it, and Drake, in his place as member for Plymouth, answered him in Raleigh's style, describing 'the King of Spain's strength and cruelty wherever he came; and wishing a frank aid to be yielded to withstand him; and he agreed to three subsidies.' Eventually, after eleven days' debate, the bill was passed for the full amount.²

Still little was done. The rumours that Drake was to be afloat again were so far true that a warrant was actually issued to him and Hawkins for three Queen's ships and twenty merchantmen; but for the present it went no further.³ Fresh troops were sent to the French king's assistance, but beyond furnishing a squadron to the relief of Boulogne, which was in danger, the navy was almost inactive. The Breton ports at present in

¹ Heywood Townshend, *Megolopsychy*.

² Drake was very active in this Parliament, serving on a number of committees, especially those for 'Liberties and Privileges'; for 'conferring with the Lords about the subsidies'; for 'the Ecclesiastical Court Bills'; for 'Relieving sick and wounded soldiers and sailors'; for 'the preamble of the Subsidy Bill'; and for all public bills, and several private and local bills, especially the 'Plymouth Haven Waterworks.' It is worth notice that he was not on the committee on the bill for restraining the 'Brownists.'

³ Burghley's Diary in Murdin, p. 800.

Spanish hands were useless as a naval base, but already the Spaniards had occupied an important post at the entrance of Brest harbour, and it was clear that this port was their main objective. All through 1593 Burghley's agent at Bayonne continued to report the steady progress of the Armada at Passages, emphasising the apprehensions that were felt there of an attack by Drake, and urging as the one thing they feared, that he should be employed in a counter expedition against Lisbon. Raleigh, Drake's most ardent disciple, was of the same mind. 'I hope you will remember,' he wrote to the Lord Admiral in giving information of the Spanish operations round Brest and the Passages Armada, 'it is the Queen's honour and safety to assail and not defend.'¹ It is these considerations that seem to explain why Drake and Hawkins were not allowed to act on their warrant. In view of the threatening outlook it was probably thought wise to keep them at home, but yet nothing definite was done. Detachments of transports and storeships continued to feed the Spanish forces in Brittany, and no effort seems to have been made to intercept them. The omission was probably intentional. Henry, knowing that it was essential to Elizabeth's maritime position that Brittany should not fall into Spanish hands, had practically left its protection to her, and had persistently neglected to co-operate with her troops. The result was that Morlaix and Quimper were now in possession of the Spaniards as well as Blavet, and the Queen possibly was holding her hand in hopes of seeing her ally alarmed into performing his engagements. Instead, came the startling announcement that Henry had accepted the Catholic faith and made truce with the League. The Queen was aghast; for a while she was for abandoning his cause altogether, but to break with him was impossible. The King's conversion was soon seen to have weakened the Spanish position by detaching the League from Philip's cause, and in the end

¹ 'Chateaumartin to Burghley,' *Hatfield Papers*, iv. 306, 321; &c. Raleigh's letter in *ibid.* 551.

a regular defensive and offensive alliance was concluded between Henry and Elizabeth against the common enemy. Before, however, it could be acted on effectively the Passages fleet had sailed, and in mid-winter had landed its troops at Blavet without opposition.

It was on the arrival of these reinforcements that the Spaniards had found themselves strong enough to seize a position within Brest harbour. Brest itself was now in serious danger, and so alarming was the situation that in the spring an expedition was prepared under Norreys for the relief of the threatened port. To Frobisher, who was already at sea, the naval command was assigned. Till July he cruised with a squadron of six royal galleons, probably to prevent further reinforcements reaching the Spaniards, and then at the head of a fleet of eighty sail stood over and landed Norreys and his troops at Paimpol. Morlaix, which Sir Thomas Baskerville, the hero of Sluys and Bergen-op-Zoom, was besieging, at once surrendered, and sending the transports home Frobisher, with some pen sail of royal and private men-of-war, went round to blockade the Spanish position in Brest harbour. Shortly afterwards Sir Henry Norreys reduced Quimper, and the army was free to co-operate with the navy for the relief of Brest.

The place where the Spaniards had established themselves was a rocky promontory in the Crozon Peninsula opposite the town of Brest, a position of a great natural strength, which they had further strengthened by well-planned works. On November 1, Norreys arrived before the place, mortars were landed from the fleet, and the siege was formally opened by a combined force of French and English. While the troops, with the assistance of a detachment of sailors, battered and mined ashore, the ships bombarded the sea front. After the impetuous manner of the 'Chickens of Mars,' as the Norreys brothers were nicknamed, several assaults were delivered before the works were properly prepared, and were repulsed with severe loss. And the Spaniards were still holding out

when it was announced that a strong force under Don Juan d'Aquila was pressing to their relief. A final desperate attempt both by sea and land was at once decided on, and this time it was successful. The place was carried and the garrison, to the number of four hundred, put to the sword after the ruthless law of the time. The loss of the allies was heavy. Frobisher himself, leading his sailors to an escalade with his usual splendid courage, was shot in the thigh at a distance of a few yards. So close was his assailant that the wadding entered the wound. This an unskilful surgeon did not observe, and though the ball was extracted the wound mortified, and Frobisher, after lingering long enough to reach Plymouth and receive a letter of thanks from the queen, died.

So perished the first of the great group of Elizabethan admirals, lost to his country before the final effort against Spain was made, and when such men were most sorely needed. To judge by what has come down to us, courage rather than conduct was his strong point. We have no evidence from him of any broad conception of what naval warfare meant, such as is found in the letters and despatches of Drake, Hawkins, Fenner, and Raleigh. 'He was very valiant,' says Stowe, 'yet harsh and violent.' As a hard fighter and an accomplished seaman he was indeed unsurpassed; but in spite of all his fine qualities no conspicuous naval success had coloured his career, and he must be classed as an intrepid captain and explorer rather than as a great fleet commander.

CHAPTER XI

THE LAST VOYAGE

THE relief of Brest gave what was practically the last blow to the Spanish cause in France. The immediate danger to the English naval position passed, but the lesson was not lost. Ever since Walsingham's death in 1590 the war had languished. The aged and ailing Burghley was left in undisturbed control with no one to goad or trick him into violent measures, but now a shock had galvanised the struggle into life again. From Ireland Tyrone's rebellion and continued reports of Spanish intrigue there kept the smart tingling. The new navy, which Philip had created for the protection of his trade and colonies, was viewed as a new armada for the invasion of England. Sir Robert Cecil, while his father fought against the gout, was daily absorbing a larger influence in affairs of state and Drake had gained his ear.

The result was the resumption of a more active and sounder naval policy, and some time in 1595 it seems to have been decided that the following year a vigorous blow should be struck at Philip on his own coasts. The queen had promised it to her parliament when the subsidies were voted,¹ and the country was straining to be let loose. 'All men,' says Camden, 'now began to prepare for war and the general concern was that so many brave men capable of doing their country the best service were

¹ There are indications that the great expedition was originally intended for 1595, but the state of affairs in France necessitated its postponement.

thrown away upon France; and it was a new subject of grief to women to reflect that their sons and relations were unhappily taken off and not reserved for this glorious occasion.' What Norreys and Frobisher had achieved in Brittany for the English maritime position was naturally little understood by the people, and the 'Idolatri of Neptune' resumed all its old sway. Drake again became the central figure of the popular impulse, the moving spirit of the preparations. It was he even who was chosen, as in 1586, to discharge the difficult mission of inducing the Netherlands to co-operate in the great undertaking, and to consent to the withdrawal for service with the fleet of the splendid English force which by this time Sir Francis Vere had brought to perfection.¹ It is more than likely that the protests of the French king were the main cause of delaying the action of the second great English armada till 1596. He was in a position to point out that the military situation in France demanded the detention of Vere's English Brigade, which was paralysing the action of the Spanish forces in Flanders. The danger that threatened from Spain at sea was imminent and growing, but still there was breathing time. Although Hennebon, from which the Spaniards had not been ejected, was still a present menace, the Channel Squadron, which was at sea under Sir Henry Palmer, was adequate to deal with

¹ This mission is extremely obscure. All we know of it is from a despatch of Unton's, our Ambassador at the French Court. In this he reports the offence which Henry IV. had taken at Sir Francis Drake's 'publick speech to the States' in which the admiral had pointed out how they might safely withdraw their own troops from Henry's service to replace Vere's (Murdin, p. 754). It is possible that Drake had also seen Henry previously. At least it would seem that in the summer of 1594 he was going on some mission into the interior of France. On July 21, Burghley wrote to Sir Robert Cecil, 'If Sir Francis Drake come not to-morrow, there will be scant time to provide to pass beyond Brest' (*S.P. Dom., Cal.*). This may, however, only refer to Drake's getting a Plymouth contingent to the Channel Islands to replace the garrison which was apparently intended to join the Brest Expedition. See Burghley's 'Memorial for Brest,' July 15 (in *Hatfield Papers*, iv. p. 562): 'Sir Francis Drake to come to the Isles with the men from Plymouth.'

it.¹ Another small squadron was in the Narrow Seas stopping all communication with Spain through the Channel, and Crosse with the 'Swiftsure' and the 'Crane' was ordered to the coast of Spain to observe the enemy's movements and endeavour to pick up two East India carracks that were expected home.² It was known in England that Philip could not be ready to move in force for a considerable time. He had internal trouble at home both in Aragon and Portugal; all over Spain the new levies met with great opposition; and money could only be raised at ruinous interest. Under these circumstances Drake, restless for action and still chafing to carry out his long-cherished designs on Panama, persuaded the queen to allow him to repeat his opening of 1585. The idea was sound enough. For the effect must certainly be to increase Philip's financial embarrassment and to compel him to interrupt his preparations in order to detach a fleet to parry the attack. It was thus at last that the private expedition, which Drake had been contemplating for the past three years, was eventually set on foot. Unfortunately, however, the queen could not trust him so far out of her sight alone. Her old confidence in his star, which in himself was still unshaken, she had lost. Since his way, as his friendly critic Maynarde says, was ever to enter upon his undertakings 'as a child of fortune, it may be his self-willed and peremptory command was doubted.' It was probably true, and thus Hawkins, broken in nerves and spirit by age and misfortune, was commissioned to serve with him for the first time since the affair of San Juan d'Ulua.³

¹ Palmer's squadron was the 'Vanguard,' 'Rainbow,' and 'Dreadnought' galleons, the 'Quittance' crompter, and the 'Sun' pinnace. *Hatfield Papers*, v. 307.

² 'Crosse to Cecil'; *Hatfield Papers*, v. 397. The other squadron consisted of two of the new crompters, the 'Answer' and the 'Advantage,' and two pinnaces, the 'Scout' and the 'Advice.' *Ibid.* p. 307.

³ This is the aspect of the case generally given by the authorities, but Richard Hawkins's remark about the delay of his expedition and the joint warrant of 1594 look as though their original intention was to sail together.

The queen provided a powerful contingent. It consisted of two of the new 'Revenues' viz: the 'Garland' and the 'Defiance,' and the older 'Bonaventure,' 'Hope' and 'Foresight,' besides the 'Adventure' which was the old 'Bull' rebuilt on the latest galleon lines.¹ Panama, which still lay virgin as it was when Drake had surveyed it from the little wood by the Isthmus road over twenty years before, was the main objective. Thus, although some attempt seems to have been contemplated against the previous year's fleets that had been wintering at Havana, the expedition was as much military as naval, and the bulk of the fleet had to be furnished as transports to carry the large numbers of troops required. As Colonel-General to command them was chosen Sir Thomas Baskerville, who had just crowned his reputation in the Brest campaign. The first of the famous captains of Sir Francis Vere's new school of professional soldiers, at the head of a hundred Englishmen he had already taught eight companies of the old Spanish Legion they were no longer the finest infantry in Europe, and during a truce Parma himself had embraced him, declaring no braver soldier served a Christian prince. On his staff were his brothers Arnold and Nicholas and the young Sir Nicholas Clifford, still smarting under the chagrin of being ordered by the queen to send back the insignia of the order of St. Michael which Henry IV. had conferred on him for conspicuous gallantry in the field and with which he had appeared at Court without her leave.²

It was on January 25 that the admirals' commission was signed,³ and it was soon abundantly clear that Drake's

¹ The 'Bull' was remade by Baker between March 1 and September 30, 1594 (*S.P. Dom.* ccl. 33). In Borough's List (*S.P. Dom.* ccxliii. 111), the name 'Bull' is erased and 'Adventure' substituted. Her dimensions were: keel, 88 feet; beam, 26 feet; depth, 10 feet. Her real tonnage was, therefore, 228, but she was rated at 250.

² Camden. This seems to be the leading precedent for the rule that no one in the sovereign's service may accept a foreign decoration without license.

³ *S.P. Dom.* ccli. A copy calendared in *Hist. MSS. Com.* vi. 314 is dated the 29th, and so also one in the *Tanner MSS.* 168. Baskerville's commission is dated May 22. *S.P. Dom.* cclii. 28.

name had lost none of its magic. Volunteers flocked to his flag in such numbers that all the pressed men were dismissed and numbers of eager volunteers had to be turned away. In Spain during March and April, as the alarm spread, from 8,000 to 9,000 soldiers deserted, and Lisbon in a single week was almost abandoned by its inhabitants. From the highest to the lowest, wrote an English spy, all the people had no other talk than Drake's coming. 'His name,' said he, 'is more feared here than ever Talbot's was in France.'¹

Had he been able to strike while the enemy were thus ripe for defeat, the blow must have been of deep effect, but the usual interminable delays prevented his sailing. The queen laid the blame on the admirals, the admirals on the queen. By the first week in May it was reported the voyage had been stayed altogether. It was not till the 22nd of the month that Baskerville's commission was signed; and meanwhile the previous year's armada and convoy from Havana came safely home. In Portugal the panic passed and the moment was lost.² We can only guess at the cause of all this delay. Secret reports were coming in from Spain, that Philip was being urged to break the English command of the sea, that paralysed his trade, with a counter attack from the Blavet river; by the end of April the intelligence of another Armada assembling at Passages for that purpose grew definite and serious; and with all her old infatuation the queen could only see safety in keeping her most trenchant weapon in its sheath.³ During June confidence returned. The Spanish preparations were seen to be mainly defensive, and early in July Drake was hard at work again reorganising his fleet. He expected to be ready by the end of the month, and was already in the midst of his last arrangements and had received his final instructions

¹ *S.P. Dom., Cal.* June 9, 1595. 'Halliday to Burghley,' March 16, 1595, *S.P. Spain*, xxx.

² Duro, *Armada Esp.* ii. App. p. 490; *S.P. Dom.* cclii. 15.

³ *S.P. Spain*, xxviii. 45; *Hatfield Papers*, v. 164, 264.

from no less a person than Sir Thomas Gorges, sent down specially for the purpose, when a desperate alarm in the West again stopped the work.

On July 23 a squadron of four galleys with their attendant pinnaces carrying some 600 soldiers suddenly appeared before Mousehole in Cornwall. The troops were at once landed, and proceeded to lay waste the whole country side. No resistance was offered by the inhabitants. 'I speak it,' wrote Hannibal Vyvyan, the Governor of Falmouth Fort, 'to the disgrace of those people.' Mousehole, Newlyn, St. Paul, 'Church Town,' and other villages adjoining were laid in ashes. Penzance Sir Francis Godolphin tried to save with some two hundred men he had been able to gather, but they all deserted him except four or five gentlemen. So Penzance was served like the rest, and next day as its ruins smouldered beneath them the Spaniards heard mass upon the Western Hill and vowed to found a Friary there when they had conquered England. Forty other strange sail were reported to have been seen off Falmouth two days before the galleys appeared, and it looked as if retaliatory measures had begun in earnest. 'I beg you,' wrote Vyvyan to Drake and Hawkins, 'if your ships are not fit to fight, to send into these parts some of their leaders who have commanded in war, as they are greatly needed now and will be more so if the Spaniards should land.' Sir Nicholas Clifford and three other captains were hurried off to Godolphin, who was mobilising the county forces, and Drake, it is said, put to sea with the few ships that were ready.

It proved, however, to be but a false alarm, a mistake in fact, and through some prisoners whom the enemy had released the truth was soon known. The Spaniards had sailed from the Blavet river with the intention of making a raid on the Channel Islands. After seizing Penmarck on the Breton coast and holding it to ransom, they had the wind foul for proceeding up Channel, and made for Scilly instead. Running short of water they had put in

to Mousehole on the way, and finding no resistance had begun ravaging. Their intention then was to proceed into the Bristol Channel and continue their work, but hearing Drake had not yet sailed, they thought better of it, and on the wind coming into the North they took advantage of it to escape.¹

Still to Elizabeth the shock was a severe one. It was just half a century since English soil had been violated by an enemy's foot. Cornwall was her Galicia. Drake by his demonstrations had taught Philip how useful to an enemy such a distant and defenceless province might be made, and how well Philip had learned the lesson the recent operations in Brittany had shown. So far, therefore, from final sailing orders coming down to the admirals, they were ordered to detach Baskerville to inspect and report on the county forces and coast defences.² In alarm they despatched Gorges to the queen to reassure her, but there was still worse to come. As ill luck would have it, fresh information had just been received from Spain of an intended expedition to Ireland, and Gorges before the mud was well dry on his boots was galloping back to Plymouth with the most lamentable instructions for the unhappy admirals.

The queen's incapacity for grasping the elementary principles of naval warfare was not one whit bettered for all she had gone through, and the orders which Gorges brought, at least in so far as they are to be inferred from the protests of the admirals and other hints, were those of a child. Instead of proceeding direct to surprise Panama, they were to begin with a cast into St. George's Channel and round the south coast of Ireland for the threatened Spanish expedition. If nothing were found there they were to proceed to the coast of Spain to encounter any force that might be putting out for England. If all were quiet, they were to cruise a month for the West India fleets before crossing the Atlantic, and

¹ *S.P. Dom.* ccliii. 30, 31, and 33; *Hatfield Papers*, v. 290.

² *S.P. Dom.* ccliii. 41.

finally they were to say definitely whether they would be back in time to fight the new Armada next summer. To these new orders the admirals returned a firm remonstrance. They were quite ready, they said, if they encountered a fleet coming from Spain to turn and follow it; but as for the Irish cruise, they protested that if they were asked to go out of their course to do work to which as the queen's fellow adventurers they had not agreed, she must bear the cost of the expedition. At the same time they suggested that the proper way out of the difficulty was to reinforce the Channel squadron and move it to the Western Station. The time limit they ignored.

The Admirals' position was unassailable. Howard, who was certainly responsible for the new orders, was consulted, and in his answer we can see how little time had done to mend his feelings towards Drake. 'I did not think,' he wrote to Cecil, 'there was any meaning that they should with their fleet run into St. George's Channel, but only along the coast to Cape Clear, which would not have been out of their way very much, whatsoever they write. And to you in private, they needed not to take such exceptions for going so little out of the way, when they have retarded their going so long as they have done, promising they would have departed the first of May.' Here is unmistakably the old soreness unhealed, yet it is characteristic of the innate nobility of the man that he did not allow it to pervert his judgment. He frankly admitted the admirals' contention was strictly just. 'For my opinion,' he said, 'I do not see how they can alter their course of their voyage, and but the whole charge must be her Majesty's.' Their suggestions, however, for modifying the naval dispositions he naturally resented, declaring that he did not see his way to reinforcing the Channel squadron without prejudicing the next year's mobilisation. 'For making more ships ready,' he says plainly, 'I will not take it upon me.'

The effect of his honesty was so far satisfactory that the queen sent a reply to the admirals in which nothing

further was said of the Irish cruise. As a further concession to their opinion she promised to send the Channel squadron to the station they suggested. But that was all. After dwelling on the forces that were preparing in Spain for the following summer, she said, before consenting to their sailing, she must have their promise to be back by April or May at the latest; she should also expect them to make a reconnaissance on the Spanish coast, so as to be sure no expedition was coming to Ireland; and she still insisted that before crossing the Atlantic they must cruise a month to intercept the second West India fleet. If they could not undertake this in the time, and she saw no reason why they should not, she begged them to advise her how best their fleet could be employed in distressing the Spanish ports.

At her persistence in this childish plan of campaign the admirals were aghast. They had a fleet of transports crowded with soldiers and cumbered with boats for disembarking troops and with other land-service stores. Yet this semi-military force was expected to fight a naval action against a powerful fleet, to go cruising for prizes, and where surprise was the keynote of their design to betray themselves with a reconnaissance in force of the Spanish headquarters. In vehement protest the admirals replied that they were ready to spend their lives in her service, but what she asked was impossible. They pointed out in detail the unfitness of their force for the work proposed. They vowed their men, if kept cruising at sea in the crowded ships, would perish wholesale, and the moment they got wind that their destination was changed they would desert in mass. If her heart was set on the new programme and she was willing to bear the whole cost of the voyage, they on their part were ready to reorganise their force for the purely naval operations in contemplation, but they could not work with tools unfit for the end in view.

The queen was deeply offended. It is clear she considered that she had already made large concessions to her admirals' obstinacy. Burghley drafted a despatch to

refute their strategical objections. But they were too obviously right, and it was not sent. Still the queen would not be denied the last word. Their answer had contained no assurance as to the date of their return. All they had to say was that it depended on God's blessing. Their pious remark, so thoroughly characteristic of both of them, particularly irritated Elizabeth, and she seized upon it as the text for a sound rating. She called it an uncertain and frivolous answer, and finally told them plainly that unless they undertook to be back in May 1596 she would break up the expedition. August was already half gone, and now or never they knew they must get away. Fortunately as the queen was dictating her angry reply they had found her a new temptation. Certain news had reached them through a Spanish prize that one of the *almirantas* of the last year's fleets, laden with a vast amount of treasure, had not been able to sail with the rest.¹ By stress of weather she had been forced into Puerto Rico, little better than a wreck, and there she still lay dismantled and disarmed with two millions and a half of treasure from the Mexican mines on board her. The bait was too sweet to resist. Two days later a soft answer was returned to her ultimatum and then came down the long delayed order to sail.²

On August 28, after a further delay from adverse weather, the fleet finally put to sea in two squadrons,

¹ She was the Vice-flagship of the fleet of New Spain; Duro, *ubi supra*.

² *Hatfield Papers*, v. 324, 332. This interesting correspondence, which throws so much light on Elizabeth's relations with her officers, is contained in the following letters: 'The Queen to the Generals,' August 1, *Hatfield Papers*, v. 297; 'Howard to Cecil,' August 8, *ibid.* p. 307; 'The Queen to Drake, Hawkins, Gorges, and Baskerville,' August 9 (draft), *S.P. Dom.* ccliii. 70; 'Same to same,' August 11 (amended copy), *ibid.* p. 76; 'Drake and Hawkins to the Queen,' August 15, *ibid.* p. 79, 1; 'Drake and the others to Cecil,' August 13, *ibid.* p. 79; 'Drake and Hawkins to Essex,' August 13, *Hatfield Papers*, v. 319; 'Baskerville to same,' August 13, *ibid.*; 'Gorges to Cecil,' August 13, *ibid.* p. 320; 'Queen to Drake and Hawkins,' August 16, *S.P. Dom.* *ibid.* p. 87 (Burghley's draft 'not sent'); amended draft of same, *Hatfield Papers*, v. 324; 'Drake and Hawkins to the Queen,' August 16, *ibid.*; 'Drake and the others to Cecil,' August 18, *ibid.* p. 332; 'Burghley to Cecil,' August 20, *S.P. Dom.* *ibid.* p. 88.

numbering twenty-seven sail in all and carrying 2,500 men. Hawkins flew his flag on the 'Garland'; Drake on the 'Defiance,' sister to his old 'Revenge'; and the council-of-war met alternately on the two ships, beginning with that of the elder officer. The experiment of associating the master and pupil in a joint command seems to have caused as much anxiety as did the determination to unite the fleets of Howard and Drake in 1588. Gorges had taken the trouble to report to Cecil that 'the Generals do agree very well.' But tension was inevitable between a man of Drake's impatient ardour and one who, as Maynarde, the chief authority for this voyage, tells us was 'old and wary, entering into matters with so leaden a foot that the other's meat would be eaten before his spit could come to the fire.'¹ Even in Plymouth their relations, though they concealed the fact, had been strained, and in the run down to Spain the friction increased. Off Cape Saint-Vincent it nearly came to an open rupture.² A council-of-war had been called on the 'Defiance' to decide on their further proceedings. Drake was for his old opening, an attack on the Canaries or Madeira. The moral effect, he hoped, would be great and the ransom considerable, and further there was need of filling up with fresh victuals before they crossed the Atlantic. Baskerville was of the same opinion; but Hawkins firmly opposed it as unnecessary and inexpedient. And now, says Maynarde, who as captain of a land company was a member of the council-of-war, 'the fire which lay hid in their stomachs began to break forth, and had not the Colonel pacified them, it would have grown further.' Drake went so far as to say that come what might he would carry his squadron to the Canaries and that Hawkins if he was so minded could take his direct to the Indies. Baskerville, however, persuaded them to adjourn

¹ *Sir Francis Drake, his Voyage, 1595*, by Thomas Maynarde; see Appendix D.

² The first council was on September 2, and the second about a week after, i.e. on the 9th or 10th.

a decision and to dine together the following day aboard the 'Garland,' and there on Drake's urging absolute necessity Hawkins unwillingly consented to attempt the Grand Canary. So for the time the matter was ended, but many hard speeches had passed which, as the officers thought, he never forgot.¹

So far things had gone badly for the English. Crosse, unable in Drake's absence to cover enough ground, had let the carracks steal past him, and just ahead of Drake and Hawkins the Havana fleet of thirty sail with twelve galleons and eight armed flyboats to guard them had got safely into Saint Lucar with, it is said, ten millions of treasure; and so for the second time Drake had missed the great quarry.² How he would have fared had he brought to action the greatly superior Spanish force is impossible to say. That in spite of all he had said to the queen he would have attacked it is certain; for his contempt for the Spanish power was as great as ever, and he had no comprehension of the change that had taken place since last he was employed. The year 1595 marks the full completion of Philip's system for the protection of his commerce. In the previous December the council of the Indies had officially established the 'Royal Armada of the Ocean, and the unfortunate Duke of Medina-Sidonia reappears from obscurity to replace the disgraced De Bazan as its official head with the title of 'Captain-General of the Sea Ocean.' Under his nominal leadership were enrolled all the galleons of the Indian Guard, together with three or four which the Ivellas had brought from within the Straits. The remainder of their squadron after one voyage had been pronounced unfit for ocean work, and had been dismissed the service. To man the newly organised fleet a special brigade of infantry had been raised, known as the 'Tertia of the Indian Trade.'

¹ See Captain Troughton's Journal in *S.P. Dom.* colvii. 48, i.

² Report of Captain Warburton (of the 'Crane'), *Hatfield Papers*, v. 387; Bodley to Burghley, *ibid.* p. 423. The fleet arrived ^{Aug. 28} _{Sep. 7}. Drake was off the North Cape (Finisterre) September 6. Cf. Duro, *Armada Españ.* ii. 489.

In the failure to grasp that Spain had become a great sea power with a fleet in a constant state of mobilisation and admirals well practised in handling and protecting large numbers of ships, lay the fatal misconception that overhung the whole expedition. It was far too weak for the work it had to do, and yet Drake was for adding to his task. It was easy to blame him afterwards, but with the knowledge he had at the time the idea was sound. For five years he had been kept out of touch with the enemy, and he could not tell how much the rejection of his methods had done for Spain. He naturally expected to repeat his easy triumphs of ten years back at Santiago, and so enhearten his men for what was before them and be ready to strike immediately he reached the Indies. He could only judge by the experience of his first great expedition, and there was nothing to tell him that all it had done, as Monson says, was to waken rather than weaken his enemy. But so it was; and at the Grand Canary he found the first signs of the change.

It was on September 26 that the fleet appeared before Las Palmas. Upon the Isleta at the end of the long promontory, which forms the western side of the harbour, and about half a league from the town itself stood a fort, and here within saker-shot Drake came to anchor. Determined as of old to use all the advantage of surprise, he at once set about finding a place to land. A strong surf was running and for three hours in his barge he sought a practicable beach. At length a spot between the fort and the town was chosen, as the best to be had, and hither he led the whole of the light craft and brought up within musket-shot of shore. Meanwhile the weather had grown from bad to worse; the surf had seriously increased, and for the time the landing had to be abandoned. The respite thus gained the Spaniards put to the best use, and so well had Philip developed his colonial defences that it was soon evident that anything like a *coup de main* was no longer possible. For Drake it was enough. In vain Baskerville undertook in four days

to carry the place by regular operations. Time and men were too precious, and Drake would not listen. The same evening the fleet was taken round to the lee side of the island, where it proceeded to water without interruption.¹ Even here ill luck followed them. For a captain and a party of soldiers who had wandered too far inland were cut off and killed or captured to a man. It was a bad beginning. Instead of ransom and honour, Drake could only show an ignominious failure and lost prestige; instead of blooding his men he had touched them with presage of defeat, and with the capture of the shore party his destination was no longer secret. To Drake's high confidence the repulse seems to have given no hint of what was in store, and on the following day, determined to outsail the enemy's *avisos*, he was standing away boldly from the scene of his earliest triumphs.

On October 29 the whole fleet was at anchor at Guadaloupe—all, that is, but two small vessels, the 'Delight' and the 'Francis.' Their absence would have mattered little, for here a stay was necessary in order to re-water and to set up the launches for landing and get the heavy guns from the holds upon their mountings; but the ill luck clung to the expedition like a plague. Five of Philip's new treasure-frigates had been sent out to bring home the bullion that had been landed from the dismantled ship at Puerto Rico, and by an extraordinary coincidence they made Guadaloupe the very day after the English arrived.² So it happened that they fell in with the two lagging vessels and gave chase. The 'Francis' was quickly overhauled and captured. Her men were made prisoners and she was scuttled. The 'Delight' managed to hold away till she was chased into sight of the English anchorage, and so escaped; but not before all the

¹ The various details of this affair are gathered from Troughton, Maynarde, and Stallenge's reports (*Hatfield Papers*, v. 474). Stallenge was Sir R. Cecil's regular correspondent at Plymouth.

² In 1574 the old course to Hispaniola had been changed to that adopted by the corsairs, and the fleets now made their landfall at Dominica; Duro, *Armada Españ.* ii. 472.

harm had been done. The Spanish commander, who had been in chase of her, had counted nine great-ships in the anchorage. From the prisoners he learnt their destination and the details of the force; and he was soon crowding all sail for Puerto Rico with the news that Drake's great fleet, of which Philip had long ago sent them warning, had come at last and was hard by at Guadaloupe setting up launches.¹

To Drake the whole meaning of the disaster was at once apparent. He was for immediately giving chase, if not with the whole, at least with part of the fleet. But to this old Hawkins, with his characteristic caution, offered an obstinate resistance, and young Clifford saw fit to support him. He wanted to stay where they were till the pinnaces were set up, the ships trimmed and re-watered, and all the guns mounted, so as to be ready to fight any fleet they were likely to meet. In vain Drake urged the importance of rapid action. His old kinsman was ill, he did not like to press him too far, and so the fatal resolution was taken to adopt the safer course.

It was not till the fourth day that they got away, and then only to anchor in four days more amongst the smaller Virgins. The purpose of the fresh delay seems to have been twofold. Complete surprise was now impossible; but here in the unexplored recesses of the group, as in his pirate days, Drake could conceal his fleet where the enemy's scouts would not dream of seeking him, and so lull them into a belief that his plan was altered, while at the same time the troops were prepared for the operations that were now inevitable. The usual course from Dominica to Puerto Rico was by what is now called the Neckar Island Passage, and here the enemy's pinnaces would be on the look-out. So while Baskerville and his officers exercised the men in their companies

¹ Don Pedro Tello de Guzman, the officer in question, reported the force as of twenty-five sail, including eight queen's galleons of 800 tons and two private ones as large, carrying 3,000 infantry and 10,500 sailors. See the collection of papers relating to the voyage printed by the Hakluyt Society, p. 47.

ashore, Drake in his barge sought and discovered a new passage, and by this on the fifth day he carried the whole fleet safely out in rear of the Spanish scout-boats.

Thus without any warning, at daybreak on November 12, the English fleet was seen from the port advancing slowly on the faint morning breeze. Drake's ingenuity had been so far successful that he had arrived unannounced, but thanks to the previous warning everything was ready for his reception. The Spaniards' first idea had been to get the treasure away in the frigates, but eventually the bolder determination of defending it where it was till the last moment had prevailed. Don Pedro Tello, the general of the frigates, undertook the direction of the defence. His troops were landed to reinforce the garrison, fresh artillery was mounted, the dismantled *almiranta* and another large vessel were sunk in the mouth of the harbour, and a boom of spars constructed upon them to complete the barrier. Information was also despatched to Havana that Pero Menendez Marquez, who had come out this year in command of the fleet of New Spain, might be warned of the danger.

As the breeze increased the English came on more quickly, a caravel leading to pilot them, with a number of boats sounding and signalling the course with white flags as they advanced. Like so many other Spanish seaport towns, Puerto Rico was built upon high rocky ground at the end of a peninsula. It was joined to the mainland by an isthmus running roughly from east to west. Westward of the town is the entrance to the port, here only 500 yards wide, but opening out behind the promontory into a spacious harbour. In 1590 the place had been thoroughly fortified, and by this time was one of the strongest ports in the Indies.¹ The entrance was commanded by the Rock battery and the Morro; the town landing-place by the battery of Saint Helena. At the east-

¹ An intercepted letter dated November 20, 1590, from the Governor to a member of the Council of the Indies, in Hakluyt. Cf. also chart, *post*, p. 395.

ward or shore end of the town were two other works called the Morillo and Cabron, while the shore end of the isthmus was defended by the Boqueron fort. In all, the defences mounted seventy guns, and were held by over 1,500 trained troops, besides some 8,000 or 9,000 colonials and strangers capable of bearing arms.

Feeling their way along the coast the pilot boats soon drew the fire of the Boqueron fort, and at once showed coloured flags and stood out. The fleet still came on with the freshening breeze in close order till it was opposite the Cabron, and then, to the Spaniards' astonishment, it suddenly came to anchor in a sandy bay to the eastward of the town. No one had ever seen a ship anchor there before, and an attempt to surprise the eastern defences was apprehended and perhaps intended. The batteries, however, opened so hot a fire that the surprise was on the part of the English. As the Spanish gunners got the range the fire grew deadly. A shot got home in the 'Defiance's' mizen, another crashed through her main cabin, where Drake and his officers were sitting at supper, and with disastrous effect. The admiral had his seat shot from under him, Sir Nicholas Clifford and Brute Brown, a great favourite of Drake's, were mortally wounded, and several others more or less hurt.

But this was far from being the only loss the fleet suffered at this point. Ever since the Virgins had been left, Hawkins's sickness had been increasing upon him. 'I think that there is no man living,' he had written a few years back, 'that hath so careful, so miserable, so unfortunate, and so dangerous a life. . . . There is hardly any time left to serve God.'¹ But now he felt an end had come to all his trouble. On the morning of the 12th, as the fleet came in sight of Puerto Rico, he was sinking fast, and he called Captain Troughton to his bedside. He begged him to assure her Majesty of his devotion to his last breath, and to tell her that the perverse and cross dealings of some in that journey, who preferring their

¹ *S.P. Dom.* cccxxi. 83, 1596.

own fancy before his skill would never yield to him, had broken his heart. He saw nothing ahead but the ruin of the voyage, and begged the queen to accept a legacy of two thousand pounds as amends for his share in urging her to undertake it, and this he wished, with a last touch of chivalrous devotion to his princess, should be spared out of his wife's portion. Till the afternoon the unhappy man lingered, and then as the fleet came to anchor before Puerto Rico he ended his 'troublesome and painful life.'¹

So too late the error of a divided command was mended. The death of the broken old admiral was no actual loss to the expedition; but though he had never done, as he himself said, any royal thing, and all through the voyage had stood persistently in the way of rapid and decisive action, no one could forget how much the Navy owed to him, or how his was the first English name that became a terror to Spaniards on thesea. To a force already depressed by loss and failure the moral effect must have been severe, as under the shadow of the great seaman's death, Drake had to signal for the fleet to weigh and move out of range. Driven from his anchorage, he ran to the eastward as though he had had enough. But this was far from his mind. 'Ah, dear Brute,' he is reported to have said as his friend fell, 'I could grieve for thee, but now is no time for me to let down my spirits.'² Misfortune after misfortune had, indeed, crowded upon his head, but all his life he had risen superior to them, and now he would not believe that the day for his wild exploits was gone. Rather did the spirit of his youth seem to increase upon him. As day broke, instead of a clear sea, the Spaniards saw the fleet standing in to the opposite side of the harbour entrance. Here lay two islands forming a narrow channel with the mainland, but the place was

¹ Maynarde and Troughton both say he died as the fleet lay at anchor before Puerto Rico—'in the afternoon.' The Hakluyt account says the death occurred the previous evening off the east end of the Island. The Tanner MS. puts it on the 12th, two hours before coming to Puerto Rico.

² Fuller, in his *Holy and Profane State*, on the authority of Henry Drake, who was present.

encumbered with shoals and the entrance was so dangerous that it had not been thought necessary to fortify it. Drake had seen the weak point the previous day, and before weighing had sent boats to make soundings. The result was that, to the Spaniards' dismay, they saw the whole fleet come to anchor there, behind the islands, where not a shot could touch them.

From this point the treasure frigates could be seen lying close under the batteries of the Morro and Saint Helena. They had been placed there by Tello in order that, if it came to the worst, the treasure which lay in the citadel might be run on board and slipped out to sea in the night. As though Drake divined the scheme for outwitting him, he there and then resolved to commence operations by destroying the frigates where they lay before making his attempt on the town. Accordingly, while the flotilla was being organised, he in person reconnoitred the coast to the westward to find a place to land, thereby compelling the Spaniards, who observed his movements, to detach a force in that direction.

The night fell with no sound or sign of movement from the hidden fleet, and then about ten o'clock the Spaniards were suddenly aware that a crowd of boats and pinnaces was upon them. The forts opened fire blindly, till showers of fireballs were seen falling upon the frigates. One after another they took fire, and again and again were extinguished, as Spaniard and Englishman fought hand to hand amongst the flames. For an hour the struggle continued with stones, steel, and muskets, till one of the vessels, fired for the third time, burst into a mass of flame and lighted up the whole scene like day. Sure now of their aim, gunners and musketeers poured upon the devoted flotilla a hail of balls it was impossible to withstand. Some of the boats were sunk, all severely cut up, and so terrible was the fire that the new hands could hardly be induced to handle the oars for a disastrous retreat.

The daring attempt had failed and with lamentable loss. Nothing had been gained but a dearly bought

lesson how much safer it is to cut out vessels under batteries than to attempt to fire them.

To the depressed spirit of the fleet it was a heavy blow ; but Drake seems still to have kept hope of success. Next morning, as the land breeze began to blow, the fleet was seen to weigh and begin to work to windward of the port. Convinced from Drake's movements the previous day that a landing in force was his intention, the garrison was straining every nerve to strengthen the shore works. But Tello, as he watched the movements of the renowned admiral, grew uneasy. He had seen him do things with his fleet such as neither he nor anyone else had believed possible, and suddenly he was seized with the idea that Drake meant to run in with his whole force past the ends of the boom. Hurrying to his colleagues he proposed immediately sinking two of his fine frigates to bar the openings. A council was called, but objection was taken to so heavy a sacrifice. But Tello could not rest, and eventually it was determined to use two ships laden with merchandise for the purpose, and should he think them insufficient the anxious General was given leave at the last moment to sacrifice two of his frigates as well. Upon this Tello returned to his command. At four o'clock he saw Drake tack as he expected and run straight for the entrance. For him it was enough ; with such an enemy he dared risk nothing. Both merchant ships were scuttled with all their precious cargo on board. There was no time to remove anything. Still the fleet held on, and Tello in desperation sank beside the merchant vessels his *capitana* and another frigate, just as they were, with all their guns and equipment. The sacrifice was heavy, but it had the desired effect, and Drake came to anchor on the town side of the islands.

Seeing an entrance into the port was now impossible, so that he could not hope to treat the place as he had treated Cadiz, he called a council to consider an attempt by land. Baskerville and the majority were against so hazardous a proceeding. Some of the younger officers

gallantly protested they could give no opinion on the strength of the defences till they had been allowed to see them closer. They were persuaded, too, that no place in the Indies could yield them more honour or profit. 'I will bring you,' Drake replied, 'to twenty places far more wealthy and easier to be gotten.' And there is no doubt he still thought he could. So it was decided; and when the morrow broke, from Puerto Rico not a sign of the fleet was in view. 'Here,' says Maynarde, 'I left all hope of success.'

Three days later they were at anchor at the west end of the island near Cape Rojo taking in water, setting up new pinnaces to replace those they had lost, and re-organising the fleet for the main object of the expedition. In a week all was ready and they stood away for the Spanish Main. Close on their course to Nombre de Dios lay Rio de la Hacha, the settlement where Drake had suffered his first reverse. The injury was still unavenged, and it would look as though he could not resist what might be his last chance of retribution. At any rate he turned aside, and on the night of December 18 landed his troops and seized it. It was now more like old times. The people had hidden everything of value, but the runaway slaves revealed the hiding-places, and a considerable amount of treasure was discovered. While Drake held the town and treated for its ransom, Baskerville with the soldiers ravaged the country for miles round, burning every village he came to and recovering more treasure. In his absence Drake seized the neighbouring Rancheria, where the pearl fisheries were carried on, and made a haul of such value that it was considered the expense of the expedition was covered. The negotiations for ransom failed. The citizens were willing to pay 24,000 ducats in pearls, but the Governor refused to allow it and plainly told Drake the negotiations had been permitted only to give them time to warn their neighbours. The bold officer was given two hours to save his skin, and then Drake burnt the place to the ground, saving only the

church and the house of a lady who had written to beg his clemency ; and so, having wreaked his vengeance and done something to enhearten his men, he went on his way.

At Santa Marta another halt was made. On the 20th it was occupied almost without resistance and the chief officials taken prisoners. Thanks, however, to the warning from Rio de la Hacha it was found completely cleared. With a stop therefore of but one day to lay the place in ashes, on the 21st the voyage was continued. Cartagena it was determined not to attempt, and in a week more they anchored before Nombre de Dios.

That Menéndez had made no apparent attempt to hamper Drake's movements was only to be expected. He probably considered it his duty to guard his fleet ; and indeed, with all the frigates of the Indian station and his own galleons, he was hardly a match for the English admiral. So great, indeed, was the terror of Drake's name, that although the exact strength of his force was well known to Philip, a fleet of at least twice his strength was hastily organised in Spain to pursue him. From Passages were taken fifteen galleons, four more were drafted from the Royal Armada of the Ocean, and these, with the four of Ivella's Neapolitan squadron, that were alone pronounced fit for work in the Atlantic, were placed under Don Bernardino de Avellaneda with orders to follow in Drake's track and endeavour to crush his fleet while his troops were away at Panama. Thus with twenty-three fine galleons and presumably the usual proportion of smaller vessels, he sailed early in November.¹

At Nombre de Dios no time was lost. On December 27 it was seized with but small resistance from a hundred soldiers in the fort, which Drake on his first visit had found in course of construction. But little plunder was obtained. Like the rest, the place had been warned and deserted, and only a few treasure caches were discovered. Without further delay, therefore, than was necessary

¹ Duro, *Arm. Españ.* ii. App. p. 490.

to clear the environs of lurking parties of the enemy a picked force of 750 men was organised from Baskerville's companies, and on the 29th they started upon the perilous march by the old Panama road.

The two following days Drake spent in firing the town and the shipping in the harbour, and then prepared to move the fleet round nearer to the Chagres river. By this time Nombre de Dios had been condemned as too unhealthy to be retained as the Atlantic port of the Isthmus. It was about to be abandoned, and already some twenty miles to the westward Puerto Bello had been founded. The destruction of the new port therefore was probably Drake's aim. He very possibly too intended to send boats up the Chagres river to meet Baskerville at Venta Cruz and bring down the plunder of Panama. But just as he was about to start, an exhausted messenger staggered in at the Panama gate to say that Baskerville was in full retreat. The line chosen had been found wholly impracticable. On the third day, after an exhausting march of nearly thirty miles in incessant rain, the colonel had found himself confronted in a defile with an impenetrable abattis strongly held by Spanish troops. An assault was made and repulsed with loss. Baskerville, with a soldier's eye, at once saw the futility of proceeding. Half his remaining provisions and ammunition was ruined by the wet, and before he could fight his way through a succession of such obstacles to Panama he would have no troops left to hold it. He had therefore quickly determined to retire, and on January 2 he succeeded in bringing the wreck of his force into Nombre de Dios.

From this time Drake's hopes seem to have left him. 'Since our return from Panama,' says Maynarde, 'he never carried mirth nor joy in his face.' Yet none of his friends dared show they noted the change. Outwardly, he was still determined to succeed, and called a council to decide the next point of attack. On a map he showed them Truxillo, the famous port of Honduras, and the golden

towns that clustered round the lake of Nicaragua. He asked them which they would have, and Baskerville cheerily cried 'Both! one after another'; and so for the river San Juan del Norte the course was laid. It was an enterprise as wild as the last; but now it is plain Drake had resolved to retrieve his reputation or never to return. Fortunately perhaps for all, the wind proved contrary, and after struggling desperately against it for some days, they were forced to anchor under the lee of the island called Escudo de Veragua, but thirty leagues west of Puerto Bello.

No place in the Indies had a more evil name for sickness, but here day after day Drake clung waiting for the weather to change. To profit by the enforced delay, he set the men to cleaning the foul ships and to putting together more pinnaces for the San Juan river; but in spite of all that could be done man after man sickened and died. Though still determined Drake could not but confess to his intimates he never thought any place could have changed so much. As he looked back upon the palmy days of his youth he remembered the Indies 'as a delicious and pleasant harbour' that had become a 'vast and desert wilderness.' In his memory the wind was always fair with a prize worth chasing in sight. Now the seas were bare and stormy, and everywhere sickness and defeat. 'Yet,' says Maynarde, 'in the greatness of his mind he would in the end conclude in these words, "It matters not man! God hath many things in store for us, and I know many means to do Her Majesty good service and to make us rich, for we must have gold before we see England."'

A week went by and still the wind held obstinately in the west. Dysentery had taken fast hold of the crews, numbers of men and some of the best officers had been carried off, and at last Drake himself was seized. Prostrate with the disease he began to keep his cabin. Provisions were running out, his force was completely broken, there was no sign of a change in the weather, and

at last in three days more he consented to weigh and 'to take the wind as God sent it.' So they stood out from behind the pestilential island to get clear of the Mosquito Gulf into which they had been forced, and Drake still kept his cabin, unable to shake off the sickness that had seized him.

On the night of the 27th he grew rapidly worse, and as it would seem fell delirious; for he rose and dressed himself and raved in words that no one cared to record. As the frenzy passed he was got to bed again, and there, after lingering an hour, 'he yielded up his spirit like a Christian to his Creator quietly in his cabin.'¹

They buried him in the sea. The fleet had come to anchor in the fine harbour of Puerto Bello. The unfinished settlement was seized; and next day Sir Thomas Baskerville bore the admiral's body in a leaden coffin a league from shore, and there, amidst a lament of trumpets and the thunder of the guns, the sea received her own again.

Of the men who had followed him, as he used to say, 'for friendship's sake and the renown of his name,' so many were gone, that hands were too few to man the ships. So for a last and fitting honour to the dead, two vessels of his own fleet and all his last taken prizes were sunk near where he lay, while ashore the fort which the Spaniards had just completed was given to the flames. And so they left him on the scene of his earliest triumphs, lying, as it were, in the cradle of his reputation, at rest like a Viking in the midst of his weapons and the trophies they had won.

¹ As was usual when a great man died at a critical moment, a rumour spread in Spain and amongst his detractors at home that he had been poisoned. His last wild utterances may have been the origin. It had always been a note of his indomitable self-reliance to attribute his failures to the action of traitors, and we seem to trace the ruling passion strong in death. Certainly the story had no other or better foundation.

CONCLUSION

As the news of Drake's death spread amongst the islands and along the Spanish Main, it was received with transports of rejoicing. In Spain it was heralded by the devout as a sign that the sins for which he had been permitted by Heaven to torment them were expiated, and Lope de Vega wrote a triumphant poem to celebrate how the scourge of the Church had been removed.

Aboard the English fleet so overwhelming was the shock of the great admiral's loss, that for a time every man was for flying home as best he could without aim or order. But they were not left headless. In full council Sir Thomas Baskerville produced his commission, firmly assumed the command, and persuaded them all to hang together at least till they were clear into the Atlantic. According to the information they had, a fleet of sixty sail had been sent out from Spain against them, and this they believed would be stationed at the Yucatan Channel to intercept their homeward course. It was therefore agreed to hold together and attempt to escape by the outward bound route. To this end the fleet was compressed and reorganised, and as though in honour of the great name Thomas Drake was made vice-admiral.

Their first point was Santa Marta, if the wind would allow them to retrace their course so far to the eastward. As far as Cartagena all went well, but here, on February 14, the fleet was broken up in a gale. The 'Foresight' of her Majesty's, one large Londoner and two

smaller craft parted company;¹ and next day, with a fleet reduced to fourteen or fifteen sail including pinnaces, Baskerville, unable to work any further to the eastward, held away for Cape Antonio, resolved boldly to fight his way through.

Their information as to the enemy's dispositions was quite incorrect, and it so happened that their well-conceived double back had brought them into the very danger they were seeking to avoid. In Cartagena at this time was lying Don Bernardino Delgadillo de Avelaneda, with a squadron of over twenty sail, including some of the new 'Apostle' galleons. It was the special service squadron, which, besides the reinforced armadas of the Indian Trade, had been sent out in pursuit of Drake with orders to endeavour to fall on his fleet while the troops were away at Panama, and if not to see him disembogue from the West Indian Seas.² Arrived at Cartagena his hastily equipped squadron was in so bad a condition, that he was easily persuaded by the governor to stay where he was and refit. Nor does he seem to have made any attempt to move again until an *aviso* brought tidings that Drake was dead. Upon this he summoned courage to sail with twenty vessels which he considered fit for service and to make for Havana, where, he says, he expected to fall in with the English fleet. Five days, therefore, after Baskerville had laid his course for Cape Antonio, he resumed his chase, and on March 1, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the two fleets sighted each other off the Isla de Pinos, that lies due south of Havana under the west end of Cuba, and about a hundred miles from Cape Antonio. The result was an action which from its clearness and the consequent light it throws on contemporary

¹ The 'Susan Parnell' of the Levant Company, the 'Help,' and the 'Pegasus.' Another vessel, the 'Susan Bonaventure,' was in distress, but managed to keep company.

² Birch, i. 429, and Delgadillo's letter in the *Libel of Spanish Lies*. The officer of the 'Defiance' in Hakluyt says it was the third part of a fleet of sixty sail, but he seems to be including all the warships that were on convoy duty.

tactics is one of the most interesting in the whole war, and especially as it enables us to gauge the exact point to which Drake had carried the art at the moment of his death.

The English fleet, after a vain attempt to find a harbour for the relief of their necessities at the east end of the Isla de Pinos, had been standing along it to the westward about four leagues from shore. The intention was to put in somewhere at the west end, and three pinnaces were feeling the way inshore. Thus the Spaniards in holding their direct course for Cape Antonio had passed them to seaward, and must have been sighted by the English on the port bow. Baskerville by this time had reached clear of Cape Frances, at the western extremity of the island, and was steering W. by N. on the starboard tack preparing to go about inshore, when the Spaniards were sighted ahead bearing for Cape Corrientes. As usual the direction of the wind is nowhere stated, but every indication shows it was somewhat to the east of north.¹ The Spaniards say the English had the weather gauge. 'As soon as they descried us,' says an officer of the 'Defiance,' 'they kept close upon a tack thinking to get the wind of us, but we weathered them.' Savile says that on sighting the Spaniards 'we kept our luff to get the wind, but their vice-admiral with divers other ships went about to cut off our pinnaces.' Upon this Baskerville with some other vessels went about upon the port tack and 'so ran in towards the land, keeping the wind so as were covered our pinnaces.'² Thus the Spanish vice-admiral and her consorts were forced to tack again and bear for the support of the bulk of the fleet.

¹ Captain Troughton says he wanted Baskerville to continue as he was W. by N., because the wind was 'good to stand alongst and very ill to loof.' This seems to mean the wind was a good one for reaching and bad for beating (cf. 'to lie along' on a beam wind). The inference is that bearing W. by N. they were reaching on a wind about N. by E. Further, whenever the ships are described as going upon the port tack they are said 'to tack about to the eastward.' If on a port tack an easterly course was the best they could do, the wind cannot have been far from N.N.E.

² We see from this the island bore E. of the head of the English fleet.

The formation of the English fleet must now be noted. It was in two divisions, a vanguard and rear-guard. The vanguard seems to have consisted entirely of navy vessels as follows: Captain Troughton, as vice-admiral of the division, leading in the 'Elizabeth Bonaventure'; next him Baskerville in the 'Garland'; then Bodenham in the 'Defiance,' and lastly Savile in the 'Adventure.' The second or rear division seems to have consisted of the merchantmen led by Thomas Drake, as vice-admiral of the fleet in the 'Hope' of the queen's. The two divisions are clearly described as sailing abreast and each in line ahead, with the second division 'outward' of the first—that is, away from the enemy and therefore to windward of the vanguard.¹

In this formation Baskerville stood on till he was dead to windward of the isolated Spanish vice-admiral and the two vessels that had tacked with her, and then 'putting out the royal standard with his close fights up, flags, ensigns and streamers displayed, and the men orderly placed in each quarter,' he bore up in silence to attack. That the ships tacked in succession, and that the movement brought the second division in rear of the first, is clear from what follows. The Spanish vice-admiral, which was one of the 'Twelve Apostles,' and much larger than any of the English ships, did not give way, but keeping on close hauled as she was, commenced the action by opening fire on a merchant vessel called the 'Concord,' which presumably was out of her station. Still, according to orders the English held their fire, till they were at close range. Then the 'Bonaventure,' which was the leading ship, 'bare full with her (the Spanish galleon), ringing her such a peal of ordnance and small shot withal, that he left her with torn sides.' Then the

¹ Savile says Baskerville 'wisely and politically had so ordered his vanguard and rearguard; and as the manner of it was altogether strange to the Spaniard, so might they have been without hope of victory, if their general had been a man of any judgment in sea-fights.' This does not necessarily mean the formation was entirely new, but that it was essentially English and strange to the Spaniard.

'Garland,' says Savile, 'bare up to the enemy, playing with his great ordnance hotly, until he came within musket shot. Jonas Bodenham, captain of the "Defiance" (the third ship, which Baskerville had ordered to keep close behind him), and Henry Savile, captain of the "Adventure" came likewise into fight with them.'

Here, then, we have a clear picture of the vessels coming on in succession firing their bow guns, and when within musket shot hauling to the wind on the same tack with the enemy and giving their broadsides. The 'Bonaventure' was thus engaged half an hour before she forged ahead of the Spanish vice-admiral and gave place to the 'Garland.' The 'Bonaventure,' it seems, did not return, either because the rest of the Spanish fleet, which all this time had been beating up in short boards, was now coming into action, or because she was engaging the vice-admiral's consorts, or because she had some injury to repair. The other four ships, however, tacked in succession, and were all again engaged with the Spanish vice-admiral in turn. Finally, after their second course, Thomas Drake came up and joined the line of battle with the 'Hope,' which seems to show his squadron must have been in rear. Avellaneda reported officially that the whole of the English thus engaged his vice-admiral three times, but from the English accounts it is clear that only the vanguard performed the typical English manoeuvre twice before the action became general. The merchant ships and small craft throughout the engagement remained 'without,' that is, to windward of the Navy ships, 'and shot when they saw opportunity.'

The day was now closing in and the fight had lasted three hours or more. During all this time the Spanish vice-admiral had been fighting his ship says the admiring Savile, 'like a true valiant man.' But now with three or four other vessels he was seen to come up into the wind unable to lie on either board. Thus the crippled ships were left to the eastward of their admiral and the rest of the fleet, who had not been so hotly engaged. Thereupon

the whole Spanish fleet went about and stood to the eastward, and Baskerville, to prevent them getting to windward, did the same. Finding, however, that this course would embay him between Pinos Island and Cuba, and seeing the enemy were beaten for a time, he decided to give them the wind and continue his course westward for Cape Antonio. In this he was undoubtedly right. For the squadron they had beaten off they believed to be part of a much larger fleet that was waiting to intercept them in the Yucatan Channel, and it was important to engage the rest of it before Avellaneda's division recovered the blow it had received.

The Spaniards of course claimed the action as a victory, and strategically it was so. They had prevented the English from watering, and forced them to dis-embogue. But the fact remains that Avellaneda was unable to give chase with more than nine vessels that night and four more the next morning. All night long Baskerville, though the enemy were abreast of him to windward, carried his cresset light defiantly, without the Spaniards venturing to attack. Nor did they next day when he hove-to and offered battle in order to cover one of his vessels which had to make a board to weather Cape Corrientes, and was in danger of being cut off.¹ Avellaneda contented himself with seeing the English double Cape Antonio, and so, considering he had fulfilled his orders, left them to continue their course for the Bahamas Channel unmolested.

When the remnants of the expedition, naturally proud of the exploit, came home and found that the Spaniards claimed to have beaten and driven them from the Indian seas, they were furious. Captain Savile, mistranslating all the important points in Avellaneda's report, wrote with Baskerville's approbation an intemperate refutation of what the Spanish admiral had never said. It was printed under the title of a 'Libel of Spanish Lies,' and to

¹ The 'Solomon.' She had to tack to the eastward, and so came astern and to leeward of all the Spanish fleet.

it was attached a solemn declaration from Sir Thomas Baskerville that Don Bernardino Delgadillo de Avellaneda falsely lied, which he was ready to maintain against him with whatsoever arms he should make choice of, and suggesting France, where both their princes had armies in the field, as a convenient place. Needless to say the challenge was not accepted, and Don Bernardino, who had merely been guilty of a little pardonable boasting, was branded throughout England as a coward and a liar, all because two honest English soldiers blundered over his crabbed Spanish¹.

With the return of the last of Elizabeth's great raiding expeditions the epoch most closely associated with her adventurous seamen came to an end. The men who had been its makers had passed away. Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Fenner, Leicester, and Walsingham—all were dead. None of them lived to wield or direct the forces they had created; but their work nevertheless was done, and the new epoch of which they had dreamed had begun. When Baskerville reached England the great fleet for which Drake had striven so long had sailed for Spain; a naval war, as he preached it, had begun in earnest. The sailing of that fleet, which he should have lived to command, marks the triumph of his ideas. The Lord Admiral was at its head: the most famous of the seamen were amongst its captains: the whole force of the nation was put forth, and all were at one in an undivided purpose to fight a campaign on the lines he had pleaded for in vain. It is impossible not to regret that the master who had traced the design was not spared to execute the work. After years of languishing and ineffectual warfare, and energies unemployed, the new era of active hostilities had to look for its leaders to new men—the shadows and successors of the old. Much they achieved and much they might have achieved was let slip; yet all that was done was in the track that Drake had marked out and the

¹ Hakluyt reprinted the pamphlet, but only seems to have noticed one of Savile's blunders, and that the most glaring and the most trivial..

spirit of the force was his spirit. It is possible that even if he had lived, the defects of his great qualities would have prevented his being able adequately to handle the complex weapon. No greater victory might have been won, and no less unhappily might the fruits of it have been squandered. Yet fatal to the Spanish power at sea as was the final adoption of his ideas, it cannot be disguised that nothing stamped the coming time more conspicuously than the lack of one master mind to direct it, as Drake in spite of all that was against him had directed the first glorious years of the war.

Never once, as was afterwards remembered, when in sole command had he missed success. It was only when hampered by a colleague of lesser calibre that he had failed. For the full development of his power a free hand and absolute authority were necessary. To a genius that was inspired like Napoleon with so firm a belief in his fortunate star, and like Nelson with so resolute a faith in his instincts, it was impossible to stop to persuade a colleague by reason. For such a man success depends on swift and sudden actions which there is no time to explain, and which indeed are often unexplainable. They are the inspirations which at the crisis of a campaign mark out the great commander from the mere man of experience. It was in the very nature of Drake that so long as his nominal commander would consent to be a figure-head and his council-of-war a mere court to record his opinions, he could command with brilliant success. But such a position he would never have been allowed and could not possibly have achieved in the Cadiz expedition of 1596. The Elizabethan age, high as it rose beyond all that had gone before, yet lacked the greatness of spirit that could recognise and trust implicitly a heaven-born admiral, as a ripper age could trust Nelson. So it came about that he was denied the opportunity of proving the tremendous force of his ideas, and he passed to posterity, as the narrow view of his contemporaries could see him, with a renown, it is true, so great as to become at once almost mythical, yet

not for what he was. For those who reaped the harvest he had sown, he lived not as the father of a new art of war—which, with an originality of conception, a directness of purpose, and a breadth of view hardly ever surpassed, he created out of the fulness of his genius—but rather as a daring navigator and a prince of corsairs of whom we are half ashamed to be proud.

Yet that his end was so inglorious mattered little. It is a mark of the greatness and reality of what he had accomplished that his presence was not needed. His work was done ; his school was founded ; everyone from Howard downwards was now of his party ; and though he did not live to know it, yet even as he passed away, distraught with failure, England was fairly launched upon the course that brought her to the empire of the seas.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

AUTHORITIES FOR THE INDIES VOYAGE, 1585

1. 'A summarie and true discourse of Sir Francis Drake's West Indian voyage, begun in the yeere 1585,' &c.

This was mainly drawn up by Captain Walter Biggs, captain-lieutenant of the lieutenant-general's company. On his death it was carried on by his lieutenant, Cripps, and finally entrusted to Mr. Thomas Cates of the same company for publication. It was printed by Hakluyt in his collection of voyages, and hitherto has been regarded as the only complete narrative extant. It is of high value, but naturally suffers from the defect of having been written by soldiers, who were not able adequately to treat naval matters. The operations of the fleet are sometimes altogether omitted.

2. A hitherto unnoticed MS. in the British Museum (*Bibl. Reg.* 7, c. xvi. fol. 166) entitled: 'The discourse and description of the Voyage of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. Captain Frobisher set forward the 14th day of September 1585.'

It is anonymous but in a contemporary hand, and from internal evidence was written by someone (probably an officer) on board Frobisher's flagship, who was not either the captain or the lieutenant. It is quoted in the text as the 'Primrose' log. Being in the form of a log recording events from day to day, it is of great value in correcting and testing Biggs's more slipshod narrative, and further it supplies many details of naval movements that he omits or misunderstands. It is, moreover, full of touches that give a minute and vivid picture of the behaviour

of the force generally, and is altogether more intimate than Biggs.

3. *Despatches*. Only two of any importance appear to exist, one from Carleill, and one from Edward Wynter to Walsingham. Both are in 'S.P. Dom. clxxxiii.' They are written from Vigo in October, and contain a full account of the operations there. No despatches appear to have been sent home from the Indies.

4. The Spanish official reports and other accounts are noted by Captain Duro, and their effect given in his '*Armada Española*,' vol. ii., chap. xxiii. '*Piratería en gran escala*,' where other Spanish authorities are also collected.

APPENDIX B

AUTHORITIES FOR THE ARMADA CAMPAIGN

A VERY remarkable feature of the Armada campaign is the extraordinary meagreness of the English accounts of it. Indeed, it may be said that no complete report of it was ever written in the language, nor have we even a despatch from any one of the flag-officers engaged detailing so much as the various actions which took place.

The earliest summary of the fighting is contained in a despatch from Hawkins to Walsingham on July 21, as the fleet was starting on its North Sea chase of the Armada. It is nothing but a summary, and throws no light on the nature of the actions (Laughton, *Defeat of the Armada*, i. 358).

A week later, August 7, Howard, on his return from the chase, sent Walsingham what he calls 'a brief abstract of such accidents as have happened, which hereafter at better leisure I will explain by more particular relations.' It is headed, 'A Declaration of the Proceedings of the two Fleets,' but is little more than an abstract log of his own ship, and says nothing of the other admirals' action (Laughton, ii. 55).

As the chief flag-officers proceeded to Court at this time, no further despatches were written.

The earliest attempt at a full account that we have is contained in a MS. without date, title, signature, or endorsement (Brit. Mus. Cotton, *Julius*, F. x. ff. 111-117). This has always

passed for an official narrative of the campaign, and upon it all subsequent accounts appear to have been founded. It was printed as the main authority by Professor Laughton at the beginning of his first volume. During the progress of his work his attention was called to the existence in the British Museum of an Italian MS. which purported to be a translation of a narrative written by Howard, and comparing it with the anonymous account, he found the resemblances between the two were so strong as to leave no doubt that the latter was the original of the Italian, and therefore, as he had conjectured, authorised and inspired by Howard.

That this document should have become the foundation, either directly or indirectly, of all subsequent histories is not surprising; and yet that it should have been accepted for three centuries as a complete account of the campaign is not a little remarkable. A close study of it reveals certain very curious features. To begin with, it contains several blunders of seamanship; leeward, for instance, is written for windward, the points of the compass are mistaken, and ships are made to sail impossible courses. In the next place, important movements in which Howard himself was not concerned are merely referred to, as a rule, without any mention of the officers or squadrons that made them. Others, that we know from Spanish authority were made, are omitted altogether. Again Drake, whose services Howard freely acknowledged at the close of the campaign, is hardly mentioned. When he is, it is merely as a prominent captain with others, or else where it appears he was doing something discreditable. From end to end it is an exaltation of Howard and his kinsmen. As a military document it will not compare with those of Henry VIII.'s officers in 1545. It has the air of a piece of journalism rather than of an official report, and of a piece of journalism so inadequate and confused as to suggest that the writer either did not understand clearly what he was writing about, or purposely suppressed important matter. To add strength to these unavoidable suspicions, we have the fact that as far as we know the document, though obviously intended for the press, was never published.

With this *prima facie* case against Howard's 'Relation' on internal evidence, we may examine the circumstances under which it was produced. The Italian translation of it is dated April 15, 1589, so that we may assume the original was produced some time during the winter of 1588-9. At this time

the manner in which the war was to be proceeded with had been decided upon, and Howard was to have no fresh commission. Active operations with the fleet had been handed over to Drake, and he was busy organising a great private expedition on his own lines, in which neither Howard nor his friends took any share or part. That Howard could regard the arrangement with satisfaction it is impossible to believe. To him it must have looked like an official confirmation of the boast which Frobisher attributed to Drake, that in the late campaign 'no one had done any good service but himself.' In any case it must have appeared to him that he was being superseded by his second-in-command, and to expect even the most magnanimous of men under such circumstances to be perfectly just to his second-in-command is hardly reasonable.

Still, in spite of these considerations, nothing came to light to correct the Lord Admiral's version of the affair, and it continued to hold its place without suspicion. This, however, it can do no longer. For, hitherto unnoticed, there exists another version of the Italian narrative by the same hand as the first, which throws quite a new light on Howard's 'Relation.'

The author of these Italian narratives was a Florentine of good family called Petruccio Ubaldino. He was born about 1524, and in early manhood came to England, where he taught Italian and illuminated books for a living, under the patronage of the Court and especially of Henry, Earl of Arundel. He also, as he says himself, 'served voluntary' in the wars of Henry VIII. and in those of Scotland under Edward VI. On the accession of Mary he retired to Venice, which would suggest that the original cause of exile was heretical opinions. At this time he translated Cebes, and dedicated the work to Cosmo di Medici, his sovereign, but it was never published. Thenceforth, however, he seems to have adopted the career of an historian. About 1564, having received an intimation that Elizabeth desired his services, he hurried back to England, but to his chagrin found he could get no regular appointment and he had to take to writing again for a living. In 1581 he produced his '*Vita di Carlo Magno Imperadore*,' a work which had so much success that a new edition was called for by 1589 and another two years later. It is also noteworthy as being the first Italian book printed in England. His next task, as far as we know, was to complete a work he had begun while serving in Scotland under Edward VI. He entitled it: '*Descrittione | del*

Regno di Scotia | et | delle Isole sue adjacenti,' and dedicated it to Hatton, Leicester, and Walsingham. The work was completed by the end of 1587 and offered as a new year's gift to the three patrons.¹

The next thing we have from his pen is the translation, or rather the ornate version, of Howard's narrative referred to above. The dedication is to Howard and from it we learn the Lord Admiral had entrusted his 'own relation' to Ubaldino for translation. The work was presented as on April 15, 1589. Whether or not Ubaldino was struck by the remarkable way in which his original kept Drake in the background, we cannot tell, but certain it is that he took upon himself to insert into his work an elaborate apology for the vice-admiral's conduct in abandoning his place as leading ship the night after the action off Plymouth. This addition may have been directly inspired by Drake. He must at any rate have frequently met Ubaldino in the ante-rooms of Leicester, Hatton, and Walsingham. Probably they were well known to each other, and according to Ubaldino, as we shall see, Drake had already broached to him the idea of an Italian history of the campaign.

We now come to the remarkable second edition. This was completed by August 12, 1589, four months after the first. This we know from a letter of that date in the Florence Archives (*Archivio Mediceo*, 4185) in which Ubaldino enclosed a copy of it to the Grand Duke, Ferdinand de' Medici, who himself had contributed a galleon to Philip's armada. 'Signor Lorenzo Guicciardini,' it runs, 'has many times intimated to me that it would be well for your most Serene Highness to receive from me some summary of the armada that passed through these seas last year, knowing that I was writing those things. I have at length written it and by my own hand, and it is not printed nor will it be. And I know that, from those who were employed in every part of those events, I have from their own lips sure information.' The last sentence makes it clear that it is the second version to which he refers and not the first.² The first is expressly stated to be from Howard's information only; the second was from that of others as well. Its title runs thus: 'Commentario della impresa fatta contra il regno

¹ These biographical details are taken from the *Dict. de Biogr. Universelle*, the preface to the Bannatyne Club edition of his *Scotia*, and the introductory matter of his own works.

² See also next page.

d'Inghilterra dal re Catholico l'anno 1588 per la relatione et instruttione del ill^{mo} Signor Grande Ammiraglio, di Signor Caval. Franc^o Drake Vice-Ammiraglio et altri huomi honorati, che nell'armata erano.' It is certain, then, that between April 15 and August 12, 1589, Ubaldino produced his second version. It must be noted, however, that at the foot of the title he retains the date of his original version—viz. April 15.

At this date Drake was down at Plymouth waiting for a wind to carry his great expedition to Lisbon, and just a month previously he had left London to hoist his flag at Dover. On July 1 he was back to meet the disgrace which followed the comparative failure of the expedition. He was therefore absent from the country during the time the second version was written.

That it was inspired by Drake, however, is certain. On New Year's Day 1590 Ubaldino presented the manuscript to Hatton, Drake's old patron, now Lord Chancellor. In the dedication he gives him a short account of how the work came to be produced. The previous year, he says—that is, presumably in 1588, but possibly 1589—Drake had asked him to write an account of the campaign in Italian. 'Wherefore,' he continues, 'having received from him for my instruction careful information as to the occurrences that took place in either fleet, I wrote thereon a little commentary.' This was almost certainly the 'Commentario del Suceso dell'armata Spagnola,' &c, which he wrote 'by the instruction and direction of the Lord High Admiral,' and which is the translation of Howard's 'Relation' already referred to. That Drake considered this a very inadequate manner of fulfilling his request for a full account of the campaign is not surprising, and it would seem he was not slow in saying so. 'He begged me,' Ubaldino continues, 'to examine over again all that which each of the better sort wished to assert [*dimostrar*] concerning the proceedings of the said fleets¹: and having found therein some discrepancies, whether arising out of the doing of the things that befell them, each man naturally desiring to prefer himself to the credit of successful actions, or by reason of forgetfulness (as often happens when a man has a thing written of himself and allows himself to be directed by another, in that which ought absolutely to have been directed

¹ The paragraph introducing this passage is obscure. It runs thus: '*Vero è che havendo havuta di poi occasion per non essere ad altri scortese della penna, et non pur richiesto, ma pregato,*' &c.

by himself), I, after considering the merits of all parties as well as I could, have taken from each that which seemed to me to come nearest the truth, allowing sometimes also something for the passion of the parties.' This can mean nothing but that Drake persuaded Ubaldino that Howard's narrative was unfair and partial, giving the Lord Admiral credit for what he did not do, and that Ubaldino after full inquiry was convinced that although Drake's resentment at Howard's injustice carried him too far, yet on the whole he was right and his complaint justified.

So convinced, indeed, was Ubaldino of his own impartiality and truthfulness that it would seem that when the new version was done he offered it to Howard and Howard refused to accept it. In presenting it afterwards to Hatton, Ubaldino says: 'The work being moreover pleasing to certain persons of good taste, but not now to him, who most ought to accept it (and as I urgently desired), I thought it might not be a thankless gift, slight as it is, to your Excellency, this New Year's tide, no other man having had a copy of it up to now in this realm.' By this last expression it becomes practically certain that this and not the first was the version he sent to Ferdinand di Medici. As to what he means by his remark about a man not doing things himself, he is so guarded in his expression that he is quite obscure. His meaning may be either that Howard got someone to write what he ought to have written himself, or that he left the direction of the campaign to Drake, and so was unable to give a proper account of it. Ubaldino's marginal comment is equally vague. '*Chi opera,*' he says, '*et si lascia governar da altri nel distender di suoi fatti, non sene intende; havendo i grandi huomi non sol bisogno di sapere operar, ma di esprimere i lor concetti ancora,*' which seems to mean, 'he who acts [or perhaps 'writes'] and allows himself to be governed by another in spreading [or stretching] his actions is ill-advised, great men having need not only of knowing how to act [or write] but also how to express their ideas.' Still, whatever it was exactly that Ubaldino wanted to say, it seems certain that Drake produced evidence which convinced him that Howard either was deliberately exalting himself at Drake's expense or that Howard did not understand what had happened.

Another reference to this second version shows that it did little to better the author's position. It is contained in a dedica-

tion to the queen of his next work, published in 1591, and entitled: '*Le vite del/le Donne illustri/del Regno d'In/ghilterra, et del regno di Scotia et di/quelle che d'altri paesi nei due detti/regni sono stato maritate/.*' The copy in the British Museum was presented to Sir Robert Cecil, and contains an inscription to him in the author's hand. In the course of the dedication to Elizabeth he gives several autobiographical details, specially lamenting his failure to get an appointment and calling attention to his previous work, both printed and unprinted. 'Particularly,' he says, 'should be considered my last writings of the *Enterprise by sea*, attempted by foreign princes with great forces, and by you curbed,' and these, he seems to say, had been taken away from him to his great loss, '*da altri statemi con mio danno occupati di poi.*'

Still, in spite of his complaints, the unhappy victim of the admirals' rivalries could obtain no recognition of his revised narrative, which, whatever may be its bias, is undoubtedly the fullest and most trustworthy account of the great campaign that exists. When Adams under the signature of 'A. Ryther' published his charts of the fleet movements, the letterpress that accompanied them was a translation of Ubaldino's first version, which the author himself had condemned. This work was entitled: '*A discourse concerning the Spanish fleet invad-inge Englande in the yeare 1588 and overthrowne by her Majesty's Navy under the conduction of the Lord Charles Howarde, Highe Admirall of Englande, written in Italian by P. Ubaldino, and translated [by R. Adams]. Unto which discourse are annexed certaine Tables expressing the severall exploits and conflicts had with the said fleete.*' H. Hatfield, London 1590.

B.L. This work, of course, cannot be considered an original authority except in so far that Adams, owing probably to the difficulties he met with in constructing his charts from Howard's '*Relation*,' detected certain errors in the Lord Admiral's seamanship and corrected them to the best of his ability. Thus in the Portland action, where Howard says that on a north-east wind he 'cast about to the eastwards,' Adams writes, 'cast about to the west, with a reasonable compass'; and where Howard says Frobisher got left 'far to the leeward' when he really was to 'windward,' Adams corrects to 'rereward.' Again, in the same action, Howard in one of his most suspicious passages says a squadron which he refrains from specifying attacked the Spaniards 'to the westward.' This obscurity Ubaldino

tried to clear by writing 'which were towards the east,' while Adams has 'which were to the westward.' With the exception, then, of these attempts to correct obvious errors, the charts can have little higher authority than Ubaldino's first version, and with it they must stand condemned by the man who, as the historiographer chosen by both Drake and Howard, as a foreigner writing for foreigners, as a trained historian, and as a student with every desire and facility to learn the truth, is the most impartial critic we have.

It was this book of Adams, Professor Laughton says, that formed the basis of the accounts given by Camden and Stowe, 'who reared thereon a weighty superstructure of very questionable matter.' That they allowed their imagination a loose rein is true, and yet it must be noted to their credit that part at least of the superstructure, as well as that of Speed and Meteren, the Dutch historian, is also to be found in Ubaldino's second version.

The general tenor of the 'Second Commentary' and its chief points of difference from the first I have endeavoured to show sufficiently in the body of the work. Ubaldino began by entirely rewriting his narrative; but this process unhappily only went, in so far as naval matters are concerned, down to June 6, when the fleet was driven back to Plymouth. From this point onward he follows his first version again with no important additions except for a full account of Drake's capture of Valdes's flagship, and he thus throws little or no further light on the actions. For these, indeed, he is no help except as affording by his introductory remarks an explanation of how it was that important and decisive movements which the Spaniards relate find no place in Howard's narrative, thus enabling us to reconcile the apparently conflicting English and Spanish authorities.

The reason why the narrative was not entirely re-written can only be surmised. It would look as though, when Drake found what Ubaldino had done and asked him to reconsider the work, he furnished him with information on the points he was proudest of and where he felt most aggrieved, such as his capture of Valdes and his exact position in the fleet; and having furnished him with the necessary documentary evidence, he went to sea, intending to complete his instructions on his return. When he came back in disgrace we know that he was plunged into such a mass of harassing business in winding

up the unlucky expedition that he may well have had no time or inclination to help Ubaldino. And when it was all done and he was at leisure again, he was far away at Plymouth. We know, too, that about this time he was contemplating a complete autobiography, of which 'Sir Francis Drake Revived' was the first fruits.¹ This may have been his reason for never getting Ubaldino to finish his work. It is possible, too, that at a time when the naval art was still jealously regarded as a 'mystery,' he did not care to publish his manœuvres with too much detail in a foreign tongue. And again, when he was restored to favour he was probably too good a courtier not to let bygones be bygones. Howard, as far as we are able to judge him, was of too chivalrous and lofty a nature to nourish an unworthy jealousy of Drake after the first bitterness had passed, and, as we have seen, his invidious 'Relation' was probably suppressed. Much as he resented Drake's vain-glory, his admiration of his genius, as we know, was deep and genuine, and if he evinced a desire to accept Drake on the old terms we may be quite sure that Drake, chastened by his punishment, would do nothing to make things harder or to stir up difficulties for himself in view of the great schemes of which his mind was full.

With regard to the other authorities, it is fortunately sufficient to refer to the admirable collections of Professor Laughton and Captain Duro. Of these two works, 'The Defeat of the Spanish Armada' and 'La Armada Invencible,' it may be said that no one who has not attempted to write a history of the campaign can fully appreciate their value.

A few Spanish documents which are not in Captain Duro's collection are to be found amongst the Froude Transcripts in the British Museum, especially the valuable narrative of the Contador or Fleet-treasurer, Pedro Coco Calderon. This document has been recently printed by Capt. Duro as an appendix to vol. iii. of his *Armada Española*.

As to the famous House of Lords tapestries, which by some have been regarded as an original authority as having been executed for Howard soon after the campaign, they must fall under the same suspicion as Howard's 'Relation' and Adams's charts. From the reproduction of them by Pine (London, 1739 fol.) it is clear that even the charts as reproduced by the weavers are full of errors. The large designs founded upon them are in

¹ See vol. i. Appendix D.

a great measure fanciful. They do not even agree with Howard's 'Relation'; they mistake Spanish vessels for English, and quite ignore much that we know happened in the Spanish fleet. Its dual formation is entirely ignored, nor is any difference shown between its sailing and its fighting formation.

The most recent and careful review of the whole of the authorities will be found in Dr. Tilton's 'Die Katastrophe der spanischen Armada,' Freiburg-i.-B. 1894. To these, however, must be added the important 'Foljambe Papers' printed in the last volume issued by the Historical MSS. Commission (Rep. xv. pt. v.), consisting mainly of contemporary transcripts of Privy Council papers. For the land mobilisation they are invaluable, but they add but little to our knowledge of the naval campaign. The leaves which contained an account of the movements of the fleets are missing, as well as 'The Minute of her Majesty's letter to the Lord Admiral for his revocation.' Did we but know the contents of this letter, or even the circumstances under which the missing leaves were removed, new light might be thrown on the origin of Howard's narrative and on the strained relations between him and Drake which Ubaldino suggests.

APPENDIX C

ELIZABETHAN TONNAGE MEASUREMENT

THROUGHOUT Tudor times the method of measuring tonnage seems to have been very uncertain, and the controversy as to what the rule should be led to an attempt in 1626 to arrive at a definite system. From the results there arrived at we are able to get considerable light as to how the question stood in Elizabeth's time. The report of 1626 (Oppenheim, pp. 266 *et seq.*) lays it down that a ship might be considered in three ways. 1. By cask, in which case two butts or four hogsheads went to the ton. 2. In feet, by which forty feet of timber went to the ton. 3. By weight, in which twenty hundredweight went to the ton. We also gather that further confusion was caused by the different ways of taking the three main dimensions. Length of keel might be measured with or without the false post. Beam might be measured within or without the planks. The third

dimension might be 'depth in hold' taken from the upper edge of the keel to the (main) deck, or 'draught of water' taken from the lower edge of the keel to the plane of extreme breadth.

The first attempt to formulate an official rule, that has come down to us, was made in 1582 and attributed to Matthew Baker, one of the queen's principal shipwrights. In his report (*S.P. Dom.* clii. 19, cited by Oppenheim, p. 132) he admits two bases of measurement: (1) 'burden in merchant's goods,' and (2) 'dead weight of ton and tonnage.' To arrive at these measurements from dimensions he gives no rule, but takes a standard example, from which he seems to consider all other cases may be calculated. The 'Ascension' of London, he tells us, was in breadth 24 feet, in depth 12 feet, and in length 54 feet, and that she carried in merchant's goods (that is, 'in pipes of oil or Bordeaux wine') 160 tons. Baker's dimensions, so the report of 1626 tells us, were taken thus: keel without false post, beam within planks, depth from top of keel to plane of greatest breadth, and, further, that his burden was arrived at by dividing the 'solid number' of the ship (that is, her length \times beam \times depth) by 100. But that was clearly not his method. The solid number of the 'Ascension' was 15,552, which would make her burden 155.52 tons, and not 160. The solid number divided by 100 he evidently considers as giving too small a result, but he makes no attempt to suggest any definite proportion which might be added to give a true and constant register. His result, however, may be obtained from his dimensions by using 97 as a divisor instead of 100. By this rule the 'Ascension' would be $160\frac{1}{2}$ tons.

The next document we have that throws any light on the question is a report by William Borough, Controller of the Navy, made in 1592 (*S.P. Dom.* ccxliii. 110) entitled 'Of Proportion in Burden or Tonnage of Shipping.' 'When a ship,' he writes, 'or any other vessel is filled with merchandise, that is to say, forced by weight down in the water to the breadth in the midships or to the place commonly appointed for the lading-mark, she may then be compared to a solid or massy body, as a cube or globe. A similar cube or globe may be weighed by comparing their [its] measured contents with one whose weight is known; and so the tonnage of a ship may be compared with one whose capacity is known. *Example.* A ship 20 feet broad, 45 feet on the keel, and 10 feet deep, is found

to be of burden in Bordeaux casks or pipes of oil 100 tons (which tonnage is accounted of the mean proportion neither too great nor too small). To know the solid number,

$$20 \times 45 \times 10 = 9000.$$

So a ship of $65 \times 28 \times 13 = 23660$ or $262\frac{2}{3}$ tons.'

From this we may deduce the formula,

$$\text{Tonnage} = \frac{(\text{beam} \times \text{keel} \times \text{depth})}{90}$$

Whereby it appears that Borough went considerably beyond Baker in his idea of the true proportion between solid number and burden.

Still it remains uncertain how far Borough's rule was official. A manuscript treatise on shipbuilding in the Pepysian Library (apparently Elizabethan or early Stuart) gives the simple formula

$$\frac{\text{Beam} \times \text{keel} \times \text{depth}}{50} = \text{burden} \times 2,$$

and Monson in his 'Naval Tracts' has the same—viz. solid number over a hundred. Further the Report of 1626 distinctly says that this rule, which it calls 'Mr. Baker's old way,' had been 'established in Queen Elizabeth's time and never questioned all King James his time.' In the Navy, at any rate, it seems to have been considered quite satisfactory. Two lists of Elizabeth's ships of war exist giving their dimensions and tonnage, one drawn up in 1592, apparently by Borough himself (*S.P. Dom.* ccxliii. 111), and the other in 1602 (Oppenheim, p. 124), and in both of these the burden for every ship is the solid number divided by a hundred.

The explanation of the attempt to hit on a rule which would give a higher result possibly is that it arose from a desire to satisfy the merchants whose ships were requisitioned by the Crown. As they were paid at a regular rate per ton, it was natural they should incline to full measure. From time to time in Navy estimates we find suggestions that the claims for the hire of private vessels may be reduced by an accurate measurement of their tonnage. There are traces, too, of an attempt on the Thames to get a solid number obtained by extreme outside measurements and divided by 94 only as the measure of burden. So that Baker's and Borough's systems

may have been intended as a compromise with the merchants, and never regarded as an official system of measurement in the Navy.

As to 'dead weight of ton and tonnage' there is no dispute. All authorities agree that it is derived from the 'burden' by adding one-third. And yet in the Navy List of 1626, where the burden is the solid number over a hundred, the 'ton and tonnage,' in every case but one, is obtained by adding one-fourth instead of one-third to the burden.

From the official return of the whole of the vessels both royal and private employed against the Armada in 1588 it is clear that the system of 1602 was not then adopted. The ratings of the 1588 schedules differ widely and very irregularly from those of 1602, as appears from the following table of ships taken at random from each class.

Built	Re-built	—	Rating of 1602	Burden, Solid No. 100	Burden + $\frac{1}{4}$	Rating of 1588
1587	—	'Ark'	692	555	740	800
1561	1595-6	'Triumph'	955	760	1,013	1,100
1559	1597-8	'Elizabeth'	855	684	912	900
—	1581	'Bonaventure'	560	448	597	600
1586	1599	'Vanguard'	561	449	598	500
1586	1602	'Rainbow'	480	384	512	500
1573	1592	'Dreadnought'	450	360	480	400
1570	—	'Foresight'	306	294	392	300
1586	—	'Tramontana'	165	132	176	150
1586	—	'Advice' (pinnace)	52	42	56	50

It will be seen that five of the above vessels—viz. 'Triumph,' 'Elizabeth,' 'Vanguard,' 'Rainbow,' and 'Dreadnought'—were rebuilt between 1588 and 1602, but from Borough's report of 1592 it appears that their main dimensions remained exactly the same, so that the discrepancies of rating between 1588 and 1602 cannot be explained by rebuilding.

Taking, then, the normal method of rating by 'ton and tonnage' as

$$\frac{\text{solid number}}{100} + \left(\frac{1}{3}\right),$$

we see that the official naval ratings of 1588 in no case greatly exceeded it and in most cases were very much below it. As to

the merchant ships employed in that year we can only judge by one. The 'Ascension,' of London, that Baker rated at 160 tons, had a solid number of 155.52. This gives her ton and tonnage by the one-third scale as over 207 tons, but she was rated in 1588 as a 200-tonner.

So much is all that is discoverable up to the present of the system of rating in England in Drake's time. Of the Spanish system we have more definite information. In 1590, according to Captain Duro (see Oppenheim, pp. 53, 132-3), the system in force at Seville was to multiply half the breadth by the depth-in-hold and the product by the length over all including the rake fore and aft. From this 5 per cent. was deducted for entry and run, and the remainder divided by 8. This gave the 'burden.' For 'ton and tonnage' 20 per cent. was added. The Seville formula for 'ton and tonnage' was therefore

$$\frac{\left(\frac{\text{beam}}{2} \times \text{depth} \times \text{length over all}\right) - \frac{1}{20}}{8} + \frac{1}{5}.$$

Reducing the

Spanish cubits, in which the dimensions were taken, to English feet, the 'Elizabeth' works out at 996 tons burden and 1,196 ton and tonnage. So that the Spaniards would probably have rated her at 1,200—that is, 300 tons or 25 per cent. heavier than her official English rating. But this is not all. The 'Elizabeth,' it must be borne in mind, is the vessel whose official rating most nearly corresponds with her true 'ton and tonnage.' The great majority of the English Navy ships were rated very much under their true 'ton and tonnage.' In two cases, the 'Vanguard' and 'Dreadnought,' their rating is no less than 20 per cent. below it. The conclusion is that if we wish to compare generally the size of the vessels composing the two fleets, we must deduct from 25 per cent. to 45 per cent. from the official registers of the Spaniards. In the galleon class this would leave Elizabeth distinctly superior to Philip. In the auxiliary squadrons similar deductions probably should be made. The Seville *tonelada* was smaller than the English ton, the former containing 53.44 cubic feet against the latter's 60, so that an English 54-ton ship would be larger than a 60-ton Spaniard. The 'San Salvador,' whose official register was 958, was estimated by the English prize survey at 600. Assuming this to be her estimated burden, and adding one-third for her ton and tonnage, she cannot be placed higher than 800 tons by the English rule. Thus in the only cases we have for

comparison we find the Spanish merchantman rated at least one-sixth higher than the extreme English rating would have placed her, while the 'Ascension,' the English merchantman, is rated below the register to which she was entitled.

APPENDIX D

AUTHORITIES FOR THE INDIES VOYAGE, 1595

1. 'Sir Francis Drake, his voyage,' 1595, by Thomas Maynarde. ('Add. MSS.' 5209.) Printed by the Hakluyt Society, 1849. The author was captain of a land company, and as such a member of the council-of-war. He seems to have been on terms of intimacy with Drake, and is on the whole favourable, though inclined to criticise in a grumbling spirit, when things went wrong. The Hakluyt Society editor inclines to think he was illiterate because he spelt Spanish place names phonetically, but this was a common practice amongst well-educated people at the time. He must have sailed in the 'Foresight,' since his ship parted company March 14.

2. 'Relacion de lo sucedido en San Juan de Puerto Rico de las Indias,' &c. (Add. MSS. 13964.) Printed with a translation in the same volume. It is the Spanish official report of the proceedings up to the departure of the English fleet from Puerto Rico.

3. 'The Voyage truly discoursed made by Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins chiefly pretended for some special service on the Islands and Main of West Indies, with six of the queen's ships and 21 other ships and barks, containing 2,500 men and boys in the year 1595.' (In Hakluyt's collection.) The author seems to have been an officer on Drake's ship the 'Defiance;' e.g. he was in advance of the fleet at Dominica, 'there came aboard the Defiance,' &c. It has the most detailed account of Drake's death and illness, and he specially dwells on the 'Defiance's' share of the action at Isla de Pinos.

4. 'A Libel of Spanish Lies,' &c., also in Hakluyt. This is a pamphlet written by Captain Henry Savile to answer the official despatch of the Spanish officer commanding in the action at Isla de Pinos. It sets out the original despatch with a translation full of the most extraordinary blunders, which

make the Spanish officer appear to be lying outrageously ; e.g. the despatch gives the action as follows : ‘ Fueme arrimando a el, aunque tenia el viento per suyo, y el almiranta, que iba mas al viento con otros dos navios commenço arrimarasele, yaunque vino sobre ella con todos los suyos tres veces, no fue parte acercarsele para que quisiessse investir.’ This Savile renders : ‘ I drew towards them, although they had the wind of us, and our admiral, who bore up towards the wind with other two ships, began to draw near them, and although we set thus upon them three times with all their ships, yet would they not set again upon us.’ The true meaning is : ‘ And the *almiranta*, which sailed nearer the wind [or, perhaps, was more weatherly] with two other ships began to get near them, and although they came against her with all their vessels three times, it was impossible for her to get near enough to attempt to board.’ Similar mistakes occur throughout. Savile charges the Spaniard with six distinct lies, five of which are mistranslations. In conclusion, he gives a complete account of the action, which is very valuable, and in the main lines agrees with the Spanish account which he disputes.

5. The ‘ Journal ’ of Captain Troughton of H.M.S. ‘ Bonaventure,’ in ‘ S.P. Dom.’ cclvii. 48, i. He unfortunately gives no details of the action.

6. Another ‘ Journal,’ of whose author nothing is ascertainable, is in the *Tanner MSS.* 77.

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